Afghan Desertions in the U.S.: Assessing the Desertion and "Ghost Soldier" Problem in Afghan National Security Forces

By Anthony H. Cordesman

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It is all too easy to forget that the success or failure of the war in Afghanistan ultimately depends on the real-world combat capability of the Afghan fighting solider. U.S. airpower, Special Forces, fire support, and use of CIA operatives can all help; but "train and assist" means exactly what it says. Just as was the case in Korea—a win—and Vietnam—a loss, it is the native soldier that ultimately counts.

Defections are at Most a Side Show

It is a bit odd, however, that it should take defections in the U.S. to get the kind of attention that reporting on the entire force by the Office and the Secretary of Defense and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has gotten only to a far smaller degree. The scale of the defections of Afghan military training in the U.S. reported in early October is only impressive in terms of the percentage of the exceedingly small force involved.