Gordon G. Chang
The Party in the post–Mao era has been able to manage its “miraculous” rise in large part because of an extraordinarily benign and supportive international environment. For more than four decades, for example, U.S. presidents have believed it was in America’s interests to support the integration of China into the international system. Other countries have even longer histories of “engagement” of Beijing. Engagement was premised on the notion that China’s political system and economy would evolve in positive directions, and Americans and others acted accordingly.
Xi, by trying to hold onto a ceremonial post, has made it clear that his vision for the country is more Maoist than modern. That, by itself, reduces the incentive to continue generous—and often indulgent—approaches to Beijing.
The risk for Xi is clear. The increasingly pro-Beijing South China Morning Post captured the mood of the moment in a headline on Monday: “End to Term Limits at the Top May Be Start of Global Backlash for China, Analysts Say.”
Moreover, if China is fragile, as some are now correctly arguing, there will be even less reason to believe that Beijing must be accommodated. These days, and as far back as the Clinton presidency, many have maintained it would not be wise to upset the future owner of the twenty-first century.
In the last few days, the view of a dominant China is being questioned. As Tom Pepinsky of Cornell University tweeted Sunday, “I’m no China expert, but centralizing power in the hands of one leader sounds like the most typical thing that a decaying authoritarian state would do.”
In short, China is beginning to appear weak as well as hostile and dangerous.
That is not a formula for success for a country that still needs a supportive environment. In fact, it looks like a recipe for regime failure.
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