KEYU JIN
The prospect that President Xi Jinping could remain in power indefinitely has caused much consternation outside China. But within China, and among many serious observers, the elimination of the constitutional term limit on presidential incumbents has attracted a more positive, or at least nuanced, response. In the West, government accountability is closely identified with democratic elections. In China, it is a function of how – and how well – the government responds to and protects the needs and interests of the people. China’s recent constitutional amendment eliminating the term limits for the president and vice president has left much of the West aghast. Critics fear the emergence of a new and unaccountable dictatorship, with President Xi Jinping becoming “Chairman Mao 2.0.” This response is more than a little inappropriate.
Long tenures are not exactly unheard of in the West. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has just begun her fourth four-year term – a development that the rest of Europe has largely welcomed rather than criticized.
Of course, a Westerner might argue that Merkel has an electoral mandate, whereas Xi does not. But democratic elections are not the only way to achieve accountability. And Xi’s approval rating, according to almost all international surveys, seems to exceed the combined approval ratings of US President Donald Trump and UK Prime Minister Theresa May. While there may be reason to worry that Chinese politics could change for the worse, the same is true in the United States and the United Kingdom.
Term limits are little more than an arbitrary constraint, which are not needed to ensure competent and responsive government in China. In fact, term limits could do just the opposite, cutting short the tenure of effective leaders, leading to policy disruptions, or even leading to political chaos.
The US has long recognized this. Alexander Hamilton wrote that it is necessary to give leaders “the inclination and the resolution” to do the best possible job. They can thus prove their merits to the people, who can choose to “prolong the utility of [their leaders’] talents and virtues, and to secure to the government the advantage of permanency in a wise system of administration.”
In 1947, however, following President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s election to four terms in office, Congress enacted the Twenty-Second Amendment to the US Constitution; since its ratification in 1951, US presidents have been limited to two four-year terms. The idea was to make a virtue of inexperience. But most new presidents make significant blunders at the start, and now there are more starts. If the US had no term limits, Trump might well not be in office today.
To be sure, term limits have their value. Deng Xiaoping added them to the Chinese constitution after the Cultural Revolution, in order to prevent the recurrence of chaotic and brutal one-man rule. But the new generation of Chinese leaders is not just well-educated, but also well aware of international norms and standards. Unlike the ideological diehards of the past, they can be expected to behave rationally, intelligently, and responsibly.
In this context, the removal of term limits will enable Xi to sustain a complex reform process that will take years to complete. It will not make him president for life, nor deliver him unbridled and undivided power.
Western critics emphasize that Xi has done much to concentrate power in his own hands over the last six years. And, to some extent, that is true. For example, he has taken over some of the economic policy decisions that used to be the prime minister’s domain.
But a strong leader is not necessarily an autocratic leader. And, in a high-stakes environment, a strong leader is needed to neutralize vested interests that resist crucial reforms. Xi knows the obstacles that blocked the implementation of his initiatives during his first term, and he is committed to overcoming them.
In any case, the situation is hardly a “one-man show,” as much foreign commentary suggests. Half of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, China’s supreme government body, are not of Xi’s choosing. And compromises were made in the placement of many senior officials, including key cabinet members.
It would be a mistake to assume that because China has vowed not to copy the Western political model, there are not hidden democratic processes at work. While leaders are not elected, either directly or by a representative body, their performance is subject to close scrutiny – for example, by the National People’s Congress (NPC) and local people’s congresses. The Chinese government is also unusually responsive to citizens on social media.
Moreover, checks and balances, though still inadequate, have been strengthened in recent years. Policy changes require consensus within the Politburo, especially the Standing Committee. On major issues, the NPC must give the green light. Nothing stops deputies from casting a dissenting vote, thanks in part to the growing prevalence of secret ballots. A small but significant feature of this year’s Congress is the elimination of the electronic voting system; instead, officials will drop paper slips into a ballot box.
This is not the first time that Western media have adopted a perspective on Chinese political developments that runs completely counter to the prevailing view in China itself. Over the last few years, Xi’s anti-corruption drive has raised many eyebrows in the West, where it is often regarded as just a means for Xi to remove would-be political rivals. But the almost two million officials who have been indicted surely weren’t all Xi’s opponents. Among Chinese, the effort to root out corruption has boosted respect and support for Xi.
In the West, government accountability is closely identified with democratic elections. In China, it is a function of how – and how well – the government responds to and protects the needs and interests of the people. Given the sheer complexity of modern China – not to mention the paramount need for the government to continue the country’s progress toward high-income status – success may require leaders to stay in place longer than initially expected. But, if recent history is any guide, the recent changes will contribute to making China’s political and economic system increasingly stable – without undermining accountability.
In a fast-changing world, governance systems must support rapid decision-making under conditions of radical uncertainty, while maintaining accountability. That – not the Western expectation of what a governance system should look like – is the standard by which we should be assessing political developments in China.
HONG KONG – Following China’s “two sessions” – the annual meetings of the national legislature and the top political advisory body – all Western observers, it seems, are discussing the removal of the two-term limit for the president. Xi Jinping, the international media insists, is consolidating power, and may even be laying the groundwork for a Mao Zedong-style personality cult. But this reading is fundamentally flawed.
The predominant Western view that Xi’s growing authority represents a dangerous trend partly reflects anxiety over growing challenges to democracy in the United States and across Europe. But it makes little sense to view Chinese political developments through a Western lens, especially at a time when the world is shifting from a unipolar to a multipolar system.
Recent changes in China should instead be regarded as part of a broader process, in which competing systems of governance are emerging to cope with complex, globally connected challenges, such as disruptive technologies, geopolitical rivalries, climate change, and demographic shifts. In short, countries are trying to find their governance footing.
In a fast-changing world, governance systems must support rapid decision-making under conditions of radical uncertainty, while maintaining accountability. That – not the Western expectation of what a governance system should look like – is the standard by which we should be assessing political developments in China.
In fact, Western-style governance no longer looks like the gold standard its advocates long proclaimed it to be. Western democracies are facing serious internal threats – most notably, populist forces espousing dangerous policies like trade protectionism – that have risen largely in response to these systems’ failure to manage problems such as income inequality, political polarization, rising debt, and failing infrastructure.
That failure partly reflects the short-termism that tends to dominate in Western democracies, where short electoral cycles (from about six months to four years) often compel politicians to focus on cyclical issues, rather than on structural impediments to long-term productivity gains and income growth. (Similarly, Western companies tend to base their operations on quarterly results, and thus may neglect long-term risks and opportunities.)
By contrast, when China’s leaders formulate and execute policies, they tend to think in terms of decades. This is vital to enable an effective response to the structural problems – such as corruption, environmental pollution, and inequality – that more than two generations of rapid growth and development have brought.
The current bureaucracy, working within its silos, is already addressing these problems, in order to create a more equitable society that is also innovative and adaptable. Only then can China escape the infamous “middle-income trap” before population aging begins to take a higher toll on economic growth.
More broadly, China’s leaders have set a 30-year target for modernizing the country’s economy and governance – a long-term goal that reflects the kind of vision that few countries have managed to articulate, let alone implement. By removing the presidential term limit, China’s leadership is improving its chances of success, by opening the way for Xi and his vice president, Wang Qishan, to go further in realizing this vision.
Xi and Wang are seasoned politicians with extensive experience dealing with crises and managing complex institutional and social challenges, from the local to the global level. Both have a strong grasp of history, as well as the charisma and will needed to confront recalcitrant vested interests. Their continued leadership is thus invaluable.
But this does not mean that accountability will be lost. On the contrary, the National People’s Congress has approved a major overhaul of China’s governance structure, creating a new National Supervision Commission to check corruption by all Chinese officials, regardless of their affiliations or status in the Communist Party of China.
The State Council has also been restructured, with ministries, commissions, and agencies consolidated and streamlined to manage reforms in a more coordinated and efficient way. For example, agriculture and rural affairs have been combined under one ministry, as have all environmental issues.
Likewise, in order to reduce financial-sector risks (including excessive leverage and shadow banking), regulation of banking and insurance have been consolidated under the new China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission. These sweeping institutional reforms would make China’s governance structure look functionally similar to American and European counterparts.
Like Xi and Wang, officials at these institutions are dedicated, competent, and experienced reformers. Assisting Premier Li Keqiang will be the Harvard-educated vice premier Liu He, who has spent more than 30 years in long-term development planning, and has a deep understanding of how market forces can support efficient resource allocation. Financial reforms are in the hands of People’s Bank of China Governor Yi Gang, a US-educated economist, and the chairman of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, Guo Shuqing, an Oxford-trained economist with experience in provincial leadership, central banking, and securities regulation.
Two thousand years ago, the Chinese philosopher Han Fei argued that effective governance required three things: the rule of law, bureaucratic tools, and political will. Changing laws or honing the tools of governance is important, but they mean little without sustained and determined efforts by political leaders. China’s system has survived because its leaders have been willing to confront market failures and administrative deficiencies in a direct and consistent manner. New efforts to boost accountability – vital to reinforce legitimacy – will strengthen the system further.
China, like the US and Europe, is too big to fail. It thus has a responsibility to develop a system of governance that can deliver structural changes to its economy and society, while ensuring effective accountability. The test is whether that system adapts to long-term challenges and contributes to national and global wellbeing, not whether it adheres to Western standards.
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