Strategic Futures and Intelligence are central to the successful conduct of ‘hybrid defence’. However the concept is precisely defined, drawing on the corporeal analogy of Strategic Futures and Intelligence as respectively being the ‘head’ and ‘heart’ of ‘hybrid defence’, emerges as an appropriate approach to adopt for evaluation. Following that path forward is particularly helpful because - as its name suggests - ‘hybrid defence’ frequently can mean almost anything, and even everything-to-nothing (nothing still being something), to different participants and observers.[ii]
Possessing such a vague and contested status renders ‘hybrid defence’ a tricky concept to employ. A high-degree of refinement and improved definitions relating to more specific contexts need their greater advancement. Should Strategic Futures and Intelligence work be more neglected or overlooked, even underfunded, within this sphere of activity, then ‘hybrid defence’-related events and developments will quickly unravel, with cascading effects and outcomes soon becoming endowed with negative repercussions. Those situations cannot be afforded.[iii]
First, in this article, what is meant by ‘hybrid defence’ is further unpacked; before, second, examining the theme of ‘strategic futures and hybrid defence’, including further probing their relations. That analysis is followed, third, by a section on ‘intelligence for hybrid defence’, which examines (a) the utility of intelligence and (b) the value it can bring, as well as (c) suggesting ways in which, extending into the future, intelligence can then be best done both in and for ‘hybrid defence’ and other closely related security enterprises that range beyond. Finally, some overall conclusions are presented.
What is ‘Hybrid Defence’?
‘Hybrid defence’ is clearly a highly expansive term. It boasts several confusing meanings, becoming a difficult concept to take forward. Both not exclusively and at a minimum, advancing ‘hybrid defence’ necessarily involves: (i) engaging with many complex concepts, entities and phenomena; as well as (ii) that engagement occurring in a hugely diverse way, in varying locations, extending across and reaching down into any-to-all of the five different, physical-to-virtual-ranging, spatial domains of defence and security activity, spanning sea, air, land, space and cyber, extending to information considerations. That work emerges most acutely during the conduct of, for example, intense situations of hybrid warfare, where - again amongst other almost limitless characteristics - both public and private entities are intimately involved, including in their public-private partnerships through various forms of ‘sponsorship’, and so forth.[iv] Focus to targeting remains difficult, as ‘multiplexic’ situations prevail and conditions of ‘multiplexity’ increasingly exist.[v]
Simultaneously, the prevailing configurations that emerge in relation to ‘hybrid defence’ are also especially attendant with: (iii) that above ‘hybrid defence’-associated work occurring across many different time-frames and over differing timelines to time-horizons temporally during the course of joint service (army, airforce and navy) endowed multi-functional up and across to special operations (MFOs-SpecOps/SOs), where much interoperability and ‘jointery’ is also demanded, and while those MFOs-SpecOps/SOs are embedded in overarching contexts of globalised strategic risk (GSR); and while in momentum terms the ‘hybrid defence’ work is equally occurring at (iv) highly-differing clock-speeds (tempos/rates); amid (v) conditions of much uncertainty; and when (vi) the full-spectrum of defence (including military) and security (including law enforcement/policing) practitioners are operating within ‘glocalised’ (messy global-local combined) environments where much ambiguity exists and is experienced; and as (vii) ‘non-linear’-occurring events and developments are manifesting themselves in highly dynamic and in both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ ways and means manners - ‘from the ground-up’, from ‘grassroots’ and ‘amongst the people’ - across several different locations. Thereby, all participants, civilian and military, are considerably foxed as to where risk-thresholds and where other so-called ‘red-lines’ are drawn and should be maintained in the face of much undermining subversion and other rapidly unfolding developments.[vi]
Further concerns arise. As the term ‘hybrid defence’ in itself and when most generalised is perhaps not the most helpful to reference - bringing into purviews of interest an almost unlimited array of concerns and considerations (as has already been noted above and by several other commentators over the years, particularly in relation to more recent contested observations of so-called ‘hybrid warfare’, where today Russia undeniably features emphatically[vii]) - here is where having the, at least beginning and guiding, tools, and, by extension, their closely associated toolboxes and toolsets, of: (i) Strategic Futures and (ii) Intelligence emerges as most advantageous. Notably, those entities help provide tangible meaning to plot ways forward for whatever is sought to be most accomplished operationally up to strategically during the course of conducting ‘hybrid defence’.[viii]
Strategic Futures and Intelligence work offers a veritable smörgåsbord of highly-selectable and adaptable devices akin to ‘sat-navs’ when embarking on a journey. This includes all of the content and approaches that those flexible and agile tools can provide, ultimately for the highly functional purposes of advancing viable ‘ways’ and ‘means’ for reaching most desired strategic ‘ends’.[ix] Concepts relating to more explicit ‘intelligence engineering’ (IE) activities come through strongly.[x]
Strategic Futures and Hybrid Defence
Strategic Futures work has substantial value as an aid to guide commanders and other decision-makers across to ‘front-’ and ‘fault-line’ practitioners and operators. For instance, this merit is through providing a series of grander-ranging frameworks, often bound up as scenarios, for helping several diverse participants to stakeholders navigate or negotiate their way through a multitude of highly complex contexts, such as those described above relating to ‘hybrid defence’; and where, simultaneously, there are many other competing defence and security demands that have to be met as expeditiously as possible, such as ranging from ‘collective defence’ and ‘deterrence’ to ‘crisis management’ tasks, and their nexus or fusion.[xi]
As Australian Professor Alan Dupont and US Professor William Reckmeyer have concluded relating to the ‘doing’ of Strategic Futures work, with equal implications and ramifications for international organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): ‘Nations adept at anticipating developments, discerning trends and evaluating risk among the clutter of confusing and contradictory change indicators will be significantly advantaged over those which are not…’ Finishing with: ‘This is not an easy task, but it is a vital one.’[xii]
Greater investment in Strategic Futures areas of work pays dividends. Deploying many ‘futures methodologies’ can give several helpful, at least starting, insights into differently-ranging and complex futures, such as over the short-, mid-, to long-terms. Offering ‘tips’ and ‘leads’ ready for subsequent follow-up, notable examples of approaches that can be employed include: ‘Written Estimates’, ‘Futures Wheels’, ‘Trend (time/impact) Analysis’, ‘Force Field Analysis’, ‘Using Analogies (past/present)’, ‘Decision-Trees’, ‘other Indications/Indicator and Warning Systems’, with - as already introduced - ‘Scenario Methods’ and other closely related ‘foresight’ and ‘Horizon-scanning’ techniques emerging as being particularly key facilitators towards contributing to better understandings relating to differently-scaled unfolding events and developments, including all of those associated with ‘hybrid defence’.[xiii]
Demonstrating many of the benefits which can be reaped, including most notably with regard to ‘hybrid defence’ work: ‘Bringing in more of a scenarios methodology … with worst-case scenarios figuring on an equal par with best-case scenarios, can help in rebalancing processes’; for example, helping in decision-making contexts, as well as enriching overall analytical pictures for aiding towards improved ‘context appreciation’ or, at a minimum, ‘situational awareness’, of: (a) what is actually going on, and then (b) what is required next by way of some sort of a ‘response’.[xiv]
To summarise, adopting scenarios as part of doing Strategic Futures work in ‘hybrid defence’ contexts can give defence and security practitioners an improved idea (or at least a better sense-to-focus) regarding: (i) what wants to be defended; and then (ii) how to go about realising that work and accomplishing those missions. Extra ‘edges’, useful for maintaining the initiative in overall defence and security enterprises, can similarly be better structured and yielded.[xv]
Albeit if they figure in merely ‘on-going issue management’ guises, first steps are adopted towards accomplishing better ‘context appreciation’ (contexualisation) and then ‘solution-fashioning’ (problem-solving/trouble-shooting) ends. So that the ‘hybrid defence’-related scenarios are more richly informed for providing greater contextualisation and for helping tasks such as improving prioritisation, their underpinning intelligence work soon acquires enhanced importance, as is examined next.
Intelligence for Hybrid Defence
A recent ‘globalisation-friendly’ definition of ‘intelligence’, which has implications for the framing and then conduct of ‘hybrid defence’ is:
[T]he collection and processing (analysis) of information that is particularly of military and/or political value, and which especially (and purposefully) relates to international relations, defence and national (extending to global, via regional) security (threats [also read here, to encompass at their most broad, the full-spectrum of ‘issues-problems-hazards-to-risks’ confronted]). It is also usually secret (covert and/or clandestine), [(and frequently, although not exclusively - as private and non-state actor contributions are also included)] state activity conducted by specialized ‘intelligence’ institutions (or organisations) to understand or influence entities.[xvi]
To ‘do’ intelligence most optimally, so that its highest value can be reaped for the overall purpose of conducting ‘hybrid defence’ as successfully and most sustainably as possible - such as for providing direction beyond merely support functions: firstly, an interconnected ‘multi-level approach’; secondly, a ‘systems approach’; and, thirdly, a ‘system of systems dynamics (SoSD) approach’, consisting of harnessing and exploiting both system of systems analysis (SoSA) and engineering (SoSE) approaches, can now be proposed.[xvii]
Advancing a ‘Multi-level Approach’
Firstly, the ‘multi-level’ approach covers:
eight different, yet interrelated, levels of activity and experience. They each offer many different insights, and can hence be subsequently used for analysis [to engineering] purposes. Ranging from ‘high’ and ‘macro’ to ‘low’ and ‘micro’, these levels comprise: (i) the ideological level; (ii) the theoretical level; (iii) the strategy level; (iv) the policy level; (v) the operational level; (vi) the tactical level; (vii) the individual (as ‘professional’) level; and (viii) the personal level.[xviii]
Harnessing a ‘Systems Approach’
Secondly, once the insights from the differing levels are harvested, the ‘systems approach’ then tackles eight systemic attributes or variables. This is in order to acquire further in-depth insights pertaining to currently unfolding events and developments. In turn, the eight systemic attributes or variables consist of: ‘1. internal influences/factors; 2. rationale; 3. types and forms; 4. conditions and terms; 5. trends; 6. functions; 7. external influences/factors; and 8. effects and outcomes.’[xix]
Exploiting a ‘System of Systems Dynamics (SoSD) Approach’
Intelligence, and what concerns it - namely, its tasks - are all not subject to being or involving solely a ‘single’ system in their composition and behaviour. Therefore, thirdly, developing ‘system of systems’ (SoS) or ‘federation of systems’ approaches equally have increasing relevance when it comes to advancing entities such as ‘hybrid defence’. For instance, this is most clearly demonstrated with the use in the intelligence domain, such as during intelligence analysis, of (amongst others): ‘PMESII’, which stands for: ‘Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational/Intelligence and Infrastructure’ factors, as already utilised, for example, by NATO. Those different System of Systems Dynamics dimensions can then be used for both, first, analysis - making use of SoSA approaches - and then, subsequently, for engaging in more advanced engineering tasks - thereby also employing SoSE methodologies. Essentially, SoSA+SoSE aspects work in tandem, and in a feedback-looping and informing-to-updating manner, for better sculpting the prevailing ‘hybrid defence’-associated events and developments into the future. Reflecting a constantly iterative process, SoSD range far.[xx]
Preliminary Conclusions
Ultimately, ‘hybrid defence’ can be rendered less mystifying. Once the output from those three above approaches towards conducting intelligence work - namely: (i) multi-level, (ii) systems, and (iii) system of systems dynamics (SoSD) - are fused overall or, put another way, are employed collectively, a much clearer and better informed picture of what ‘hybrid defence’ consists of and how it should be realised begins to transpire. All of the differently-ranging factors, elements, aspects, or dimensions covered above provide an array of important insights into how ‘hybrid defence’ and other security enterprises ranging beyond could be better configured and calibrated, as well as informing how potential futures can be more advantageously, also more pro-actively and pre-emptively, architecturally shaped and engineered. Comprehensive and holistic (all-encompassing) pictures begin to emerge overall.[xxi]
These more proactive intelligence engineering-related design and shaping approaches, ranging across both the #2 Intelligence (G2/J2) and #3 Operations (G3/J3) domains of particularly military activity, surpass over weaker conditions of neglect and complacency for instead better generating future opportunities and possibilities. Infused with greater command qualities, this work is also conducted for preventing prevailing events and developments from escalating and from more spiralling out of control. Degrees of command are simultaneously retained. Some overall conclusions are tabled next.
Conclusions
From the overall discussion introduced here in this short article, several enhanced understandings and then the improved calibration and configuration of ‘hybrid defence’ can be realised. As argued, this work can be most viably accomplished through advancing the better harnessing of the full-spectrum range of Strategic Futures methodologies and approaches, as outlined above; with the employment of differently-scaled scenarios emerging as being particularly valuable for the purposes of the improved and grander-focused framing of ‘hybrid defence’-related challenges.
Intelligence and its closely associated constructs, likewise, can be considerably better mobilised. For instance, this is especially when intelligence is exploited on most comprehensive bases, involving several different approaches all being collectively employed in their fusion - such as (i) multi-level, (ii) systems, and (iii) system of systems dynamics (SoSD) approaches, as cited above. Due to their centrality for providing direction, even offering leadership to command and control (C2) qualities, both Strategic Futures and Intelligence - up to and including all of their associated work and tasks - can readily be argued to be at and form the ‘head’ and ‘heart’ of ‘hybrid defence’ and its associated guiding understandings.[xxii]
Indeed, unless greater analytical (addressing the ‘what is it?’ questions) and assessment/estimation approaches (interrogating the ‘what does it mean?’ and ‘so what?/why?’ queries) are harnessed in relation to ‘hybrid defence’ - or are at least attempted - that last construct will continue to remain highly elusive in its content and form. That situation and condition is both (a) when ‘hybrid defence’ is received as a more abstract concept and (b) in terms of its greater visceral reality when rapidly unfolding events and developments are encountered and experienced in and across various battlespaces, necessitating the conduct and attainment of ‘hybrid defence’, both operationally and strategically. Greater understandings of situations of multiplexic defence-to-warfare strive for their improved articulation.[xxiii]
Without advancing better and more sophisticated knowledge of the specific contexts where ‘hybrid defence’ is involved, detrimental portent for all into the future is potentially heralded. Tangible meanings can be found and, as has been argued throughout this brief article, the tools of: (i) Strategic Futures and (ii) Intelligence for fashioning at least beginning templates for finding viable ways forward are at hand.[xxiv] Ultimately, greater clarity can be attained and is required.
References
[i] An earlier version of this article was originally drafted for the NATO Defence College in Rome, Italy, during April 2015.
[ii] For further valuable insights, see, for example, M. Galeotti, ‘Time to Think About “Hybrid Defense”’, War on the Rocks (30 July 2015).
[iii] See also, with more of a historical perspective, the work discussed throughout J. Michaels, ‘General Sir John Hackett’s The Third World War: Or, How to Think about a Future War with Russia Today’, Defence-in-Depth Blog (1 August 2016).
[iv] For experience in recent years, see, for example, O. Ivshina, ‘How Ukraine rebels rely on Russians’, BBC (31 March 2015); K. McCaney, ‘Russia's hybrid warfare tactics gain upper hand in Ukraine’, Defense Systems (24 March 2015); T. Bukkvoll, ‘Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas’, Parameters, 46, 2 (2016), pp.13-21; T. Gibbons-Neff, ‘As focus remains on Syria, Ukraine sees heaviest fighting in months’, The Washington Post (16 February 2016); T. Bellon and M. Nienaber, ’Germany, France press for peace plan action ahead of Ukraine visit’, Reuters (22 February 2016); G. Gotev, ‘Ukraine: With Minsk stalled, Russian sanctions must continue’, ‘US ambassador: “Ukraine fatigue” in Europe is major risk for Kyiv’, and ‘Linkevicius: Not all in the EU are reading Minsk in the same way’, EurActiv.com (3-4/15 March 2016); ‘Urgent steps needed towards full respect for ceasefire in eastern Ukraine, says OSCE Chairmanship Special Representative and Chief Monitor’, OSCE (28 July 2016); ‘Germany's foreign minister eyes regulation to keep Ukraine ceasefire in weeks’ and ‘Obama meets Hollande, Merkel on G20 sidelines to discuss Ukraine - White House’, Reuters (4-5 September 2016); K. Pynnöniemi and A. Rácz (eds.), Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine (Helsinki, Finland: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, May 2016); C. Paul and M. Matthews, ‘The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model’, RAND Perspective (2016).
[v] Where ‘multiplex’, and its extended derivatives of ‘multiplexic’ and ‘multiplexity’, is defined relevantly by the OED as: ‘… involving or consisting of many elements in a complex relationship … involving simultaneous transmission of several messages along a single channel of communication.’ - from the Oxford Dictionary of English (2016); for use of ‘multiplex world’ concept thinking, see also J. Kirkpatrick, ‘Interview – Amitav Acharya’, ISN/ETHZ/e-IR.info (April 2016); C. Coker, ‘Rethinking Strategy: NATO and the Warsaw Summit’, Norwegian Institute of international Affairs (NUPI)/ETHZ (May 2016).
[vi] A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Intelligence Liaison: An essential navigation tool’, in J. Schroefl, B.M. Rajaee and D. Muhr (eds), Hybrid and Cyber War as Consequences of the Asymmetry (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang International Publishers, 2011), as well as the other chapters; for context insights, see A. Mckenzie, ‘“New Wars” Fought “Amongst the People”: “Transformed” by Old Realities?’, Defence Studies, 11, 4 (2012); M.M. Christensen, R. Haugegaard and P.M. Linnet, ‘“War amongst the people” and the absent enemy: Towards a cultural paradigm shift?’, FAK Research Paper (Copenhagen, DK: Royal Danish Defence College - RDDC/FAK, 2014); UK Gen. (rtd.) R. Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2006); E. Simpson, War From The Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics (London: Hurst & Co., 2012); D.E. Tromblay, ‘The Intelligence Studies Essay: “Hybrid Warfare” at Home: Asymmetric Tactics Are Not Just Used in Ukraine, They Are Employed against the United States, and Have Been for Quite Some Time’, Lawfare (29 August 2016); see also the developments discussed throughout A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)’ in J. Deni and D. Galbreath (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Defence Studies (London: Routledge, forthcoming [2017]).
[vii] See, inter alia, M. Kofman, ‘Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts’, and his ‘Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia’, WoTR (11 March/12 May 2016); J. Bērziņš, ‘Russian Warfare is not Hybrid’, Strategy and Economics - Blog (16 March 2016); C. Paul, ‘Confessions of a Hybrid Warfare Skeptic’, Small Wars Journal - SWJ / ISN (3/16 March 2016); M. Galeotti, ‘Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? How new is Russia’s “new way of war”?’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27, 2 (2016), pp.282-301; S. Charap, ‘The Ghost of Hybrid War’, Survival, 57, 6 (2015), pp.51-58; A. Monaghan, ‘Putin’s Way of War: The “War” in Russia’s “Hybrid Warfare”’, Parameters, 45, 4 (Winter 2015-16), pp.65-74; F. Hill, ‘Putin: The one-man show the West doesn’t understand’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72, 3 (2016), pp.140-144; A. Monaghan, ‘No Going Back to Business as Usual for NATO and Russia’, Chatham House (25 April 2016); ‘Russia says will respond to NATO deployment in Poland, Baltics’, and ‘Kremlin to NATO - Resurgent Russia not a threat, but will defend its interests’, Reuters (4-5 May 2016); M. Galeotti, ‘The West needs to stop panicking about Russia's "hybrid" warfare’, Vox (4 May 2016); R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Britain is not at war with Russia, nor is it at peace’, The Guardian (19 May 2016); H. Cooper, ‘Long Emphasis on Terror May Hurt U.S. in Conventional War, Army Chief Says’, The New York Times (15 May 2016); W. Bowen, ‘NATO and the challenges of implementing effective deterrence vis-à-vis Russia’, Defence-In-Depth Blog (16 May 2016); E. Colby and J. Solomon, ‘Facing Russia: Conventional Defence and Deterrence in Europe’, Survival, 57, 6 (2015), pp.21-50; S. Frühling and G. Lasconjarias, ‘NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge’, Survival, 58, 2 (2016), pp.95-116; Col. T.K. Kowalik and D.P. Jankowski, ‘Hybrid Warfare: A Known Unknown?’, Foreign Policy Association Blog (18 July 2016); A. Klus, ‘Myatezh Voina: The Russian Grandfather of Western Hybrid Warfare’, Small Wars Journal (10 July 2016); K. Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, Survival, 58, 4 (2016), pp.7-26.
[viii] See also N. Schadlow, ‘The Problem with Hybrid Warfare’, War on the Rocks (2 April 2015); R. Fontaine and J. Smith, ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial Isn’t Just for Asia Anymore’, Defense One (2 April 2015); L. Simón, ‘The third US offset strategy and Europe’s “anti-access” challenge’, European Geostrategy (25 October 2015) and his ‘A European Perspective on Anti-Access/Area Denial and the Third Offset Strategy’, WoTR (3 May 2016); O. Manea, ‘The A2/AD Predicament Challenges NATO’s Paradigm of “Reassurance Through Readiness”’, Small Wars Journal (9 June 2016); Z. Stanley-Lockman, ‘The US between Silicon Valley and European Allies’, EUISS Brief No.35 (13 November 2015); see also A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Discovering “unknown-unknowns” & beyond’, conference paper delivered at 33rd International Symposium on Military Operational Research - ISMOR, Royal Holloway University of London (July 2016).
[ix] D.S. Reveron and J.L. Cook, ‘From National to Theater: Developing Strategy’, Joint Forces Quarterly - JFQ, 70 (2013), pp.113-120; see also G.F. Treverton and J.J. Ghez, Making Strategic Analysis Matter (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012).
[x] For an introduction to the concept of ‘intelligence engineering’, see A.D.M. Svendsen, Intelligence Engineering: Operating Beyond the Conventional (New York: Rowman & Littlefield / SPIES - Security and Professional Intelligence Education Series, 2017).
[xi] See, for instance, ‘NATO Secretary General: One of our greatest strengths is our ability to adapt’, NATO Update (25 March 2015); ‘Deputy Secretary General: NATO ideally equipped to project stability beyond our borders’, NATO Update (23 May 2016); M. Banks, ‘NATO Members Face Hard Budget Choices, Official Says’, DefenseNews (26 May 2016); see also Gen. D.G. Perkins, ‘Big Picture, Not Details, Key When Eyeing Future’, Army Magazine (12 April 2016).
[xii] A. Dupont and W.J. Reckmeyer, ‘Australia’s national security priorities: addressing strategic risk in a globalised world’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 66, 1 (2012), p.46; see also S.R. Ronis, ‘Forging an American Grand Strategy: Securing a Path Through a Complex Future’, http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ (2013); G.F. Treverton, et al., Threats Without Threateners? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012); L.S. Fuerth, with E.M.H. Faber, Anticipatory Governance, Practical Upgrades / aka. the ‘Project on Forward Engagement’ (Washington, DC: NDU and the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, 2012); N. Silver, The Signal and the Noise (London: Allen Lane, 2012); A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Advancing “Defence-in-depth”: Intelligence and Systems Dynamics’, Defense & Security Analysis, 31, 1 (2015), pp.58-73.
[xiii] UK MoD Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Red Teaming Guide (Shrivenham: DCDC, UK Defence Academy, March 2013 [2ed.]), esp. pp.3–9–3–11 (fig. 3.5 and table 3.1); S. Moody, ‘Future War: Thinking the Thinkable’ and ‘Urban Operations in the Future Operating Environment’, Defence-in-Depth Blog (11 November 2015/16 March 2016); A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Introducing RESINT: A “missing” and “undervalued” INT in all-source intelligence efforts’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26, 4 (2013), pp.777-794; see also the fifty-five structured analytic techniques as detailed in R.J. Heuer, Jr. and R.H. Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2014 [2ed.]); J.S. Lockwood, The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP): A Method for Predictive Intelligence Analysis (London: Bloomsbury Intelligence Studies, 2013), esp. pp.3-22.
[xiv] A.D.M. Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method out of Mayhem (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.153-154; S. Malo, ‘Governments should study worst-case global warming scenarios, former UN official says’, Reuters (4 May 2016); see also the example reported via E. MacAskill, ‘West and Russia on course for war, says ex-Nato deputy commander’, The Guardian, and T. Whitehead, ‘Britain has become “semi-pacifist” under Cameron, says retired general as he warns of war with Russia’, The Daily Telegraph (18 May 2016).
[xv] See also as discussed throughout Svendsen, ‘Advancing “Defence-in-depth”’, esp. p.60.
[xvi] This definition is substantially based on that given in A.D.M. Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.9-10; see also Svendsen, Intelligence Engineering.
[xvii] See these approaches as discussed in-depth throughout: Svendsen, ‘Advancing “Defence-in-depth”’; A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Contemporary intelligence innovation in practice: Enhancing “macro” to “micro” systems thinking via “System of Systems” dynamics’, Defence Studies, 15, 2 (2015), pp.105-123; A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Sharpening SOF tools, their strategic use and direction: Optimising the command of special operations amid wider contemporary defence transformation and military cuts’, Defence Studies, 14, 3 (2014), pp.284-309; Svendsen, Intelligence Engineering.
[xviii] Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence, p.12; see also ‘levels of war’ in J. Ångström and J.J. Widén, Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War (London: Routledge, 2015), esp. p.203, col.2.
[xix] Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence, pp.99-107.
[xx] Svendsen, ‘Advancing “Defence-in-depth”’, p.64; Svendsen, ‘Contemporary intelligence innovation in practice’; Svendsen, Intelligence Engineering; D. Jordan, D. Lonsdale, J.D. Kiras, I. Speller, C. Tuck and C.D. Walton, Understanding Modern Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016 [2ed.]), pp.129-131; reports, such as F.M.J. Lichacz and R. Jassemi-Zargani, Human Factors and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): Making the case for a Human Factors Capability in the ISR Concept Development & Evaluation (CD&E) Process (Ottawa, Canada: Defence Research & Development Canada – Ottawa Research Centre, April 2016), pp.10-11.
[xxi] See also as demonstrated in A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘An Intelligence-Engineering framework for Defence Engagement Considerations’, paper presented at the Human Geography in Defence Engagement: 9th Annual International Spatial Socio-Cultural Knowledge Workshop (Shrivenham: UK Defence Academy & Cranfield University, May 2016).
[xxii] See also developments as reported in J.E. Barnes, ‘EU Defense Ministers Back New Group Focused on “Hybrid Warfare”’, The Wall Street Journal (19 May 2016); also valuable intelligence-relevant insights as discussed throughout J.H. Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing (London: Routledge, 2016 [2ed.]) and in D. Jordan, et al., Understanding Modern Warfare, esp. pp.8-9.
[xxiii] See, inter alia, N. Gowing and C. Langdon, ‘Want to lead? Then tear up the rulebook’, The World Today (June & July 2016), pp.12-16, and their ‘Thinking the Unthinkable: A New Imperative for Leadership in the Digital Age’, CIMA Report (May 2016); Coker, ‘Rethinking Strategy’; D. Farley, ‘Fundamental Changes in Warfare’, Small Wars Journal (26 May 2016); J. Dempsey, ‘Strategic Europe: Is NATO Taking on More Than It Can Chew?’, Carnegie Europe (9 July 2016); K. Lilley, ‘The millennials have taken over: A primer for the military’s generational shift’, ArmyTimes (31 July 2016).
[xxiv] Additionally, see as discussed and demonstrated throughout Svendsen, Intelligence Engineering; see also A. Mehta, ‘Joint Force 2035: Lasers, Biotech and Global Instability’, DefenseNews (29 July 2016); K. Amerson and S.B. Meredith, III, ‘The Future Operating Environment 2050: Chaos, Complexity and Competition’, Small Wars Journal (31 July 2016); see also the chapters throughout H.L. Larsen, J.M. Blanco, R. Pastor Pastor, and R.R. Yager (eds), Using Open Data to Detect Organized Crime Threats: Factors Driving Future Crime (London: Springer, 2017).
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