Spencer P. Boyer
Through most of the first two years of Donald Trump’s presidency, there have been competing prisms through which to view the current state of trans-Atlantic relations. Is the glass half-full, or half-empty? Both perspectives still present a fairly grim picture of dysfunction and confusion between the United States and Europe, largely fueled by Trump—featuring interpersonal friction, provocative rhetoric and U.S. policy choices that have upended the established liberal international order.
With the early start of a lengthy U.S. presidential election season, and the possibility of a hard Brexit in March and European parliamentary elections in May that could cause additional disruption, there are several paths the relationship could still take. The likelihood of positive movement over the next two years, however, is slim due to domestic political distractions and leadership weaknesses on both sides of the Atlantic.
The glass half-full analogy, of course, requires a mindset that things could be worse, based on extreme pessimism about how a trans-Atlantic agenda would fit within an “America First” presidency. From the beginning, Trump has been clear about his disdain for Euro-Atlantic institutions, especially NATO and the European Union, and his preference for transactional relationships with America’s strongest allies.
The original glass half-full hope, however, was rooted in the idea that career professionals in the State Department, Pentagon and Treasury, as well as the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the intelligence community and other agencies, would keep the ship on course. They would be the so-called adults in the room, despite being overseen by an inexperienced and inwardly focused group of Trump loyalists who did not naturally see the value of a U.S.-led international order.
Several early appointments helped build optimism: the replacement of National Security Adviser Michael Flynn with H.R. McMaster, the widely respected Army general; the addition of Fiona Hill as the top White House official overseeing policy in Europe and Eurasia; A. Wess Mitchell as the assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs; and former U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison as ambassador to NATO.
Trump’s team pushed him to finally endorse NATO’s mutual defense clause and moderate, although not eliminate, his gratuitous attacks on European leaders. American allies in Europe are grudgingly responding to calls for increased defense spending, although this positive movement began before Trump came into office. One could argue that Trump’s insistence on allies reaching the threshold of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense is having an impact.
There has also been a reinforcement of American contributions to deterrence in Eastern Europe worth billions. NATO, too, has stayed together regarding sanctions on Russia for its aggression in Ukraine, interference in the 2016 U.S. elections and broader meddling against the West.
Although the U.S. imposed tariffs on European steel and aluminum, and Brussels retaliated against iconic American products, a full-blown trade war did not break out after a truce was declared in July 2018 between Trump and Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission. Discussions continue about points of contention.
While European officials are hoping they can ride things out until Trump is out of the White House, there is a worry that the damage might be permanent.
This may look good enough, all things considered. But in many ways, any successes could be characterized as sighs of relief that the worst has not happened yet, which is quite a low bar. And in the face of the larger, more accurate glass half-empty view, these so-called successes are short-term and tactical, rather than long-term and strategic.
It is hard to discuss the state of U.S.-European relations without putting them into the context of the president’s worldview. Ask just about anyone inside or recently out of the White House—if they are answering truthfully—and they would say Trump sees the world as a zero-sum playing field. A deal where the other guy walks away happy is one where you could have gotten more. Everything is transactional.
From the start of his presidential campaign to the present, Trump has often insulted democratic leaders and their countries, such as Canada and Germany, while praising ethnic nationalists, authoritarians and strongmen, from Vladimir Putin to Kim Jong Un. All the while, he has expressed distrust for international institutions and America’s global leadership role.
This worldview is leading the U.S. on a path toward strategic disengagement from Europe. Granted, it is not all America’s fault. On the continent itself, Europe is fracturing and realigning. It is grappling with a range of challenges, including Brexit, illiberalism and rising populism, the collapse of the political center throughout the EU, the failure to deal effectively with the migration crisis, and leaders who are anything but visionary.
But the combination of the president’s abiding interests and Europe’s internal challenges makes for a dangerous trajectory. Trump is the first postwar American president to question the liberal order as such. And it isn’t just his unprecedented rhetoric, like calling the European Union a “foe.” Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy codified much of the shift in U.S. thinking about its strongest alliances. The strategy emphasizes competition, with an outdated view of national sovereignty. Three of the stabilizing U.S. officials in the trans-Atlantic relationship—Secretary of Defense James Mattis, McMaster and Mitchell, who describes himself as a devoted Atlanticist—are now all gone. Mitchell announced his resignation from the State Department unexpectedly last month; he steps down today.
There are major policy differences born from Trump’s mindset, of course. The U.S. has gone its own way on China, Iran and climate change. But this shift in posture and philosophy should not be viewed as just another bump in the road, reminiscent of policy disagreements of the past. This is not a moment on par with the Iraq War or the U.S. surveillance of European leaders. It is a deeper rupture.
While European officials have attempted to make the best of the situation, hoping they can ride things out until Trump is out of the White House, there is a worry that the damage might be permanent. Leaders like German Chancellor Angela Merkel have proclaimed that Europeans must now take their fate into their own hands because they cannot rely on the U.S.
American officials often say to “ignore the tweets and focus on what we’re doing”—the glass half-full mantra—but that advice rings hollow when Trump’s Twitter account has rattled markets and scuttled G-7 communiques. This is how the president communicates. One can’t ignore a Trump tweet any more than one could ignore a televised speech by Ronald Reagan 35 years ago.
In the end, while the U.S. might have more tools to make a go at decoupling from the liberal world order and global economy than Europe, such a move has not worked in the past and won’t work now. There are still too many areas where, without trans-Atlantic cooperation and a shared sense of purpose, no one will succeed. This is a glass half-empty moment, and it could get worse.
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