Steven Metz
Soon after 9/11, President George W. Bush recognized that the United States needed Pakistan’s cooperation to eradicate the training camps in Afghanistan where al-Qaida planned the attacks. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf declared that his nation was a full partner in the new “war on terror.” A few years later, Bush designated Pakistan a major non-NATO ally. Since 2002, Pakistan has received more than $33 billion in economic and security assistance from the United States, while the American military greatly expanded cooperation with its Pakistani counterpart.
But this was always a deeply troubled partnership. Pakistan, especially the politically dominant Pakistani military, defined its national interests very differently than the United States, seeing a weak or conflict-ridden Afghanistan as a benefit rather than a threat. As a result, Pakistan provided sanctuary to some extremist groups targeted by the United States or, at least, did not make a major effort to exterminate or expel them. For years, the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network have killed Americans in Afghanistan, then retreated to their bases in Pakistan. Al-Qaida’s leaders, including Osama bin Laden and his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri, have lived in and plotted from Pakistan, as did long-time Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar.
The Bush and Obama administrations struggled mightily with this problem. They recognized the importance of intelligence-sharing with Pakistan and depended on Pakistani ports to support the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan. But they were also appalled at Islamabad’s support for extremist movements. Both administrations tried a variety of means to alter Pakistani behavior, blending threats and inducements. Nothing worked.
The Trump administration, though, is more inclined to sticks than carrots. In an August speech, President Donald Trump declared that “We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond.” He notified Congress that he intended to make U.S. military assistance contingent on Pakistan cracking down on extremist networks operating from within its borders.
Unfortunately, this didn’t have much effect. After all, Islamabad had heard it before. Then, on Jan. 1, Trump tweeted, “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!” Days later, the U.S. announced it was suspending all military aid to Pakistan.
Unsurprisingly, Pakistan fired back, accusing the United States of “betrayal,” among other things. While some security experts and even policymakers like Secretary of Defense James Mattis attempted to build a political firebreak between Islamabad and the Trump administration, there is a real chance the relationship will continue its downward spiral.
If Washington were willing to walk away from Afghanistan and Pakistan, it would immediately gain significant leverage over both.If this happens, America’s Afghanistan strategy will no longer be viable. Not only does the United States depend on moving supplies and equipment across Pakistan, but Islamabad also plays a major political role in Afghanistan. There can be no political solution to the tragic Afghan war without Pakistan’s blessing. A few years ago, this was a major reason for tolerating Pakistan’s support for terrorist movements, but now it is not.
While the United States has a deep psychological and ethical stake in Afghanistan, from a strictly security perspective, it might not actually matter if the U.S.-Pakistan relationship collapses, largely because U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is based on a flawed assumption. As Micah Zenko and Amelia Mae Wolf pointed out in an astute 2015 essay, the “premise for the war in Afghanistan”—and much of America’s wider strategy against transnational Islamist extremism—was the belief that terrorists need a safe haven to plan and launch attacks against the United States.
Even if that was true then, it no longer is. Today violent Islamist extremism has become decentralized. Its leaders do not need to be in the same physical location to plan or inspire attacks. Nor do the low-tech terrorists that extremist movements rely on need elaborate training. In a very real sense, the internet and global connectivity have undercut the counterterrorism strategy that the United States has implemented since 9/11.
So what does this mean for U.S.-Pakistan relations? C. Christine Fair argues that with the Trump administration cutting off aid to Pakistan, the United States “may well stumble into a foreign policy success.” While the surge of U.S. troops in Afghanistan during the Obama administration required the use of Pakistani ports and roads, the current lower profile American position, Fair believes, could be sustained solely by air supply, freeing the United States from dependence on Pakistan.
What could change the entire game, though, is if the United States jettisoned the flawed and obsolete idea that Afghanistan is a vital American interest, which is based on the thinking that if the Taliban wins in whole or in part, it will provide al-Qaida with territory to plan attacks against the United States. If Washington were willing to walk away from Afghanistan and Pakistan, it would immediately gain significant leverage over both. This could signal a new U.S. strategy against extremism that is both acceptably effective and considerably more efficient.
The United States and Pakistan have been strategic partners of one type or the other for many decades. The very different security priorities of the two have always made this a difficult relationship. But now it may not matter if it collapses altogether.
Steven Metz is the author of “Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy.” His weekly WPR column, Strategic Horizons, appears every Friday. You can follow him on Twitter @steven_metz.
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