Beijing is demonstrating an inflexibility that is injurious to the bilateral relationship
By ruling out a compromise to end the standoff between the Indian and the Chinese troops at Dok La and placing the condition that India must withdraw its forces for a resolution to happen, Beijing is demonstrating an inflexibility that is injurious to the bilateral relationship. The Chinese Ambassador to India, Luo Zhaoui, says the the ball is in India's court and it is up to New Delhi to decide if it desires a military solution to the crisis. This is being disingenuous. Indian troops didn't enter Chinese territory, but it's the other way round. Moreover, the Chinese Army also intruded into Bhutan's territory, and the Bhutanese Army personnel were compelled to confront the intruders.
Besides, this is not the first time that Chinese Army personnel have sought to claim disputed territory as their own — either along the Indian borders or even elsewhere — in the South China Sea. China's expansionist mindset is well known and it has for long followed the tactic of forcefully occupying disputed land and then seeking to negotiate from a position of strength — negotiations that lead nowhere for decades. By placing conditions, Beijing has only made a resolution difficult. India is committed to protecting the sovereignty of Bhutan, besides its own territorial integrity, and there appears to be little scope of New Delhi backing out from this commitment. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping are slated to meet on the sidelines of the forthcoming G20 meet, and it is hoped that the two leaders will be able to find common ground to proceed in a peaceful manner.
Meanwhile, one should hope that the already fragile situation along the Tibet-Bhutan-India tri-junction does not escalate further. The Chinese media is over-hyping the situation — even the Indian media is not averse to it, admittedly — and baying for India's blood. References to the 1962 war have made the situation more complex. The Indian side was forced to respond to this remembrance by pointing out that the India of 2017 is not the India of 1962, and this led to a retort from the other side that even China of 2017 was not the same. Additionally, an article posted by a strategic affairs expert, on a Chinese military website, sought to remind India that the People's Liberation Army would have the upper hand in case the confrontation escalated to a military response from both sides. All this tit-for-tat leads us nowhere. Hopefully, sensible minds on both sides will take over.
Amusingly, China has circulated the canard that even Jawaharlal Nehru had accepted the 1890 treaty between British India and China on the border issues of Tibet and Sikkim. In the first place, Beijing has itself often derided this treaty and dismissed many of its provisions. Now it suddenly sees merit in them. Besides, Nehru had expressed strong reservations over the Chinese position on the matter. This is a matter of record. In his letters to then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959, Nehru observed that there is “no dispute regarding the boundary of Sikkim with the Tibet region”. He also added, worryingly, that “Chinese maps show sizeable areas of Bhutan as part of Tibet”. Nehru may have blundered elsewhere in his understanding of Chinese designs, but he had certainly not endorsed Beijing's position on this issue.
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