Happymon Jacob
On April 18, 2018, the Government of India constituted a new high-level Defence Planning Committee (DPC) to recommend policy measures to improve India’s defence preparedness and national security. Several committees in the past – like the Kargil Review Committee (1999), Arun Singh Task Force (2001), Naresh Chandra Committee (2011) – have made recommendations to successive governments to look into the issue of India’s defence management and preparedness. The CAG report of July 2017 and the latest report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, raise serious concerns about India’s defence capabilities and point out lacunae with regard to budget deficits and critical shortages. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been largely dismissive of these reports. While most recommendations made by the various committees have not been taken on board, some have been implemented in a half-hearted and cosmetic manner. If these recommendations were to have been implemented properly, we wouldn’t face some of problems that confront our defence preparedness today. Nevertheless, any new step to reform the national security structure should be welcomed prima facie; if the new DPC is able to deliver on the charter given to it within its time, we should not preempt it. One can only hope for the best.
‘The system that we use to ensure our national security is a dysfunctional one’
The optimal utilisation of resources has been a serious problem for the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces. Despite being the world’s fifth largest defence spender and world’s largest arms importer, India faces serious shortages. India’s defence planning system is highly slow and inefficient. Long delays in the MoD means that the allocated money is not spent within that year. The unspent money lapses. The figures for defence budget allocation can therefore be misleading. A huge proportion of the defence budget is spent on revenue (salaries, etc.), and little on modernisation and re-equipment.
‘The defence bureaucracy in India is obdurate, opaque and ossified.’
There are three main stakeholders in India’s defence planning: the politicians, the bureaucrats and the armed forces. The politicians in India are deeply preoccupied with electoral politics and have no time for national security. The civilian leadership which should be in charge of national security has been derelict in their duty and have passed the responsibility to the bureaucracy. The bureaucrats are temporary occupants of the post and have no real stakes; the IAS cadre are not experts on national security and lack comprehension of serious national security issues. The armed forces in India unfortunately have been parochial and short-sighted.
As an organisation, the defence bureaucracy in India is obdurate, opaque and ossified. The Indian Defence Accounts Services (IDAS), called the integrated financial advisors, for instance, owe allegiance to the Ministry of Finance and often return files and reject cases. Integration of the armed forces HQs, which are currently outside the MoD decision-making, is therefore important to bring together technical expertise and financial management which can short-circuit delays in decision-making. Beyond integration however, the Indian defence organisation is in need of structural reforms.
‘Need far-sighted politicians who understand that integration is important for India’s national security’
There is a need to institute a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in India. The integration of the HQs of the armed forces in the MoD through the institution of the CDS could help reduce redundancy, duplication and superfluous expenditure. However, the creation of the CDS seems to threaten the MoD and defence bureaucracy, and even some or all of the services. Given a combination of these opposing forces, no politician has had the time or inclination to reflect and decide who is right.
In the absence of the CDS, there should be a permanent full-time Chairman COSC to work on integration of the armed forces. In the present system, one of the chiefs of the armed forces becomes the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). This is a part-time rotational job that cannot be given adequate time and attention.
Similarly, there is a need to create more integrated commands. The armed forces in India currently have 17 commands and no two commands are located in the same place. In the eventuality of war, these 17 will have to coordinate their actions. In an integrated system, each wing of the armed forces will lose something. The integrated commands will report to the CDS.
‘Mismatch between India’s defence capabilities and changing nature of warfare’
India’s defence preparedness is in a precarious situation. China is way ahead in terms of defence technology. China believes in a phase zero of warfare, even before Phase 1 when the war starts. This phase zero involves massive cyber attacks. Is India prepared for cyber warfare and space warfare? From here on, every kind of warfare is going to be integrated. I (Arun Prakash) have deep apprehensions that our system is archaic and not suited for tomorrow’s warfare.
‘Joint-ness should be institutionalized and written down.’
Notionally there is supposed to be joint-ness among the three services. But there is no doctrine to tell us how this is to be done. Inter-service consultation is necessary before writing a joint doctrine. The first joint doctrine was written in 2006. The new joint doctrine of 2017 is not very good because it doesn’t point out the changes that took place in the last decade; it doesn’t say anything substantively different from the 2006 doctrine. It could have been delayed.
A joint doctrine should emerge from a national security strategy issued by the government of India. The service strategies are supposed to flow from this national security strategy. However, the Indian government has neither issued a national security strategy nor ever asked the services to issue it. The Indian Navy wrote their own strategy and doctrine and made a ‘second’ edition.
‘Reinventing the wheel’
If India wants to be a military power, we will have to manufacture military hardware. Today, 75 percent of India’s military hardware is imported. The Russians do not provide hardware overnight and the Russian import can take upto 6 months. On the other hand, today China is exporting sophisticated weapons. In national security you have to be self-reliant.
‘Long-term policy recommendations to improve India’s defence preparedness’
Reforming the national security structure by bringing the armed forces into it by act of parliament. This includes the creation of the CDS and integrating the armed forces HQ with the MOD.
Professionalizing the IAS and IDAS cadre and creating a specialized national security cadre with requisite technical expertise.
Forming theatre commands.
‘A National Security Strategy document’
We must have a national security strategy to clarify our intentions and redlines to friends and adversaries and to guide the armed forces about the tasks to be undertaken. One version of this documents can be classified and another version can be made public.
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