Doval's muscle policy: If it worked in Punjab, it would in Kashmir

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Unlike Indian prime ministers of the past, Narendra Modi, appointed a former spy

and not a career diplomat, Ajit Doval, as the head of the country's national security

infrastructure.

And the decision has already shown a marked diỌerence. And the diỌerence

comes in the form of the new policy on Pakistan and Kashmir, being result oriented

rather than that of process.

Soldiers and those from the security establishment, by training and temperament,

have a diỌerent approach to solving issues concerned with threats to the country,

both internal and external.

They are taught by experience that wars and battles, of any kind and size,

inherently bring with them losses, both human and ꈼnancial. Making them more

patient with such losses suỌered in the process of achieving targets.

Doval, is no exception to this, as he has been a part of many Intelligence Bureau

operations in diỌerent parts of the country, throughout his career, eventually rising

up the ranks to head the organisation.

And now, as the Kashmir and Pakistan policy of the Narendra Modi led government

has seen a change from those of its predecessors, the role that Doval must have

played in such a decision is not too di࿨�cult to imagine.

Such a change occurred after initial attempts by the prime minister to make peace

with his Pakistani counter-part in were rebuỌed by its army through the attacks on

an air force base in Pathankot.

It is following such events that India's policy has shifted. Till now the problem was

being dealt with on two diỌerent fronts.

First front comprising of dealing with Pakistan's action at the border and the

terrorists that are sent across the border, and, the second of dealing with the

separatists leaders in Kashmir and violent protestors who help bring the state to a

standstill at will.

Now under the new thinking, they have been connected in the way they will be

dealt with. The change is clear and similar to what was done in Punjab during the

1980's.

It is to isolate Kashmir from the turbulence of India's relationship with its

neighbour, by using considerable force both in Kashmir and at the border, and

cutting oỌ Pakistan's in䔶uence in the valley.

The attempt is to weed out trouble within the territory of India and eventually just

having to deal with Pakistan at the border and not within.

Hopefully to reach a point where Kashmir can be treated like any other state in the

country and eỌorts to bring development and lasting peace can be brought in

without depending on the countries relations with Pakistan.

The change is from the aim of achieving normalisation of the relationship with

Pakistan, to normalisation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

And the government wants to do it through not just negotiations but mainly by

using force as it feels all other methods just hide the problem and post pone aAn example of how this is being done can be seen by the application of what is

being called as the 'Doval Doctrine.'

The government has chosen to take a tough stand in Kashmir and towards

protestors in the valley. No negotiations to take place till there is peace except of

some back channel talks which is the norm in any complicated issue, seems to be

the rule of the day. The Indian army too seems to be playing a tougher role in the

state.

And with respect to muscle power being used in terms of Pakistan, it was used in

what is now being called 'Surgical Strikes' on terror camps inside Pakistan's

territory by the Indian army in September last year. And further such actions can

be expected given the recent killing and mutilations of two Indian soldiers.

Under such a policy results might take some time to show and it might cost more in

the short run, but if successful it will not cost nearly as much if the battle in

Kashmir continues, even if intermittently, into the future with no end in sight.

In Kashmir, like Punjab

But surprisingly this is not the ꈼrst time in India that such a strong policy is being

implemented in a state.

Doval, who played an active part in security operations during the turbulent times

in Punjab when terrorism 䔶ourished under the disguise of separatism, seems to

have learnt lessons from what he saw.

The policy change now trying to be implemented in Kashmir is quite similar to what

was done in Punjab. It may not be so exactly in the steps taken for execution of the

plan, but clearly is in terms of what process has been chosen for the valley.

The situation in Punjab during those times was similar to present day Kashmir in

some very important ways.

violence, of terrorists and that in retaliation from the Indian establishment. Like

Kashmir, the terrorists in Punjab too were backed by the Pakistani establishment

and supported with cash, weaponry, escape routes etc., and both had separatist

tendencies, which found support among the general masses.

But in around a decade's time, the problem in Punjab was signiꈼcantly reduced and

ꈼnally rooted out. And there is no doubt that it was done with an iron hand,

through the police and the army under the Armed Forces (Special Forces) Act,

which is now surrounded in controversy in Kashmir.

The state was isolated from Pakistan and also treated in isolation as compared to

the rest of the country with unprecedented use of state machinery. Eventually

making the support from Pakistan of little use for the extremist forces, while the

army dealt with the neighbor at the border and not within India.

This did not come easily. A lot of lives were lost, a prime minister killed, and there

existed a widespread suspicion between citizens towards each other based on

religion of the other. And yet none of the issues that hampered the state exist at

any serious level today.

Challenges di嚖erent than in Punjab

Despite similarities, Punjab of then and Kashmir of today have visible diỌerences

as well, which could hamper the application of a similar policy.

Firstly, the nature and situation at the border that Punjab shares with Pakistan is

quite diỌerent from that of Jammu and Kashmir. The terrains, the porous nature

due to it, make it far more di࿨�cult to contain Pakistan and its o࿨�cial and uno࿨�cial

agents.

Secondly, the times have changed from then, when video reporting was in its

nascent stage and social media did not exist, which have now drastically increased

the power of the world's in䔶uence and the role public pressure plays.

And lastly, though Pakistan had supported the calls of Sikh extremists for secession

from the Indian union, the history and standing of the country on Kashmir is much

more blatant and so too would be the position that the other countries of the

world would take on it, than that on Punjab.

Three camps would form in such a case, those supporting India, another Pakistan

and the third of those who remain neutral. Such a situation would be precarious

and would depend what side powers like US, Russia and China take.

As in todays world no one can aỌord a full-䔶edged war between two nuclear

powers. A situation that may arise if an approach similar to Punjab is taken now.

These points are going to make a process to apply a Punjab like policy extremely

hard, and, will require certain amount to tweaking to it.

The drawbacks of such an approach

The ꈼrst, can be seen through reports of the time from Punjab, and the court cases

fought since, which have made it clear that human rights were violated, innocent

lives lost and that many who survived never got even a semblance of normalcy

back in their lives.

have ever happened. But the reality is whenever force is used for a task like this,

such repercussions do occur.

And whether such an action was, and is, right or not, should it have been done

diỌerently or not, was the cost too high or not, are questions for each person to

decide on.

The other major drawback is the criticism in the media, both national and

international, that such a tough approach invites, which can alienate the public,

and end up with the government losing control of the narrative.

This results in serious damage to the e࿨�cacy of the policy as certain decisions that

should be taken objectively end up being taken under pressure which have the

capability of causing serious damage.

But what cannot be debated today is the result that such an approach can bring,

which is seen in the form of a total absence of the terror of violence, from state or

non-state actors, from the lives of ordinary citizens in Punjab.

And this is what seems to have made up the minds of Modi and his go-to-man on

Kashmir, Doval, on the issue of which policy to follow in the state.

Whether it succeeds or not is anyone's guess but it does look like even if it does fail,

it will not be for a lack of trying.

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