Russia, Japan: Representatives Struggle to See Eye-to-Eye On Military Matters

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Stratfor's annual forecast highlighted Russia and China's concerns that enforcement of U.S.-allied missile defense infrastructure in the region around North Korea could undermine Moscow and Beijing's own missile architecture. The tension between Japan and Russia is reflective of this burgeoning trend, but also of Japan's long-term efforts to balance against China's rise.

What Happened

Japan and Russia held their third 2+2 meeting of foreign and defense ministers on Aug. 1 in Moscow. Agreements were made on several points related to the ongoing ministerial talks and respective approaches to dealing with North Korea, but discussions failed to make progress on some more contentious military issues. During the talks, officials planned annual 2+2 vice-ministerial meetings, tabled two upcoming September meetings between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin, organized a Russian port visit and arranged for a Japanese business delegation to the disputed Southern Kurils. Notably, Russia offered to help resolve the issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese nationals. However, the two countries were less aligned in other areas: Japan asked Russia to show restraint in military buildups in the disputed Kuril Islands, while Russia expressed concern about Japan's planned deployment of the Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defense System.

Why It Matters

This latest meeting signals that, despite a committed effort on both sides, Russia and Japan are still struggling to strengthen their bilateral ties. Japan's status as a U.S. ally amid the ongoing standoff between Russia and the West has been a barrier to improving relations. In fact, the 2+2 dialogue itself was suspended from 2014 to 2017 following Russia's annexation of Crimea. These complications have stalled Tokyo's efforts to resolve its longstanding territorial dispute over the Southern Kurils and complete a peace treaty ending World War II. Japan has long hoped to trade economic concessions in the islands for an easing of Russian territorial claims and military deployments. In February, Moscow approved deployments of military aircraft to the island chain.

Further Context

For several months now, military deployments have been a particularly thorny topic between Japan and Russia. Russia is concerned that Japan could use its ballistic missile defense systems in conjunction with the United States to threaten Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. For instance, Japan has chosen to use the Long Range Discrimination Radar for its Aegis Ashore system, which is the same radar that the United States will use with its Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system in Alaska and California. Russia is worried that Japan will feed into the same network and help the United States defend against a potential Russian attack. Aegis Ashore is also compatible with midcourse interceptors that have a wider range than the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systemdeployed in South Korea. For Russia, there is the risk that these missiles could eventually be used to intercept Russian missiles directed toward the U.S. from positions in Japan. All in all, Moscow feels threatened by the wider American buildup of ballistic missile defense, be it in the United States or in allied territory in Europe and Japan.

Russia is concerned that Japan could use its ballistic missile defense systems in conjunction with the United States to threaten Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent.

Japan's development of the Aegis Ashore system was initially justified by the threat posed by North Korea, and Russia is still offering unspecified assistance to Japan when it comes to dealing with Pyongyang. But this will not eliminate the longer-term issues. A resolution on North Korea would not change Japan's missile defense calculations, given China's massive ballistic missile arsenal, which is far more capable than North Korea's. And while Japan would like to alleviate military tension with Russia to the north so it can focus on China in the south, Moscow's constant strategic paranoia about U.S. involvement overseas is a major obstacle to doing so.