Lt General H S Panag
The facade of the coalition of opposites, that came together in early 2015 to uphold larger national interest and ensure the integrity, security and development of J&K, ended on June 19, 2018, with the BJP withdrawing support. Ironically, the party cited the same reasons for its exit as it did for the union. The blame game is acrimonious, but there should be no doubt that that the two parties have been “partners in crime”. People have never been more alienated, little or no development has taken place and the security situation has deteriorated, not so much due to the level of violence but due to active popular support for terrorists in the form of the violent “stony intifada” and direct interference by the people with conduct of operations.
The political and neo-nationalist narrative is talking of security forces getting a “free hand” to follow a “muscular approach” under Governor’s rule. Surprisingly even some military analysts have bandied these terms about. There are no such terms used by the Indian Army. It evolves its operational strategy based on the political direction “received” or more often than not perceived, from the Central government. The armed forces evolve and execute the operational strategy to conduct people- friendly operations as per clear rules of engagement, army regulations, and the law of the land.
Has the Central government issued formal political directions defining political objectives or the end state sought in J&K? To date, no government has given any formal directive to the armed forces for conduct of operations in J&K or in the North East or defined the political objectives or the end state it is seeking. Forget directions, there is little or no dialogue between the armed forces and the Prime Minister, defence minister, national security advisor, or home minister regarding the conduct of the counter-insurgency campaign.
The Unified command at the state level is nothing more than “meet and greet” with high tea, except that under the Governor’s rule, there is better cooperation and coordination with the JKP and the CRPF. With the Central and state governments abdicating their strategic responsibility, the Northern Command pursues perceived military goals of eliminating terrorists, countering infiltration, winning over the hearts and minds of people and creating conditions for the political process to take over.
Has in the past the Army been “shackled” or its “hands tied” by the state or Central government? I must grant it to the politicians of all hues that they have never interfered with the conduct of military operations in any form. In J&K, at best, a polite suggestion is made when military operations impinge on core political concerns. The final decision is still left to the Army. If any military commander has acted to the contrary, he has done it in violation of military ethos and for advancing personal interests. There have been no “political shackles” in any form whatsoever.
What is the meaning of a “hard strategy” or a “muscular approach”?
“No patchwork scheme, and all our recent schemes, blockades, allowances are mere patchwork, will settle the Waziristan problem. Not until the military steamroller has passed over the country from end to end will there be peace. But I do not want to be the person to start the machine,” said Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, 1899 – 1905.
Even Lord Curzon, the avowed imperialist and colonist, understood that running the military steamroller would not resolve an insurgency. The advocates of “hard strategy”, “free hand” and “muscular approach”, actually want a no holds barred military campaign with complete disregard for human rights violations.
Failure to resolve the Kashmir issue on own terms is considered an ideological defeat. However, resorting to such crude military strategy against own people will eventually result in the defeat of the idea of India, if not a military defeat per se.
Once the Indian Army called to restore order in a disturbed area it conducts people-friendly operations against insurgents/ terrorists/ terrorists as per its rules of engagement, ethos, regulations and law of the land. The principle is minimum force for effect. Since 1956, the Armed forces have had a stellar record and are admired all over the world. Aberrations have been severely dealt with. The role of the Army is clear – to create a conducive environment for a political solution. Notwithstanding popular perception, levels of violence are no way near what we saw up to 2008. Concerted effort will once again create an environment conducive to political solution. The problem today is not terrorists but the stone-armed mass with a death wish. Winning the masses is a political problem.
An insurgency and counter-insurgency campaign are both driven by political aims and a political strategy on which the military strategy of both terrorists and state is contingent. The political aim of both is to win the hearts and minds of the population. The irony of the current situation is that terrorists have lost the military battle, but are winning the political battle and the Indian State, which has won the military battle many times, has lost the political battle. It is a sad commentary on our strategic thinking that no government has defined the political or military end state. Yet despite the political disconnect, the military strategy has been eminently successful and brought the conflict, generally judged by the number of terrorists and violence, to sub-critical level.
Unfortunately, rather than seizing political initiative, the state, trapped by ideology and political rhetoric, an excited jingoist media and public emotions fed by orchestrated nationalism, is suffering from inertia and continues to repeatedly ride on military strategy which is useless against an alienated mass.
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