India Takes a Bold Approach in Border Standoff With China, but the Endgame Is Unclear

Source Link

Anubhav Gupta 

The border standoff between Indian and Chinese troops on the remote Doklam area in the Himalayas is approaching the two-month mark with no end in sight. Simultaneously egged on and hemmed in by nationalistic fervor at home, neither government can afford to back down, making escalation a real risk. India’s national security adviser, Ajit Doval, met with China’s state councilor, Yang Jiechi, and President Xi Jinping at the end of July, but the two sides failed to reach an agreement to quell the border row. 

The most serious dispute between India and China in decades, the standoff at Doklam represents a shift in ties between Asia’s two primary powers, with India acting more forcefully to counter Chinese influence and activities in South Asia. New Delhi’s bold decision to confront Chinese troops at Doklam—an area near India’s so-called tri-border with China and Bhutan—surprised and angered Beijing. While India may have succeeded in standing up to China in the short run, the endgame remains unclear and fraught with danger. Even if a peaceful resolution is achieved quickly, the China-India relationship, complicated under the best of circumstances, has entered a new, tenser stage. 

New Delhi’s actions are noteworthy—and this standoff unlike previous border incidents between India and China—because India does not actually have a direct claim to Doklam, which is instead territory claimed by both China and Bhutan. On June 16, Chinese engineers started building a road in Doklam. Two days later, on Bhutan’s behalf, Indian troops crossed India’s border to stop the construction work. Around 300 troops from India and China have been facing off since. China has demanded that Indian troops withdraw first, while India has called for joint withdrawal. 

Other analysts, including Ankit Panda and Manoj Joshi, have written at length about the complicated border dispute, the contradictory language in an 1890 colonial border convention that gives rise to the competing claims, and the various interests involved for China, Bhutan and India. All sides have legitimate claims and concerns. The critical question going forward, however, is not how to untangle history, but how to smooth tensions to avoid conflict. 

The standoff is the culmination of rising tensions between India and China over the past two years. Bilateral ties under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Xi were clouded by mistrust early, after Xi’s inaugural visit to India in September 2014 was overshadowed by Chinese incursions into disputed territory, and they have only soured further since then. Three years later, with another border crisis brewing, Modi and Xi chose not to have a formal bilateral meeting at the G-20 Summit in Germany last month. 

India’s deliberate shift toward the United States and Japan under Modi has confirmed Beijing’s worst suspicions about New Delhi’s regional intentions. Through its “Act East” policy, India has enhanced its engagement with East and Southeast Asia, even echoing U.S. concerns about the South China Sea in public statements. This has led to a hostile attitude in China. 

On the other hand, China’s growing influence in South Asia, especially its close partnership with Pakistan, has increasingly agitated India. China has provoked India with a flurry of maritime activity in the Indian Ocean region, as well as with its huge China-Pakistan Economic Corridor infrastructure initiative that crosses through territory claimed by India. India was disconcerted when China, on Pakistan’s request, blocked India’s attempts to have the United Nations sanction Masood Azhar, the leader of the terrorist outfit Jaish-e-Mohammad. Additionally, China’s blocking of India’s bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group has hardened the view in New Delhi that Beijing is actively constraining India’s rise. 

The China-India relationship, complicated under the best of circumstances, has entered a new, tenser stage.

India has reciprocated by openly bucking China over the past year. In December, Indian President Pranab Mukherjee met with the Dalai Lama, angering Beijing. In April, India allowed the Dalai Lama to visit a part of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh that China also claims. In both cases, the Chinese were incensed. Moving beyond symbolism, in May, India boycotted China’s Belt and Road Forum, a setback for China’s flagship regional initiative. Confronting Chinese troops in Doklam can be seen as New Dlehi’s latest move in a concerted effort to stand up to Beijing, even on controversial topics where India has tread lightly in the past.

The Doklam crisis is playing out against a combustible backdrop. While neither Modi nor Xi can afford a military confrontation, backing down does not serve either leader politically. A major Party Congress in China this fall may incentivize Xi to eschew compromise. It is possible, therefore, that India and China may not reach a resolution until heavy snow makes Doklam inhospitable in the fall. The longer the crisis continues, however, the greater the chances for an accident or confrontation. 

A military confrontation would be devastating to both countries, but a deep and long-standing political rift would be equally problematic given the strategic anxieties in play. Sustained, long-term hostility would be harmful for India, China and the region at large. 

While a ready solution may not be available, there are three immediate priorities for managing the crisis. First, both governments and militaries must continue to exercise extreme restraint at Doklam to ensure it does not turn into a live confrontation. 

Second, diplomats and officials on both sides have to work to tone down the hostile rhetoric currently being leveled, while avoiding incidents that could raise tensions further and make it difficult for the two sides to reach a compromise without losing face. 

Third, the continuation of diplomatic talks is critical. China initially declared that it would only consider talks once Indian troops withdrew unilaterally. Thankfully, Beijing has since moderated that stance, and diplomats are hard at work to find a mutually acceptable way to resolve the crisis. Ajit Doval’s trip to China was an important start in cooling tensions. It is critical that both countries continue engaging at the highest level. 

With few face-saving options available to China and India, Bhutan could be a wild card that helps the two sides find a solution. Thus far, Bhutan has largely been squeezed out of the discussion about the border standoff. Though historically aligned with India, the small buffer country is in a difficult position, stuck between the strategic interests of two large powers that it cannot afford to upset. 

Its small size and power notwithstanding, Bhutan has a legitimate stake that could help guide the direction the crisis takes. The Indian presence in Doklam depends on Bhutan’s acquiescence, and China’s claims are undermined by Bhutan’s. This gives Thimphu some leverage in this crisis. Though China and India may otherwise ignore Bhutan’s interests and claims, they cannot afford to do so completely, given the international attention on the crisis and their own justifications for their actions in Doklam. In short, Bhutan could provide a convenient reason and necessary roadmap for both sides to walk back from the current impasse.