Violence once again grips Afghanistan, with the Taliban, the Islamic State and other terror groups carrying out deadly attacks and kidnappings across the country. Last month, the Taliban announced the beginning of its annual “spring offensive,” and this past weekend bombed a mosque that was being used as a voter registration center, killing 14 and injuring dozens more. What follows is a section of The Cipher Brief’s 2018 Annual Threat Report, which breaks down the greatest threats facing the United States and the world at this point in time. For more information on the full report, please click here. Bottom Line: The Afghan Taliban is mounting an increasingly lethal insurgency across Afghanistan, as both U.S. troops and Afghan Security Forces face near-everyday violence throughout the country. With the Taliban gaining momentum and reasserting control in remote, loosely governed parts of the country, the window for reaching a negotiated peace to end the ongoing conflict is rapidly closing.
Background: The Afghan Taliban was formed in September 1994 in the predominantly Pashtun areas of southern Afghanistan under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar, along with a group of Afghan clerics and religious students with ties to hardline mujahedeen rebels that had fought against the Soviet Union during its invasion of Afghanistan.
Literally translated as “the students,” the Afgan Taliban gained popular support in southern Afghanistan by pledging to bring stability to a region fraught with conflict. The group imposed strict Sharia law in areas it controlled, carrying out amputations and executions. Television, Western music and dancing were prohibited, and women were banned from attending school.
The Afghan Taliban, along with many mujahedeen fighters who subsequently joined the movement, maintain longstanding ties to Pakistan dating back to the late 1970s and 1980s when the U.S. government turned to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) as a conduit to funnel U.S. and Saudi weapons and money to mujahedeen fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Following the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, many mujahedeen crossed over into Pakistan where they were educated in Islamic seminaries known as madrassas and later joined the Afghan Taliban.
The Soviet Union’s retreat left a power vacuum in Afghanistan, and the Taliban’s forceful military approach enabled the group to assume control over the country in May 1996. Pakistan’s ISI supported the Taliban’s rise to power as part of its broader regional strategy to install a friendly government in Kabul and prevent India from extending its influence into Afghanistan.
In October 2001, the U.S. initiated combat operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban government after it refused to hand over Afghan-based Al-Qaida leaders and operatives who were deemed responsible for orchestrating the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. military succeeded in pushing both groups to retreat to the mountainous Afghan-Pakistan border. On May 1, 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush delivered his infamous “Mission Accomplished” speech declaring, “In the battle of Afghanistan, we destroyed the Taliban, many terrorists, and the camps where they trained.” Yet, the Afghan Taliban has not been listed by the U.S. State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, presumably to allow eventual peace talks with the group.
A key faction within the Afghan Taliban is the Haqqani network, which was founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani in the 1970s and emerged as one of the most important mujahedeen resistance units fighting against the Soviets during their invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Throughout the Afghan-Soviet war, the Haqqani network established strong ties with Pakistan’s intelligence services, receiving U.S. weapons and Saudi funds that were funneled to mujahedeen groups through the ISI. Jalaluddin Haqqani formally joined the Taliban in 1995, serving as a military commander and cabinet member.
After the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in October 2001, the Haqqani network retreated to Pakistan where it continued to direct and conduct terrorist activity inside Afghanistan. The U.S. State Department designatedthe Haqqani network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in September 2012. Ties between the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban were further strengthened in July 2015, when Jalaluddin’s son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, was appointed as a deputy leader of the Taliban. It is estimated that the Haqqani network can draw from some 10,000 fighters to carry out its operations.
Dan Markey, Academic Director of the Global Policy Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
“The Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and al-Qaida leaders have all found opportunities for safe haven inside Pakistan. Of the three groups, the Haqqanis are widely perceived to have maintained the best terms with the Pakistani state. Washington generally views the Haqqanis as the proxy group with which Pakistan enjoys the greatest influence and control, which helps to explain the particular frustration that U.S. policymakers feel at Haqqani attacks on U.S., NATO and Afghan forces.”
Issue: Through persistent violence, the Afghan Taliban has crippled the Afghan government’s ability to exercise authority across the country, paving the way for terrorist organizations and other extremist groups to find safe haven in ungoverned spaces. Furthermore, the Afghan Taliban’s surge has directly impacted and strained U.S.-Pakistan relations, with Washington accusing Islamabad of harboring and supporting the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network.
From the 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment: “The overall situation in Afghanistan probably will deteriorate modestly this year in the face of persistent political instability, sustained attacks by the Taliban-led insurgency, unsteady Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) performance, and chronic financial shortfalls. The ANSF probably will maintain control of most major population centers with coalition force support, but the intensity and geographic scope of Taliban activities will put those centers under continued strain.”
A January 2018 BBC report concluded that the Taliban threatens nearly 70 percent of Afghan territory. According to the study, the Taliban runs 14 districts – roughly four percent of the country – and approximately half of Afghanistan’s population lives in areas that are susceptible to some level of Taliban violence or influence. According to the most recent quarterly report issued by the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the Afghan government controls only 55.8 percent of the country. Both of these statistics represent alarming trend lines with respect to Taliban gains.
News reports from January 2018 cite U.S. and Afghan officials who assess that the Taliban maintains a force of around 60,000 fighters – a significant increase from 2014 estimates, which placed the group’s numbers at around 20,000.
The Afghan government and the Trump administration have blamed Pakistan for failing to root out Afghan Taliban, Haqqani and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin leaders, who they believe find safe haven on the Pakistani side of the border. Pakistani officials deny the charges, instead accusing Kabul of failing to crack down on militants it says are sheltering in Afghanistan.
Dan Markey, Academic Director of the Global Policy Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
“In the aftermath of 9/11, the Pakistanis chose to be with us for multiple reasons, but mainly because they decided that the alternatives were too costly. But as they started to realize that our attention in Afghanistan began to wander, most importantly to the war in Iraq, that we weren’t actually hunting down and killing all al-Qaida and Taliban leaders and that we were going to leave Afghanistan a bit of a mess, then they reverted back to an influence strategy, using many of the same groups and individuals that they had come to know over decades.”
Response: While the U.S. military has maintained a consistent troop presence in Afghanistan since 2001 and has diligently trained, advised, supplied and assisted the Afghan National Security Forces, policymakers in Washington have failed to articulate a clear strategic objective in Afghanistan throughout the nearly 17-year conflict and peace talks with the Afghan Taliban remain elusive. The Trump administration has faced the same uncertainty with its approach to Afghanistan, although it has pressed Pakistan to rescind its support for certain militant groups and bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table.
In August 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump revealed his strategy for Afghanistan, which included a shift from a time-based approach to a conditions-based approach for U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan. Trump also announced that transparency about troop numbers and military activities was off the table, stating that “America’s enemies must never know our plans or believe they can wait us out.”
The U.S. has approximately 15,000 troops stationed in Afghanistan, while an additional 3,000 NATO forces from U.S.-allied nations were deployed in January 2018, bringing the total number of NATO forces in Afghanistan to around 16,000.
As of August 2017, Afghan forces numbered an estimated 320,000 troops. The Afghans took primary responsibility for their security in January 2015, and the goal strength for the defense force is approximately 352,000 people, including roughly 195,000 members of the Afghan National Army and 157,000 in the Afghan National Police. Reaching these goals has proven challenging, however, as Afghan casualties rise due to increasingly common and deadly Taliban strikes across the country, and the Afghan Army faces more difficult recruiting prospects.
The Trump administration is withholding more than $1 billion worth of security assistance from Pakistan, including $900 million in Coalition Support Funding, due to Pakistan’s failure to crack down on members of the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban inside its territory. The Trump administration has provided Pakistan with a hit list of nearly a dozen top militants to detain as a way to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate and win back security funding. Aid to Pakistan has been suspended before. In July 2011, the Obama administration blocked $800 million in aid to Pakistan, after the U.S. found Osama bin Laden had been hiding in the country.
Peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban have thus far failed to gain traction since the July 2017 launch of the Kabul Process for Peace & Security Cooperation, which aims to bring a political settlement to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. In February 2018, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani called on the Taliban to join the peace effort, offering to grant the group political party status with an office in Kabul, help remove Taliban leaders from terrorist blacklists and negotiate without preconditions. However, the Taliban has insisted on direct negotiations with the United States, while Washington has maintained that any talks must first occur between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Washington has also asked Pakistan to use its influence to bring the Afghan Taliban to the table.
General Michael Hayden, former Director, CIA and NSA
“Frankly, what I think our objective is in Afghanistan is to make sure it doesn’t become something we can’t live with. In other words, realism about Afghanistan suggests this will take a long time, and the final outcome will not be totally satisfactory.”
Looking Ahead: A decade and a half after 9/11, the Taliban has reasserted itself as an important player in Afghanistan, holding significant territory and influence in the country. As the Afghan government and security forces have failed to stop Taliban advances, and an alienated Pakistan may now be less willing to help bring the Taliban to talks, the most likely outcome is a continuing stalemate, with the U.S. and NATO providing just enough firepower to keep the Kabul government in control of the populated parts of the country.
Kevin Hulbert, former Chief of Station, CIA
“When it comes to Afghanistan, we are stuck in a stalemate and pursuing the morally ambiguous course of action of doing just enough not to lose, but not really enough to win. The way forward will be determined by clarifying our objectives and by recognizing that there are alternative courses of action more elaborate and nuanced than the simple and binary calculation over whether to put more or less boots on the ground. President Trump’s actions on both Afghanistan and Pakistan over the last year may have created some forward momentum in the long sought after goal of Taliban reconciliation and there do seem to be some flickers of light at the end of what has been a very long tunnel. However, I’m not sure if that nascent light flickering is some sort of an exit and a way forward with the Taliban and other factions, or the light of an oncoming train. The idea of “Taliban reconciliation” is something we have unsuccessfully sought for many years.”
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