Since there were first soldiers the weight they have carried has been subject to cyclical variation. The upward trend that saw its zenith during operations in Afghanistan is now subject to a realisation that it is both unsustainable and undesirable.
The Recurring Problem of Overburdened Soldiers
None of this is new, the Athenian General Iphicrates was widely credited with introducing a light force (Peltasts) that enabled them to overcome the much heavier armed and armoured Spartans at the Battle of Lechaeum. Increasing the length of their weapons and reducing the weight of their armour resulted in a force with increased mobility and firepower at the cost of protection. During the Thirty Years War, Gustav Adolphus of Sweden often called the Father of Modern Warfare, favoured the use of combined arms where mobility was emphasised.
During the many reforms after the Crimean War, the subject of weight upon the soldier was studied. The 1865 ‘Report of the committee appointed to inquire into the effect on the health of the present system of carrying the accoutrements, ammunition, and kit of infantry soldiers, and drill &c. of recruits.’ was followed up with a second report in 1868 titled ‘The Second report of the committee appointed to inquire into the effect of the present system of accoutrements and knapsacks on the health of the infantry soldier.”
A third report, available here, its introduction had an excellent summary of the problem;
The soldier must be well fed: he is. The soldier must be well clothed: he is. The soldier must be well trained: he is. The soldier must transport a reasonable amount of equipment and personal belongings, but there is a limit to his performing the dual role of beast of burden and fighting soldier
It also warned against believing mythical tales of long road marches carrying extraordinary loads, from Romans Legionaries to British soldiers in the Peninsular War, myths were debunked with fact. The report concluded that the ‘fighting value of a soldier is in inverse proportion to load he carries’.
With improvements in load carrying (packs and pouches), the maximum load was approximately 27kg. Work continued on both reducing the load, tailoring those loads to the application and determining the best means of carrying loads. The Boer War reinforced lessons about infantry loads, an 1899 extract from CO’s reports stated;
‘As regards the kit a man should actually carry, my opinions are entirely derived from regimental experience as a company officer in three campaigns in India and as a Commanding Officer in this campaign. I am strongly of opinion that the less weight we put on our men’s backs the better results we shall get, and for two reasons:-
I believe that, other things being equal in actual battle, the lighter equipped of two combatants, and the least encumbered by extraneous articles, will win the day; he is at any rate the best adapted to take cover or to get rapidly across an exposed zone.
I do not consider our men are naturally good marchers; British troops have never had that reputation, but with strict marching discipline they can be taught to march well, and the lighter they are equipped the easier it is to teach them. I have frequently heard the argument adduced that foreign soldiers carry “so much” therefore we must train our men to carry a like amount. I do not believe that many of the overloaded soldiers could fight a modern battle without throwing away a portion of their equipment.’
Reductions swiftly followed but by the start of WWI, weights had risen to 26kg. Despite some measures to reduce this, the demands of trench warfare with the increasing need to carry hand grenades, gas masks and cold weather clothing meant by the end of the war, average weights were approximately 30kg. Reports noted that infantry were so encumbered that they were only able to close with the enemy by virtue of supporting fire, one even attributed some of the failure of the Dardanelles campaign to over encumbered soldiers.
During WWII, the same problems occurred.
In the initial assault waves at Omaha Beachhead there were companies whose men started ashore, each with four cartons of cigarettes in his pack—as if the object of the operation was trading with the French. Some never made the shore because of the cigarettes. They dropped into deep holes during the wade-in, or fell into the tide nicked by a bullet. Then they soaked up so much weight they could not rise again. They drowned. Some were carried out to sea but the great number were cast up on the beach. It impressed the survivors unforgettably—that line of dead men along the sand, many of whom had received but trifling wounds. . . . No one can say with authority whether more men died directly from enemy fire than perished because of the excess weight that made them easy victims of the water. . . . This almost cost us the beachhead. Since it is the same kind of mistake that armies and their commanders have been making for centuries, there is every reason to believe it will happen again.
After exposure to combat operations, weights tended to fall as soldiers discarded all that was not essential, the image below shows Polish soldiers at Cassino taking ‘fight light’ to the extremes!
Since then, there has been a depressingly regular round of studies before and after conflict from any number of nations that all conclude the same; infantry loads are too great. Not only are ‘approved loads’ too high but ‘actual loads’ are way too high, an important distinction because the reality of uncertain and fragile logistics means confidence in resupply can be low, resulting in soldiers carrying more of everything, just in case.
Iraq, and particularly Afghanistan, again pushed the carried weights up, recommended marching order weights were hugely exceeded in fighting order. Injuries and reductions in combat mobility were the results.
The average carried weight for Operation HERRICK was a whopping 56kg or 123 Pounds
Attacking the British strategy in Helmand, the officer claims that soldiers are now so laden with equipment they are unable to launch effective attacks against insurgents. The controversial account of the situation in Afghanistan appears in the latest issue British Army Review, a restricted military publication designed to provoke debate within the Army.
Writing anonymously, the author reveals that the Taliban have dubbed British soldiers “donkeys” who move in a tactical “waddle” because they now carry an average weight of 110lbs worth of equipment into battle. The consequences of the strategy, he says, is that “our infantry find it almost impossible to close with the enemy because the bad guys are twice as mobile”.
The officer claims that by the end of a routine four-hour patrol, soldiers struggle to make basic tactical judgements because they are physically and mentally exhausted. Attacking the British strategy in Helmand, the officer claims that soldiers are now so laden with the equipment they are unable to launch effective attacks against insurgents.
The original article reproduced here, leaves with a very interesting quote;
If we don’t work out now how we are going to lose that weight we will do the old trick of starting the next war by repeating the mistakes of this one.
The next war may well be against an enemy more able to punish this approach.
The Operation Herrick Campaign Study devoted a whole chapter to protection and ‘weight on the man’
This clearly recognises the problem of increasing weight driven by a reduction in risk tolerance and describes three key projects that are in progress to address the issue; VIRTUS, PAYNE and ATLAS.
More on these later.
The Impacts of Weight and the Need for Less of It
The carriage of equipment resulting in weight increases has three principal effects;
Injury
Load carriage will inevitably result in musculoskeletal and soft tissue injuries. Some of these injuries are due to accumulations of smaller injuries over time, common in those that repeatedly carry large loads.
Foot blisters and subsequent infection, stress fractures, knee injuries, digitalgia and meralgia in the lower limbs, brachial plexus palsy (backpack palsy) and injuries to the pelvis and lower back all increase in line with increasing weight stresses and are often compounded as weights increase.
Mounted personnel, when dismounting, can be subject to excessive stress and vibration induced injury can also be compounded by excess weights.
Gender also impacts the types and incidence of injury when subject to excessive weights.
Whilst many of these can be reduced with training and equipment design, as the British Army has reduced in size, the proportion of soldiers medically downgraded due to excess weight carriage must be reduced.
Mobility
Energy costs due to loads are commonly reported in terms of kilojoule (kJ) per unit of time or oxygen uptake. A number of studies have been completed that allow a reasonably accurate prediction of the energy cost of multiple activities in different environments.
Comparing this with an individual’s maximum aerobic capacity allows some measure of sustainment. Task intensity measured against individual capacity provides a good way of defining how weight can impact performance e.g. the more intense the activity the less time it can be sustained, and vice versa.
The graph on the right shows walking speed energy use at different external loads, from 20kg to 50kg. If the reference is 20Kg external load, 3km/hr on a flat firm surface, increasing the weight to 30kg results in an energy requirement increase of 12% but if the weight is increased to 50kg, it goes up by 50%.
This can be translated into rules of thumb for weights and speeds, characterised by the table below.
Duration task, terrain, climate, altitude and individual fitness will all have an influence but as one might expect, more weight makes every task harder and/or slower.
Recent studies (Silk 2010) demonstrated an average decrease in soldier mobility performance of 1,5% for every 1kg carried. Another study (Basaan 2005) looked at the time to complete an obstacle course and found that for every 1kg increase in external load (between 15 and 42kg) the time to complete increased by just under 8 seconds.
Other
There is a range of other factors that can impact the ability of a soldier to complete tasks. One example is exiting a vehicle quickly, snag hazards from bulky loads and simply the too much weight will hinder the ability to do that quickly.
In addition to physical factors, exhaustion from excess weight can reduce cognition and the ability to make sound decisions and operate complex equipment. Muscle fatigue will markedly decrease weapon accuracy, requiring a far greater weight of fire (and more weight).
When carrying heavy equipment it has been shown that the overlooking of visual clues to threats and decreases reaction times.
In summary, mental alertness will decrease with increasing weight.
Strategies to Reduce or Mitigate the Load
More weight causes increasing numbers and severity of injuries decreased mobility, survivability and judgement. None of this is a surprise, it has been known for centuries, if not longer. Many studies are available and funnily enough, they all conclude the same things.
Whilst the absolute weight has increased over time the relative weight has remained, except for recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan where both have increased markedly. All this despite the advances in electronic miniaturisation, power density and logistics availability.
It is, therefore, an enduring requirement to mitigate the effects of excess weight but given the recurring nature of the problem, it is abundantly clear that doing something about it is much more difficult than talking about it.
There are a number of potential strategies, none of them magic or seen in isolation.
Risk Management
Training and Conditioning
Equipment Weight Reduction
Carriage Assistance
The first three on this page and Carriage Support in Part 2
Risk Management
The issue of risk management was accurately described in the Herrick Campaign Study.
This is probably the most significant challenge that faces the Army in terms of ‘weight on the man’ because it requires an organisational shift and unwavering support from the chain of command all the way up to ministerial level. If local commanders are not confident that a risk-based decision to reduce weight by reducing protective equipment will be backed, they will simply default to the lowest risk approach, regardless of mission success or even actual survivability.
Local commanders cannot second guess post-conflict litigation against the Human Rights Act or Coroners Courts judgements whilst making decisions.
If we are to practice mission command, this means empowering local commanders to adjust weights as they see fit and eliminating the long-handled post-conflict legal screwdriver.
Training and Conditioning
In recent years there have been many advances in understanding biomechanics and how training and physical conditioning programmes can be tailored to individuals and collective requirements.
Implementing individual training programmes based on soldiers specialisms and starting points may be expensive but if it yields lower injury rates and improved ability to cope with the excess weight it could yield significant benefits that outweigh costs. Modern load carriage equipment like Virtus are increasingly person specific and this would simply be extended to include training.
As dismounted combat roles become open to women, this individual approach to training may be needed even more so
Load Carriage Equipment and Carrying Smart
Weight is only one part of the equation, the carriage and distribution of that weight can either reduce or increase the impact. Tailoring equipment carried depending on the phase of an operation also allows weights to be mitigated, marching and fighting order (CEMO and CEFO of old) are well-established concepts and load carriage equipment would reflect this.
Project PAYNE sprung from Afghanistan observations and the dramatic increase in weights. Although some think the name is a humorous play on words, it comes from Fusilier Tom Payne, 11 Platoon, B Company, 6 Royal Welch Fusiliers, a soldier from WWII used to illustrate some of the points about weight.
It proposed a scalable and appropriate approach to both firepower and load carriage. Load carriage would include;
Immediate Level 1 (IL1) – Vest
Immediate Level 2 (IL2) – Belt
Immediate Level 3 (IL3) – Daysack
Support Level 1 (S1) – Bergen
Support Level 2 (S2) – Holdall
Without going into too much detail, each level would hold different amounts of equipment that would be carried or dropped off at different stages in an operation. It is an intelligent approach to carrying only equipment relevant to the demand at any given point in time.
Project Virtus is aimed at delivering a new body armour system for infantry which will increase agility and make it easier to carry heavy equipment. Established by UK Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S), Virtus replaces the Personal Equipment and Common Operational Clothing (PECOC) project. As the foundation of infantry Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), Virtus will deliver an integrated head, torso and load carriage system with a built-in quick release capability. It will be used by dismounted close-combat soldiers including soldiers, marines and airmen involved on land, littoral manoeuvre and ground support to air operations.
One of the key features of Virtus is scalability.
The Scalable Tactical Vest (STV) can be used for load carriage without any armour; as a fragmentation vest with soft armour padding consisting of a composite granular material but no hard plates; as a plate carrier with no soft armour; or as a full body armour system with soft and hard armour. It is compatible with both Osprey and Enhanced Combat Body Armour. Any combination of front, rear or side plates can be employed.
The rest of the system is equally integrated and scalable.
A new, lighter helmet will provide increased blunt impact protection, face and mandible guards for certain roles and a shape that is designed to work with the armour and daysack so weapons can be comfortably used even in a prone position. One of the most radical innovations is an integral ‘spine’ – the ‘dynamic weight distribution’ system. The device is linked to the user’s waist belt and helps spread the load of the body armour, a Bergen or daysack across the back, shoulders and hips. A lightweight webbing system is designed to be worn under and integrated with the body armour. Both the daysack and Bergen are fully integrated with the rest of the torso sub-system. This ensures that they are carried close to the body preventing excessive movement of the load but without pushing the rear ballistic plate into the body. Both can be used in conjunction with the dynamic weight distribution system. Pouches are made from one piece of fabric and fold flat when empty, minimising profile and the possibility of snagging. The dynamic weight distribution system contains a hard spine that takes the load and is linked to a hip belt. This allows the soldier to transfer the weight of his load from the shoulders to the hips or the other way via an adjuster positioned in the small of the back. The Virtus helmet has a fixed shroud for the mounting of night vision goggles and a counterweight for neck comfort. Its fit can be easily adjusted in the same way as modern cycling and climbing helmets. The sculpted rear prevents interference with body armour or daysack when adopting a prone fire position. It provides more protection to the side of the head and is 350g lighter than the Mk7 it succeeds. The helmet can be fitted with both mandible guard and visor, or either, which provide face protection for crews in open vehicles such as Jackal or WMIK.
Of course, no new load carriage system will be without its problems and Virtus was no different but it is likely to evolve and improve and represents what I think is a genuine innovation. Above all, it supports the concept of scalability (I might have said that once or twice above!)
The excellent UK Land Power blog collated a list of current infantry loads recently, click here to read it, broken down by category and in four groups;
On the Soldier, 18.96kg
Assault Order, 12.55kg
Patrol Order, 16.26kg
Marching Order, 16.17kg
On the Soldier and Assault Order together weigh 31.5kg, marching order tops out at just under 64kg.
This is with the latest Virtus load carriage equipment ECBA plates and represents a ‘standard rifleman’.
As noted, not on the list are radios beyond the Personal Role Radio, support weapons, ECM, weapons other than SA80, breaching equipment, Vallon, the Underslung Grenade Launcher (including FCS), 7.62mm link and various items of ISTAR equipment.
It is therefore on the light side of what will actually be carried.
So no matter what the weight reductions of some parts of Virtus it is still some way off the accepted maximum of 40kg and target of 25kg for the ‘Energy Efficient Soldier’
So in a nutshell, Virtus and Payne aren’t enough to get anywhere near our objective.
If we truly want to reduce combat loads, after having addressed the above, logically, there are only two remaining options;
Make stuff lighter
Provide assistance
Make Stuff Lighter
Equipment carried can be broadly described as personal and collective.
It is often the collective equipment that both piles on the weight and has less focus on weight reduction; ECM, batteries, spare link, GPMG SF tripods, mortars and mortar bombs, Javelin/NLAW, section radios, breaching equipment, stretchers, ladders and a plethora of other equipment is added to the infantry soldiers burden.
For personal carried weight, the approach taken by ultra-lightweight hikers and backpackers can yield useful savings, so whilst cutting a toothbrush handle in half or spending a tenner on a 6g titanium spork might garner derision, it is worth bearing in mind that in the studies described above, a single kilogram saving provides a demonstrable mobility and cognition improvement.
Every bit really does count.
That said, there is only so far one can go with lightweight ‘life support’ type equipment, the real big hitters are protection, weapons and electronic equipment.
Weapon calibres and types is a tremendously complex (and somewhat emotive) subject but what Project PAYNE did was recognise that firepower must be tailored to operation type and environment. The concept of the one true ‘section firepower mix’ is a false one. In a complex counter insurgency type mission, excess protection and greater amounts of suppression firepower may well be the optimum choice, for a conventional assault operation, different thinking may be required.
Mwoar firepower is a poor way to approach this subject.
Many have noted that whilst the 5.56mm LMG might be excellent for close urban terrain at ranges in excess of 200m it is an excellent way of turning money into noise but very little else. Therefore, weight reductions may be obtained by changing the section firepower mix.
The SA80 is a heavy weapon, with an Underslung Grenade Launcher, Fire Control System and sight, it is even heavier. The fire control system especially adds significant weight to the front of the weapon and this is a good example where weight reduction obtained by, for example, swapping the steel magazines for polymer ones, is then negated by added weight elsewhere. The A3 variant is expected to reduce weight even further but it is still a heavy weapon and so as the British Army starts to look beyond the A3, weight should be one of the main selection criteria.
Polymer case technology also looks very promising as a means of weight reduction, Textron is working on conventional and telescoped rounds in a variety of calibres (5.56mm, 6.5mm and 7.62mm). In one example cited, using polymer cased ammunition resulted in a 12kg weight saving in a typical setting for an M240 team and a reduction of 39% over 5.56mm (200 rounds belted). Another example is the Textron 6.5mm CT Carbine that weighs 3.8kg; compare that to the SA80A2.
These are huge savings
The problem here though is the unlikelihood of adopting a new intermediate calibre versus the weight benefits of the technology in 5.56mm and 7.62mm. It would be a shame if the significant weight advantages of this were not realised because of the never-ending arguments about calibre.
Lighter weight GPMG’s are also available, likewise 81mm mortar baseplates (14% lighter). Both these weapons are arguably more valuable than any other and yet we have not pursued weight reductions via design and new materials with any great zeal. Both these are available off the shelf and would require only minimal changes to support and training arrangements. The US has also developed a lightweight Javelin CLU that is 70% smaller, 40% lighter and with a 50% increase in battery life. It also has a range of other improvements, GPS and network connectivity.
The much missed 51mm mortar had a range in excess of 600m and weighed just over 6kg. When it was replaced with the 40mm UGL and flares, the ammunition was no stopped being manufactured, leaving a rather significant range gap that was filled with ‘get on with it’. When the requirement was yet again discovered in Afghanistan, the MoD purchased the Hirtenberger M6-895 that weighed over 10kg. The individual bombs were also much heavier, and the UGL stayed in service. This is a classic example where weight has increased for marginal capability improvements and since then, there have been several reports that indicate it is being withdrawn, or not.
There are alternatives and perhaps it might be worth exploring these. The Le lance Grenade Individuel Mle F1 (or Fly-K) is in service with the French Army and uses a closed combustion chamber to propel a 51mm bomb (illumination, smoke and HE) to a maximum range of 675m. It weighs 4.8kg and has a range of interesting accessories for ambush and area defence use. Rheinmetall has also developed a digital aiming system that it claims increases the effective range to 900m.
The Antos 60mm system that has recently been purchased by Poland and would be another alternative at only 5kg.
Improving combat marksmanship through more frequent and realistic training is also a not unreasonable strategy to pursue.
Power and batteries are another significant weight problem. Communications, ECM and ISTAR equipment has a voracious appetite for power and this is compounded by different types of battery. Every watt of energy left over at the end of a mission is weight needlessly carried and if this energy is distributed across multiple battery types, the problem compounded by leftover energy distributed in those multiple types.
The small battery problem is a particular challenge; sights, illumination and other small devices in service variously use 1/3 AA, AA, CR123, CR2032 and CR17345 types. Potentially, on a single weapon, there are three of four different battery types.
This is before we get to the larger batteries, where thankfully, progress has been made, they are still heavy though simply because of the energy demand. Lincad have the excellent LIPS range which have evolved continually over several years and increased energy density so that fewer need to be carried. Fuel cells may well provide useable weight reductions as they develop.
Another promising means of stored energy and weight reduction is to take a systems architecture approach and here, the MoD may well be significantly ahead of the curve. I have written several times about the Land Open Systems Architecture (LOSA) and specifically Generic Vehicle Architecture (GVA) (here for more detail).
As can be seen from the diagram above, Generic Vehicle Architecture is one of three, Generic Soldier Architecture (GSA) is described as;
The GSA is a platform specific architecture, the physical implementation of which is the Dismounted Soldier System (DSS). GSA defines the infrastructure to be implemented by DSS and the interfaces between it and the soldier’s role equipment. Architectural components and requirements that enable off-soldier communications and connectivity, including data sharing, between platforms, will be captured within the Land Open System Architecture (LOSA) Common Open Interface (Land) (COI(L)) Defence Standard.
Benefits are said to be;
Enable ‘plug and play’ of legacy and future systems for soldiers.
Provide interfaces that comply with publically available open standards.
Promote third-party competition by providing modular components.
Promote innovation and diversity.
Allow incremental improvement of systems.
Facilitate technology insertion into existing systems.
Reduce the burden on the individual soldier from a weight, cognitive and thermal perspective.
Make the best use of COTS.
Improve operational effectiveness,
Reduce the whole life cost of ownership across all Defence Lines of Development (DLOD).
Whilst weight reduction is not core to GVA, it is potentially one of the greatest outcomes as centralised batteries and wire-free textiles can be used to drive weights down by the elimination of duplication.
Both Ultra and BAE have recently demonstrated GSA compliant products with the BAE Broadsword Spine system looking particularly well developed. One of the key features of Broadsword is a centralised battery contained within the harness that is used to power all soldier worn electronics. One of the particularly innovative features is the inductive ‘wireless’ charging pad on the back. A soldier would simply charge the central battery by sitting in a vehicle seat equipped with a charging coupler. This is not dissimilar to the Bosch tools wireless charging system.
A more radical approach to attacking the weight of communications equipment is to recognise that in a COIN environment, a deployable mobile telephone infrastructure or trunked mobile radio system like TETRA/TERTRAPOL might be perfectly acceptable in comparison with conventional systems.
By deploying such infrastructure, especially TETRA/TETRAPOL that does not need a base station every 500m, the weight of receiving equipment can be reduced to that close of contemporary mobile telephones. TETRAPOL might not deliver high bandwidth imagery and live video but it is perfectly capable of managing end to end encrypted voice and text messaging.
A single TETRAPOL base station can comfortably cover 25km and handle 2,500 users. The latest Airbus TPH900 handset has a 13-hour battery life, text and status messaging, vibrating mode, covert controls and location reporting and GPS, yet comes in at less than 1kg. By accepting the trade-offs of deploying a vehicle or container based TETRAPOL base station, considerable weight can be shifted off the man. NATO used this approach in Kosovo and the Bundeswehr deployed similar systems to Afghanistan.
The TETRAPOL BW system cost €55 million and included;
The entire systems will be delivered by EADS Secure Networks; base stations – with a range of 25 kilometres for voice and data transmission – hardware, workstations and air conditioning technology are housed in standard military containers and can thus be moved quickly. The scope of delivery includes 10,000 terminals. The terminals also allow a direct mode communication, i.e. bypassing the base station at close range (2.5 km). The provision of one training system is also part of the order placed with EADS Secure Networks.
We might think TETRA/TETRAPOL is an old-fashioned system but it is reliable, functional and critically, allows the weigh to be moved to a base station, as long as we accept the limitations of a base station with 25km range. The RAF’s Zephyr High Altitude Pseudo-Satellite (HAPS) has also been reported to include an option for a TETRA/TETRAPOL base station which would allow continuous coverage over a much greater area.
Zephyr – High Altitude Pseudo Satellite (HAPS)
Clearly, this would not be applicable to conventional operations against a well resourced and equipped enemy, but it should give food for thought as Project MORPHEUS progresses, trading off high bandwidth for simple secure voice and messaging and accepting limitations of a base station approach can yield significant weight savings.
All these are interesting technologies with many of them available off the shelf. Others will take more time to mature but the question remains, would they provide the kind of weight reductions required?
If not, and it would arguably be safe to assume not, the next and final strategy is to provide some means of mechanical carriage assistance.
Carriage Assistance
The problem here is that providing assistance cuts to the core of the ethos of light role infantry or simply shifts the burden to yet more technology that needs support, support that would eat into the traditionally very high bayonet ratio of light role infantry.
One of the issues with using vehicles to carry light infantry stores and equipment is they would absorb finite personnel and increase the support burden, thus reducing the very high ‘bayonet count’ in light role infantry battalions. They also have to get to the battlefield and sustained whilst there. Many terrains will be completely unsuited to a vehicle, even a quad, so the concept of providing vehicular assistance can be easily stretched to breaking.
Perhaps esoteric systems like powered exoskeletons and delivery drones might be the answer but again, there are downsides to technology maturity and tactical applicability. Drone deliveries might look great but a competent enemy would simply use them as a very handy means of determining the next mortar aiming point (something I think we forget in our rush for technology). So whilst we can keep a note of these high technology systems for the purposes of this article, will not detail them. Instead, I will try and keep things simple, cheap and supportable.
There is three separate Think Defence long reads on Military Quad Bikes, Military Motorcycles and All Terrain Vehicles so I won’t go into them here.
An oft-overlooked but important requirement during WWII airborne operations was the need to rapidly move stores away from the drop zone. CLE’s went through a number of revisions and the MkIII’s were still in service 40 years after the end of WWII. CLE stood for Central Landing Establishment but eventually changed into Container Land Equipment and then Container Light Equipment. CLE’s went through a number of revisions in size and construction with some specialised units developed for radio equipment for example. Dimensions were similar, 1.7m long and 0.4m diameter. Moving them quickly off the drop zone required some form of assistance.
One device used was the folding airborne trolley, designed to fit inside a CLE, it was used extensively for both stores and medical evacuation. Toggles were used to allow it to be both pushed and pulled. There was also a larger version, the Airborne Handcart, used by glider forces.
US forces also had a similar approach, the M3A4 Utility Hand Cart, for example, a couple of brilliant resources for information on the US hand carts are the Liberator and Handcartz, click to read. They found use not only in airborne operations and could be towed behind a Jeep, also available in specialist versions like cable laying and mortar ammunition carriers.
Getting up to date, this news piece about Afghanistan from 2006 illustrates the problem, members of the US 10th Mountain Division hauling water with stretchers illustrates the problem well.
Can the first piece of equipment considered for improving the mobility of light role infantry be a throwback to WWII? Anything to reduce carried weight, improve efficiency or speed has to be worthy of consideration, regardless of how it looks or if it is lacking in allyness. If it was good enough for WWII Paras and Rangers, surely it is worthy of today’s air assault forces?
A trolley or hand cart does not need to be the result of a huge research programme, the leisure and industrial markets have all the required components, some examples shown below. There are also a number of manufacturers that manufacture similar products, the Handimoova and Wheelz for example (more Wheelz examples here)
Zarges make large wheels and handle for some of their larger boxes and Hinterher, an ultra-lightweight trolley with Zarges fittings. We might also look at the rescue market where a number of manufacturers make rough terrain wheeled stretchers.
For supporting carriage over longer distances, there are a number of simple wheeled pack supports available, Carrix, Dixon Rollerpack and Monowalker Fatmate for example.
Another interesting system to look at that has great merit in improving infantry mobility is the Easibridge Tactical Assault Bridge converted either as a load carrier or simply as a means of transport carriage. This is an ingenious approach and would avoid the ‘dead weight’ problem associated with the wheeled packs described above.
Simply put, wheels allow heavy loads to be carried over longer distances with less effort than carrying them in a Bergen (rucksack). Some terrain may not suit wheels and so they might not be worth using but over short distances, could be a cheap, simple, silent and effective means of improving mobility. None of this will help in the assault or patrol mode but for long approach marches, wheeled carts will simply preserve energy for those phases.
Now I will be the first to admit, they are somewhat lacking in credibility and ‘allyness’ but if a glorified grocers trolly was good enough for the men that did the whole Arnhem thing, it really should be good enough for today.
Moving on…
There is some fascinating history on military bicycles but in a modern context, they are much rarer.
The exploits of Vietnamese and Japanese soldiers with bicycles are well known, joined by lesser-known examples of the Swiss Cycle Regiment, US 25th Military Bicycle Corps and the British Cycle Division, but all these remain firmly in history, the world has moved on.
One use suggested by a Think Defence author and an ex-recce officer was to use a folding bicycle as an adjunct to a conventional armoured reconnaissance vehicle, a quick move forward from a protected position for example. The well-known Brompton is joined by the Montague Paratrooper Bicycle and lesser known designs such as the Fat Bad from Bad Bikes. Non-folding electric bicycles like the Sondor Indiegogo and Xterrain Electric might also be considered.
Paratrooper Jump with a Folding Bike
And as we all know, muscles don’t have to be human.
No doubt there are less practical but keeping an open mind and experimenting with means of reducing energy on long road marches, despite the equipment actually adding weight and having to be transported to theatre, cannot be a bad thing.
Summary
There is an ongoing debate about the validity of light role infantry in the contemporary operating environment, articulated for example at the Wavell Room but many of the issues described here remain valid for all infantry. But the simple fact is, and this is supported by historical evidence, conflict will more often than not need light role infantry in one form or another. We cannot assume support helicopter availability or be able to operate from operating base will feature in future conflict.
Against a well organised and well-equipped enemy, dismounted infantry may well be subject to significant amounts of observation and detection with a likelihood of accurate indirect fire soon after. As the BAR article described above noted, excess weight leading to decreased mobility is a tactical matter above all else.
So if we are at all interested in winning the close battle we must take note of the issue of overburdened infantry soldiers because whatever the next conflict might be, there is a very real danger we will be punished badly for not addressing it.
However, the key issue is not one of weight, it is the inability to take a risk-based decision without defaulting to turning infantry into tanks.
The amount of research that goes into protection is enormous, just as one example, this one looks at neck protection on Osprey and the requirements for Virtus, click here to read. The amount of protection has gone up and up and whilst some individual systems might be lighter than earlier generations, they still represent a significant percentage of the carried weight. There is continuous and ongoing work to reduce weight, some technologies may not mature for decades so the risk question has to be addressed.
Arming unit commanders with an ability to make risk-based decisions are critical, especially if they evaluate that going ultralight will be essential to achieve objectives. Risk training and providing confidence that they will not be crucified by a lawyer after the battle will mitigate instances where risk aversion results in no risk-taking. Soldiers are professionals and its about time we let them get on with their jobs, they understand the risks and the corporate culture of the MoD, no matter what the political cost, needs to reflect this. The reality is that in the majority of cases full protection would be the order of the day but commanders must have the flexibility to act as they see fit.
We also need to be wary of excessive technology; energy harvesting from smart fabrics and powered exoskeletons may well be part of a future answer but at what cost and when?
Chasing unicorns instead of getting on with taking practical step, no, let’s not do that.
It is probably the case that the infantry receives the least amount of investment per person than any other arm. This needs to stop, there are easy options for modest investments available now, much better in terms of return on investment than spending money on drone research.
If some of the approaches of fight light are to work, those that supplement infantry with quads and ATV’s for example, there must be confidence in the logistics system that allows them to fight light but not freeze at night. This means, again, modest investments.
Our strategy should therefore be;
Continue with existing research programmes and systems architectures like GSA
Training, training and training
Invest in off the shelf systems that achieve weight reductions for the heaviest items
Accept that until the higher technology systems mature, invest in carriage support
None of this is easy, but as shown above, it is hardly a trivial matter.
Ultimately, much of the problem is about organisational focus and leadership, something the British Army likes to pride itself on.
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