Russian Analytical Digest No 219: Russia in the Middle East

By Mark N Katz and Nikolay Kozahanov for Center for Security Studies (CSS)

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In this edition of the RAD, Mark N Katz first examines how President Putin’s Russia seeks to maintain good relations with multiple actors in the Middle East that consider one another as adversaries, and the limits to this policy. Nikolay Kozhanov then considers the Russia-Saudi Arabia relationship, noting that the efforts to promote better relations between the two have not as yet been derailed by various stress-tests in their relations. The two articles featured here were originally published by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) in the Russian Analytical Digest on 3 May 2018. What Do They See in Him? How the Middle East Views Putin and Russia

One of the most remarkable achievements of Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East under Putin is that Moscow now has good relations with every state in the region and many of the major non-state movements there too, despite the fact that many of these Middle Eastern actors are bitterly opposed to one another. This achievement, though, is not just the result of Putin’s own diplomatic prowess, but also of the willingness of various Middle Eastern actors to build and maintain good relations with Putin despite the fact that he also has close relations with their regional adversaries. This article will explore the seeming contradiction of why so many Middle Eastern actors opposed to one another maintain positive relations with Putin’s Russia, and what the limits to this phenomenon might be. 

Good Relations with Everyone

Russia, not surprisingly, has good relations with the major anti-American and anti-Israeli actors in the region: Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. Moscow also has good relations with the two main Palestinian movements: Fatah and Hamas. At the same time, Putin has built up good relations with what have traditionally been America’s allies in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Cooperation Council states (including Qatar, which Riyadh and others are at odds with), Egypt, Jordan, and even Israel. The Russian–Israeli relationship has grown especially close since Putin first came to power. The addition of Israeli technology enhances Russian arms exports to several markets, and Israel itself serves as an important source of Western military technology for Russia.

Moscow’s relations with Turkey deteriorated sharply after the latter’s forces shot down a Russian military aircraft flying in the vicinity of the Turkish–Syrian border in November 2015, but they rebounded just as sharply in mid-2016 when Turkish President Erdogan apologized for this incident and later when Putin more quickly expressed support for Erdogan than Western governments did during the coup attempt against him that summer. At the same time, Moscow maintains good relations with Syrian Kurdish forces which Turkey opposes. In war-torn countries such as Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, Moscow maintains good relations with the internationally recognized governments in each of them, but also with some of their principal antagonists—including the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq, General Haftar in Libya, and the Houthis in Yemen. The only important Middle Eastern actors Moscow does not have good relations with are Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS)—and they do not have good relations with anyone, including each other.

Reasons for Russia’s Success

Explaining why Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah seek good relations with Russia is not difficult. Each of them shares with Russia the desire to oppose American foreign policy in the region—especially its calls for President Assad to step down and its support for his opponents. Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah also see Israel—which America backs strongly—as a common enemy. Anti-American actors, of course, can and do have important differences with Russia. Iran in particular has had many over the years, including over Moscow’s close relations with Tehran’s adversaries. But so long as they view America as more of a threat, Russia—especially through its willingness to forcefully defend the Assad regime—is a useful partner for all three.

But America’s traditional allies have also sought good relations with Russia despite its support for their anti-American adversaries. Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and even Israel have all come to fear a lack of commitment on the part of the US. Russia’s willingness to sell them weapons without regard for human rights issues is an especially useful way for Middle Eastern governments to ward off or get around actual or potential American restrictions on arms sales over such concerns (as Egypt’s al-Sisi did in response to Obama’s objections to Cairo’s crackdown on its domestic opponents, and Saudi Arabia now faces from Congress over its intervention in Yemen). Improving relations with Russia, then, is useful both as a means of motivating greater US support and of hedging against the possibility that it might not be fully available.

Putin has also portrayed Russia as a firm upholder of the status quo in the Middle East—something that governments in the region see Moscow doing more consistently than did either George W. Bush (with his interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and stated desire to promote democratization throughout the Greater Middle East) and Barack Obama (with his outreach to Iran, half-hearted intervention in Libya, and unwillingness to intervene in Syria). And compared to the highly erratic and unpredictable Donald Trump, Putin is viewed as more consistent and reliable in his policies.

But Middle Eastern motivations for improving relations with Russia are not just related to dissatisfaction with, or a desire to shape, American foreign policy. Another motive is the desire to balance against regional rivals: When Russia is supporting one’s rival, but is also willing to support oneself, then it makes sense to work with Russia as a means of 1) giving Moscow an incentive to balance between rivals as opposed to only supporting one against the other; and 2) possibly undercutting Russia’s relations with one’s rival. Israel and Saudi Arabia, for example, do not appreciate Russian support for Iranian activity in Syria. But Israel and Saudi Arabia having good relations with Moscow gives it more of an incentive (at least they hope) to restrain Tehran than their not having good relations with Russia. And the fact that Tehran complains about Moscow having close ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia is something that pleases these two governments.

In addition, there are sometimes other pragmatic reasons for cooperation with Moscow despite differences with it. For example, while Saudi Arabia does not appreciate Putin’s close ties to Iran or support for Assad, Riyadh and Moscow have developed a common interest in restraining oil production in order to support higher oil prices. As Moscow had previously been unwilling to join in Saudi-led OPEC output restraints, their recent cooperation on this is a significant development—even if it was motivated primarily by their joint fear of the “threat” to oil prices from expanding American shale oil.

Domestic political concerns within Middle Eastern states may also militate toward improved ties with Moscow. For al-Sisi in Egypt, being seen to cooperate with Putin is useful in portraying the image that he is not overly dependent on Washington. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (often referred to as MBS) of Saudi Arabia may have seen Putin’s seizure of property from the Russian oligarchs when the Russian leader first rose to power as a role model for MBS’s treating his royal relatives in a similar fashion more recently.

How Long Can It Last?

There are numerous reasons, then, why a wide range of Middle Eastern actors have sought good relations with Russia. And up to now, Putin has been remarkably successful in balancing between Middle Eastern actors that are bitterly opposed to each other. But can this continue indefinitely? There is a real possibility for change in this pattern if conflict between regional rivals increases. In an escalating conflict between Iran and its allies on the one hand and either the Gulf Arabs and/or Israel on the other, the US (especially under Trump) is highly likely to strongly support the latter. If Russia responds by strongly supporting Iran, it may well lose influence with the Gulf Arabs and Israel. But trying to maintain balance or remain neutral while the US supports Iran’s adversaries will lower Russia’s usefulness to Iran.

Similarly, while an expanded Turkish–Kurdish conflict will further strain Turkish–American relations, it could also strain Turkish–Russian ones. While Russia would like to see Turkey’s alliance with the US further undermined, it (along with Iran and the Assad regime) does not want to see Turkey play a larger role in Syria. Supporting Syrian Kurds might appeal to Moscow as a means of both thwarting Turkey’s ambitions and preventing the US from acquiring predominant influence with the Kurds. But opposing Turkish actions against the Kurds risks another crisis in Turkish–Russian relations that could be much worse than the one that occurred after the November 2015 shoot down incident.

Finally, by aligning itself so strongly with status quo governments, Russia may find (as America and others have, or should have) that this strongly alienates the forces seeking change—which, as history shows, do not always remain suppressed. And it is not at all clear that Moscow would be willing to intervene elsewhere in the Middle East to defend existing regimes to the same extent that it has intervened in Syria to defend Assad.

At present, though, Putin’s policy of working with most Middle Eastern actors courting Moscow despite their antagonism toward each other is very much a success. The continued success of Putin’s Middle East policy, though, is dependent not just on his own tactical brilliance or the likelihood that Washington will continue to make mistakes in the region which Putin can exploit. Putin’s future success is also dependent on regional actors actively seeking, or just fearful of doing without, cooperation with Moscow despite its cooperation with their adversaries. The problem with this approach is that while as successful as Moscow has been up to now, Middle Eastern states and other actors would all prefer that Russia (as well as all other external great powers) support them more than it supports their adversaries. The fact that Russia does not do this results in Middle Eastern actors being wary of Russia’s motives and reliability. However unhappy they may be with American foreign policy, those Middle Eastern actors whom Washington supports against its adversaries are hardly likely to switch from being primarily American allies to primarily Russian ones if they cannot trust Moscow fully. And the continued cooperation of Moscow with those Middle Eastern actors which fear the consequences of not doing so is dependent on that fear continuing, but also being kept within bounds. Those who become convinced that Moscow is doing far more to support their adversaries than them are going to seek external support and/or cause problems for those Moscow-backed adversaries if they can. Yet those who no longer fear what Moscow does may react in the same way. Such a situation might arise if a Middle Eastern government decides, for whatever reason, that Moscow needs it more than it needs Moscow.

Thus, while Putin has so far been successful in his policy of balancing among Middle Eastern adversaries instead of firmly backing some against others (as the US does), there is no guarantee that he can maintain this balancing act indefinitely. Indeed, to the extent that Putin’s successful Middle Eastern policy has raised expectations on the part of regional actors about what Moscow can and will do for them, which were lowered at the end of the Cold War, Putin may face difficulties in fulfilling them. And if Russian policy either does not prevent or actually contributes to wider conflict that Moscow cannot contain (such as between either Turkey and the Kurds or between Iran on the one hand and Israel and/ or the Gulf Arabs on the other), then Putin’s current policy may be contributing to the decline of Russian influence in the Middle East at some point in the future.