By C Uday Bhaskar
Pakistan officially announced that it had successfully tested, for the first time, a nuclear-capable-submarine launched cruise missile (SLCM) – the Babur 3- from a submerged platform on Monday (Jan 9). This is a major techno-strategic achievement in the naval domain and has elicited considerable notice. However aspersions are being cast about the authenticity of this ‘success’ and the parentage of the missile.
Be that as it may, the official statement noted that the “Babur-3 SLCM in land-attack mode, is capable of delivering various types of payloads and will provide Pakistan with a credible second strike capability, augmenting deterrence.”
It was also added that testing an SLCM of 450 km range was in keeping with Pakistan’s quest for ‘credible second-strike capability’ and ‘credible minimum deterrence.’
This determination to acquire a submarine launched nuclear weapon capability was evident for the last decade plus and in keeping with Rawalpindi’s conviction that tactical nuclear weapons – notwithstanding their inherent de-stabilizing character – were necessary for Pakistan’s strategic parity with India.
Having acquired the land-based variant of the Babur , it was expected that the sea-based variant of the same would be soon unveiled and the January 9 SLCM test is now perceived to be the second-strike option for Pakistan.
In the nuclear domain, it may be recalled that during the Cold War the USA and the former USSR went through various stages of technological improvements in missiles and nuclear warheads – including the nuclear tipped cruise missile.
Technology and strategy shaped each other in a synergistic manner and finally it was agreed by both sides that reasonably assured – and verifiable – strategic stability could only be ensured with both sides acquiring ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD) capability.
The acronym is Freudian for it pointed to the ‘madness’ of the Cold War nuclear pursuit with a theological gravitas that could not be questioned. The nuclear weapon was the cross borne in stoic fashion by the cloistered few who were aware of its apocalyptic destructive capability.
Stability, however menacing was the Holy Grail and in its pursuit both Washington and Moscow were agreed that the nuclear tipped-cruise missile was de-stabilizing and hence to be abjured. Ultimately the desired level of deterrence stability was assured through the submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with ranges in excess of 5,000 kms.
The nuclear propelled submarine with the SLBM is referred to as the SSBN and is regarded as the pinnacle of second-strike capability and related strategic stability.
Pakistan which is an anomalous nuclear weapon state (it is the only one among the seven declared N weapon states where the military controls the button) has identified India as the focus and target for its nuclear weapon capability. It has used the logic of the weaker state in a nuclear dyad to threaten the use of tactical nuclear weapons and the Babur 3 SLCM is a manifestation of this effort.
While it will take some more time for Pakistan to fully induct the SLCM on board its Agosta class submarines, the introduction of tactical nukes at sea will increase the opacity that currently exists as far as regional WMD (weapons of mass destruction) stability is concerned.
Pakistan is not an autonomous actor in the WMD arena and China has provided considerable support to Rawalpindi since the late 1980’s. Currently Beijing is expected to supply eight Yuan class submarines to Pakistan and they will also be SLCM capable. One question that lingers is if the Babur 3 is also a validation of China’s underwater capability.
The challenge for India in the years ahead both in the maritime domain and the related strategic stability matrix will be compounded and fraught with many undesirable exigencies by this introduction of the SLCM into the regional security calculus.
The waters of the Indian Ocean will get roiled by the Babur 3 and regional WMD stability will become more brittle. The need for India and Pakistan to return to the spirit of the Lahore accord of 1999 is imperative. Will China play a constructive role?
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