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Lieutenant General Gautam Banerjee's Articles on Military Matters

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1. Celebrating 1962 : A Golden Jubilee of National Blunder.

CELEBRATING 1962 : A GOLDEN JUBILEE OF NATIONAL BLUNDER !

“ ...... a permanent piece of education ......” , Pandit Nehru referring to the 1962 debacle.

Forethought

Who, in his right senses, would ‘celebrate’ a national debacle that rankles Indian conscience even after fifty years?

Recalling those days of late 1962, it is impossible to forget how terrible the trauma was. Shaken out of a fifteen years long dream-sequence of ‘swadheenta’ (freedom), every citizen of India was seized with grief as the news of the debacle filtered through. The wound upon the collective psyche` was aggravated by stories of unimaginable gallantry shown by officers and soldiers of the Indian Army in face of deprivation, death and defeat, and the contrasting breakdown of the ‘will to fight’ among many of the top military leadership. The political leadership, made of personages of impeccable vision and honour, was overwhelmed by the guilt of having invited war on an ill-prepared nation. The nation went into mourning. A fear of revisit of that situation remains palpable in the defence establishment till today.

How can then one celebrate that event of supreme national failure and have the insolence of casting its 50th anniversary in the haloed mould of a ‘Golden Jubilee! As it would be discovered in the following discussion, this unusual urge emanates from attempts made herein to re-discover strategic wisdom from the ‘lessons’ taught to us by China on hard facts of statecraft. Indeed, the mauling India received at the hands of China in that ‘war’ – a limited border conflict in fact – caused the government to institute far-reaching improvements in its military administration. Articulation of diplomacy too went through drastic revision. The ‘lesson’ had been learnt well. To the government’s credit, it must also be stated that the neglected and demoralised Indian Army was resuscitated within a short period of just three years, so to be able to stand up to its mandate in 1965 War and then exceeding the national expectations in the Bangladesh War of 1971. There is therefore good reason for the debacle of 1962 to be seen as a cause celebre` , a reminder to our mandarins of the South Block in New Delhi – both civilian and military – not to fall back into the pre-1962 abyss ever again.

The purpose of this discussion would, therefore, be served if our apex leadership reaffirms as to what they ‘must not permit’ to happen again in our journey ahead to peace and prosperity.

We may start with the post-independence scene.

Post-Independence Turf Grab

Better part of governance in India had been delegated to the ‘natives’ much before the formal promulgation of independence. On the eve of independence therefore, power was transferred to an already astute political leadership. These were persons of highest intellect who yet lacked one important insight into the state-craft: management and articulation of military power. Thus, having inherited a world-celebrated fighting force in the form of the British Indian Army, they tried to cover the blind spot by turning to those they had befriended - departing British Generals and members of civil service who had provide for the ‘steel frame’ on which stood the British Indian Empire. The former, disconcerted by the unstated question over the loyalty of Indian armed forces and fear of another 1857, which was a strong reason for the British to leave, could not have been generous in their advise regarding nurturing a native military institution. Similarly, so far marginalised in matters of military administration, Indian civil servants were known to be chary of losing an opportunity, as provided by the transfer of power, to ride over ‘headstrong’ military professionals.

Thus fooled by motivated chants whispered into their ears, politicians of the Nehruvian school, in comfort of conviction that the armed might had no role to play in their ‘tryst with destiny’, found justification to their cause of marginalising, if not decimating, their newly inherited military institution - it was of no use if one could have one’sway just by “turning the other cheek”. Indeed, brazen presumptions like, “We do’nt need a defence plan, our policy is non-violence!”, “We see no military threats, scrap the Army!” and “The police are good enough to meet our security needs”, came to grip the political minds. There was talk of doing away with the Army, but first the Pakistan-sponsored tribal invasion of Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-48, and then a self-aggrandising urge to arbitrate in international quarrels postponed that event. Finally, China’s belligerent posture on the Indo-Tibet Border since the mid-1950’s put paid to that suicidal idea.

Saved by our neighbours from committing that ‘suicide’, a disoriented state apparatus now proceeded to dismember itself by weakening its military institution. Thus was perpetrated the lie, that British rule was perpetuated through the British Indian Army - actually that role was played by its civil services and police - and therefore, the Army was a force of the aliens. Innuendo from power-brokers, ‘whispered’ to the political masters and yet for the entire country to hear, went on to propagate the looming of a ‘military coup’. The problem so invented was then sought to be prevented by distancing the military hierarchy from policy-advisory role, undermining their authority, promoting acquiescing favourites in top command positions and investing on police organisations, these being traditionally amenable to political expediencies (1). Thus emerged a governing apparatus that discarded the role of military power – and along with it, military men – from their politico-diplomatic calculations (2). With the military institution atrophied thus, the stage was set for the catastrophic war of 1962, a debacle that paid put to India’s political, diplomatic and economic aspirations for half a century.

Lesson one of 1962 debacle was that it was important for the politicians to understand that when it came to jostling for space and power, the military hierarchy stood outwitted by inter-cadre coalition of ‘common-cause’ bureaucrats. They also needed to appreciate that while building up institutional military spirit was a long and tedious process, just some signs of neglecting dispensation was enough to undermine it. Therefore, as the bureaucratic instinct of usurpation of cadre-advantages was a fact of life, it was incumbent of the political leadership to be the fair arbitrator in fostering balanced equation among state institutions. Politicians, therefore, may not overlook inter-cadre turf race when it impacts the military institution, and use their authority to protect its sensitivities - for the good of the nation.

Obviously, this lesson has not been learnt. South Block’s instinct of marginalising the armed forces is again on show. Nuances of military preparedness – both tangible and intangible - is decided by bureaucrats, scientists and auditors, while politicians would rather not intervene on an issue which is outside their focus towards ‘power’. Finding themselves cast aside, military leaders in increasing numbers are taking leave of the hard path of their ‘calling’ and freeing themselves from the hoary compunctions of the ‘spirit’ of soldiering. Sadly, the military institution is again in a state of profound anguish, as it was prior to 1962; it seems to be once again on the verge of weakening its war-winning asset: the élan of exclusivity.

Restitution measures from the state as well as from within the military fraternity is urgently called for.

Military Factor in State-craft

Great nations, from times immemorial, have factored military recourse into articulation of political power much before this principle was formally propagated by Sun Zsu, Chanakya, Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Morgenthau. Institutional experience of thousands of years in state-craft and near-continuous engagement in war-fighting since the mid-19th Century had thus prompted the post-World War II leadership in China – Guomintang nationalists and their successor Communists - to factor military power as a pillar of their political aspirations. Indeed, expansionist territorial ambitions had been a common persuasion of all Chinese regimes at all times. They also understood that claimed territories could be secured either by the threat or actual use of armed might; no country was expected to cede territory in charity.

It was therefore only natural that within a year of settling the Civil War in its favour in 1949, Communist China first invaded Tibet in 1950-51, and then proceeded to extend her grip over the outlying areas of Tibet and East Turkmenistan, while building up an elaborate logistic infrastructure to consolidate her territorial sovereignty. Consequently, the policy of physically occupying the claimed but un-demarcated swathe of open-usage areas astride the Indo-Tibet Border belt was put in practice during the mid-1950’s. India meanwhile had already declared her sovereignty over much of these areas, with good reasons, and therefore responded by inching her border postsnorthwards (3). Thus started a race, chequerboard game of establishing new ‘flag’ posts, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian Army trying to beat each other in establishing control over their versions of the borderline. And in matching steps with her growing military preparations, territorial claims that China had been ‘mumbling’ so far were now being asserted firmly. Thus went past the 1950’s. Indeed, India’s so called “Forward Policy” was actually the only recourse at her hand to beat China to her gain of ‘adverse possession’ over Indian territory (4). In hindsight, therefore, it is clear that a clash of some kind between China and India on the boundary issue was inevitable, more or less.

But what may strike the students of politics of the 1950’s and 1960’s, is that China coupled military force as an instrument of political power to foster a condition that she was unable to bring about by other means. India, on the other hand, believed in using her military power to deny fruition of her adversary’s use of force. In other words, in India’s understanding, the military institution was meant to be used, not in the form of a proactive ‘power’ of change, but only as a reactive ‘force’ to undertake ‘police action’ so to say, to discourage the adversary from using force to address contentious issues. This conceptual difference manifested in 1962 when Chinese strategists defined an ‘end state’, devised deliberate and infallible plan of operations, built up for war to the point of over-insurance, and then hit hard when ready. India, on the other hand, pushed up small detachments of military personnel armed with minimal wherewithal to man isolated ‘posts’ under the extra-ordinary presumption that the even if prodded, the “Chinese would never attack” (5).

Mired in poverty and backwardness, there was much politico-economic merit in India’s disavowal of military power in articulation of her statecraft. However, our founding fathers failed to distinguish their urge for peace with the politics of power-play. They deceived themselves with the simplistic notion that elaborate preparations need not be made when recourse to use of force had been adopted aversely and for defensive purpose. They banked on pious ‘hope’ against ‘realities’ of real-politick.

Lesson two of 1962 debacle was that whether or not a nation factors military power into its state-craft, maintenance of a judicious level of military preparedness was a mandatory responsibility, and that deliberate preparations and planning were imperatives even when military operations are launched with limited aim. The lesson was visible till the late 1980’s.

Looking at today’s state of cost-ineffective defence budget, archaic expenditure procedures, stale defence industry, stagnant research and development, regressive personnel management and disjointed modernisation schemes, the question looms: has the lesson diffused over time? No doubt, many steps are underway to ameliorate the disconnect, but the sweep and the pace of reforms are just not adequate.

Political Understanding of War

1962 highlighted a contrast in exercise of political control over the war. Chinese political leaders – Mao in the lead – ensured that the military plan was enmeshed with diplomatic postures from time to time and political objective of the war dictated the scope and pace of the military operations (6). The PLA was fully provisioned, acclimatised and built up to overwhelming strength over the years, leaving nothing to chance. The most experienced Generals were placed in command and every bit of information regarding the terrain as well as Indian dispositions, weaponry and strength was collected to build up a clear intelligence picture. Mao Dezong himself approved the ‘rules of engagement’ and the offensive plans before leaving it to local commanders to execute in the manner they considered fit. It was so that even for their superiority, the PLA displayed utmost restraint till ordered to engage, and when engaged, hit so ruthlessly as to instil shock and awe. All principles of war were strictly adhered to, for the strategy analysts to mark this war as the most perfectly executed ever by the PLA.

In contrast, besides occupying distant ‘posts’ that were selected off the map, little political control was exercised by the Indian government to manage the impending crisis, besides of course, annoyed dismissal of professional concerns and playing favours. The army brass, ever on back-foot due to trust deficit, easily gave-in to the pressure to advance towards the claimed border alignment – the effort was limited only by the capacity to keep troops supplied with subsistence rations and fuel. No doubt, military commanders have to give-in to their political masters even against their professional judgement, but then, adverse contingencies are to be anticipated and catered to. Indians, however, had no such ‘plan B’.

Once engaged in unanticipated conflict, political and military leaders failed to appreciate that military operations can not be called off halfway, at the first signs of setback. Indeed, the reverses in the Western and Walong Sectors were but usual experiences in the initial stages of defensive warfare. Truly, therefore, just one set of serious reverses - that is astride the Tawang-Se La-Bomdila Axis - had caused these leaders, all formidable in their past reputation, to panic. While one might be inclined to mark the politicians for undermining the military ‘spirit’ in peace and then exposing their own ‘soft belly’ in war, the loss of fighting spirit among higher military leadership in 1962 was shocking - the formation commanders were distinguished World War II veterans after all.

Ironically, whereas diplomacy is meant to avert war, and failing in that, to strengthen the war-effort, in this instance, Indian diplomacy managed to aggravate China’s belligerence. By repeated refusal to engage in substantive parlays, New Delhi made it easier for Beijing to implement her long decided plan to, as their diplomats proclaimed with a straight face, “counter-attack in self defence”! It is difficult to decide which of the two ‘performances’ was more bizarre.

Lesson three of 1962 was that a certain level of understanding of war among political leadership was necessary, as indeed was the need for mutual trust between politicians, diplomats, intelligence heads and the military brass. In the aftermath of 1962, the lesson was well assimilated. Today, however, there is discernable isolation among these pillars of the state - the lesson has not survived; the military leadership has turned professionally more emphatic though. 

Fostering Military Professionalism

Our narrative of the 1962 border conflict is but a list of self-deprecating ‘never dos’. A force of just three weak brigades in the Eastern and two in the Western Sectors out of forty odd in the Indian Army at that time, were inducted post-haste to occupy disjointed defensive positions with little in terms of depth, fire support, obstacles, manoeuvre elements, etc., to offer what bloody resistance the valiant officers and men could. Deserted by fundamental tactical sense in face of political pressure, top Indian commanders had thus left the entire combat zone for as many as five divisions equivalent of the battle-hardened PLA to manoeuvre at will and unhinge their defensive positions before overrunning these. In short, there was just one episode replayed over and over again all along the front line: sections, platoons and companies from different units, hurriedly formed and deployed in static positions for administrative expediency, fighting out through sheer grit and little else in terms of weapons, ammunition and equipment, till overwhelmed by text-book manoeuvre of a vastly superior force (7). It was a series of hopeless battles fought for military honour by small groups of soldiers under the leadership of spirited young officers who had been left to their devises.

In contrast, the Chinese had foreseen the offensive at least five years earlier, planned in meticulous details at the highest level leaving nothing to chance, and led by the most astute Chinese Generals of that time (8). Preparations – intelligence, logistics, induction, acclimatisation, etc. - were deliberate and thorough and the war was fought as one must be. Hardened by continuous warfare for over three decades, the PLA attacked resolutely even if the expected resistance did not materialise. Truly, our self-righteous disapproval of China’s ‘betrayal’ of our political solidarity, surreptitious military build up, tactics of infiltration, ‘cutting off’ and ‘human wave’ assault was nothing but a lament of a loser over what are fundamental to astute military practices of deception, manoeuvre and concentration of force. Similarly, our soldiers having no winter clothing or modern rifles did not cause us to lose the war – Indian soldiers had fought under worse conditions and yet emerged victorious.

We lost because we had pawned our military acumen and with it, lost the nerve to keep the struggle alive. We deployed amateurishly, fought mechanically, did not bring to bear the better part of what forces we had including our air power, broke up when ‘cut off’ and accepted defeat in what was actually just a few battles lost in an early stage of what should have been a protracted war. Unlike our officers and men, higher commanders and their political mentors lost the stomach for fight even before gearing up. The panic apparent among the Chinese leadership when faced with approach of winter, triggered by some delay in India’s response to their offer of ‘unilateral ceasefire’, makes interesting reading in this context (9). The prospect of being trapped across closed passes while the formidable Indian Army girdled up to fight, was anything but enticing to them. No doubt, India’s acceptance of the ceasefire came as a great relief to Chinese leaders – it helped secure the political gains that they had sought to achieve.

Lesson four had led to the armed forces rededicating to the fundamentals of military professionalism: contingency planning, resolute leadership, adherence to battle procedures, repudiation of short-cuts and steadfast struggle against all odds. After 1990, however, there seems to have crept-in some dilutions in the commitment to the exactions of hard soldierly ‘calling’. Military fundamentals – preference for difficult options in training, planning, execution and character building, and Chetwodian leadership, never easy to follow, seem to be giving way to cosier, ad hoc ‘solutions’. That such affliction is a sure recipe for dilating the military structure, is a disturbing thought.

Arguably, within the polity there is a connection between thrust on economic liberalisation, rise in socio-political aspirations and acquiescence with ‘hollowness’ in military resources. May be, this causes adulteration in military professionalism. This is a virus of which the military leaders have to be wary of.

Emergence of New Maladies

Lessons of 1962 and the government’s alacrity in acting fast allowed India to rise quickly from the damage done to her internal as well as international standing. Thus during the following two decades or so, India’s internal and external policies reflected a new found strength. However, effects of stale economic policies finally blew up in 1991, to the extent that the nation had to pawn its gold bullion to keep afloat. In the salvage act, defence spending had to be cut to balance the budget, and stalling operational preparedness became a ready solution. The regression was exacerbated by collapse of the Soviet Union, the dependable source of military hardware, failure of the DRDO to deliver and procurement scandals perpetuated by greed in the system which put the procurement process in deep freeze.

Fundamentally sensitive to swift degeneration, the armed forces were soon afflicted by depilating deficiencies in their inventory of war-material. Finally in 1996, as the Army Chief put it to the government: “the (Army’s) spirit is strong but body is weak”, he rued. Soon enough came the territorial intrusion into Kargil when supreme valour and sacrifice from young officers and men saved the day. This time the sorry state of the Army was reflected in the Army Chief ‘s pronouncement that, “We will fight with what we have”. Then, like a weak body playing host to viruses, immorality, favouritism, recalcitrance and misappropriation started festering upon the body military. The government, by its nonchalant indifference to the soldier’s sense of entitlements, did what it could to hasten the decline. That is the state today, worse than 1962, as it appears.

To this situation may be added some new maladies that seem to emerge to the further detriment of nation’s military institution : -

· Image of a ‘soft state’, adapting to reconciliation with intransigence abounds. Hard realities of power-play are overlooked in the comfort of ostrich-like approach to military planning. Inimical forces are encouraged thus to play mischief. 

· The political directive to the armed forces remains ambiguous. The ‘Raksha Mantri’s Directive’ to the armed forces, besides being cursory, is literally a ‘poor’ document because the government is unable to provision her forces to be able to fulfil that mandate.

· Nuclear weaponisation, with the military assigned to superficial role, is seen as panacea of all voids in basic military hardware. Consequently, a credible deterrence and comprehensive schemes for war-fighting remains elusive to the third largest armed force in the world!

· As if hardware deficiencies are not enough, quality soldiery is in short supply, as indeed is the absence of cutting-edge battle leadership. Average standard of training is gradually tapering short of what must be achieved to fight a modern war in all its hues – selected few gladiators do not win wars.

· Defence industry has failed to manage proper turnover of equipment and ammunition, causing latent weakness in fighting formations.

· Most crucially, modernisation schemes remain disjointed in scope, inadequate in range and depth, and trapped in political as well as procedural quagmire. Logistic upgrades remain excruciatingly slow in coming, while ‘jointness’ in military endeavours has not proceeded beyond lip service.

The Indian state seems to be intent on pushing its military institution back towards the nadir!

Renewal of Past Resolve

1962 is a case study in contrasting strategies. One lightly equipped force, unprepared for combat, was hastily moved to unknown terrain and ordered by the government to engage in combat with a deliberately composed military adversary, that was acclimatised and logistically well supported, was experienced in combat in difficult terrain, and nurtured by a civilian leadership that understood the complexities of combat.

Lessons assimilated of the 1962 debacle had paid us good dividends. It saved India in 1965, brought glory in 1971, preserved Indian interests in the region and prevented inimical forces from dismembering India. However, the post-1990 period gives indications that all may not be well any more. Thus we had the armed forces crying out their ‘hollowness’ in war wherewithal, the failure in forestalling “Kargil War’, and the recent uproar of consternation on neglect of the servicemen’s sensitivities that went to the sad extent of appeal to the Supreme Court and the President of India. Meanwhile, larger issues of military strategy - potent policy on ‘security vs budget vs strength vs preparedness’, an achievable political directive and result oriented scope and schedule of modernisation - remain unaddressed. The state falters even in attracting best candidates to shoulder the excruciating burden of soldiering, even when it earns the dubious distinction of becoming the largest importer of arms in the world!

The Kargil Committee Report states, “An objective assessment of the last 52 years will show that the country is lucky to have scraped through various national security threats without too much damage, except in 1962. The country can no longer afford such an ad hoc functioning”. It goes on to add, “The public discourse on military modernisation currently revolves around procurement delays, purchase scandals and issues of pay and status”. A dozen years later, as successive annual reports of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence repeat, the situation has not changed!

Larger and smaller nations, developed and developing, have maintained their armed forces in good fettle. Celebrating the 1962 debacle may rekindle a resolve among the Indian polity to rescue itself from another blunder. 

* * *

ENDNOTES

(1)- In spite of being at the receiving end of their ‘danda’, the freedom fighters-turned- politicians were comfortable with policemen, whereas soldiers shunned them and cared little for their political expediencies when weighed against adherence to military ethics. Hoary traditions of the armed forces permitted that liberty to the soldiers; the ‘system’ did not allow policemen that choice.

(2)- Thus the three service headquarters were kept away from decision making at the Ministry of Defence. The ‘rules of business’ in the Ministry crystallised to apportion authority to unaccountable bureaucrats, when at last, by the mid-1950’s, it assigned the burden of ‘defending India’ to the Defence Secretary, and in 1962, that of ‘ordering’ the Army to fight, to an Under Secretary! The surreptitious process of easing out military’s leverage over defence-specific establishments – military R&D, quality assurance, defence estates, ordnance factories and now the MES – followed, as did the devaluation of military ranks. The military hierarchy did not care to resist such machinations - in any case, it was no match for the hard-boiled machinations of civil servants.

(3)- It is no secret that these so called ‘posts’ were actually more of police type ‘nakas’ of one or two section strength. Neither sited for positional defence nor for offensive manoeuvre, and devoid of logistics of combat, occupation of these posts was forced upon the combat units by Generals who had willingly gone along with political naiveté`.

(4)- The Communist Party of China (CCP) was not enamoured of any law that did not suit her designs. In this case, however, with Indians nowhere present around the contentious areas, this law did suit her expansionist plan.

(5)- Admittedly, had not the government of India pushed her border posts towards the Indo-Tibet Border, howsoever weak and vulnerable these might have been, the current Line of Actual Control (LAC) would have been much more adversely aligned. Indeed, gratitude is due to those soldiers and policemen who paid with their lives for the real estate that was snatched from certain gobble-up by the Chinese – and of course, to Pandit Nehru and his advisors.

(6)- Chinese strategists displayed a perfect example of using military power as a potent tool of politics. In fact, in the Chinese scheme, the army has often been obliged to ‘buy’ death and destruction in order to secure political objectives. Subservience of her military strategy to political grand strategy in Korea was a glaring example. 

(7)- All tenets of war-fighting were jettisoned: units had been broken up and sub-units placed under different units, more units were placed in command of battalion and brigade headquarters than what they could control, troops were thinly spread, hardly any support weapons were deployed, ammunition was woefully short, etc – the list of ‘never done’ is endless. The defensive battles were fought exactly as these must not be.

(8)- China’s preparation, planning, execution and extrication from the Conflict was perfect. All Principles of War were adhered to and the military plan was dovetailed perfectly into the overall political objectives. 

(9)- Chinese leaders did not waste time in advocating conciliatory measures even as the second phase of offensive was launched on 17 November 1962. The ‘unilateral ceasefire’ was timed to coincide with completion of this phase. The plan to extricate before India either decided or was forced by public opinion to gear up for a long and deliberate fight, was pushed with much alacrity, Zhou Enlai virtually persuading Nehru to accept the ceasefire. 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1. Ed. Prasad SN, “History of Conflict with China, 1962”, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992.

2. Ed. Rayan, Finkelstein & McDevitt, “Chinese War-fighting : The PLA Experience since 1949”, KW Publishers, New Delhi, 2010.

3. Dave AK, “The Real Storey of China’s War on India, 1962”, CAFHR, USI, New Delhi, 2006.

4. Banerjee PK, “My Peking Memories of Chinese Invasion of India”, Clarion, New Delhi, 1990.

5. Taylor Maxwell, “India’s China War”, Jaico, Delhi, 1969.

6. Palit DK, “War in High Himalaya: Indian Army in Crisis, 1962”, Lancer International, London,1991.