Rebecca L. Brown
Experts and politicians have long stoked fears of a biological terrorist attack. But in the 17 years since the coordinated terrorist attacks of 9/11, no bioterrorist attack has come to fruition. Terrorists have tried to launch biological attacks, but their attempts have been plagued with failures. In fact, terrorists are more likely to cause a local epidemic by accident than to succeed in launching a sophisticated biological attack. Governments and the public should still be concerned about bioterrorism. But considering the risk that terrorists will accidentally cause a dangerous outbreak, government spending should focus more heavily on public health.
Attempted attacks. The Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo, which experimented extensively with toxins such as botulin and anthrax, came the closest to launching a fatal bioterrorism attack. But even with equipment and a team of scientists, and at least nine attempts, the group still lacked the sophistication to succeed in killing even one person. Aum Shinrikyo’s bioterrorist attacks were so inept that, had their botulin and anthrax cultures been potent enough to work, their own people would have been killed when they accidentally exposed themselves to the liquids while attempting to disseminate them.
Actors with even less sophisticated means should not be expected to meet with greater success, but the risk of deadly mistakes is still high because Sunni jihad groups have determinedly attempted to weaponize bacterial agents and toxins. Al Qaeda, for example, has included bioterrorism planning in its training and plotting from the late 1990s onward.
Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of Al Qaeda, recruited biologists to develop anthrax-based biological weapons. His two high-level recruits, Rauf Ahmad and Yazid Sufaat, were arrested just months after 9/11, heralding a change in Al Qaeda’s organizational structure as well as its biological weapons exploration. Al Qaeda became more decentralized, so there was less direct control of biological weapons development, even though some cells still pursued it.
A dangerous accident. In 2009, the world saw the first deadly sign that terrorists pursuing biological weapons are more likely to unleash a local outbreak than a biological attack. Forty Al Qaeda jihadis in an Algeria-based cell, who may have been experimenting with biological weapons, all died of plague. Had any one of those jihadis interacted with somebody from a nearby community, they could have set off a localized epidemic in rural communities where antibiotics and other medicines are not readily available.
This incident showcased both the risk to any community where terrorists experiment inexpertly with biological agents and toxins, and the lack of sophistication in the safety procedures terrorists are using. Establishing safety precautions sufficient to prevent the spread of infectious diseases is difficult, even in modern facilities, which the Algerian terrorists lacked access to. In the United States, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration strictly regulates personal protective equipment and health worker contact with infectious diseases. Without such safety precautions, accidental infections are likely, and cross-infection with the local community is possible, especially if the infected terrorist ventures into a community in search of medicine.
Terrorists are also likely to lack additional protective measures that states have employed to allow work on biological weapons. In his book Biohazard, former Soviet bioweaponeer Ken Alibek explained that the Soviet Union protected its biological weapons scientists by repeatedly inoculating them with vaccines against the diseases they were working with. Terrorists, however, are unlikely to have access to vaccines. Weaponizable diseases such as plague and anthrax are not commonly contracted in the world today, and a terrorist attempting to obtain vaccines would arouse suspicion. Moreover, the vaccines can’t be easily stolen, because they are typically controlled and stored by governments—and are therefore much more secure than common flu vaccines stored in a pharmacy. Terrorists experimenting with diseases must do so without vaccines or rigorous safety standards, so the risk of an accident is much higher than in an authorized lab.
Prioritize public health. As long as terrorists pursue biological weapons, there is a risk of a bioterrorism attack. But given the much higher chances of terrorists making mistakes when handling dangerous bacteria, governments should refocus their budgets accordingly.
All nations with a domestic terrorist presence should invest in their public health systems to minimize the effects of an accidental terrorist-caused outbreak. Promoting public awareness of symptoms associated with the diseases terrorists may be using is essential to containing an outbreak and saving lives. Training health professionals to handle these diseases and increasing the availability of vaccines are also vital steps in preparing for a possible outbreak.
Bioweapons accidents are more likely in countries with a large terrorist presence, so nations such as the United States should contribute aid to bolster public health systems in all of the nations where they are already providing defense aid to fight terrorism. Even though a localized accidental outbreak may ultimately be less lethal than an intentional biological attack, it deserves significant policy attention due to its greater chance of occurrence.
No comments:
Post a Comment