Hamas' new charter will not change the party's stance toward Israel, nor Israel's stance toward it, and the risk of fresh conflict between the two will continue to be high.
The party's main political rival, Fatah, will keep ratcheting up the pressure to try to coerce Hamas into giving it more control over the Gaza Strip.
Though Hamas will probably compromise over economic issues, it will be loath to relinquish its authority over security functions in its stronghold.
Hamas is changing its approach, if only slightly. When the Palestinian party unveils its new charter May 1 in a meeting from its political base in Doha, Qatar, the document will largely replicate the content of its current platform, adopted in 1988. The new charter, for example, promises to continue Hamas' Islamist ideology and opposition to Israel, whose sovereignty the group refuses to recognize. But the anticipated changes, though small, are significant. The document is expected to strike a softer tone overall, calling for moderation and unity in the global Islamic community while modifying previous language about Israel in an attempt to broaden the party's appeal and appease its foreign benefactors. And if the final version recognizes the Palestinian borders established in 1967, it will signal a powerful concession for the party, which has steadfastly insisted on the long-since obsolete boundaries that existed before 1948.
The adjustments, coupled with the personnel shifts in the party's ranks, reflect the many pressures facing the group, both internally and externally. As it fights for legitimacy in its Gaza Strip stronghold, in the Palestinian Authority and abroad, Hamas will likely have to make some concessions. But when it comes to Gaza's security, the party will dig in its heels, and its obstinacy could complicate its relations with allies and adversaries alike.
Playing Political Chicken
Hamas is in the throes of economic crisis. To make matters worse, the Palestinian Authority has recently stopped paying bonuses for public employees in the Gaza Strip and halted fuel deliveries to the area's main power plant. The moves are meant as retaliation for Hamas officials' allegedly withholding taxes on the fuel aid Gaza receives from two of its major benefactors, Turkey and Qatar. The Palestinian Authority's ruling party, Fatah — Hamas' main political rival — has offered to waive the taxes and help ease the financial troubles plaguing the area, but only if Hamas agrees to grant it greater security and administrative control. (The West Bank party has its own economic problems to deal with; financial support for the Palestinian Authority has dropped to an all-time low in recent years.) For Hamas, however, meeting the Palestinian Authority's demands would be politically infeasible. The party, after all, depends on its authority over Gaza to sustain its already foundering legitimacy.
To ratchet up the pressure on Hamas, the Palestinian Authority announced April 27 that it would refuse to pay for the electricity Israel supplies to Gaza. Hamas officials, in response, accused Fatah head and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas of compounding Gazans' suffering in a bid to curry favor with the U.S. administration ahead of his trip to Washington, scheduled for May 3. As the two main Palestinian parties continue their game of chicken, the worsening conditions in Gaza will fuel further unrest among its people. In the long term, they could also prompt Hamas supporters to turn instead to competing Salafist groups, such as Jaish al-Umma or even the Islamic State, thereby further diminishing the party's sway in Gaza. And so, Hamas will have little choice but to compromise with Fatah eventually, at least on economic issues.
Squeezed on All Sides
Until it does, its foreign backers will keep delivering aid to the Gaza Strip while also trying to advance their own interests. Qatar and Turkey will encourage Hamas to negotiate with Fatah in an effort to maintain functional relations with the Palestinian Authority. At the same time, Turkey also has its recently restored diplomatic ties with Israel to consider. To that end, it has been offering Hamas help — including plans for a new Turkish Red Crescent aid center in Gaza — in hopes of enticing the party into a dialogue with Israel. And Egypt, one of Hamas' fair-weather allies, has likewise promised more frequent shipments of basic supplies to Gaza if the party will cede some of its control over the border crossing at Rafah.
Hamas and Egypt have established an uneasy detente born of mutual necessity since tensions between the two flared in 2013 after the Egyptian military ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power in Cairo. The country needs Hamas' help to contain the Islamic State on the Sinai Peninsula, while the party needs financial support to maintain control in Gaza. The benefits of this arrangement notwithstanding, Qatar, one of Gaza's main sources of financial and energy support, has pushed the party to stop normalizing its relations with Egypt. The country would prefer Hamas join its Arab Peace Initiative instead of forging closer ties with its competitors in the region.
Keeping tabs on Hamas affords these countries influence over prospective negotiations with Fatah as well as Israel. Their role in the peace processes, in turn, offers Hamas' foreign benefactors leverage that they can use in their dealings with the United States, the European Union and other states in the region. But as much as Hamas needs their support, it will be reluctant to relinquish its control over security in the Gaza Strip. Regardless of the cosmetic changes in its new charter, the party's guiding principles are the same as ever.
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