June 12, 2017: The recent terror bombings in Kabul were explicitly denied by Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban. Actually both these organizations are now run by the head of the Haqqani Network, which remains a “protected (from attack by Pakistani security forces)” group in Pakistan. Nevertheless the Haqqani Network has been avoiding attacks that kill a lot of civilians and concentrating on the security forces and especially specific commanders. The Afghan Taliban has been ordered to follow the same fuels but observance has been spotty. The usual suspect in large scale attacks, ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) has not claimed credit. While Afghan security forces are blamed for not preventing this attack, the Afghan intel and police investigators have become quite good and with American intel back in force it is usually possible to identify who carried out a specific attack based on debris at the scene and the growing informant network and databases the Afghans have created. The Afghan police have already admitted they knew of Haqqani plans for a Kabul attack in late May but underestimated the size of it.
The major sponsor of most attacks in cities is not the Taliban but ISIL or Haqqani Network and continued that is made possible with support from the Pakistani military. That means Haqqani has less trouble obtaining explosives and safe areas in Pakistan where staff for bombing missions can be trained and indoctrinated. ISIL does it for their own reasons while Haqqani does it because that is how they continue to enjoy a sanctuary in Pakistan. The government of Pakistan insists Haqqani has moved to Afghanistan but American and Afghan intelligence efforts keep picking up evidence that leads back to Pakistan. This includes dead, or captured, suicide bombers who turn out to be Pakistanis or Afghans who received training in Pakistan and captive ones casually note that the military and police there left them alone.
The Afghan Taliban still openly enjoys sanctuary in southwest Pakistan (on the border with Helmand province, where most of the world heroin supply comes from) but has been in turmoil since 2015 because of a dispute over who the senior leaders should be. There are also increasingly loud accusations that the current leader, who is also the head of the Haqqani Network, has turned the Taliban into a Pakistani puppet. There have always been complaints about this but they have gotten more popular, and more violent, as more Taliban remain in the group mainly for the money, not the goal of turning Afghanistan into a religious dictatorship. These attitudes were reinforced in late 2014 as thousands of Pakistani Taliban fled to Afghanistan to escape a Pakistani military offensive against their longtime sanctuary in North Waziristan. These refugees spoke of the devious plans the Pakistan military had for Pushtuns (most Taliban have always been Pushtuns) and Afghanistan in general.
The Pakistan angle also plays a role in the feud going on inside the local ISIL branch (the “Khorasan Province”). This crew is based in eastern Afghanistan and being torn apart by disputes over interference by the Pakistani ISI (military intelligence) that created the Taliban in the 1990s and supports many other Islamic terrorist groups that will cooperate with Pakistan when asked. There are growing signs that the Pakistani military (mainly the ISI) is trying to gain some influence, or even some control, over local ISIL leadership. They do this by exploiting divisions within ISIL and offering the losing faction help in surviving. Most Islamic terrorist groups know that ISI is active in supporting Islamic terrorists in an effort to achieve ISI goals (which mainly involve protecting the political power and economic assets of the Pakistani military).
Islamic terrorist leaders are always being tempted with offers like this and the ISI is a major player in the region because they have been so successful at it since the 1980s. The Islamic terrorists also know that you can exploit the ISI for a while, before the Pakistanis run out of patience and come after you as they did in mid-2014 when they shut down North Waziristan. This weakened local Islamic terror groups (that were not on the ISI payroll) but also provided ISIL with recruiting opportunities. The ISI knows that one weakness ISIL has is a sense of false superiority. ISI has exploited that before with other Islamic terrorist groups that believed their own propaganda. ISI is aided in these recruitment efforts by Islamic terrorist leaders who see the ISI relationship as mutually beneficial, not a betrayal to the religious doctrine most Islamic terror groups preach. Thus ISI still controls much of the Afghan Taliban because the current leader is also the head of the Haqqani Network. That has caused a split within the Afghan Taliban but that is nothing new and the dissenting factions are at a disadvantage.
The increased fighting between Taliban and ISIL groups is also about drugs although it is unclear if all these battles are over ISIL hostility to the drug trade or wanting a piece of it. Without cash even the most fanatic Islamic terrorists cannot survive, especially since the 500 or more ISIL men left in Afghanistan are at least half non-Afghan and have a reputation for treating locals brutally. That has largely turned the tribes against ISIL. Despite that ISIL survives and continues to attract Afghan recruits, mainly because ISIL is seen as uncorrupted, at least compared to the Taliban. Most Afghans are more concerned with the cash. ISIL had nearly 3,000 personnel in 2016 but battles with the Taliban, local tribes plus increased attacks from the Americans and Afghan forces have reduced that by more than 70 percent. In some weeks over a hundred ISIL men were killed and many of those dead were reached by Afghan or American troops who gathered information for more such attacks. The fighting continues and the Afghan and American commandos in eastern Afghanistan have the dead ISIL men and captured documents to prove it.
The North Resists
In the north (Kunduz province) an army offensive against the Taliban (using airstrikes, artillery and ground forces) has been going on since early May. Back then the Taliban again tried to get into Kunduz city. They failed at that but did manage to seize control of a district outside the city. The Taliban announced that this was part of their 2017 “Spring Offensive” during the traditional warmer weather Afghan “fighting season.” Since that Taliban claim was made the Taliban have been on the defensive around Kunduz and the security forces claim over 500 Islamic terrorists casualties including the death of several prominent (and well known) local Taliban leaders.
June 11, 2017: After going back and forth a few times to clarify who said what at recent peace talks in Astana, Afghan and Pakistani political leaders agreed that both nations would cooperate in attacking Afghan Taliban who refuse to enter peace talks. This cooperation would include regular meetings in Afghanistan and Pakistan by officials from both countries to discuss problems and opportunities. These arrangements are mainly for civilian officials, especially from Pakistan. That’s because the key problem many fear to even speak about openly is the fact that the Pakistani military (and ISI, its intel branch) continue to offer sanctuary for the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network. ISI is also trying to gain control of local ISIL leadership. The Afghan sanctuary has long been obvious to anyone visiting Baluchistan (southwest Pakistan) while the Haqqani Network has always been more concerned with concealing its operations in Pakistan.
The Pakistani military not only denies the sanctuaries exist but insists the main foreign sponsor of Islamic terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan is India. The Pakistani military has supporters in many government ministries that ensure that the Pakistani government does what the military requires (like official condemnations of India for supporting Islamic terrorism in Afghanistan). No one in Afghanistan believes that, viewing it as yet another Pakistani lie while many in Pakistan agree with that assessment but fear to speak out openly because the Pakistani military continues to threaten or even murder those who do. What these new security arrangements are doing is allowing the civilian leaders in both Afghanistan and Pakistan do what they can to deal with the rogue Pakistani military.
In Kabul the government suspended the Kabul police chief as well as the commander of the military garrison.
June 10, 2017: In central Afghanistan (Wardak Province) police arrested a Haqqani Network suicide bomber who was on his way to carry out an attack in Kabul but backed out. He confirmed the Pakistan/Taliban connection when describing how he was taken across the border to a terrorist training camp in Pakistan. He described how the Pakistani border guards let them pass once his Taliban escort displayed his ID. The Afghans are pretty sure that whoever was responsible for the recent Kabul attacks they used ISI and support based in Pakistan. The Afghans have captured and interrogated many reluctant suicide bombers like this and nearly all have either been to Pakistani training camps or knew about them.
In the east (Nangarhar province) three American rangers were killed and one wounded when they were fired on by an Afghan commando they were working with. The Afghan soldier was killed by return fire. The Taliban claimed credit but it is more likely the incident, if deliberate, was the result of a personal disagreement not an Islamic terrorist plot. Such attacks peaked in 2012 when there were 61 such fatal attacks by "friendly" Afghans against foreign troops. There were only 35 such deaths in 2011. There have been more of these deaths in 2011-12 than in all the previous years (back to 2001). These “green-on-blue” attacks caused 15 percent of foreign troop deaths in 2010 year and six percent in 2011. For the Taliban the problem is that overall foreign troop deaths were declining during those two years (down 20 percent or more each year). Moreover, most of these “green-on-blue” deaths turned out to have nothing to do with any Taliban activity. The main problem with Afghan soldiers was that many have serious anger management issues and the size of the Afghan security forces had expanded enormously by 2012. Afghan commanders believed that more careful screening would eliminate the less stable troops, as well as traitors. By 2012 foreign troops were well aware that they must be careful about getting into an argument with an armed Afghan. Most of the attacks were caused by a recent argument, often over something trivial (at least to the Westerners). An Afghan will often open fire on armed NATO troops, even though it's obvious that this is a suicidal action. The Taliban often take credit for these incidents, when it was just another case of an Afghan soldier losing control. Afghan troops often do this with other Afghans but those incidents rarely make the headlines in Afghanistan or outside the country. Afghanistan is a very violent place, which fascinates, perplexes, and frustrates foreigners. The violence is also at the root of the many social problems that keep Afghans poor, ignorant, and terrorized. It starts in childhood and never stops. Westerners who get to know the place are appalled to discover how violent Afghanistan is. It's not just men killing each other over minor matters but violence against women and children. Western doctors and nurses working in clinics see a lot of this, much more so than they would back home. The violence continues into adulthood. This violence makes it more difficult for Afghan troops to receive advice, training, or services (intelligence, medical, logistic) from the foreigners. Worse yet, the foreign troops are more wary when among their Afghan allies, creating the risk that there will be friendly fire going in the other direction, as NATO troops open fire at threats they formerly dismissed. After 2012 the Afghan military screened troops, and new recruits, more thoroughly. Officers and NCOs were ordered to report troops they believe may be unstable or working with the enemy. All this was not enough because the problem was not so much with individuals as it was with Afghan culture.
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