LEONE LAKHANI
New rules go into effect this weekend that restrict electronic items in passenger cabins on U.S.-bound flights. The measures are being taken as a security precaution to thwart potential threats.
The ban includes flights on nine international airlines operating out of 10 airports in the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey. They include Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. It affects: Royal Jordanian Airlines, Egypt Air, Turkish Airlines, Saudia, Kuwait Airways, Royal Air Maroc, Qatar Airways, Emirates, and Etihad Airways.
Speaking to The Cipher Brief this week, Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, said the restrictions were not surprising given that “terrorists are getting better and better at miniaturizing their explosives.”
The UK announced a similar ban this week, on flights from six countries in the region: Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia.
The British ban affects a total of 14 carriers, and also includes Royal Jordanian, Egypt Air, Turkish Airlines and Saudia. But it adds to the list: British Airways, easyJet, Jet2, Monarch, Thomas Cook, Thomson, Atlas-Global, Pegasus, Middle East Airlines, and Tunisair.
The Cipher Brief’s Executive Producer spoke to network member Rob Richer — the CIA’S former Associate Deputy Director of Operations, responsible for Clandestine Service Operations in the Middle East – to find out more about the security procedures in the region, and why certain airports may have been selected.
TCB: With your knowledge of the threats in the region, what type of intelligence could lead to an electronic ban like this?
Rob Richer: Well, you can think back to the toner ban from Yemen – which was about 4 or 5 years ago – when we had information that an al-Qaeda bomber was putting things into toner cartridges for printers. That resulted in a huge change at how we looked at cargo and checked-in equipment. And it was proven to be true that they were experimenting with that kind of stuff.
In this case, there’s no doubt that there’s intelligence that those wanting to commit these acts have been experimenting with new technologies in terms of explosives. It’s very easy to come up with ways to set off explosives which aren’t electronically based and which aren’t bulky.
So the concern is, as they refine explosives down to very thin forms, they can be put into any type of device and be operable. Scanners may not pick it up, if they are very thin.
If nothing else, this is probably more due diligence. The fact that we’re in the fight on the ground in Iraq and Syria means coalition forces are capturing bomb-making facilities or getting intelligence.
Almost always, intelligence and security services act on protection of the lowest common denominator, i.e., if this information is partially reliable that [terrorists] can do X, then we need to do Y - just in case.
TCB: So in terms of the scanners – the ones that are in the United States – would they pick up something in a laptop that goes into the cargo hold?
RR: Probably. The technology for scenting explosives is pretty good. Is every piece of every cargo inspected to the level it should be? Probably not.
For the most part, they’ll detect anomalies. Can they protect everything? No. Can they detect bulky stuff? Yes. Can they detect small things? No. But that’s one of the reasons they’ve been reinforcing cargo containers in cargo holds.
The concern is cargo security in some countries.
TCB: Given your knowledge of the region, why do you think these particular airports were singled out? When you think of the Gulf, there’s a perception that the UAE and Qatar, for instance, have very advanced aviation hubs and airlines.
RR: I’m confused about why some of these airports were picked. I’m pretty familiar with the security practices at the airports that allow direct flights to the States, and they are pretty darn good. They have to comply with U.S. standards to accept those flights, so they get FAA inspections.
There was probably pretty specific information that addresses some entity or organization or person using that particular area. That would be the only reason.
I think there's some mystery with this one. Why these particular airports? Why this particular time? Why are you worrying about foreign flag airlines, and why aren't we worrying about U.S. carriers who fly directly to the States, because they go through the same security?
What is interesting is the ban addresses flights to the States, but not necessarily U.S. carriers.
Usually terrorists want to take out a U.S. carrier because there is a U.S. flag on it, or as it gets closer to the homeland.
But it is unusual that they picked certain airports in the region, and didn't pick others. If you look at where the most recent terrorist attacks have happened, they’ve been in Europe, where we've had these singleton and lone wolf attacks.
If whoever drove that threat has the technology to make a device, sitting in the desert in Raqqa, then they can probably pass that information along on the internet and do it in Paris, Germany or somewhere else.
TCB: That’s a question that is being raised. If someone really wants to carry out an attack, they could go to other airports.
RR: Exactly.
TCB: You’re familiar with the security procedures in these Middle Eastern airports. How strict are they? Give me an idea of their procedures.
RR: Almost everything depends on a tiered-level of security, and by that, I mean multiple places to be checked and things to be looked at. Most Arab airlines that fly directly to the States had to be certified for those flights, which means they had to adhere to our security concerns, plus their own security concerns. That means that they have to have people operating at the first level of screening when you walk into the airport.
I’ll give you an example. In Jordan, everything that goes into airports is x-rayed. So when you wheel your luggage into the airport, there is an x-ray machine right there. The first thing they do is they x-ray your luggage, before you even go into the check-in area.
Then there is almost always a duplicate set of eyes on the machines. So you’ve got the operator and someone supervising the operator. Then it goes inside, and whichever airline you’re going on will have their own security practices.
I fly out of the States to get to the Middle East, and the only time my bag is checked is down in the cargo areas of whichever U.S. airport I am flying from. It may be just as good. But my point is, in the Middle East, they generally go overboard on security because an attack at an airport or on an airplane is as detrimental to that country as it is to the target country.
So again, the threat must have been specific enough for them to worry about two things: Either number one, it could circumvent those security practices - that are pretty good - or number two, that they've got someone that can help them put cargo on a plane, or do something to a device. I’m speculating a little here.
TCB: With your knowledge of the region, the airlines and airports, why do think there's been a distinction between the airports and these particular airlines?
RR: I've seen postulating that it’s a trade issue because those airlines compete with U.S. airlines. I don't know why they picked those airlines, unless there is a specific threat or intel chain that says “we're going to use an Arab airline flying directly to the States,” and those are the ones that were identified.
TCB: The U.S. and U.K. share intelligence very closely, so why is there a discrepancy in the airports and airlines they chose? Would that be due to different types of intelligence?
RR: Generally, we share our threat intelligence with all our treaty partners.
A significant number of people fly from London to the Gulf for their connections to the Far East because it's cheaper than the national carriers in the U.K., and they're better airlines, in many people's opinions.
They will have assessed that information the same way we do, and they will make that decision based on the level of threat is, and the level of prevention on the other end.
TCB: Final thoughts?
RR: Terrorists and extremists are like a stream flowing around rocks. If there's a rock, a stream can go around it. If the rock is "we can no longer use these airlines" - then what do they use next?
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