Sima Shine
In the coming days President Donald Trump is to decide whether or not to authorize the continued suspension of nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. The US president is required to waive sanctions every 120 days to remain in compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Failure to waive sanctions will result in the automatic reinstatement of American sanctions on Iran, which contravenes the commitments stipulated in the agreement and therefore constitutes a breach of the deal and, in practical terms, an American withdrawal from it. This scenario was examined in a simulation that took place in November 2017 at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), in collaboration with the RAND Corporation. The purpose was to consider Iran’s potential response and the responses of other relevant parties should the United States withdraw from the deal, as well as the consequences of such a development for Israeli national security.
Co-authors: Ari Heistein and Ezra Friedman
There are several advantages of a simulation over a more conventional roundtable discussion. One is that participants are playing the roles of key stakeholders and remaining “in character” during the simulation. Another is the structuring of interactions between different groups as they simulate the considerations and policies of the countries they represent. As a practical example, the simulation featured many bilateral discussions between the United States and Israel that other stakeholders were not invited to join, which mirrors the reality of how U.S.-Israeli coordination would occur in the real world.
Of course, the scenario considered—effective U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA—does not necessarily reflect the most likely scenario in reality, but it does highlight ideas and options that experts may have missed, and thus the responses to the scenario and the emerging policy might well be realized. 8 I The United States Withdraws from the Nuclear Deal with Iran The United States, whose moves in the simulation (as in reality) drove the developments, set as its strategic objective to improve the nuclear agreement and apply stronger wording that would be more binding regarding the sunset clauses, halt research and development by Iran on advanced centrifuges, increase supervision—including of military installations—and limit the Iranian missile program. However, apart from setting these goals, the United States did not present any concrete plan to achieve them, and it quickly became clear that the American administration wanted other international actors—the European parties to the agreement (France, Britain, and Germany) and Russia—to exert pressure on Iran as a way of forcing it to meet the US administration’s demands.
The European partners to the agreement were prepared to assume the role of mediator, but their opening position accepted the Iranian argument that it is not possible to renegotiate the deal. Therefore, their main interest was to preserve the JCPOA by maintaining economic relations with Iran while avoiding as much damage as possible in transatlantic relations. The Europeans recognized the need to address the Iranian missile program and to restrain Iran’s actions in the Middle East and attempted to create a new arrangement that would preserve the agreement in return for Iranian concessions regarding its missile program and regional policy. They were even prepared to exert some economic pressure in the form of sanctions on Iran if necessary. However, this European position was not muscular enough to satisfy the United States, and the major disagreements between the parties were underscored in the simulation.
Russia cleverly positioned itself as the only realistic mediator within the simulation, which is how the American administration perceived it, to the dismay of the Iranian representatives. Russia proposed that the agreement be extended for another 10 years and that limitations be placed on the Iranian missile program and its presence in Syria. However, as is usually the case with Moscow, it demanded a quid pro quo from the West of lifting the sanctions imposed on Russia in response to its policy in Ukraine. Israel’s good relations with Russia and the United States enabled it to convey the Russian message to the Americans, a move that reflected the Israeli interest in avoiding termination of the agreement at this stage. However, the Russian attempt at mediation ultimately failed.
Two other regional elements with conflicting interests—Saudi Arabia and Hezbollah—were also represented in the simulation. Saudi Arabia’s interest was to undermine the agreement and harm Iran, while Hezbollah’s interest was to help Iran and prevent a breach of the agreement, however, neither party had a significant impact on the simulation. With limited independent means of exerting pressure, Saudi Arabia tried to encourage Israeli and American moves—including a military one—but without much success, even though Israel saw the chance for military cooperation with Saudi Arabia as an important achievement and was ready to use it in order to signal to Iran that it had a military option. Although it was prepared to use force and create points of violent conflict, Hezbollah was, in fact, restrained by Iran, which expressed a desire to avoid any move that might play into the hands of Washington.
Iran’s main goal was preserving the international consensus for continuing the agreement and its policy decisions were aimed at promoting this interest. Following intensive contacts with the other partners to the agreement, Iran estimated that none of them wanted to upset the deal. This was the basis of the Iranian policy of restraint, intended to prevent moves that would place the blame for harming the agreement on Iran. This policy did indeed facilitate mediation attempts by European countries, as well as Russia. During these attempts, the outline of Tehran’s policy emerged, which centered on its determined opposition to reopening the agreement and a certain limited willingness to discuss the missile program and the extent of its presence in Syria. The levelheaded Iranian policy made it hard for the American administration to recruit support for its policy and led to serious disputes between Washington and the European partners.
At the end of the simulation, Iran resumed the enrichment activity to preagreement levels, but only when it was clear that it would not be accused of torpedoing the agreement because the re-imposition of secondary sanctions meant that the United States was the party in breach.
Israel found itself obliged to support President Trump’s policy, even though its immediate and urgent concerns were the Iranian missile program and its presence in Syria, and only secondary was the nuclear agreement, which is less urgent if not less important. Israel’s position rests on the assessment that at this stage, it is not possible to renegotiate the agreement, and focusing on this aspect could detract attention from more urgent issues. Israel also did not want to be at the front line of activity against Iran, but supported President Trump’s steps and even decided to renew its military preparations, which it presented as a bargaining chip that the United States could leverage against the other parties to the agreement. However, in the framework of the simulation, Israel did not manage to advance Washington’s aim of recruiting the support of Europe, Russia, and China for the move, nor was it able to influence decisions taken by the US administration in this context.
In terms of the positions of the main actors in the simulation, there were a number of conclusions:
• The American administration has no clear plan on how to achieve its stated goal vis-à-vis Iran – improvement of the JCPOA. Its one-sided move relied on other elements, mainly European countries, and it hoped they would take action against Iran. However, since the US move was contrary to the interests of its European partners and was made without prior coordination with them, it was difficult to get their support for this decision and to navigate the ensuing developments.
• The crisis created by the administration regarding the flaws of the nuclear agreement could be exploited to promote issues more urgent for Israel (mainly Iran’s missile program and presence in Syria). The European countries and Russia were prepared to work on those issues if it was considered to be “enough” for the American administration. However, US insistence on amending the nuclear agreement and the problematic relations between the United States and Russia prevented any possible compromise.
• At the end of the day, Israel found itself in a situation where the agreement was breached; Iran resumed work on its nuclear program and continued its ballistic missile program; there was no agreed change to its regional conduct; and it was very doubtful that the current American administration was prepared to take serious action against Iran, beyond leaving the agreement.
• Although all the parties to the nuclear deal except for the United States want it to continue, the departure of the United States, particularly if it imposes secondary sanctions, would in effect neutralize the deal. Following that development, Iran would resume work on its nuclear program.
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