John P. Sullivan, José de Arimatéia da Cruz and Robert J. Bunker
Brazil’s gangs are challenging the state and each other in a contest for power. The powerful Primeiro Comando da Capital (First Command of the Capital or PCC) is at war with the Comando Vermelho (Red Command or CV) and its allies for control of the nation’s prisons, favelas, and lucrative criminal enterprises—including drug trafficking. As part of this deadly competition, the gangs are alleged to wield corrupt influence over politics—funding elections and bribing political officials. In the latest accusations, Wálter Maierovitch, a retired São Paulo judge and mafia scholar, raises concerns that the PCC is infiltrating political processes to elude state interference. He is concerned that this mafia-or narco-politics (narcopolitica) will extend to interference in Brazil’s upcoming national elections in October.
Key Information: Flávio Costa and Vinícius Andrade (Arman Kazemi, Trans.). “The Power of Crime: Ties Between Drug Trafficking and Politics in Brazil.” RioOnWatch. 8 January 2018, http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=40620:
“Drug trafficking finances electoral campaigns.”
Marcinho VP [a Commando Vermelho leader] likes to write. He claims to have been the target of “injustice” and, to defend his claim, he published a book titled “Marcinho Truths and Positions—Criminal Law of the Enemy” (Marcinho Verdades e Posições—Direito Penal do Inimigo) on October 21. The work was coauthored with journalist Renato Homem. The inmate recounts his career in the world of crime, denies the accusations against him, recalls his associates, weighs in on politics and Operation Car Wash’s corruption investigations, and attacks former governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral Filho of the PMDB party, for whom he claims to have given campaign favors in 1996. “He’s the head of the biggest criminal organization in Rio de Janeiro.”
… “Drug trafficking doesn’t stop because it finances political campaigns in Brazil,” he claims. “Trafficking is dangerous and deadly, but corruption is Brazil’s most lethal crime.”
…“Whether intentional or not, crime plays a huge social role in the favelas. The UPP has simply been an occupying force. Everything that crime has offered these communities, the State will need to replace. For example, basic commodities, medicine, doctors, access to healthcare. All kinds of support. Crime fills a vacuum left by the State.”
…In 2006 he was thought to be one of the masterminds behind a series of attacks orchestrated by the Comando Vermelho against Military Police bases, offices, and other public buildings, which resulted in the deaths of 19 people. His transfer to a federal facility was a direct result of this case.
Marcinho blames Cabral for his transfer to Mossoró. Currently behind bars thanks to the ongoing Operation Car Wash investigations, the former governor is a constant target of criticism in the book. “He’s the biggest Judas I’ve ever known,” writes Marcinho VP, in one excerpt.
In the book, he claims to have given campaign favors to the politician in 1996 during the Rio municipal elections. “He was in my private venue box seated, eating, drinking, complimenting me. I helped him with a team of canvassers. I got nothing out of it,” he says. “I won him about 50,000 votes in Complexo do Alemão,” he adds.
Key Information: João Fellet, “PCC financia igrejas e pode influenciar eleição, diz ex-desembargador.” BBC Brasil. 11 January 2018, http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-42643310:
Há décadas estudando a ação de organizações criminosas, o desembargador aposentado Wálter Maierovitch diz que o fortalecimento da maior facção brasileira, o Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), e o acirramento de conflitos entre gangues nos Estados podem impactar as eleições deste ano.
Em entrevista à BBC Brasil, Maierovitch diz que o PCC ainda não alcançou o peso econômico de antigos grupos mafiosos italianos ou de cartéis colombianos e marroquinos. Mas diz que a facção paulista vem expandido sua atuação e tem força suficiente para influenciar a votação em outubro.
Segundo o desembargador, há relatos de que o PCC patrocina eventos de igrejas na periferia de São Paulo. Afirma ainda que facções criminosas têm interesse em se infiltrar no poder político para costurar acordos que reduzam a repressão policial em certas áreas. Segundo ele, um acordo desse tipo já vigora na periferia de São Paulo…
…A preocupação de que facções influenciem o resultado da eleição deste ano já foi ecoada pelo presidente do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), Gilmar Mendes, e pelo ministro do Gabinete de Segurança Institucional da Presidência, Sérgio Etchegoyen. Ambos têm dito que o fim da possibilidade de que empresas façam doações eleitorais abrem espaço para que o crime organizado financie candidatos por fora.
Key Information: “Desembargador diz que PCC financia igrejas e pode influenciar eleição.” AM Post. 11 January 2018, http://ampost.com.br/2018/01/desembargador-diz-que-pcc-financia-igrejas-e-pode-influenciar-eleicao/?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=socialnetwork:
O desembargador aposentado Walter Maierovitch…, que se dedica a estudar a ação de organizações criminosas, afirma que o fortalecimento do Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) e o aumento de conflitos entre as gangues podem ter impacto no resultado das eleições deste ano.
Maierovitch explicou em entrevista à ‘BBC’ que o PCC – maior facção do Brasil – ainda não alcançou a importância econômico de antigos grupos mafiosos italianos ou de cartéis colombianos e marroquinos, mas vem expandido a sua atuação e tem força suficiente para influenciar as próximas eleições.
O especialista cita que há relatos de que o grupo paulista patrocine eventos de igrejas na periferia de São Paulo.
De acordo com ele, facções criminosas costumam se infiltrar no poder político para fazer acordos que reduzam a repressão policial, o que, segundo ele, já acontece na periferia da capital paulista.
Key Information: Pedro L. Macêdo, “A expansão da lei do silêncio.” DM/Cotidiano. 12 January 2018, https://www.dm.com.br/cotidiano/2018/01/a-expansao-da-lei-do-silencio.html:
A sombra do PCC e de outras organizações criminosas pode se firmar nas eleições
Organizações criminosas como o Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), Comando Vermelho (CV) ou outras, mais ou menos conhecidas e influentes, podem ver as campanhas eleitorais deste ano como uma oportunidade ímpar para expandir seu poder de influência e zonas de operação. O acirramento de conflitos entre essas organizações, observado em vários estados brasileiros, irão ditar e motivar tais facções a organizar suas estratégias, a fim de encontrarem apoio vindo dos poderes Legislativo e Executivo.
Key Information: Jefferson Ribeiro, “‘Temo pelo financiamento das eleicoes por organizacoes criminosas,’ diz Gilmar Mendes.” O Globo. 10 August 2017, https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/temo-pelo-financiamento-das-eleicoes-por-organizacoes-criminosas-diz-gilmar-mendes-21922460:
Eu temo muito pelo financiamento das eleições por organizações as mais diversas, inclusive as criminosas. Já temos casos de países em que o crime financia as eleições, como o México. No Rio, temos o problema do tráfico, das milícias, que é notório. Para colocarmos urnas nas favelas precisamos de blindados da Marinha. Portanto, a liberdade do voto está fortemente ameaçada. Em São Paulo, já se fala que o PCC elegeu vereadores na Câmara da capital. No Amazonas, a calha do (rio) Solimões vem sendo utilizada pelos traficantes e se diz que algumas prefeituras foram tomadas por eles. No Maranhão, nós acompanhamos a situação de agiotas financiando as eleições, com dinheiro que viria do PCC. Tudo isso é preocupante e não podemos querer que o quadro da política no Brasil, que já não é exemplar, se torne ainda pior.
Key Information: Silvia Amorim, Tiago Dantas and Sergio Roxo, “Em São Paulo, ligação de facção com eleiçōes é apurada.” O Globo. 29 August 2016, https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/em-sao-paulo-ligacao-de-faccao-com-eleicoes-apurada-20197706:
Em São Paulo, os primeiros indícios de que a facção criminosa que atua dentro e fora dos presídios do estado tentava expandir seus tentáculos para a política surgiram nas eleições de 2010. Até hoje, nada se provou sobre a influência do crime organizado em campanhas eleitorais, mas, a cada disputa, aparecem candidatos apontados por terem ligação com o grupo criminoso.
Key Information: Vladimir Platonow, “Rio: Ministro alerta para atuação do tráfico e da milícia na próxima eleição.” Agência Brasil. 10 July 2017, http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2017-10/rio-ministro-alerta-para-atuacao-do-trafico-e-da-milicia-na-proxima-eleicao:
A força do crime organizado em comunidades e favelas do Rio de Janeiro, incluindo o tráfico de drogas e milícias, será um desafio a ser superado nas eleições do próximo ano, avaliou hoje (6) o ministro da Justiça, Torquato Jardim.
Third Generation Gang Analysis
Concerns that criminal gangs can corrupt and co-opt states are not new. Indeed, mafia-and narco-politics (narcopolitica) are contemporary concerns throughout Latin America. These concerns have been characterized as criminal insurgencies and co-opted state reconfiguration (CStR).[1] Both the Primeiro Comando da Capital (First Capital Command-PCC) and the Comando Vermelho (Red Command-CV) have been considered in this context.[2] Most recently, these concerns have been raised by Wálter Maierovitch, a retired judge (in the Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo) and national antidrug secretary (Secretaria Nacional de Políticas Antidroga).
Maierovitch, a mafia scholar, warns that the PCC is becoming more powerful, embracing social activism (including funding church functions)[3] and potentially influencing Brazil’s upcoming elections in October. These concerns are shared by Gilmar Mendes, the president of the Supreme Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral) (TSE) and Sérgio Etchegoyen, minister of Institutional Security in the Office of the President (ministro do Gabinete de Segurança Institucional da Presidência).[4] In addition to these concerns, Marcinho VP, a prisoner believed to be a key leader in Rio’s Red Command (Comando Verhelo-CV) asserts that “Drug trafficking finances electoral campaigns” (“Tráfico de drogas financia campanhas”) and that “Corrupt politicians make up the largest criminal organization” (“Corruptos formam a maior organização criminosa”).[5]
The extent of criminal gang penetration in Brazil’s political processes are unknown. Nevertheless, there are strong indications that it is a concern. As noted by Ribeiro, funding for the upcoming elections is likely to include criminal sources and PCC-influenced legislators are suspected.[6] In São Paulo, the PCC has been suspected of expanding its reach from the prisons and streets into politics since at least 2010.[7]
Indeed, in 2010 the PCC attempted to place a candidate on the slate for deputy in the São Paulo Legislative Assembly.[8] That attempt was unsuccessful as were previous attempts dating back to 2002.[9] In addition to attempting to run candidates, the PCC has also been accused of using corruption and assassinations to influence political processes. Links to corrupt police officers and a scheme to assassinate Governor Geraldo Alkmin in São Paulo were also uncovered in 2010.[10]
In 2014, gangs in Rio reportedly charged candidates to hang campaign posters or electioneer on gang-controlled turf. According to an Al Jazeera report, “Candidates are routinely told they must pay for access. Depending on the size and influence of the favela, a politician might be asked to pay $4,000 to $20,000 to campaign there, up to $40,000 to do so exclusively or as much as $120,000 for the support of a gang leader, which can supposedly secure victory.”[11] Politicians that don’t pay the street tax are threatened. In the words of one candidate, Cidinha Camos a deputy in Rio de Janeiro’s state legislature, gangsters armed with assault rifles approached his campaign workers, who were replacing burned posters that had been ripped off the walls, saying “the area was owned and if they didn’t leave right away, they would set fire to our Kombi van with my campaigners inside.”[12] This intimidation is one factor in gang political interference. Violent attacks, corruption, and collusion are the others.
There is increasing evidence that the gangs are aligning with Evangelical Christian sects to exert political influence. This trend where ‘Evangelical Bandits’ (bandidos evangélicos) have led to violent attacks reminiscent of Europe’s pre-Westphalian Wars of Religion in Brazil’s favelas.[13] According to a recent Financial Times article, some of these “attacks come as the evangelical churches are positioning themselves to be kingmakers in elections next year.”[14] Through personal conversation with one of the authors, two Evangelical ministers have said that they have not been approached by any criminal organization but they know that gangs are active in the churches since many pastors have an association with one candidate or another. Likewise, the potential for disruption or the extent of corrupt influences on October’s election are unknown. Despite this uncertainty, Brazil’s Justice Minister Torquato Jardim believes that the strength of organized crime will be a challenge to the forthcoming elections.[15] This evolving situation warrants monitoring and assessment.
The situation in Brazil is indicative of the growing political power of gangs that is currently manifesting itself globally. In states with low levels of political capacity—many of which are clustered in Latin America—such entities are increasingly transitioning from solely a law enforcement issue to a full-blown national security concern as they directly challenge sovereign prerogative and authority. Weak institutions of statehood are being targeted and co-opted with a mixture of violence and corruptive influences by a bewildering array of belligerent (and well-armed) non-state actors—gangs, posses, bands, brigands, commands, militias, et. al. This phenomena has been analyzed by a growing cadre of international security researchers—including Martin van Creveld,[16] Max Manwaring[17] and Ioan Grillo[18], as well as some of the authors of this note. It is indicative of the rise of power-seeking 3rd generation gangs (such as the PCC & CV) and the criminal insurgency form associated with them and the Mexican cartels.[19] Ultimately, it is representative of epochal change (e.g., the transition from a modern to a postmodern international system) which portends the privatization of public goods such as security, state fragmentation, and the outbreak of warlordism within weak political capacity states as the Westphalian model of statehood becomes increasingly challenged as an archetype of social and political organization in the early 21st century.[20]
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