Frida Ghitis
One of the more intriguing aspects of the enormously complicated war in Syria is the position of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose allegiance and convictions appear to shift with developments on the ground. Two weeks ago, Erdogan hosted a summit meeting in Ankara to discuss Syria’s future. For a photo-op, he literally joined hands with the presidents of Russia and Iran, the main backers of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whom Erdogan not long ago was still condemning as a “terrorist” and the roadblock to peace in Syria. It was a gesture, it seemed, that Moscow, Tehran and Ankara now stood on the same side of the conflict. That appearance, however, was shattered last weekend after the United States, France and the United Kingdom launched a barrage of missiles into Syria in retaliation for the suspected chemical attack in the Damascus suburb of Douma. As the governments of Syria, Iran and Russia decried the operation, Erdogan cheered, saying the U.S.-led mission sent an important message to Assad’s regime that “its massacres wouldn’t be left unanswered.”
Turkey, of course, is a member of NATO, but in recent years it has drifted away from the alliance on a number of fronts, most notably in Syria. Ankara’s close ties with Moscow, including plans to buy a Russian missile defense system, have alarmed its Western allies.
The history of Erdogan’s position on the Syrian war is a study in shape-shifting. Long before the war started, Erdogan had developed a close relationship with Assad. Their families famously vacationed together in the Turkish resort town of Bodrum in 2008, as the Turkish leader pursued a policy of good relations with all its neighbors, starting with Assad.
Western leaders at the time viewed Erdogan as an example of a moderate Islamist politician who would support democracy, one they hoped other Muslim leaders would emulate.
By the time the civil war started in Syria in 2011, much had already changed. After the early heady days of the Arab Spring, when calls for democracy unexpectedly gave a path to power to political parties aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood across the Middle East, Erdogan tried to become a leader of the revolution. He toured the region to promote Turkey’s model of “Muslim democracy,” even as observers began to question his own commitment to democracy.
When the calls for change reached Damascus and Assad responded by crushing protesters, Erdogan became one of Assad’s fiercest opponents outside Syria. He was one of the first leaders to call for Assad’s ouster and stood firmly with the West in 2011 in saying the Syrian dictator should leave. Erdogan gave safe passage to Islamist fighters through Turkish territory, hoping to see Assad deposed.
Erdogan’s position regarding Syria shifted again in 2015. Tensions between the Turkish state and the country’s minority Kurds had intensified, and the Turkish president started treating Syria within that context. The Islamic State had become a major threat in Syria, and Syrian Kurds had scored the first significant victory against the jihadi group by retaking the key border town of Kobani. For Erdogan, removing Assad took a back seat to the imperative of preventing Kurdish autonomy—but removing Assad was still a goal.
That year, Russia entered Syria to prop up Assad. Putin and Erdogan became two of the principal foreign leaders standing on opposite sides of Syria’s war.
With his finger to the wind, Erdogan has shown a willingness to adjust his position to meet circumstances.
When a Russian fighter jet strayed into Turkish airspace and Turkey shot it down, relations between Moscow and Ankara plummeted. Russia imposed crippling sanctions on Turkey. Imports of Turkish products into Russia collapsed, and Russian tourists stopped visiting Turkish resorts. Then, a series of events shifted Erdogan’s position once again.
In August 2016, the two leaders met in St. Petersburg to try to patch up their differences. The summit achieved something of a détente, with agreements on the need for humanitarian relief, but it highlighted the sharp divergence of views regarding Assad’s future.
Four months later, a gunman in Ankara assassinated Russia’s ambassador to Turkey, shouting “don’t forget Aleppo, don’t forget Syria,” after he pulled the trigger. Oddly, the killing galvanized a further détente between Moscow and Ankara. Perhaps frightened of a crushing Russian response, Erdogan softened his stance. After a phone conversation with Putin following the assassination, Erdogan said that he and Putin “agreed to further strengthen our collaboration particularly in the international fight against terror in the forthcoming days.” Erdogan’s time as Assad’s principal external adversary appeared to be over.
Erdogan stopped antagonizing Russia and Assad, and Russia in turn gave Erdogan more latitude regarding Syria’s Kurds. The next year, Assad met with Putin in Sochi, the Russian resort city on the Black Sea. Soon after, Erdogan also landed in Sochi. After talks with Putin, he said Assad had sent a message via the Russian president that he would oppose Kurdish autonomy. Assad and Putin were agreeing to Erdogan’s goals, and the Turkish leader’s visceral antipathy toward Assad seemed to recede.
When reporters asked if he might restore relations with the Syrian dictator, a man he had thoroughly demonized, Erdogan replied, “In politics, the doors are open until the very last moment … It is not right to rule out anything on this issue.”
But then circumstances changed again, and Erdogan made another sharp pivot. Last December, when Assad was squeezing civilians trapped in the besieged Damascus suburbs of Eastern Ghouta, Erdogan called the Syrian president a “terrorist,” saying it would be “absolutely impossible” to hold Syrian peace talks while Assad remains in power.
In February, when Turkey’s main opposition leader suggested sitting at the table with Assad, Erdogan further fulminated against the Syrian president: “What will we talk about to a murderer who has killed 1 million of his citizens?”
Now the war in Syria is entering a new phase. Soon, the armed conflict will take on a different character, likely that of a continuing but lower-grade insurgency. Russia, Iran and its allied Lebanese militia Hezbollah have turned the war in the Syrian army’s favor. Questions about what happens next in Syria are increasingly political, rather than military, ones. If the recent Ankara summit was meant to establish a new troika to deal with Syria, Erdogan’s support for the recent Western strikes against Assad puts him at odds with his partners in Moscow and Tehran.
In Syria’s complex war, Erdogan is one of the most complicated players. With his finger to the wind, Erdogan has shown a willingness to adjust his position to meet circumstances. His top priority remains blocking Kurdish autonomy. But his antipathy toward Assad remains. In the next stage of Syria’s war, Erdogan may find it useful to repair relations with NATO in order to leverage his membership in the alliance and maximize his influence in negotiations over Syria’s future.
That makes him a difficult partner for Putin, a harsh adversary for the Kurds—and a wily, not altogether trustworthy ally for the West.
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