By Jon Herrmann
We’ve all (hopefully) seen Captain America, whether in a movie, comic book, or any other of a dozen venues. Even those who have heard only a little know the basics: Captain America is the super-soldier, one man who takes on thousands… and wins. Alone or with the support of some more average people (Howling Commando soldiers or secret agents of SHIELD), the key is the Captain. Compare that to the more “realistic” versions of combat we see in Band of Brothers, Saving Private Ryan, or even Call of Duty. If one person takes on a thousand, the one dies. So can we learn anything from Captain America for national security in reality? Maybe so… in information operations (IO).
Normal combat takes place in a physical realm, where normal (Gaussian) distributions and bell curves make sense. For millennia, we have learned the rules and principles of war or battle, if you prefer. We know that mass matters, and no single soldier is going to overwhelm even five adversaries, in any but the most bizarre circumstances. The rarity of those circumstances means that the effects of any single soldier are generally lost in a battle- the entire effort “averages out.” That is a key reason that having many soldiers is crucial in traditional combat.
Informational combat is atypical. Normal distributions are not normal at all, and bell curves are an illusion that poor commanders use to console themselves, seeking the comfort of a simple model instead of the frightening truth. Information warfare is the world of Captain America. In information warfare, communications professionals hone and craft hundreds of stories, developing articles like basic training develops recruits. Editors mold these stories with the sharp criticisms we once heard from drill sergeants like R. Lee Ermey or Heinlein’s Sergeant Zim. They know they are useful. Stories can overwhelm mental defenses like a traditional mass combat can overwhelm physical defenses. Psychologists have shown that repetition creates the perception of truth, regardless of factual basis, so sending story after story against the minds of opponents can be very effective over time. But the human wave is not the key to modern combat, and the story wave is not the key to modern information conflict.
The key is Captain America. In the world of information, millions of users post millions of videos to YouTube. Only a handful go viral. Those that do go viral are the Captain America figures of the information war. Those viral stories defeat dozens, hundreds, and thousands of other stories the way Captain America defeats multitudes of average enemies. The identity of the average opponents doesn’t matter. Nazis, aliens, or androids fall en masse, defeated by the super-soldier because they are average. Likewise, it does not matter the identity of the average story in the information environment. Russian, Chinese, or American, the average story will be defeated by the super-story. To win in the information environment, stop thinking like a traditional warrior. Think like Captain America.
What does that mean in real terms? How can a leader apply this concept? Three ideas spring to mind. First, get over the siege mentality and open the gates. Second, pop filter bubbles in both what we read and what we write. Third, take information conflict seriously and prioritize it- often placing IO as the supported mission in the lead, and kinetic operations as the supporting functions.
First, go for both quantity and quality. Instead of trying to control every single message, open the gates. Instead of trying to limit communications to the Public Affairs office, coordinate with as many credible messengers as possible, from individual troops to partners within the community.
Fear of backlash is understandable. Commanders know all too well how horrible one negative story can be, whether its abu Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay. But fear often creates counterproductive reactions, and this is no exception. We trust our newest recruits with weapons, knowing that if they shoot the wrong target, the results could be catastrophic. We must still empower them to succeed, even with that risk. Information releases can be as dangerous as bullets. We must still trust our people, training them how to avoid releasing the wrong information (through OPSEC) while encouraging and empowering them to use information as effectively as they use any other weapon. We must overcome our fear of letting our people wield information.
Fear leads commanders to try to exercise more message discipline, locking down information with ever greater strictness. This is the conventional wisdom. The conventional wisdom also used to be that the “right” response to IED’s downrange was to armor up, go outside the wire less often, and hunker down inside fortified bases. It was a tough call to reverse that, to accept the risk of consistent interaction with the populace, and to accept that hunkering down actually made us less safe. That bold reversal of the conventional wisdom turned an almost certain loss into a potential win and gave our forces a fighting chance.
The same is true in the information environment- we cannot lock down our information so tightly that no mistakes occur. Instead, we have to get out of the siege mentality and interact. Put out, or support, many stories so that the good outweighs the bad, instead of trying to ever prevent anything bad. Crowdsource, using message specialists less to create stories and more to search for the ones that are both going viral and supportive of U.S. themes. Boost the signal on those stories. By looking at the mass of stories, leaders can find the few super-stories- find the Captain America that your mission needs.
Second, avoid filter bubbles. Read what adversaries are saying – not to respond to or counter it, which gives them added attention, but to refute it by offering positive stories. Further, write to adversaries and potential adversaries. The State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) has handled this method well. For example, when adversaries challenge the fairness of U.S. elections to make their own rigged elections look better in comparison, the GEC presents stories showing how the U.S. ensures fair elections. When an adversary alleges that the U.S. is targeting civilians, a developed narrative could use several supporting stories to present the costs and efforts that the U.S. puts into preventing collateral damage. Some of these objectives are already in place, of course, but the expansion of such missions could be an efficient way to decrease opposition. Along similar lines, a no-cost improvement would be continuing to improve coordination between commanders and the GEC, even extended to operational levels. Contradictory stories are bullets for the enemy in information conflict, as adversaries trumpet U.S. “hypocrisy” to undermine American credibility. The whole of government has to become a way of life, rather than a catchphrase.
Finally, treat information like a superhero that can transform a conflict. No one can promise that winning the information war guarantees winning the physical war. History shows, though, that losing the information war foreshadows losing the physical war. I know how difficult it is to stand up at Fort Benning and say “In this case, infantry must be a supporting function to IO.” Sometimes there are hard truths that need to be said. In Phase Zero and early stages of hybrid operations particularly, the message is the mission. As Brian Steed noted, “Influence is the combat power of 21st century conflict.” The question is, will the U.S. continue to focus on the combat power of the last century, or try to regain the lead in the combat power of the next?
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