China’s military modernization is expanding to the open ocean, and the U.S. Navy is worried.
While the United States Navy struggles to figure out if, how and when it can expand the size of its combat fleet by 47 ships—a 15 percent increase—China’s military modernization efforts are cranking out around a dozen new large warships a year. Recently, the busy shipyard in the port city Dalian put to sea China’s second aircraft carrier, following up on that milestone two months later by simultaneously launching two Type 055-class cruisers. With the U.S. Navy being the only other fleet to operate a large number of vessels of such size and capability, the pace and scale of production at Chinese shipyards is a sign of Beijing’s desire for a fleet commensurate with its perceived status as a great power.
Displacing more than 10,000 tons, the Type 055-class cruisers are large, multirole warships similar to the U.S. Navy’s high-end Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Such warships constitute the backbone of navies focused on high-intensity naval combat. Even a decade ago, the Chinese navy had only a handful of ships capable of providing a broad range of naval combat capabilities over a large area. Today, by contrast, China has 20 large and modern multirole cruisers and destroyers in service, with another 10 in the water awaiting completion and a further seven under construction. Remarkably, most of these warships have been built since 2010.
In China, Aircraft Carrier Construction Is A Sign Of Things To Come
The past several years have seen impressive advances in the Chinese navy’s capabilities. In 2015, the year China revealed that it had begun building its second aircraft carrier, it also launched its first submarine nuclear deterrent patrols. That same year, breaking its past convention against military bases in other countries, China announced that arrangements had been made for its first military support base abroad, in Djibouti. The Chinese navy is expanding its capabilities and operations to reduce vulnerabilities in China’s near seas, but also to aggressively support its expanding global ambitions. This is consistent with a military strategy white paper published in 2015 that called for the navy to “shift its focus” from near-seas defense to a “combination of near seas defense and ‘distant sea protection.’” But China’s military modernization also has another overriding goal: to challenge U.S. leadership in Asia.
China’s Armed Forces Evolve To Tackle New Missions
China’s naval modernization is just one component of an overall military modernization campaign that has aimed to transform the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, into a smaller, more efficient and more professional fighting force with increased tactical and technological sophistication. Thanks to years of increased military spending corresponding with economic growth, China’s air, sea and ground forces and its long-range strike capabilities have acquired more modern equipment and can project greater military power across farther distances. In 2016, the government announced further plans to make large changes in Chinese military structure, with troop cuts and significant structural changes to the PLA, in order to raise the PLA’s combat effectiveness and administrative efficiency, while curtailing corruption and enhancing civilian control over the military. However, achieving these diverse goals, some of which could conflict with one another, will require the government to overcome significant obstacles.
Is China’s Navy About To Go Global?
About a decade ago, in discussing China’s naval and military modernization, it was all the fashion to speak of China’s “string of pearls,” a chain of bases, ports and even airfields stretching from the South China Sea, through the Singapore-Malacca Straits, across the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Suez Canal. The bases would allow the Chinese navy to safeguard the critical flow of energy supplies—and particularly crude oil—from the Middle East and protect China’s trade routes to Europe. There was, however, one thing wrong about this argument: There was no “string of pearls” strategy. In fact, it was mainly a Western invention—speculation about Chinese intensions that did not exist and still don’t. At least, not yet. While China might not possess a coherent constellation of “bases and places” stretching across the Indian Ocean, it is increasing its global reach more than ever before.
No comments:
Post a Comment