14 August 2017

The stand-off at Doka la?

MOHAN GURUSWAMY:

What really happened at Dokalam? Is it a coincidence that it occurred just days ahead of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s summit meeting with Donald Trump? Or is it a consequence of India not taking part in the OBOR conference organized by China? Many theories abound, but the fact is few outside both governments know what led to the present impasse. The Indian public believes it is China that is ratcheting up the tensions. The Chinese public thinks it is India. In the new world of mass and instant communications perceptions are the truth. 

However some light is peeping out from under the shut doors of the two militaries. At the farthest tip of the Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan, the Chinese are building a road to an area called the Dokalam Plains. This area is claimed by both China and Bhutan. Tibetan and Bhutanese graziers have traditionally and peacefully grazed their yak and sheep herds here in the spring and summer fromas long as anybody can recall. With a road built, the Indian Army believes that artillery can be positioned at Dokolam and will seriously threaten India at its very strategic and sensitive passage to northeastern India. 

This sliver of territory is commonly known as “chickens neck” in India. It doesn’t help very much that the Chumbi Valley too appears on the map like a dagger poised not only to render asunder Sikkim and Bhutan, but also Assam and the Northeast from the rest of India. But with the given geography the overall tactical situation in the sector seemingly favoring the Indian Army, China perhaps views the Chumbi Valley salient as a hanging monkeys tail? 

Strictly speaking it can be argued that this latest dispute is one between China and Bhutan. Bhutan became a protectorate of British India in 1910 after signing a treaty allowing the British to "guide" its foreign affairs and defence. Bhutan was one of the first to recognize India's independence in 1947 and both nations fostered close relations, whose importance were further augmented by the annexation of Tibet by China in 1950. China has border disputes with both Bhutan and India. Since August 1949 Bhutan and India had a Treaty of Friendship, wherein Bhutan agreed to let India "guide" its foreign policy and both nations would “consult” each other closely on foreign and defence affairs. 

That treaty was re-negotiated and the two countries signed a new Treaty of Friendship in 2007. While the new treaty replaced the provision requiring Bhutan to take India's guidance on foreign policy with broader sovereignty, in reality, given the sensitive geographical location of Bhutan, India is obliged to take a military perspective over any bid to pressurize Bhutan or alter its perceived borders. 

Several comments from Beijing have suggested that India had acted without consulting Bhutan and hence by implication without its consent. The MEA nailed these in its statement of June 30 that made apparent the common Bhutanese and Indian position on this. The MEA clarified that on 16th June, “a PLA construction party entered the Dokalam area and attempted to construct a road. Following this a Royal Bhutan Army patrol attempted to dissuade them from this unilateral activity. In coordination with the Bhutanese government, Indian personnel, who were present at the general area in Doka la, approached the Chinese construction party and urged them to desist from changing the status quo. These efforts continue.” 

The Ambassador of Bhutan to India lodged a protest with the Chinese Government through their embassy in New Delhi on 20 June. Clearly there is no ambiguity about where Bhutan stands.

The MEA also said that the matter has since then been discussed between the Foreign Ministries of India and China. The release stated that India is deeply concerned at the recent Chinese actions and has conveyed to the Chinese government that such construction would represent a significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India. 

The Border Defence Co-operation Agreement of 2012 stipulates that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalized in consultation with the concerned countries. The Indian position is that this is an attempt to unilaterally determine a tri-junction point and is in violation of this agreement.

Other misperceptions further confound perceptions about each other. Some Chinese experts claimed the latest standoff showed India has yet to recover from the embarrassing defeat of the 1962 border war against the backdrop of the growing competition for influence and hostility between India and China. The Indian Defence Minister, quite unnecessarily to my mind, said that 2017 is not 1962, implying India can deal with it militarily. It probably can, but such things are better left unsaid.

From another Beijing perspective, India is playing an active role in forging an anti-Chinese coalition with it, US, Japan, Australia and Viet Nam to counter China. India views the China-Pakistan axis with much concern and cites the continued transfer of nuclear and missile technologies and systems to Pakistan as plain and simple malevolence. 

India also feels that China deliberately opposes its entry into global forums like the UN Security Council and Nuclear Suppliers Group. India’s conspicuous absence from the Belt and Road summit in Beijing last month are citied by Chinese media as further evidence of strained relations between China and India. Despite their growing economic and trade relations, converging interests and centrality to world growth, both sides are very clearly distrustful of each other.

Mohan Guruswamy
Email: mohanguru@gmail.com
13 August 2017

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