Gary E. Marchant, Brad Allenby
As governments around the world struggle to govern a multitude of emerging technologies, they often seek to harmonize their regulatory approaches. But there are at least 10 different reasons why nations may seek to harmonize their oversight of a specific technology, and discerning which of these rationales will apply to a specific technology is critical for selecting the optimal harmonization approach. The traditional approach is the negotiation of formal international treaties, but, as exemplified by the challenges of cybersecurity, such treaty-based approaches are too resource-intensive and difficult to be effective for most technologies. Accordingly, a new generation of more informal international governance tools are being explored, often grouped under the term “soft law.” They include private standards, guidelines, codes of conduct, and forums for transnational dialogue.
All around the world, governments, industry, and the public are struggling to realize the promising benefits – and manage the disruptive impacts – of one rapidly emerging technology after another. A frequent response by many politicians and policymakers to these successive waves of emerging technologies is that nations need to harmonize their regulatory response. Whether it is cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, synthetic biology, gene editing, autonomous weapons, nanotechnology, geoengineering, 3D printing, bitcoin, or the myriad of other emerging technologies, international regulatory harmonization seems to be one commonly agreed goal.
While the general objective of international harmonization is appealing, the actual implementation of such a goal turns out to be a challenge. International law instruments, institutions, and doctrines are much weaker than their equivalents at the national level, and this – along with the diversity of socioeconomic and political systems, and the military and security implications of many of these technologies – makes international regulatory harmonization extremely difficult. Indeed, many practitioners now refer to international coordination, cooperation, or alignment rather than harmonization. (Harmonization typically seeks to adopt and enforce identical requirements in very different legal systems, whereas coordination, cooperation, and alignment seek a second-best but more practical solution of encouraging countries to adopt regulations that are as similar as feasible. For purposes of simplicity, we use “harmonization” in this article as shorthand for all of these approaches.)
International harmonization is much more nuanced than it may first appear. There are many possible reasons for wanting to harmonize – and different reasons apply to different technologies. Moreover, the best approach for any particular technology depends on the reason for harmonization (Abbott and Snidal 2001Abbott, K. W., and D. Snidal. 2001. “International ‘Standards’ and International Governance.” Journal of European Public Policy 8 (3): 345–370. doi:10.1080/13501760110056013.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®]). We have identified 10 of the most important reasons why international regulations should be harmonized, and two possible mechanisms for doing so: treaties and “soft law” (instruments or agreements that are not directly enforceable like treaties, but that nevertheless create powerful expectations). The optimal approach for encouraging harmonization will often depend on the reason harmonization is needed.
Why harmonize?
There are at least 10 different reasons why international harmonization is desirable, but usually only one or two of these reasons apply to any given emerging technology. One reason for harmonization is that nations want to enhance mutual security by agreeing to forgo in concert a potentially dangerous weapons technology, something no nation may be willing to do unilaterally. For example, nations may in the future agree to a convention banning autonomous weapons.
A second reason for international harmonization is to fairly share the burden of achieving an international goal – such as addressing climate change. Without an international agreement, some countries may get a free ride at the expense of other nations that are willing to make sacrifices.
Third, international agreement to harmonize national responses may be sought where there is a need to establish a commonly agreed goal, as may be the case with a technology such as geoengineering, where the actions of a single country can have global impacts.
A fourth reason for international harmonization is to minimize international trade disputes. For example, disparate standards and patchwork approvals (in some countries but not others) for genetically modified foods have resulted in billions of dollars in economic injuries from blocked shipments and additional testing requirements when food exports contain ingredients (often at only trace levels) not approved in the importing country. Such trade barriers have created unprecedented transatlantic discord.
Fifth, international harmonization may be sought to ensure safe exports and imports. If an exporting country does not abide by the same safety standards as the importing country, the exported products could harm the population of the importing nation.
Six, international harmonization may be sought to ensure equal rights and protection for citizens of all nations. Harmonized standards can prevent a “race to the bottom” in which countries may be tempted to adopt more lenient and less protective standards in domains such as environmental protection, or labor and safety standards, in order to attract investments, jobs, and tax revenues.
A related seventh rationale is to avoid medical tourism, where patients in nations in which a medical intervention is restricted may travel to undertake those procedures in countries with more permissive or nonexistent regulations. For example, many Americans go to Asian countries for stem cell treatments not approved in the United States, while many expectant Asian parents come to the United States for prenatal testing and sex selection not allowed in their countries. To the extent these practices are viewed as unsafe or unethical, harmonized standards can help eliminate the need for, or appeal of, medical tourism.
Eighth, perhaps the most classic reason for international harmonization is to protect against transboundary impacts. For example, toxic air pollutants emitted by one nation may cross into the territory of another country and cause harm. Harmonizing standards can create agreement on acceptable levels of such emissions.
The final two rationales for international harmonization are to promote efficiency. Reason nine promotes efficiency in regulated parties by subjecting them to one set of aligned requirements worldwide. For example, if workplace exposure standards, product labeling requirements, or safety testing requirements are harmonized globally, multinational companies only have to implement one common approach that will comply with the regulations of all nations.
Finally, harmonized international standards can make regulators more efficient by allowing them to share the workload and avoid duplication of efforts in adopting uniform standards. For example, under the auspices of the OECD Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials, OECD countries shared the testing of 13 commercially important manufactured nanomaterials, sparing each country from having to do its own testing of each nanomaterial.
Different reasons for different technologies
Different subsets of these reasons for international harmonization will apply to any given emerging technology or even to specific technology applications. Consider, for example, gene editing, which has been elevated to a regulatory and international harmonization priority with the advent of the powerful new Crispr method, which makes gene editing easier and cheaper. There are at least four major applications of regulatory significance: agricultural, military and security, environmental, and human health. While there have been frequent calls for harmonizing Crispr regulations, the rationale is different for each of the four major applications of Crispr gene editing.
Agricultural applications of Crispr primarily involve producing more-precise genetically modified organisms (crops and animals) for human food consumption, sometimes referred to as GMO 2.0. The major harmonization concern with these applications is that countries will adopt inconsistent regulatory approaches, resulting in major and costly trade disputes – as has occurred with the first generation of genetically modified foods.
Crispr’s environmental applications include the development of “gene drives” that can rapidly proliferate a specific genetic trait throughout an entire species to either suppress (or potentially eliminate) the natural population or to change the genetic characteristics of that population (National Academies 2016National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine. 2016. Gene Drives on the Horizon: Advancing Science, Navigating Uncertainty, and Aligning Research with Public Values. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23405/gene-drives-on-the-horizon-advancing-science-navigating-uncertainty-and.). The Gates Foundation, for example, has recently funded a project to suppress or eliminate the mosquito species responsible for spreading malaria in Africa using a gene drive technology. While the effect of such applications seems to be local, these interventions do not stay within national boundaries, because mosquitos are capable of crossing national borders, and thus transboundary impacts are the primary reason for harmonizing regulatory responses.
Crispr’s military and security implications are complex and difficult to specify, in large part because of the nascent state of the technology and confidentiality considerations. Even technologies that appear to be purely commercial may be complicated, or even completely disrupted, by underlying military or security concerns – so it is important to keep these concerns in mind during international regulatory negotiations.
Finally, perhaps the most profound application of Crispr will be for human genetic modification, including the potential to make “germ line” genetic changes that can be passed on to future generations. While most nations support gene editing for the purpose of treating disease in an individual person, changes made purely for enhancement are controversial, and germ line changes are even more controversial. Nations may take different regulatory approaches, with some prohibiting such applications outright, and others adopting more permissive or ambivalent regulations. While these decisions are primarily based on the socioethical and historical perspectives of each country, a primary driver for seeking international harmonization is to prevent risky medical tourism: traveling to less-regulated foreign countries to undergo procedures that are outlawed at home, such as stem-cell “treatments” (Charo 2016Charo, R. A. 2016. “On the Road (To a Cure?) – Stem-Cell Tourism and Lessons for Gene Editing.” New England Journal of Medicine374: 901–903. doi:10.1056/NEJMp1600891.[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®]).
Harmonization through treaties
Just as there are multiple reasons for seeking international harmonization, there are multiple approaches for pursuing it. The traditional approach is through formal treaties and conventions. While these instruments have the advantage of being enforceable against signatories, they also present many challenges. Even for a recognized serious global problem such as climate change, negotiating an international treaty has been a difficult, convoluted odyssey, and what was finally agreed in Paris in December 2015 was not a harmonized requirement but rather each individual country volunteering its own national commitment.
Treaties are inherently difficult, resource-intensive, and time-consuming to negotiate. They are also difficult to modify in response to changes in technology or circumstances, a frequent reality with emerging technologies. They often present problems with monitoring and enforcement. Formal treaties frequently fail to accommodate and address the different strategic, political, economic, and socioethical objectives and perspectives of multiple countries.
For example, in the early 2000s, the United Nations attempted to negotiate an international convention banning human cloning. The effort failed largely due to the inability to reach a consensus on the definition of cloning, and the failure to agree on an enforcement approach. Even though every nation was in theory opposed to reproductive cloning, drafting an enforceable treaty implementing such a prohibition turned out to be an insurmountable challenge.
Cybersecurity provides a more in-depth example of the challenges and limitations of international treaties. Any realistic assessment of the potential for meaningful international agreement in this area must reflect current geopolitical and strategic realities, as well as the mechanisms by which major powers maintain and deploy defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. Here, both the secrecy of “classified” information, and the inherent difficulty in identifying the sources of cyber-attacks, make evaluation difficult. Although some useful transnational discussions about cybersecurity can nonetheless be held, the international environment is rapidly evolving in ways that are making any potential agreement on cybersecurity more difficult than ever.
Cyberwarfare and other nontraditional “asymmetric warfare” strategies have emerged in response to the superiority of traditional American military forces. Reflecting both history and absolute expenditure levels, the United States is unquestionably the world’s dominant conventional military power. An obvious response of potential adversaries faced with such a dominant force is to develop strategies and expertise, and utilize technologies, that enable them to avoid direct confrontation but still assert their interests. This leads to non-traditional approaches, such as cyberwarfare, that operate in domains where American dominance is less marked, or the United States is more vulnerable, or both.
These strategic and technological imperatives are not just changes in the way traditional conflict is carried out; rather, they reflect an inchoate, but evolving, shift away from military confrontation toward a model of conflict that is intentionally waged across all domains of civilization – including not just physical infrastructure, but also economic, financial, cultural, and ideological systems. Many of the elements of such strategies – theft of intellectual property, using money from common criminal activities to fund political subversion, disinformation campaigns – are not new, but the scale and sophistication of these emerging strategies are different, and they challenge the idea of comprehensive treaties governing domains such as cyberconflict.
It is obvious that, to be successful, an international cyberconflict treaty should include at least Russia, China, and the United States. It is also clear that there are significant structural obstacles to achieving any such agreement. Consider the example of Russia. The Russian invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine did not involve the deployment of large conventional military forces, but rather provided a real-world illustration of what Russian military authorities mean by their term “New Generation Warfare” (Gerasimov 2013Gerasimov, V. 2013. “The Value of Science in Prediction.” Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur’er[The Military-Industrial Courier], February27. Translation available at:https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/). Psychological warfare, political subversion, classic disinformation campaigns carried out on social media platforms, intimidation, and bribery were effectively integrated into political, psychological, and information strategies that undermined civil society and the local authority of the Ukrainian state. In the end, only minimal conventional military commitment was required. It wasn’t just the means, but also the ends, that were non-traditional: In classic military operations, the goal is the annihilation of opposing military forces in a climactic event, but in eastern Ukraine in particular, Russia sought the destabilization of traditional social and governance institutions and the subversion of any viable opposition, enabling control without responsibility.
Russia has continued to develop this strategy, relying heavily on cyber and social media technologies. Recent examples include interference with the American, and possibly German, electoral processes, including the theft and strategic release of emails and other materials in disinformation campaigns which, in a neat bit of irony, released otherwise confidential but valid information in ways that were systemically misleading and destructive. Often, quasi-state or even criminal organizations, such as Russia’s infamous Russian Business Network (often referred to as simply RBN), are apparently part of such campaigns.
For its part, China, shocked by the success of allied forces in Desert Storm against a large, modern army, also has been reformulating its strategies, especially as regards the United States. Perhaps best expressed by Chinese strategists Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in a publication called Unrestricted Warfare, the Chinese argue that warfare in the 21st century will be qualitatively different:
[T]here is reason for us to maintain that the financial attack by George Soros on East Asia, the terrorist attack on the US embassy by Usama (sic) Bin Laden, the gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the disciples of the Aum Shinri Kyo, and the havoc wreaked by the likes of Morris Jr. on the Internet, in which the degree of destruction is by no means second to that of a war, represent semi-warfare, quasi-warfare, and sub-warfare, that is, the embryonic form of another kind of warfare… . Faced with warfare in the broad sense that will unfold on a borderless battlefield, it is no longer possible to rely on military forces and weapons alone to achieve national security in the larger strategic sense…. Obviously, warfare is in the process of transcending the domains of soldiers, military units, and military affairs, and is increasingly becoming a matter for politicians, scientists and even bankers (Liang and Xiangsui 1999Liang, Q., and W. Xiangsui. 1999. Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House. US Central Intelligence Agency translation available at:http://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf., 6, 221).
The inclusion of all dimensions of a civilization in a deliberate, strategically integrated process of long-term, intentional, coordinated conflict – one aspect of which may or may not be conventional combat – is, like New Generation Warfare, a mash-up of old and new thinking and strategies. The Cold War, for example, involved competition across many domains, including culture, economics, and advanced technology. (The launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union was not just a technological, but also a propaganda victory over the United States.) But long-term integrated conflict across the entire frontier of an adversarial culture in the context of modern technology and geopolitical upheaval is different than the conflict between two Western belief systems – Marxism and capitalism – that epitomized the Cold War. And, importantly, in both the Russian and the Chinese strategy, information systems are critical domains, and cyber a critical battlespace.
As Liang and Xiangsui note (1999Liang, Q., and W. Xiangsui. 1999. Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House. US Central Intelligence Agency translation available at:http://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf., 25), “As we see it, a single man-made stock-market crash, a single computer virus invasion, or a single rumor or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the enemy country’s exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country on the Internet, all can be included in the ranks of new-concept weapons.” Indeed, Liang and Xiangsui observe (1999Liang, Q., and W. Xiangsui. 1999. Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House. US Central Intelligence Agency translation available at:http://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf., 53) that “financial war has become a ‘hyperstrategic’ weapon … [because it] is easily manipulated and allows for concealed actions, and is also highly destructive.”
Given these geopolitical realities, a formal and meaningful cybersecurity treaty would be very difficult to negotiate and enforce. To begin with, cyber is different from other military technologies, such as poison gas, that have been controlled through treaty with relative success. In contrast, observe that many of the terms used in the digital domain – cybercrime, cyberattack, cyberwar – are differentiated not by observable technological characteristics, but rather reflect the subjective intent of the aggressor, and the legal mechanism by which society chooses to respond. Thus, for example, the same form of attack on the same target may be addressed as if it were a crime, and thus treated by the criminal law system, or as if it were an act of war, and thus appropriately addressed by military and security forces.
Is a hack by another state that steals an advanced fighter design worth hundreds of millions of dollars a crime or an act of war? What about deliberate interference in an American election? Or hacking Sony as a state response to an unfavorable film? Such questions do not arise in more conventional military domains: If a division of infantry or a tank regiment crosses a border, it is hard to see it as anything but a military event. It is easy to tell what poison gas on the battlefield is; it is far less easy to know what a hidden piece of code in the operating system of an electric grid may be.
More tellingly, each of the three states critical to a cyber treaty view it very differently from a strategic perspective. The United States, with its dominance of conventional military technology, and an economy and society heavily reliant on cyber infrastructure, has mainly defensive interests. More subtly, anything that can reduce the usefulness of cyber techniques as an element of asymmetric warfare, and therefore drive conflict toward more conventional means, favors the United States. Conversely, both China and Russia have not just developed strong cyberconflict capabilities, but they have also built new, and so far successful, strategies around such capabilities. Thus, they have every incentive to refuse to join any regime that would take such capabilities away from them. Even if they agree, they might continue to covertly use cyber weapons.
Moreover, the institutional structures around cyber are more complex than with traditional weapon systems. Cyber infrastructure involves global networks with many actors – private and public – engaged in facilitating information manipulation, storage, use, and movement, making any clear technological delineation for a treaty governing cyberconflict difficult if not impossible. Additionally, the US institutional approach to cyber tends to involve a complicated mix of private, public, and military and security organizations and responsibilities; the Chinese approach to cyber tends to rely heavily on specialized military units (such as PLA Unit 61398); and the Russian approach tends to rely on informal agreements with criminal organizations such as the RBN, and with organizations such as Fancy Bear (a shadowy cyber espionage group that hacked the Democratic National Committee and International Olympic Committee) that may be more closely linked to Russian military intelligence.
Moreover, each of these states has a deeply different perspective on information and the role of the Internet. Simplifying significantly: The United States, reflecting the influence of the First Amendment and libertarian leanings, tends to support a relatively free Internet, with information primarily being a matter between private parties; China regards information as both an important source of support for the government, and a dangerous mechanism by which the Party, and the state, can be undermined; and Russia, with a post-modern cynical distain for truth, views information (and disinformation) as an effective means to confuse and weaken potential adversaries, and to project and defend its interests efficiently.
In sum, not only does cyber technology not support the necessary definitional rigor that an enforceable treaty would require, but the strategies of the three main states involved in cyberconflict at this point diverge fundamentally. To the United States, stealing financial information may be a crime; to its adversaries, it may be an important part of a long-term strategy of civilizational conflict. This does not mean, however, that some controls are not possible, only that the realm that is most likely to be effective, at least in the short run, is “soft law.” A similar story can be told for other emerging technologies, which explains why treaties are unlikely to be a significant source of harmonization success.
Harmonization through “soft law”
Given that formal treaties will not be feasible for most emerging technologies, other approaches will be needed for international harmonization of emerging technology governance. There are numerous mechanisms available, many of which are collectively referred to as “soft law” approaches (OECD 2013OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2013. International Regulatory Co-Operation: Addressing Global Challenges. Paris: OECD Publishing.http://www.oecd.org/env/international-regulatory-co-operation-9789264200463-en.htm.). These are instruments or arrangements that create substantive expectations that are not directly enforceable, unlike “hard law” requirements such as treaties and statutes.
One soft-law category of potential relevance to many emerging technologies includes various types of private standards, guidelines, codes of conduct, and principles. For example, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has set private international standards for nanotechnology risk management, which serve as quasi-regulatory criteria for safe handling of nanomaterials. Although these standards are not directly enforceable, many international contracts and some insurers require compliance with applicable ISO standards (or their equivalents), providing an indirect enforcement mechanism.
Another example of a soft-law instrument comes in the form of guidelines produced by professional societies. For example, the International Society of Stem Cell Research has produced guidelines on stem cell research that restrict certain types of research and provide ethical safeguards for other types of research. Although not directly enforceable, these guidelines set professional expectations for stem cell researchers, and can be indirectly enforced by research institutions, funding agencies, and scientific journals requiring scientists to comply.
Although not legally binding, soft-law instruments do have some beneficial features. Because they are not promulgated by any government, their application is not limited to that government’s jurisdiction, but is inherently international in scope – and equally applicable to states, private firms, and nongovernmental organizations. Also, their informal nature makes them relatively easy to modify in response to changing circumstances.
A second type of soft-law mechanism is transnational dialogue between regulators. Events at which regulators from different countries have an opportunity to meet, get to know each other personally, and discuss common regulatory issues turn out to be one of the most valuable mechanisms for encouraging regulatory convergence (Saner and Marchant 2015Saner, M. A., and G. E. Marchant. 2015. “Proactive International Regulatory Cooperation for Governance of Emerging Technologies.” Jurimetrics 55 (2): 147–178.). For example, the International Dialogue on Responsible Research and Development of Nanotechnology, a series of three international biennial meetings of nanotechnology regulators from more than 20 nations, played an important informal role in encouraging common national approaches to nanotechnology oversight.
The appropriate choice of soft-law approach may depend on the dominant rationale for international harmonization of that technology. Consider once again the four major applications of the Crispr gene-editing technology described above: For agricultural applications, where international trade disputes are the primary concern, harmonized risk assessment and risk management principles established by an international organization such as Codex may be the best solution. For environmental applications that involve the transboundary spread of modified organisms, informal dialogue among regulators of neighboring countries may be the most effective approach. Discussions between different militaries can help manage emerging technologies, with the important caveat that secrecy within and among states can be a formidable barrier. And for human gene editing, where medical tourism is the biggest international concern, scientific guidelines adopted by professional societies may be the best way to enforce common principles.
Of course, none of these approaches is perfect. But when it comes to international governance in a complex and convoluted world, nothing is ever perfect. It is a matter of choosing the best options available. That requires a nuanced and technology-specific analysis of the reasons why harmonization may be desired for a specific governance challenge, which then will point toward the best approaches for achieving international harmonization.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
Abbott, K. W., and D. Snidal. 2001. “International ‘Standards’ and International Governance.” Journal of European Public Policy 8 (3): 345–370. doi:10.1080/13501760110056013.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®]
Charo, R. A. 2016. “On the Road (To a Cure?) – Stem-Cell Tourism and Lessons for Gene Editing.” New England Journal of Medicine 374: 901–903. doi:10.1056/NEJMp1600891.[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®]
Gerasimov, V. 2013. “The Value of Science in Prediction.” Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur’er [The Military-Industrial Courier], February 27. Translation available at: https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/
Liang, Q., and W. Xiangsui. 1999. Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House. US Central Intelligence Agency translation available at: http://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf.
National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine. 2016. Gene Drives on the Horizon: Advancing Science, Navigating Uncertainty, and Aligning Research with Public Values. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23405/gene-drives-on-the-horizon-advancing-science-navigating-uncertainty-and.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2013. International Regulatory Co-Operation: Addressing Global Challenges. Paris: OECD Publishing. http://www.oecd.org/env/international-regulatory-co-operation-9789264200463-en.htm.
Saner, M. A., and G. E. Marchant. 2015. “Proactive International Regulatory Cooperation for Governance of Emerging Technologies.” Jurimetrics 55 (2): 147–178.
Additional author information
Gary E. Marchant
Gary E. Marchant is a Regents’ Professor; the Lincoln Professor of Emerging Technologies, Law & Ethics; and faculty director of the Center for Law, Science & Innovation at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University (ASU). He also serves as a professor at the School of Life Sciences, and Distinguished Sustainability Scientist at the Global Institute of Sustainability at ASU. His research and teaching interests include the governance of emerging technologies, legal aspects of personalized medicine, use of genetic information in the legal system, legal aspects of risk assessment and risk management, and the application of science and technology in the legal system. He has published more than 120 academic articles, book chapters, and books on technology governance.
Brad Allenby
Brad Allenby is Lincoln Professor of Engineering and Ethics; President’s Professor of Civil, Environmental, and Sustainable Engineering, and of Law; and founding chair of the Consortium for Emerging Technologies, Military Operations and National Security at Arizona State University. He is an AAAS Fellow and a fellow of the Royal Society for the Arts, Manufactures & Commerce, and has been a US Naval Academy Stockdale Fellow (2009–2010). From 1995 to 1997, he was director for energy and environmental systems at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and from 1991 to 1992 he was the J. Herbert Hollomon Fellow at the National Academy of Engineering in Washington, DC. His latest books are Future Conflict & Emerging Technologies (Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, ASU: 2016), and The Applied Ethics of Emerging Military and Security Technologies, an edited volume released by Ashgate Publishing in 2015.
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