With due respect I beg to differ on some of your contentions on INDO PAK War of 1965.
I have been writing and drawing attention to some of the facts of this war for a long time. Recently I had sent some detailed papers on the same subject. I had drawn attention to the special issue of Outlook Magazine which came out with an issue on 65 War. It is available at my blog site also at :
There is no doubt that Indian Army has displayed excellent standards of courage, valour, gallantry and steadfastness under extreme duress. For example the battle of Asal Utar will remain as one of the finest example of classic mech warfare in defence after Second World War. In fact, possibly with the exception of the performance of Israeli 7 Armd Bde and Barrack Bde at Golan Heights in 73 War of Atonement, there is no other example which can match the performance of 2 (I) Armd Bde. The nation will remain eternally grateful for that. I often wonder how come much has not been heard about the Commander of the concerned Commander, 2(Independent) Armoured Brigade Brig TK Theogaraj. . However, there has been some weaknesses which need to be addressed.
During the War lot of euphoria, high claims and counter claims are made. We, after 50 years of Indo Pak War of 1965 should be able to look at this War dispassionately, analyse the issues correctly and should be able to take correct remedial measures.
The Governmental has decided to celebrate year of 65 war in a big way. In the Army also lot of seminar/discussions are taking place. That is why I am flagging certain issues. I shall be quoting not from hearsay but from MoD Reports, books by Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh : War Despatches and In the Line of Duty, Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh's India's Wars Since Independence Volume Two and Three.
War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965
India's Wars Since Independence
By Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh.
I also recommend to read the slim book of RD Pradhan, 1965 The Inside Story Defence Minister YB Chavan's Diary of India -Pakistan War. There are other books also but I found these very authentic.
1965 War: The Inside Story
By Maj Gen Laxman Singh
Missed opportunities Indo-Pak war 1965
By Lachhman Singh Lehl
I intend to address the three key issues as mentioned in your mail : Who won the war, Leadership at higher echelons and superiority of arms or equipment.
Who Won the War
6. Both India and Pakistan claimed victory. About a month back I had sent some of the analysis of the war from the Pakistan side as Other Side of the Hill. The same in available at my blog site at :
7. I am reproducing below the analysis of well known Pakistani analyst Maj AH Amin (Retd).
1965 analysed
Columnist A H AMIN analyses the 1965 war dispassionately.
1965 was a watershed in Indo-Pak history! The war instead of being dispassionately analysed became a ground to attack and condemn political opponents! Complete books were written out of sheer motivation based on pure and unadulterated venom! To date the trend continues at the cost of serious research and history writing! Most of these books were written by beneficiaries of the usurper Ayub or Bhutto haters! Men with a naive knowledge of military history made worse by a desire to settle personal scores! Jaundiced history of the worst kind!
This article is an overall analysis of the 1965 war based on military facts rather than any motivation to settle political scores based on matters of ego rather than any serious objective considerations! It is hoped that after 36 years readers would be more interested in hard facts rather than pure and unadulterated polemics by men who did not know the division of battle “more than a spinster”!
Timing of 1965 War
This has been the subject of many controversies and myths! In 1965 India was recovering from the effects of the China War. Indian Army was engaged in a process of massive expansion with units and divisions half trained half novice! Something like the Austrian Army of 1809! Outwardly expanding and larger but lacking the military virtue and military spirit identified by Carl Von Clausewitz as the key elements in an military machines effectiveness! There was no overwhelming Indian numerical superiority unlike 1971 and many parts of the
Indo-Pak border like the vast bulk of Shakargarh bulge were unmanned on the Indian side! Qualitatively Pakistan had a tangible superiority by virtue of possession of relatively superior tanks and artillery! The Centurion tank which was the backbone of Indian army was concentrated in the Indian Armoured division while the vast bulk of Indian infantry divisions were equipped with the obsolete Shermans! Even in quality of command there were serious drawbacks! The Indian 1 Corps had been just raised and the GOC of the Indian 1st Armoured Division was about to retire! Indian Mountain Divisions brought into the plains lacked sufficient antitank resources and were not in the ideal fighting condition. Some 38 plus Indian Infantry Battalions were absorbed by the blotting paper of Indian Army i.e a tract known as Kashmir! All these battalions were deployed north of Chenab River.
Indian Army was in the process of expansion and the Indian Army had no strategic reserves in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor against the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division.
Setting aside the ethical dilemma whether war is the best instrument of policy to settle political disputes militarily 1965 was the ideal time for Pakistan to settle its political problems with India. This point was realized by some mid- ranking senior officers in the Pakistan Army which included the Pakistani DMO Gul Hassan, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and by some civilians like Foreign Minister Z.A Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad.
On the other hand Musa the Pakistani C-in-C was opposed to war! This was not because Musa was a pacifist but because Musa lacked military competence and was enjoying his second four-year-term as C-in-C of the Pakistan Army! Ayub the military ruler was initially against any military adventure but revised his ideas after Pakistani military successes in Rann of Katch.
In Clausewitzian terms 1965 was the ideal time for Pakistan to start a war. The following quotation illustrates the rationale; ‘Let us suppose a small state is involved in a contest with a very superior power, and foresees that with each year its position will become worse: should it not; if war is inevitable, make use of the time when its situation is furthest from worst? Then it must attack, not because the attack in itself ensures any advantages but it will rather increase the disparity of forces — but because this state is under the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before the worst time arrives or of gaining at least in the meantime some advantages which it may hereafter turn to account’.1
Comparative Level of Planning-Strategic
At the strategic level the Pakistani plan was superior. Its initial thrust launched with an infantry division-tank brigade size force against Akhnur was enough to cause a crisis of strategic level in the Indian Army. The situation with Akhnur in Pakistani hands would have been disastrous for India. All the Indian plans to launch the 1 Corps against the MRL would have been thrown to winds and Indians would have spent the entire war redressing the imbalance caused due to loss of Akhnur! On the other hand the Pakistani thrust in Khem Karan would have bottled up three Indian Infantry divisions in the Beas-Ravi corridor and three Indian divisions would have been forced to surrender. 1965 could have then been a Pakistani strategic success rather than a tactical draw as it turned out to be.
On the other hand the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division was well poised to deal with any Indian armoured thrust launched in the Ravi-Chenab corridor.
Pakistani failure lay in poor execution and understanding at the strategic level rather than planning
It was in implementation rather than planning that the Pakistani GHQ and Ayub failed miserably at the strategic level. The reason was simple. Both Ayub and Musa lacked strategic insight! They lacked the resolution and strategic coup d oeil to conduct decisive warfare. Both were extremely defensive in their approach and saw war as reacting to enemy countermoves rather than making the enemy react to their moves. Thus Musa as late as 1983 naively claimed in his book “My Version” that the aim of Grand Slam was not to capture Akhnur but to merely threaten it. In other words Musa saw a move which had the potential to cause a severe strategic imbalance in the Indian High Command as a tactical move to relieve pressure on Muzaffarabad! Allah be praised!
Even a foreigner saw the immense importance of capturing Akhnur. Thus the remarks of Marshall Chen Yi the Foreign Minister of China who was visiting Pakistan at the time of Grand Slam. Chen Yi thus “made a sharp cutting movement at the little finger; ‘knock them out at Akhnoor’.That will help the freedom fighters and also guarantee the security of East and West Pakistan. With the little finger gone, the whole hand becomes useless”!2 So thought a veteran of a many decade long civil war! This was Greek for a man who was elevated to the rank of Army Chief because of political considerations! This was Greek for a man accused of tactical timidity in Burma!
Inability to develop a doctrine of decisive warfare
The principal reason of failure of both the armies was “failure or inability to develop a doctrine of decisive warfare”. This was a colonial legacy. The Indian Army of pre-1947 was an internal security machine designed for defence while the main forces of the empires allies came into action on other decisive fronts. The concentration on both sides was to have tactical concepts while no doctrine integrating tactics with operational strategy and national strategy existed to give coherence to the whole business of warfare.
Lack of Resolution in the Ayub-Musa duo to energetically conduct the war
1965 was a failure in resolution at the highest level. Both the president and his handpicked chief lacked the resolution to provide strategic direction to a well oiled machine which had the potential to inflict a severe strategic defeat on the enemy.
Failure of Pakistani GHQ to effectively supervise execution of plans or to create alternative organization or command arrangements to supervise the conduct of war
The job of an army HQ is not just to formulate plans but to effectively supervise the execution of plans. Ayub in words of a British contemporary was devoid of “operational experience” “organizational understanding” and “lacked tactical flair”.3 Thus Ayub and Musa saw no need to have intermediate corps headquarters to over insure the success of the army’s main attack involving a force of an infantry division and an armoured division. This was a case of extreme naivette rather than a minor error of judgement. Probably the supreme commander was too busy with Five Year Plans and big business and had lost sight of the business of soldiering! His handpicked proxy chief wanted a peaceful tenure in which he would not be forced to exercise any strategic judgement!
The 12 Divisional organizational failure, one of the main reasons of Grand Slam’s failure, was another glaring case of lack of organizational insight on part of Ayub and Musa. While the Indians had bifurcated their forces in Kashmir based on north and south of Pir Panjal range right from 1948 and early 1950s Pakistan’s military supremos naively thought that one divisional headquarter was sufficient to manage a front of 400 miles in a mountainous territory spanning the Himalayas, Karakorams and the Pir Panjal!
Indian and Pakistani armour failures compared
At the strategic level both India and Pakistan got an opportunity to knock out the other side. Pakistan got it twice, first at Akhnur and then at Khem Karan. India got it once at Gadgor on 8th September. Both the sides failed. On the Pakistani side the failure had more to do with lack of strategic insight at Akhnur, ordering a change of horses in the middle of a crucial operation. Then at Khem Karan the Pakistani failure was at divisional level i.e failure to pump in all five armoured regiments on the 8th or 9th September thus achieving a decisive breakthrough.The situation was made worse by absence of Corps Headquarter. The Indian failure at Gadgor had more to do with failure at brigade and divisional level in actual execution despite the fact that the Indians had the mains “available” as well as “physically available” to achieve a breakthrough. The failure was Brigadier K.K Singh Commander Indian 1st Armoured Division who saw a threat to his flanks which in reality was a tank squadron of 62 Cavalry which had lost its way and blundered into the Indian artillery echelons opposite Rangre. The Indians had the means to achieve a breakthrough but failed primarily because lack of coup d oeil and resolution at brigade level. This was a command and execution failure. In Khem Karan on the other hand Pakistan had the resources but failed to bring them into the battle area because of poor staff work and planning at divisional level. Thus on the decisive 8th September Pakistan did not have the means to achieve a breakthrough and this had more to do with poor initial planning and staff work at div and brigade level rather than at the command or execution level. Thus the Pakistani failure was a staff and planning failure in which all from brigade till GHQ were included while the Indian failure was a command failure in which the prime culprits were the armoured brigade and divisional commander.
On the Pakistani side the success at Gadgor had more to do with outstanding leadership at squadron and unit level rather than any operational brilliance at brigade or divisional level. In the Indian success at Khem Karan, however, an important role was played by Indian higher headquarters at divisional corps and army command level.
Triumph of Defence and Failure of Offence as a Form of War
1965 was a failure of offence and triumph of defence. Except in Grand Slam where initial overwhelming superiority enabled Pakistan to achieve a breakthrough, on both sides defence triumphed as a way of war. Both the armies were more used to defence because of British colonial military experience and comparative relative lack of difference in weaponry also ensured that defence triumphed over attack. Thus the attackers failed at Gadgor, Chawinda, Assal, Uttar and Valtoha regardless of religion of the defender! Both the armies lacked the dynamism to conduct attack a far more complicated form of war and totally outside the pre-1947 experience of fighting divisional and brigade level defensive battles till overwhelming superiority enabled the Britisher to resume the offensive as at Alalamein and that too with non-Indian formations like the purely British armoured divisions or in Burma where the British-Indians had overwhelming superiority against the Japanese in tanks and air.
Ignored aspects of the war
There are certain points which are conveniently forgotten or not understood at all. Although the paratroopers failed in Pathankot area their dropping delayed the move forward of 14 Indian Infantry Division to support Indian 1st Armoured Division operations opposite Chawinda. The latter fact was acknowledged by a man no less eminent than the Indian GOC Western Command Harbaksh Singh.4
Conclusion
While Indian GOC Western Command Harbaksh Singh admitted that the Pakistani attack opposite Khem Karan could have been decisive we in Pakistan have twisted 1965 war into a case of blaming the civilians for intriguing against the army and leading it into an aimless military adventure. Even today India’s top military thinker Ravi Rikhye admits that Khem Karan had the potential to be India’s Fourth Battle of Panipat.
Pakistan failed because its military leaders lacked the strategic insight which was necessary to transform its tangible qualitative superiority in equipment and manpower at the tactical level into a victory! 1965 was an undoubted strategic failure on part of Pakistani higher command. Pakistan paid the price six years later. Success would have meant unity. Defeat led to civil war and secession. The fault lay in lack of strategic insight at the military level.
End Notes
1. Pages-397 and 398-On War-Edited by Anatol Rapport-Reprinted National Book Foundation-1976.
2. Page-93-Memoirs of a Bystander-A Life in Diplomacy-Iqbal Akhund-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1997.
3. Pages 428 & 429-Pakistan-Memories of Earlier Years-Lieut Gen Sir James Wilson-Army Quarterly and Defence Journal-Volume-120-No Four-October 1990.
4. Pages-61,129,135 and 136-War Despatches-Harbaksh Singh-Lancer-1991.
5. Ravi Rikhye’s article on Assal Uttar-ORBAT-19 August 2001.
8. Let us see what Western Army Commander during 65 war has to say in his book War Dispatches. ( About 1 Corps Operations, page 159)
130. I Corps captured nearly 200 square miles of PAK territory and took a heavy toll of enemy armour. The press, obviously briefed by the Commanders in the fields, carried banner headlines describing our armour actions as comparable to some of the greatest tank battle of the World War II. The action of PHILLORA, it was claimed, surpassed even the sensational feats of ROMMEL at the height of his glory. The encounter between 6 Armoured Division and our 1 Armoured Division was euphemistically described as the WATERLOO of the PATTON tank and the general public caught in the mania of the prevailing self-adulation lapped up with smug satisfaction the inflated figured of enemy casualties in armour. This was all very complimentary and it was also natural that in the first flush of victory we should be carried away by sentiments in which cold logic found no place. In fact an objective assessment at that stage would have been frowned upon as unpatriotic. So we did a lot of mutual back thumping.
131. But when the dust settled down and the achievements of I Corps were viewed in their correct perspective, stripped of the aura of sensation, the initial feeling of exaltation gradually gave way to one of disillusionment. For with the exception of a few minor successes, the formation’s record of operational performance was virtually a catalogue of lost victories. It is admitted that we dealt a telling blow to the enemy but we must concede the fact that it fell far short of a decisive defeat when it was within our capacity to do so and for which the circumstances were so favorable. In consequence, the enemy armour was only mauled instead of being crippled beyond recovery – our primary aim. The PATTON met its WATERLOO mainly because of its complicated gadgetry beyond the comprehension of the average PAK solider and the excellent gunnery of own armour – not though any tactical ingenuity at higher level of command. We penetrated only 11 miles into enemy territory beyond the Bridgehead, at our deepest stretch, when, but for the mishandling of forces, especially armour, the competition of our mission appeared well within our grasp. As the truth of these shortfalls in achievements dawned on us, there are a gnawing felling of unfulfilment – a painful realization that we were capable of doing so much but had done so little. The sense of disillusionment deepened to chagrin when on further investigation it was revealed that a decisive victory slipped out of our hands due to poor leadership on the battlefield.
132. Complete surprise was achieved in the launching of I Corps and the initial blow had stunned the enemy. It was now our primary purpose to rush them off their feet before they could regain balance. But the follow through lacked the drive of a master stroke. In the event, the enemy got what they needed most – time, the most precious commodity to parry our thrust. And we, who had hoped to gain a sensational victory got instead a sterile stalemate.
133. The Armoured Division fought a good action at PHILLORA, where the skill of junior leadership combined with excellent gunnery badly mauled the enemy armour. But unfortunately, this was the only bright spot in the otherwise dismal performance of the formation. Consistently dogged by want of competent direction at Divisional and Brigade level. The imagination, enterprise and audacity normally associated with armour thrusts was conspicuously absent.
The Balance Sheet(Page 204, Para 1) . Measured purely in terms of material gains our achievements have been very modest. We occupied approximately 740 square miles of PAK territory when it was well within our capability to expand our hold over a far greater stretch of enemy land. Pakistan's fighting potential was considerably whittled down, but so was ours, though to a lesser degree. The enemy armour was only mauled instead of being crippled which we could have done. On the other hand our casualties in the officers cadrewas staggering compared to those of Pakistan. The young officers earned a grimglorification but an enormous void was created in junior leadership.
9. Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh writes :
Ayub Khan was taken by surprise as he never thought India would dare to cross the border. He had not taken Shastri seriously when Shastri declared that an attack on Kashmir would mean war with India. The two armies thereafter engaged in a series of sharp and intense actions all along the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and the international border in Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat. Fighting a dingdong battle with comparatively new weaponry but outmoded tactics, both armies tired themselves to the point of exhaustion, both in battle fatigue and expenditure of stockpiled war material. The ceasefire the UN enforced was accepted by both countries on 23 September and was welcomed by the tired forces. Although both sides claimed victory, fighting had ended in a stalemate.
When wars end inconclusively, the bargaining power for settling the issues which led to the war hinges on territorial gains, the economic burden of supporting war refugees, and making up losses in men and material among other things. It was with this in view that the Pakistani Army shed its military posture after the ceasefire and swarmed towards the vacant areas in land grab operations. They achieved most of their territorial gains in the Fazilka and Rajasthan sectors after the ceasefire. The Indian Army got wise after the event.
Territorial gains and losses at the time of the ceasefire effective at 0330 hours of 23 September were 740 square miles in Indian hands against 210 square miles with Pakistan. But such statistics had no meaning whatever so long as adverse possession did not affect the loser’s political prestige, hurt its economy and jeopardized its military posture. A detailed examination revealed that India had captured some important Pakistani posts in the Kargil sector overlooking the Srinagar-Leh highway and covering an area of 20 square miles. It was not so much the area captured as the tactical advantage gained which placed India in a better bargaining position.
Similarly, in the Tithwal, Uri and Poonch sectors, the Indian forces had managed to straighten out the existing bulges, and by the capture of important gullies and passes, including Haji Pir Pass, they had blocked the infiltration routes leading to the valley. By capturing an additional 250 square miles India had improved its military posture along the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir.
On the debit side it had lost the fertile tract of Chhamb and Jaurian covering an area of 190 square miles. Overall, approximately 140,000 people were displaced in Jammu division alone, and out of them 80,000 belonged to Chhamb. Many millions of rupees have been spent in running refugee camps and on rehabilitation projects for them. In Kashmir Valley, about 120,000 people fled their homes in August 1965 because of the infiltration menace. But they returned after the ceasefire as their lands were under Indian control.
In the Lahore and Sialkot sectors Pakistan lost about 320 square miles. India controlled a six-mile-deep belt along the border between the Teg and Deg streams in the Sialkot sector, while in the Lahore sector it held about 30 miles of the 45-milelong Ichhogil Canal on the eastern side. The salient in Pakistani territory varied from one mile at the narrowest to ten deep at Burki. In addition, India eliminated the Pakistani-held Dera Baba Nanak enclave and dominated the road and railway bridge there, but Pakistan had taken over the Indian complex of the Kassowal group of enclaves north of the Ravi.
The exact magnitude of the economic problem caused by war refuges and other allied factors for Pakistan is not known, but from the state of development of the area it may be said that it would not have hurt the Pakistani economy to an appreciable extent.
On the other hand, Pakistan controlled 20 square miles of fertile tract in the Khemkaran sector, including the town itself, in Punjab. All the towns and villages on either side were razed to the ground. Altogether some 74 villages and three hamlets were fully occupied in Punjab, while 38 villages were partially in Pakistani hands. In Rajasthan and Gujarat, Indian forces occupied a wedge ten to 12 miles deep in the general area of Gadra city while Pakistan took over the railhead of Munabao.
From 23 September till the troop withdrawals carried out under the Tashkent Agreement, the confrontation along the ceasefire line continued. The number of violations Pakistan committed up to 22 December was 21,206 in Jammu and Kashmir, 1,423 in Punjab, 209 in Rajasthan and one in Gujarat against 1,400 reported against India. In Rajasthan, the violations were serious and affected by hordes of Mujahids swarming all over the desert areas and plundering villages and destroying property. Military operations had to extend right up to the end of November to get rid of the menace. As an offshoot of these operations there were about 6,000 refugees in Rajasthan.
The India casualties ware 2,226 killed, including 161 officers,7,870 wounded, including 412 officers, and 189 confirmed prisoners of war, while 1,500 personnel were declared missing. The exact figures of Pakistani casualties are not known, but they were probably as heavy. According to the military correspondent of the London Times, India had captured 197 Pakistani tanks, and a similar number might have been damaged. Although Pakistan originally claimed some 500 Indian tanks casualties this was obviously a gross exaggeration as India did not employ so many tanks in the entire war. India might have suffered about 100 tanks casualties, far less than Pakistan, as our armour was mostly on the defensive. India lost 28 of its war planes. Overall, it was estimated that the fighting cost India and Pakistan about 250 million dollars each.
11. Last but not the least this is from Indian official history of 65 war published by MoD. In my Knowledge on Line web site there is a page on Military History. All MoD reports on 62, 65 and 71 war are available there. There were many papers on India’s Military History including Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report Were kept there. Somehow, most of there were lost as this page got crashed. This is available at : The following is from Chapter 12 of Official War History - 1965.
In the Punjab theatre, India’s Xi Corps mounted the offensive against Pakistan. Although it succeeded in blunting the enemy armour offensive in Khan karan, and winning the battle of Dograi and Barki, it failed in its aim of capturing intact the bridge on the Ichhogil Canal and all the Pak territory up to that canal of course, there was no plan to capture Lahore.
There was not only lack of good generalship, but also absence of spirited infantry offensive in some areas. Adequate defences were not organized in the Khem Karan Sector, and initial success in Dograi was not vigorously followed up. With imagination and proper preparation an important military thrust could have been mounted through Dera Baba Nanak, which unfortunately witnessed a stalemate. Although the Corps captured 360 sq km to Pak territory as compared to meager 50 sq km of Indian territory lost to Pakistan, the net result of the military action in its sector was an indecisive deadlock.
In the Jammu-Sialkot Sector, the Indian Army massed the largest chunk of its might, i.e. I Corps consisting of one Armd Division (one Armour Brigade and one Lorried Bde), two Inf Division and one Mountain Division. However, I Corps did not achieve proportionate results. Although it had captured about 500 sq km of Pak territory in this Sector and taken a heavy toll of the enemy armour, especially at Phillora, it could neither achieve a clear break- through, nor destroy the Pak war machine in this area. Here again, bed generalship at the Corps and the division levels, and lack of cooperation among the formations, were responsible for their poor showing.
On the Western Front, the story of the air effort was different. Although on 6 September, the Indian Army initiated the war in the Punjab, it did not launch the IAF in a pre-emptive strike against the enemy’s air bases. This appear and unpardonable mistake on the part of the Indian Military. There was lack of joint planning between the Indian Army and the Air Force, and it appears that the Indian Army top brass ignored the potentiality of a modern air force like the IAF to destroy the bulk of the PAF on the ground on 6 September itself. Pak cooperation between her army and air force was better than India’s, and the PAF did not lose the opportunity of launching a pre-emptive attack against the Indian air bases on 6th evening, causing a lot of destruction and damage. Had the IAF struck first, it could have destroyed or damage a large number of Pak aircraft, thus considerably weakening the air effort of the smaller PAF, denying close PAF, denying close PAF support to the Pak ground forces, and preventing the PAF’s pre-emptive attack of 6 September against the IAF air bases.
There were no strategic air bombardment missions, no airlifts, nor any air-bridge supply operations. Attacks on enemy air bases were few, and not very effective. Both the combat air forces mainly provided low-level support for their ground forces. In ground attack role , PAK F-104 C and F-86 proved less efficient than the slower and less sophisticated Mysteries, Hunters and Gnats operated by the Indians. While Pak napalm bombs were reportedly less effective against Indian Tanks and artillery, Indian Rockets and armour-piercing bombs proved comparatively more effective. French made 5 Rockets, and 20 mm and 30 mm aircraft cannon fire was also effective. Initially, the PAF fared better than its Indian counterpart, but towards the last stage of the war, the numerically superior Indian air power started prevailing over the smaller but more modern Pak air force. Had the war continued, the smaller PAF would have felt the pinch of its losses more than the larger IAF. On balance, the IAF did fairly well against superior types of Pak aircraft. With low level of professionalism, lack of proper planning and cooperation with the army, and the aircraft of old vintage, the IAF could not be expected to perform much better. Interestingly, both sides tried to conserve their precious equipment, especially tanks and aircraft, to enable them to continue to fight to the war was prolonged.
Analyzing the Indo-Pak war 1965, certain reflections are unavoidable. The war was essentially a limited one, geographically, service-wise and in time frame. East Pakistan remained almost untouched; the engagements came to an end in 22 days; and the navies were not really involved. Neither strategic planning nor strategic struggle was made, and no strategic decision was reached. Neither side appeared to be concerned with grand strategy in which military moves are dictated by politico-psychological-economic considerations. The field commanders were not very clear about goals. Was it an all-out general war, a limited war for certain objectives, a war of conquest to annex territories, or a war of attrition to weaken the enemy’s striking power?. The field commanders did not know, although at the later stage of the war Gen Chaudhari spelt out that it was a war of attrition. The result was that, in the absence of a clear-cut objective, they slugged it out, without much advantage accruing to either side at the end of the war.
Both side were trained in standard British war tactics, and blindly followed orthodox British methods of fighting, and never deviated from them. Although British military system was undergoing drastic changes, both the countries deployed their infantry and armour in the Second world war style. Again, both used armoured cars, and Pakistan suffered heavy losses. In their place, jeeps with bazookas or machine guns were more effective as recce vehicles and light screening forces.
The September 1965 war confirmed the old theory that it was not the machine but the man behind it which finally decided the fate of the battle. The Pak Army and the Pak Air Force were equipped with sophisticated equipments, such as tanks, aircraft, etc., but the latter were not matched with the...........
India ‘s strategic concept of attacking the enemy at many places along the border did not prove to be sound. Excepting the offensive in Haji Pir and kargil, no other Indian thrust proved to be entirely successful. Instead of delivering a large number of inconsequential jabs, the Indian army could perhaps have gone for a few selected, powerful thrusts to unbalance the Pakistanis. Faulty strategy led to stalemate, with no strategic decisions whatsoever.
Likewise, the rigid application of the old tactical doctrine led to failures to win different places. Instead of fighting against well-defended enemy position, the formations could have bypassed, to encircle, and finish them later. This would have conserved both men and material.
At many places, such as Mirpur, Dograi and Dera Baba Nanak, whole-hearted offensive were not undertaken out of defensive mentality on the part of the commanders. The Mirpur offensive was given up on the execuse that artillery ammunition needed to be conserved for subsequent actions. Almost everywhere, forces were held in unnecessary reserve. In the Sialkot Sector, many Indian armour thrusts failed for want of concentration of all available resources at the critical time and place, while large forces stood idle in futile reserve.
In the area of command and control on the part of the Indian commanders from battalion to Corps level, deficiency was seen in many cases. Commanders of I Corps and 1 Armd Division did not show appropriate initiative to control the battles or monitor the attacks effectively. The results was Indian reserve in place like Chawinda. Similarly, GOC 15 Infantry division failed to support the initial thrust across the Ichhogil canal at Dograi, due to the failure of control through wireless communication and the will to exploit the initial success. Commander 29 Inf Bde also faltered at Dera Baba Nanak in the initial stage. In the XI Corps Sector, although the early reserve suffered by the Indians at Khem Karan, were turned into victory by 4 Mountain Division later, the disintegration of Col Anand Singh’s tough 4 Sikh was a dark spot in the otherwise good records of this formation. However, the responsibility was not solely Col Anand Singh’s, but that of the Corps commander and even the Army Commander, who had selected a tired battalion for a difficult task against an underestimated enemy formation supported by tanks.
The failure on the part of officers in actual war indicated flaws in selection and training. The qualities which stand officers in good stead during war, such as courage, both moral any physical aggressiveness and initiative, needed to be sharpened in peace-time exercise and maneuvers. Officers at higher level of command had not conditioned themselves psychologically not to accept defeat, however adverse the battle situation might be. They did not dominate the situation by bold action. When the Commander showed weakness and diffidence, and appeared adversely influenced by dark apprehensions, this pessimistic outlook percolated down to the rank and file leading the chain reaction of demoralization. Commanders of battalions and brigades often failed to influence their battles with their personal presence. The Divisional and Corps Commanders did not visit the frontline whenever possible, in order to properly control the situations and course of battles. Instances were many in this war when due to lack of aggressive spirit, favorable situations were not exploited, attacks tapered out, and defences collapsed.
With proper planning, preparation, strategic and tactical execution of the war, the Indian could have crippled the Pak forces, instead of just mauling them. However, that does not detract from the glory achieved by the younger group of the officer cadre. The astounding Indian officer causality ration of 1 to 14, against a rank structure of 1 to 60 other Ranks, proved their valour (18). This went a long way to restore the honour lost on the battle field of NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) in 1962. It is reported that, in comparison, the junior commissioned officers, once the backbone of the Indian Army, did not fare so well.
Leadership
12. There was no Northern Command, 14 and 16 Corps. Everything was under Western Command. During the war relationship between the Chief, Army Commander and Corps Commander should have been ideal, if not totally professional.
13. Harbaksh writes about Leadership in general :
Leadership
There appeared to be a tendency in higher command to succumb to pressure of events and fall an easy prey to dark and gloomy apprehensions. This is a dangerous attitude for such pessimism rapidly trickles down to the rank and file setting in motion a snowball process of demoralization. An officer, especially in the higher levels of command, must psychologically condition himself never to accept mental defeat, however adverse the circumstances of battle or grim the overall situation. He will usually find that beyond his own disintegrating battle lies an opponent faced with a similar or even a more serious situation. At such junctures the mind and spirit play the dominant role in deciding the fate of battle – the commander with greater mental stamina carries the day.
The instinctive urge to be at the critical place at a crucial juncture in battle is the hallmark of all successful commanders irrespective of their level of command. At battalion and brigade levels commanders should dominate situations with their physical presence to influence events through personal intervention whenever required.
It is common knowledge that commanders who lie low, play ‘safe’ and await developments always come out second best. Spectacular success goes to the bold, the audacious and the enterprising in battle. There were a number of instances during this war where, through want of aggressive action, favourable situations remained unexploited, attacks fizzled out prematurely and defences collapsed with shocking ease for lack of grit and determination. The indomitable spirit that defies defeat was often found wanting.
Up in the hills, junior leadership was inclined to be complacent and sluggish especially when holding posts or picquets. Instead of using their posts as firm bases for aggressive action in the surrounding area, commanders often adopted the least line of resistance and awaited results – a most deprecatory practice both from the morale and leadership point of view.
As the drive, will power and courage, both physical and moral, of a commander are essential attributes of leadership in war, it is essential that due consideration be given to these qualities in the selection of commanders. The inculcation of the will to fight should form the object plus of all training. Situations requiring aggressive and bold action should be frequently introduced in training to instil this vital leadership quality and to assess those possessing it. Those displaying poor leadership traits should be weeded out and relegated to extra regimental employment or low grade staff appointments.
However, there were a good number of officers on leave, who upon being sent a telegram to return, did not do so. Also, during the early stages of the Operation, there were a substantial number of troops who deserted from battalions that had weak or officiating commanding officers. As a result, I had to give our tanks, which were already in the rear, orders to shoot at men trying to escape in twos and threes through the fields of cotton and fodder. This phenomenon was particularly common among the Gorkha battalions.
[ PKM Notes : Idea is not to make any comments about any Regiment or paltan. If I said about Gorkhas or say Dogras people from concerned Regts would have lynched me! It is from Army Commander! In the heat of the battle things happen. What worries me is that we are going overboard sometimes like recent two hundred years anniversary celebrations of a particular Regt. Theses things must be done, but till a certain level. Let us not forget the immortal words of FIELD-MARSHAL SIR WILLIAM SLIM : there are no good battalions and no bad battalions, no good regiments and no bad regiments. There are only good and bad officers. - . Let us learn lessons from these.]
13. Let's read what Gen Harbakhsh has to say about his Chief, Corps Commanders and some Divisional Commanders.
I feel an assessment of the then Chief of the Army Staff, General Chowdhary, is called for.
I will be the first to admit that he had a very sharp brain, and could speak and write well, in English. His greatest failing was that he had an exalted opinion of himself. ‘He often passed smart alec remarks and doubted the intelligence of everyone (around him. As a soldier, I regret to say, he left much to be desired.
How else can you explain that throughout the duration of the War with Pakistan, he visited my Headquarters only thrice, that is on the 10th, the 14th and the 20th of September. And yet, on the early morning of the 23rd of September, soon after the cease-fire was announced, he was the first one to go to the Ichhogil Canal, with a photographer, and have his photograph taken for the press? Subsequently, to prove that he had participated fully in the War he had a book written by a well-known journalist which was completely fictitious.
During the war, I believe, General Chowdhary used to issue handouts about what was happening in the war without ever having visited the frontline. Every evening, he would ring me up, and my set reply was: “nothing to worry about; all is well”. Once he suggested to me that he was not getting enough information, and that he, therefore, proposed to send two Lieutenant Colonels from his Headquarters to the Front Formations to get the latest news.
I challenged him that if he did that, I would put those Officers under arrest. He could get all the information he needed from my Headquarters, besides which, of course, he was free to go anywhere in the front, himself. I am sure, my Headquarters were sending Situation Reports to his Headquarters regularly. His problem was his huge ego. He considered himself a world authority on Armour, and I used to argue with him that though I could not claim to be an authority on Armour, I knew what it could do- and what it could not do; and that was enough from my point of View.
It may be reiterated that despite my regular pleas that any reserve forces to be committed against Sialkot must be launched from the area of Gurdaspur, so that initially they would be available to me as a reserve on the Punjab front, in case something went wrong there, General Chowdhary raised these reserve forces as I Corps, under Pat Dunn, and decided to launch them against Sialkot from Samba area, leaving me without any reserves on the Punjab front. And, as I have mentioned somewhere earlier, I was not told anything about these plans, nor even invited to the co-ordinating conference at which these plans were made. And yet, before their launching, I Corps was handed over to me for the conduct of the operations!
Since he had nothing else to do, General Chowdhary, as Chief of the Army Staff, without consulting me, started writing citations for senior officers – Army and Corps Commanders – with a view to giving them the award of Padma Bhushan. He had arranged with the Defence Minister, Mr Chavan, that he himself would be awarded the Padma Vibhushan.
One day, he rang me up to say that he was recommending senior officers – that is Army and Corps Commanders – for the award of Padma Bhushan, but in the list he had left out Kashmir Katoch whom he had originally been very fond of. You may remember that Kashmir Katoch, General Officer Commanding, XV Corps, would ring him up directly, for instructions, at the early stages of the Operations, by-passing me, his Army Commander, until I put my foot down. During the operations, he had somehow fallen out of favour with General Chowdhary; who did not wish to recommend him for the award.
I made it quite clear to him that if he was recommending PatDunn’s name for the award, then he could not leave out Kashmir Katoch, because, according to my assessment, Kashmir Katoch had done better than Pat Dunn. Since I refused to budge on the matter, he relented, and finally included Kashmir Katoch’s name also for the award.
I was intensely worked up over the whole affair of the awards, and sought an interview with the Defence Minister, Mr Chavan, to discuss the matter. I made it quite clear to him that General Chowdhary had hardly taken any part in the fighting and did not deserve to be awarded a Padma Vibhushan.
He told me that in his case the award was only of symbolic value; and tried to mollify me by saying that the Government of India was considering me for a special award, and, had besides, decided to give me the rank of a full General. Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri, the then Prime Minister, died in Tashkent, soon thereafter, as did Mr Chavan, so nothing came of the special awards that I had been promised though I was given the Padma Vibhushan after retirement. This is what they call the luck of the draw!
About GOC 1 Corps
Para 119 Page156.
(b) The battle for the CHAWINDA – BADIANA – ZAFARWAL A firm grip of the situation combined with resolute direction at Corps level would have tipped the scale in the favor. A determined leadership at lower levels could have done the rest to score a striking success. Both these vital ingredients were unfortunately missing. The guiding hand of the Corps Commander was conspicuously absent – in fact, he appeared to have hardily played a part in he battle, which even at that late stage, could have laid the foundation for an ultimate victory. In the event, however, the rot initiated by the lack of forceful direction at higher levels of command deteriorated into a dismal disaster a lower levels through atrocious execution. We came out of the battle badly battered and bruised, to usher in a stalemate that lasted for the rest of the conflict. It was an inexcusable command failure.
(c). The lack of rapport between General officer Commanding 6 Mountain Division and 1 Armoured Division mode a further contribution to the chaotic performance at CHAWINDA.
(e) Leadership at battalion and brigade level was lacking. There was a tendency on the part of Brigade and Battalion Commanders to hold themselves back instead of being well forward to dominate the situation. In consequence they had no grip over the circumstances as they developed.
120. This battle is a classic study in command failure and poor execution. Lack of control at Corps level paved the way to defeat – an indifferent leadership at lower levels made disaster inevitable. The depressing combination decided the fate of the battle and foredoomed the outcome of the entire campaign.
.........But the Chief of the Army Staff had other plans, of which I had no idea. Unknown to me, he had formed another Corps, under the command of his favourite, PN Dunn (whom he promoted out of turn), and had launched it from the direction of Samba, leaving me in the Punjab without any reserves during my offensive towards the Ichhogil Canal! It was bad planning, but there was little I could do for it would have meant going against the wishes of the Chief.
After a couple of miles advance, 1 Armoured Division came across some armour and an anti-tank nest, and having cleared them, got involved in some internecine encounters and’ soon limped to a dead-halt with the mishandling of armour both at Brigade and Divisional levels. The Armoured Division which was supposed to penetrate deep and to the rear of Sialkot, through mistakes on their part, had only advanced 4 miles after break-out from the bridge-head, when there was very scanty armour opposition ranged against them. There was no doubt that due to incompetence of command a great opportunity had been lost!1 Armoured Division, after the initial melee on the 8th of September, had gone into a harbour behind village Phillora for the next three days, and it became difficult to get them going. I could not visit this Front till the morning of the 12th of September, because of my close involvement in the Khem Karan Sector. Seeing the mix-up in which I Corps had got involved; I took the General Officer Commanding I Corps to task, on the telephone, for not getting the I Armoured Division going. He said he had received instructions from General Chowdhary, over the telephone, not to stick his head out too much forward! I was aghast and had it out with General Chowdhary, saying that he had no business to give instructions to the General Officer Commanding I Corps as he had been placed under my command. He apologised for this. The General Officer Commanding 1 Corps made a further mess in handling his Forces, and thus Chawinda could not be captured, despite many attempts made by us, and the incurring of heavy casualties, till the cease-fire came into effect.I must mention here certain names and incidents, as they not only vindicate the choice I made of certain persons for certain jobs, but throw light on the acumen and soldierly qualities of the persons so selected.
Niranjan Prasad, then in command of 15 Infantry Division, led the advance to Lahore and proved so inept in battle that he was removed from command a day or two after the start of operations.
His replacement was Maj Gen Mohinder Singh, whom the pundits had relegated to a desk job in Army Headquarters on the ground that he was unfit to command a division. In battle, Mohinder Singh already holder of the Military Cross, won the much-merited Maha Vir Chakra and proved himself a leader in crisis. But our systems had denied him a divisional command in peace.
119. (B) The battle for the CHAWINDA – BADIANA – ZAFARWAL A firm grip of the situation combined with resolute direction at Corps level would have tipped the scale in the favor. A determined leadership at lower levels could have done the rest to score a striking success. Both these vital ingredients were unfortunately missing. The guiding hand of the Corps Commander was conspicuously absent – in fact, he appeared to have hardily played a part in he battle, which even at that late stage, could have laid the foundation for an ultimate victory. In the event, however, the rot initiated by the lack of forceful direction at higher levels of command deteriorated into a dismal disaster a lower levels through atrocious execution. We came out of the battle badly battered and bruised, to usher in a stalemate that lasted for the rest of the conflict. It was an inexcusable command failure.
119. (C) The lack of rapport between General officer Commanding 6 Mountain Division and 1 Armoured Division mode a further contribution to the chaotic performance at CHAWINDA.
119. (E) Leadership at battalion and brigade level was lacking. There was a tendency on the part of Brigade and Battalion Commanders to hold themselves back instead of being well forward to dominate the situation. In consequence they had no grip over the circumstances as they developed.
120. This battle is a classic study in command failure and poor execution. Lack of control at Corps level paved the way to defeat – an indifferent leadership at lower levels made disaster inevitable. The depressing combination decided the fate of the battle and foredoomed the outcome of the entire campaign.
GOC 15 Corps
At about 11 pm, on the night of the 3rd of September, Lt Gen Kumaramangalam, the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, rang me up on the secret telephone, to say that General Officer Commanding XV Corps had been on line from Udhampur to the Chief of the Army Staff, General Chowdhary, and wanted my permission to withdraw 41 Mountain Brigade” engaged, at the time, with the Pakistanis in the Jaurian position, during the night. Now I must explain, that the General Officer Commanding XV Corps, Lt Gen Kashmir Katoch, was a great favourite of General Chowdhary and used to ring him up directly, which as Army Commander I did not like. Therefore, I questioned Kumaramangalam as to what business my Corps Commander had to ring up the Chief directly? If my Corps Commander was seeking my permission, he should ring me up directly. After saying this I put down the telephone. Within a minute, I got a telephone call from Kashmir Katoch, whom I knew quite well, and he repeated his request. First of all, I took him to task for ringing up General Chowdhary directly over an operational matter, and then discussed with him his suggestion of withdrawing the Brigade, actively involved with the enemy, that very night. “Was it feasible?” I asked. In the end, I decided that the Brigade would stay where it was, and that I would arrive at Jammu Airfield at nine o’clock the next morning, and that he should be ready to accompany me to Akhnoor, in a helicopter.
Sacking of GOC 10 Inf Div:
I arrived at Jammu exactly at 9 am and flew with the Corps Commander to Akhnoor. There we met Major General Chopra, Commander 10 Division, who reported that all was well with the Mountain Brigade at Jaurian. I asked him to ring up. the Brigade Commander (‘Bhaiya’ Rajwade), whom I knew quite well, and to tell him that I had arrived and that he would get his orders for withdrawal by 2 o’clock that afternoon, from his Divisional Commander. I also asked him to get the latest news about the Brigade. The reply was that all was well so far, but that the Pakistanis were making preparations for an attack on his forward Companies.
I ordered him, through his Divisional Commander, to be prepared for a counter-attack with reserve companies, should the Pakistanis attack and succeed in overcoming his forward defences. Both the attack and the counter-attack happened, and by 12 noon the situation was restored. In the meanwhile, a message came from 39 Medium Battery of Artillery (this was part of a Sikh Battalion converted into a Medium Artillery Regiment and the message was meant for me as Colonel of the Sikh Regiment) that the personnel of the 161 Artillery Regiment, deployed next to them, had deserted enmass, leaving their guns, with stacked ammunition, and wagon-line (vehicles) behind.They wanted them collected, lest they fall into enemy hands. Despite the desertion, they averred that the Medium Battery, in position, would continue to support the forward Brigade. Upon receipt of this message, I ordered the Divisional Commander, Major General Chopra, in the presence of his Corps Commander, to muster as much manpower and as many electrical mechanical engineers from his Division, as he could, and arrange to collect the guns, the ammunition and the vehicles. Having done so, he could then order 41 Mountain Brigade to withdraw that night. The orders for withdrawal were to get to the Brigade by 2 o’clock that afternoon, so that the Brigade Commander could plan his withdrawal properly. Thereafter, General Kashmir Katoch arid I left Akhnoor, by the same helicopter in which we had come, and flew back to our respective Headquarters.
The next morning, the 5th of September, my Chief of Staff was rung up by General Officer Commanding 10 Division to say that the Brigade had come back safely, with all its equipment and ammunition. But before congratulating the General Officer Commanding for this successful operation, I asked my Chief of Staff to check up from the General Officer Commanding if the guns had also been brought back. His reply that they could not be brought back made me furious. I ordered his Corps Commander to hold a Court of Inquiry for this lapse. As a result of this inquiry, General Chopra was sacked from his appointment.
About Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad
I was stunned to receive this message and asked Brigadier Parkash to let the General Officer Commanding 15 Division know that he would not move back an inch from where he was, and that I and the Corps Commander were coming to meet him. I drove the Jonga in which we travelled. It was not long before we saw the havoc that the enemy air had caused on the GT Road. Vehicles were burning here and there, while there were craters on the road, and enemy aircraft were still flying over head. We saw 15 Division Administrative Echelon vehicles abandoned on the road, the drivers having run away, leaving some of the engines still running. We saw an armoured carrier standing in the middle of the road, with its keys still in it. I had it removed off the road. We were directed by the Divisional Military Police to the General Officer Commanding, Major General Niranjan Prasad, who was hiding in a recently irrigated sugarcane field! He came out to receive us, with his boots covered ‘with wet-mud.
He had no head-cover, nor was he wearing any badges of rank. He had stubble on his face, not having shaved, contrary to the custom before the start of an operation. Seeing him in such a state, the first question I asked him was whether he was the General Officer Commanding a Division or a coolie? Why had he removed his badges of rank and not shaved, I asked? Of course, he had no answer. We were standing in the open, and, naturally, the men of his Headquarters had formed a circle around us, though at a distance. At one stage a couple of enemy fighter planes flew over head, strafing vehicles on the road, and Niranjan Prasad tried to pull me to safety under the cover of a bush nearby. I had to shout at him to explain that the enemy aircraft were not interested in us, nor could they see us. What they were after were his vehicles that had been abandoned the road, head-to-tail. I asked him where his reserve Brigade Commander was. He shouted: “Pathak, Pathak” and Pathak came to us, his face as white as a sheet.
Seeing him in such a state, the first question I asked him was whether he was the General Officer Commanding a Division or a coolie? Why had he removed his badges of rank and not shaved, I asked?
I asked him where his men (F Group) were, and he answered that they were following, but they were inoperative, because they had suffered very heavy casualties from enemy aircraft. I, naturally, asked him how many casualties they had suffered, and he replied, “Nearly 30 wounded”. I said, “30 out of 4000 (the strength of his Brigade) and you say your Brigade was inoperative!” I asked him to pull himself together and then gave him his orders, on the map and on the ground, for the next phase of his advance. He was to take his Brigade along the distributory, shown on the map, and on reaching the Ichhogil Canal, to turn left and re-capture the bridge on the GT Road near Dograi. In order to give his Divisional Commander another chance, I asked Niranjan Prasad to ”keep an eye on his Brigade, and report to his Corps Commander, in the morning, regarding the progress of the operations”.
I had known Niranjan Prasad for a long time. He had already, on two occasions, acquitted himself badly while commanding a Division. The first time was in NEFA and then later, while commanding 25 Infantry Division, at Rajouri. I was also aware that each time he had written a representation against his senior Commanders. I had found him deficient in command of 15 Infantry Division as early as June that year, and had said as much to General Chowdhary when he visited XI Corps during an Exercise. But the Chief chose to disregard my suggestion for according to him Niranjan Prasad had very close political connections with higher-ups in Delhi!
So, this time, sensing that I might remove him from command, General Niranjan Prasad had apparently already written out a representation against me in his note book which he kept in his brief case along with some other secret and confidential papers. I now state what was revealed in a Court of Inquiry which General Officer Commanding XI Corps ordered, to go into the circumstances that prevented General Niranjan Prasad from visiting his Reserve Brigade, under Brigadier Pathak, who had been, ordered by me to carry out a certain operation, which Niranjan Prasad had been ordered to supervise. The story goes, that on the morning of the 7th of September, Niranjan Prasad sent for an officer to lead him to the Brigade’s position, and set off towards it along the distributory, which was marked on the map. He was in the Jonga in front, with his\ADC, while two jeeps, with his escort in them, were following him. As he progressed along the distributory, he was fired at by a distant Medium Machine Gun. Both he and his ADC abandoned the Jonga and took cover in a field of crops nearby, as did the escorts.
A little later, Niranjan Prasad decided to return to his Headquarters and asked that the last jeep be turned around for this purpose. Both he and his ADC took off in this jeep, leaving the escort to make their way back on foot. Thus he left the brief-case he was carrying, with all the papers in it in the Jonga, which apparently also had his formation flag and star plates on it. This Jonga, along with his brief-case (and papers) was subsequently captured by the Pakistanis, who started broadcasting the contents of his brief-case, including his representation against me over the air! On the basis of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, General Officer Commanding XI Corps wanted to try Niranjan Prasad by a Court Martial, but the Chief of the Army Staff, General Chowdhary, sent for Major General Niranjan Prasad, and, we later learnt, asked him to resign.
GOC XI Corps writes to Western Army Commander
There was no risk to the aeroplanes taking off from the airfield. And yet, out of fear, the Air Force authorities withdrew their Fighter Planes from the forward airfields at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara, without my knowledge. I believe, that they got permission to do so from the Chief of the Army Staff, with the connivance of my Chief of Staff, Major General Joginder Singh. This greatly upset our communications and arrangements for close-air-support to the troops at the Front. Several calls from the Front had no effect on Major General Joginder Singh, who was supposed to be manning the Close-Air-Support Organisation at my Main Headquarters, at Ambala.
Air support to our troops fighting on the ground, from our fighter planes, which were taking off from Agra, and beyond, without any briefing by the Air-Contact teams, which had been left behind at the Forward Airfields, was, at its best, only spasmodic and ephemeral. The troops on the Front, who had to bear the brunt of enemy attacks from the air, complained bitterly about the absence of our planes. A situation that I found very difficult to explain. I, of course, kept on asking my Chief of Shiff, through my ADC, the reason for this lack of air support, for I did not then know that our planes had been removed to Agra, and beyond, by the Air Force, without asking me. A most deplorable state of affairs, to say the least! The result was that during the critical period of early operations, the troops at the Front had no air-support, while Pakistani planes, taking off from Sargoda Airfield, pounded them mercilessly!In the early hours of the morning of the 8th of September, I received a very alarming report, in the form of a hand-written letter, through a special courier officer, from General Officer Commanding, XI Corps, who had visited 4 Division on the afternoon of the 7th of September, 1965. Following is the text of the original letter:
CONFIDENTIAL
HQ XI Corps
C/O 56 APO
07 Sep 65
My dear Harbakhsh,
I visited 4 Mtn Div this afternoon from 1415 to 1615 hrs & met the GOC at his HQ. Most of the officers in the HQ and the GOC were wearing long faces. The troops I saw on my way to the HQ appeared slack and generally uninterested. On enquiry I came to know the following:
The strength of the six infantry has been reduced to an overall strength of about three and a half bns in 24 hours of action commencing 0400 hrs 6 Sep. This reduction was partially due to enemy action but mostly due to desertion.
The rot started with 13 Dogras, who without orders, left the position allotted to them without any enemy pressure except perhaps shelling. GOC 4 Mtn Div halted them as they were coming back. During night 6/7 Sep they all disappeared except the 5% and the CO's party. This rot quickly spread to other inf units.
4 Div have the following bns and units at present:
18 Raj Rif 4 Grenadiers 7 Grenadiers
1/9 GR 9 J &K]
13 Dogras
Of these only 4 Grenadiers & 1/9 GR are intact. I am told by the GOC that the CO of 9 J &K left his posn, without orders o~ the night of 6/7 Sep taking a coy of inf with him. 7 Grenadiers are bn only about two coy strong. 18 Raj Rif has about 10% deserters & the GOC thinks that this unit is cracking up. I am further given to understand by the GOC that deserters are restricted to inf units only & no other arm or service in the Div is affected.
Because of the above situation not a single task given to 4 Mtn Div in the current operations has been carried out. No bridge on the 1 GC in 4 Div sector has been blown. The GOC had to request the posn of the Div on the night of 6/7 Sep & again on the afternoon of 7 Sep. When I visited him today he was arranging the preparation of a def sector in the Asal Uttar .area.
The morale of the Div being what it is, it is my considered view that any defences held by the present inf units in 4 Mtn Div cannot withstand even slight enemy pressure. This is a most serious situation in the present stage of the Operations.
I recommend:
That 4 Mtn Div be immediately replaced by some other fmn for carrying out the orders given to them.
Except for 4 Grenadiers and 9 GR, the four inf units of 4 Mtn Div as given in para 4 above should be disbanded.
I request that you pay a visit to this formation at your earliest convenience to see at first hand its state of morale & the competence of its commander.
It was a privilege & an honour to have you here on the epoch making day - 6 Sep 65.
With warm regards
Yours ever
When you are fighting a war you cannot afford to have the Army Commander and his Chief of Staff not in the same wavelength. Harbaksh puts the blame of lack of air support squarely on his Chief Of Staff.
Behind the Scene: Analysis of India's Military Operations, 1947-1971 Hardcover – Import, Feb 1993
by Jogindar Singh
Maj Gen Joginder Singh has contradicted almost everything what Harbaksh has written. Maj AH Amin of Pakistan has succinctly put the issues in correct perspective in his Book Review :
BEHIND THE SCENES
Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN from WASHINGTON DC reviews the book for DJ.
Major General Joginder Singh (Retired) - Lancer International -New Delhi-1993-273 Pages-Fifteen Sketch Maps. ISBN-1-897829-20-5-Price-Hardbound-380/- Indian Rupees- (Not including postage).
“Behind the Scenes”, setting aside other factors discussed in the succeeded paragraphs still is a welcome addition to the limited number of books available on the Indo Pak wars. Major General Joginder Singh possesses the distinction of being an insider in the higher Indian command and staff echelons in the period 1958-65 and his analysis carries the weight of authority of a man who saw how various operational and higher command decisions were taken from close quarters.
Major General Joginder Singh the author was commissioned in the 5th Battalion 14th Punjab Regiment more popularly known as “ Ali Baba’s (its commanding officers designation) Forty Thieves” British Indian Army in 1937 after having joined the army through the “Y Cadet Scheme”. Joginder saw military action in the British operations against the Frontier tribes in the late 1930s. He attended the 1945 Army Staff Course at Quetta, served in various command and staff appointments including a stint at the Indian Ministry of Defence, command of an Infantry Battalion (7 Punjab), Commander 80 Brigade-Nowshera Sector), Deputy Commandant Infantry School, Brigadier General Staff 15 Corps during the Sino-Indian War, GOC 5 Infantry Division and Chief of Staff of the Western Command under three successive GOC in chiefs. The last assignment included 1965 War after which Joginder finally retired in 1967.
The book is divided into five parts and covers the entire modern post-1947 Indian military history with maximum space devoted to the 1965 conflict while smaller tracts are devoted to the 1971 War, Interwar years followed by a small section dealing with the more recent developments.
The first part dealing with “National Strategy” feels that strategic insight is sadly lacking in India’s higher decision making echelons. He feels that politicians leading India are short-sighted and self- centred and feels that Indian higher leadership lacks the qualities necessary to attain India’s position of natural leadership in Asia.
Joginder discusses in considerable detail his experiences as 80 Infantry Brigade Commander where he first advanced the possibility that Akhnur bridge by virtue of being the sole link to Poonch Valley and the fact that it was defended by the weak 191 Infantry Brigade defending Chamb Sector represented a serious imbalance in Indian defensive posture in South Kashmir and that it was most likely that Pakistan Army in case of war may capture it with ease using a force of an armoured brigade infantry division. Joginder states that a divisional exercise was held based on this scenario in April-May 1956 but the only outcome was that “GOC 26 Division was asked to proceed on pension” (Page-28) while no other changes were made in operational plans or organisational structure till 1965. The layman readers may note that shortly before the September 1965 War the Indian High Command did agree to upgrade the Chamb Brigade to a Divison in August 1965 but at the time of Grand Slam Chamb was defended only by an infantry brigade and a squadron of light tanks.
Joginder devotes a small chapter to his experiences as Brigadier General Staff 15 Corps responsible for Indian Occupied Kashmir and discusses his recommendations which included creation of an infantry division to defend Chamb, construction of a bridge on Chenab at Riasi as an alternative to Akhnur bridge stationing of an independent armoured brigade in Jammu area and stationing of an infantry division size force as 15 Corps Reserve. None of the recommendations were followed by Joginders bosses ! The author’s discussion of Sino-Indian War is not much different from the other much known discussions in various well circulated books, so it is pointless to burden the readers with repetition of much discussed issues.
The most valuable albeit controversial part of the book is the one dealing with the authors experiences as Chief of Staff of the Western Command before and during 1965 war. The author had a high opinion of his first GOC Western Command who died in a helicopter crash in 1963 along with four general officers and an airforce air vice marshal. Joginder also had a very high opinion about his second GOC Manekshaw. It was during this period as the author discusses that the Western Command carried out a detailed appreciation dealing with a future Indo-Pak conflict and recommended an offensive posture with attack aimed at isolating Lahore (going for Balloki Headwork’s) and Sialkot (from Jammu-Samba area) and against the Mangla Dam-Mirpur area were planned. It was during this period that the Western Command’s proposals for opening a second front across the international border Joginder states that the Army Chief Chaudhry accepted the idea of opening a second front in case of war across the international border. Joginder, however, noted that by 1964 Nehru incapable of taking any decisions due to bad health and indifferent mental state while defence held a very low priority with Nehru’s successor Shaastri. Thus the 1964 memorandum prepared by the Western Command was simply filed away. Joginder felt that General Chaudhri was not assertive in presenting the Indian political leadership with the true defence requirements.
The controversial part of the book begins once Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh enters the scene as the third boss of the author as GOC Western Command in November 1964. It appears that there was a personality clash between Joginder and Harbaksh while Harbaksh’s book “War Despatches” published before Joginder’s book indicates that Harbaksh did not have a very high opinion about Joginder.
Joginder states that Harbaksh wanted to base India’s main defence on River Bias while abandoning the entire territory from the international border till Beas. While it is impossible to confirm or deny this assertion it seems highly improbable that Harbaksh could hold such an opinion whether one takes Harbaksh as an Indian or a Sikh.
Joginder states that at a conference held in May 1965 the GOC of 1st Indian Armoured Division advanced the thesis that the most likely axis of Pakistani main attack was Patti-Harike -Beas Bridge. It was this conference that the Indian Chief as per the author agreed to deploy an armoured brigade in Khem Karan area to meet the Pakistani armoured threat emanating from Kasur area. Harbaksh Singh as per the author thought otherwise giving a higher priority to a Pakistani frontal threat in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor. Harbaksh Singh on the other hand states in his book that he had appreciated before the war that a Pakistani armour threat from Kasur towards the Beas bridge was most likely. There is no way in which Joginder’s assertions can be proved or disproved.
Joginder’s approach towards Harbaksh Singh while discussing almost all aspects of the 1965 war is hostile to the point of being irrational. Thus he defends Major General Nirinjan Prasad who was sacked for exhibiting timidity and cowardice by Harbaksh Singh. Joginder thinks that Niranjan was sacked not because he was irresolute but because he was a difficult subordinate. Again it is not possible to agree or disagree with Joginder about this assertion. However, Niranjan’s sacking was even justified by very neutral and dispassionate Indian military historians like Major Praval. There is one fact which stands out in 15 Division’s conduct on 6th, 7th and 8th September, i.e its conduct keeping in view its numerical superiority in infantry and the degree of surprise that it had achieved on 6th of September was not commensurate with the overwhelming advantages that it enjoyed. As a matter of fact many Pakistani defenders of Lahore who were interviewed by this scribe were surprised at the lack of initiative exhibited by the 15 Division in its operations on the 6th of September 1965. No one can deny the fact that two infantry brigades of this division bolted away in face of Pakistani counterattacks and that this led to a serious operational crisis on the 8/9 September once the 96 Brigade was brought forward to check the conditions of near rout. I am not implying that the Indians were non- Martial as many Pakistanis earnestly believe since it is a fact that a Pakistani unit from the Punjab Regiment opposite Barki also bolted away. What I am merely trying to point out is the fact that there was something seriously wrong with 15 Indian Division at divisional as well as brigade level. However, Joginder denies it and sees Niranjan as an angel of a man since Harbaksh sacked him.
Joginder asserts that he gave a suggestion that the BRB should be crossed at Barki , after the main Indian attacks against Lahore had failed on 6-9th September , but does not explain how it could have been successfully done, keeping in view the net performance of all Indian brigades of 7 and 15 Division tasked to contact the BRB, was pathetic by all definitions. He asserts that he also suggested that the 26 Indian Division should bypass Sialkot and capture Sambrial west of Sialkot but does not explain how an infantry division would do so when an armoured division supported by two infantry divisions had failed to capture even Chawinda which was hardly 11 miles from the border.
The author asserts that Harbaksh Singh took no interest in the main Indian attack i.e the 1 Corps operations opposite Chawinda but does not explain why it was so. Was it due to some inter arm rivalry or because Harbaksh was not interested that India should win the war?
The author’s conclusion that there was no worthwhile higher direction in 1965 war as far as the Indian Army is concerned stands out as one of the most credible conclusions of the book. His assertion that the 1965 War was a show of some “20 Lieutenant Colonel and their units and about seven regiments of the armoured corps....” is valid for both the armies conduct in 1965.
Joginder flatly denies that General Chaudhri ever asked Harbaksh Singh to withdraw to the Beas River. General Kaul whose book was published many years before Harbaksh Singh’s “War Despatches” had also made a similar accusation (i.e that such a withdrawal was suggested by Chaudhri). I came across a similar assertion in another book by an Indian Colonel H.C Karr’s book. It appears that Chaudhri did discuss something with Harbaksh about re-adjusting his position but since there is nothing on record, therefore, only a Prophet or a Jinn may ever know about what exactly happened. The possibility that Joginder dismisses this incident since Harbaksh Singh had written that it occurred cannot be denied since “opposition for opposition’s sake” is one of the cardinal attributes of the Sub Continental psyche.
The author agrees that the main failure at Chawinda occurred in the handling of 1st Indian Armoured Brigade on the 8th September 1965 but has spent far more energy in painting Harbaksh Singh as the main reason for the Indian failure all over the book. In this regard it appears that the book had the support of the Indian military establishment who were outraged by Harbaksh very frank and forthright remarks about the mishandling of Indian Army at various levels in the 1965 War. In this regard the book stands out as more of a “Rejoinder” to Harbaksh’s “War Despatches” than a study carried out in a detached manner with the aim of correctly analysing the 1965 War.
The author gives no explanation why the Indians wasted two complete days doing nothing following their failure at Gadgor on the 8th of September. This was the most critical phase of war for the Pakistanis when they were off balance and it was possible for the Indian armour to regain its freedom of manoeuvre by outflanking the Pakistani force opposite them. The situation after 10/11 September when the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division started reinforcing the 6th Armoured Division was totally transformed. The major Indian failure occurred on 8th 9th and 10th September and was entirely because of indecisiveness and lack of resolution in pressing forward on behalf of the Indian 1 Corps/1 Armoured Division/1st Armoured Brigade Commander.
The author has also discussed 1971 War in brief but here his criticism is very mild about the higher direction in the war. Indian Western Command Chief Candeth has acknowledged in his book that had the Pakistanis attacked in late October 1971 all Indian plans to attack East Pakistan would have been blown into winds. This proves that the plans to invade East Pakistan were not as sound as they appeared and that the Indian plan was only carried out successfully since Yahya was irresolute enough not to launch a counteroffensive in the Western Front as had been planned before 1971 War. Joginder does not explain how establishment of the Bangladesh strategically helped India in the long run since Bangladesh is militarily stronger than the old East Pakistan and is not an Indian satellite as Indians had envisaged. Even Indian thinkers are divided about the strategic success of the 1971 War! Was it fought to add another feather to the Durga Devis cap or to liberate the Bengalis ! Indira’s conduct after the 1971 War does not paint a very bright picture about her motivation to start the 1971 War. Even if the aim was to help the Bengalis it failed since major killings by the Pakistan Army whatever their quantum took place in April-June 1971 and by November 1971 the situation was far different from that of June 1971. Genocide was committed but the Indians came not with a missionary’s motive to help the oppressed but for other reasons. Wars are not fought for missionary purposes alone and 1971’s only enduring legacies are “a more aggressive and militarily viable Pakistan eager to vindicate its honour” and the creation of a smaller ethnic state which proves that after a decade or two all provinces of present day Indo Pak are tomorrow’s full time members of the UNO! In this regard the 1971 war as far as India was concerned was a strategic failure and only a symbolic success! It would have been a success only if India had the resolution to overrun West Pakistan or to at least recapture Pakistan held Kashmir.
Joginder has not discussed anywhere the relative failure of the Indian command system especially with reference to the Western Command. A dispassionate glance at the conduct of 1965 and 1971 wars proves that the Indian command system is too unwieldy and keeping in view the frontage, location of formations and their number it is very difficult for any man whether it is Harbaksh or Manekshaw to effectively command anything like the Western Command as it is and as it was in 1965 and 1971 wars. Joginder’s hero Manekshaw had nothing to do with actual operational command of any corps division or command in any of the three Indo Pak wars. The Indian failure at Chamb in 1971 which was criticised by Joginder definitely had a connection with the confusion in the Indian GHQ as the narratives of Candeth and Gurcharan Singh prove. Joginder does not explain why Chamb, which was adequately defended in 1971, lost to Pakistan in 1971. It was a command failure and had a deeper connection with the divisional commanders personality and handling of armour than with anything at brigade or unit level where the Indian 191 Brigade was brilliantly led and managed to hold three infantry brigades supported by three tank regiments for more than two days.
How should we analyse the Indian Army’s failure in 1965 or how should I put it as a Pakistani? Joginder sees the hand of Harbaksh Singh in all Indian failures in 1965! This, however, is too simplistic an approach. There were deeper reasons for the Indian (as well as the Pakistani) failure to function as dynamic entities beyond unit level in 1965. The Indian Army of 1965 was like the Austrian Army of 1809. It consisted of perhaps equally brave junior leaders but was severely handicapped since rapid expansion since the Sino-Indian war of 1962, despite being impressive on paper had not made the Indian military machine really effective because of poor training at divisional and brigade level. It was numerically strong but organisationally ineffective having dashing young leaders but tactically and operationally inept brigade divisional and corps commanders from the older pre- 1947 commissioned generation whom were initially supposed not to go beyond company level, had the transfer of power not taken place in 1947. The strike corps was a new concept and the Indian 1 Corps which was shortly created before the 1965 war was a newly raised formation whose corps commander and armoured divisional commanders were about to retire in 1965 when war broke out. The Indian commanders beyond unit level, as was the case with Pakistan Army, consisted of men who had experience of infantry biased operations in WW Two and did not understand the real essence of armoured warfare. It was this lack of understanding that led to the failures in achieving a decisive armour breakthrough in both sides. It was a failure of command as well as staff system where even the staff officers on both sides were too slow for armoured warfare and worked on yards and furlongs rather than miles. Their orientation was position oriented rather than mobility oriented and their idea of a battlefield was a typical linear battlefield. Their Burma or North African experience where the Japanese and Germans frequently appeared in their rear had made them extra sensitive about their flanks. These were men who thought in terms of security rather than speed. Conformity rather than unorthodox dynamism, having been trained in the slavish colonial orders oriented British Indian Army was the cardinal script of their life. It was this British system in which every senior commander was more interested in doing the job of those one step junior to him that led to the lack of dash and initiative at brigade and battalion level. They were trained that way and there behaviour as far as the timidity at brigade and divisional level has to be taken in this context. How could one man, an army commander responsible for three corps is made responsible for failures that occurred at battalion brigade and divisional level!
Once I heard about Joginder’s book in 1998, I had very high expectations and was convinced that a man who has been the Chief of Staff of the Western Command will be the best judge of 1965 War. In this regard the book was a big disappointment since instead of analysing Indian military history it is more of a proof that Joginder Singh was a very fine staff officer and that Harbaksh Singh was a horrible man! Joginder’s book is a welcome addition to the limited number of first hand/direct participant accounts on 1965 War. The fact that the writer has made some controversial assertions and has made an effort to write a rejoinder to Harbaksh Singh’s more famous “War Despatches”, however, does not diminish the historical value of the book, at least for the Pakistani readers of military history. The book thus retains the status of “must be read and indispensable books” on the list of all keen students of Indo Pak military history. However, his anti-Harbaksh bias should be taken with a pinch of salt. In addition his discussion of what could have been done must be viewed in relation to the relatively pathetic performance of both the armies in all three wars. The under employment of Pakistan and Indian Armies in all three wars have a deep connection with the conservative British colonial legacy. Harbaksh and various other actors were a product of that system and were relatively better or perceived to be better than their contemporaries and thus elevated to the higher command ranks. It was the outmoded system that proved to be a failure in all three wars. Individuals were just the tip of the iceberg.
14.This is what Maj Gen Sukhvinder Singh has to say about the leadership.
Niranjan Prasad, then in command of 15 Infantry division, led the advance of Lahore and proved so inept in battle that he was removed from command a day or two after that start of operations.
His replacement was Maj Gen Mohinder Singh, whom the pundits had relegated to a desk job in Army Headquarters on the ground that he was unfit to command to division. In battle, Mohinder Singh already holder of the Military cross, won the much-merited Maha Vir Chakra and proved himself a leader in crisis. But our systems had denied him a divisional command in peace.
On a rough analysis, it appears that out of 24 bridge committed in battle in 1965 war ten were sacked for incompetence in battle and only four of the rest earned command of a division. One of those four was exposed in the conflict of 1971, another left the service at his own request, a third retired, and the fourth was approved for promotion only on review despite his good performance in Bangladesh. One became an Army Commander after meeting initial difficulties with the authorities, but he was exceptionally brilliant and patriotic and rose despite prevailing prejudices. Perhaps he was lucky to serve close to Manekshaw, who valued his worth.
Out of 11 divisional commanders committed in battle in 1965, only three became corps commanders, and out of these, two did comparatively poorly and were the only ones not decorated. This in indicative of their performance. And those who were decorated and made much of by our nation were unceremoniously wasted out. Such was the efficiency of our systems.
In 1971, out of 21 divisional commanders committed in battle, eight were brigadiers in 1965. Of them only four were committed with MVC. The remaining 13 were Lieutenant colonels in 1965, and none of them was committed in battle either as an officer commanding a unit or operational staff of a division. They were a collection of untried officers, and those who had acquitted themselves well in the earlier conflict had fallen victim to our systems.
After the 1971 conflict, when the time came for appointments, two corps commanders who had lost the vital territories of Chhamb and the Hussainiwala enclave and a third with nothing to show in his favour were elevated as Army commanders, while the best field corps commander and the man mainly esposible for the fall of Dacca was sidetracked in promotion and finally retired. Let us hope history will not ignore this man and his contribution to making it possible for India to find a place as a military power of consequence.
The five corps commanders appointed after the conflict of 1971 were staff officers. None of them had commanded a division or brigade in war. Perhaps they did not get the opportunity and one or two may be good even in a crisis, but they were never put to the test. Where was our leadership, which had proved itself in crisis sometime or other?
Has anybody in our military hierarchy contributed to modern military thought with the exception of Gen Bhagat? He wrote two books which brought out the military aspect of the problems faced by developing countries in Asia and elsewhere. In service, he was the only soldier of any stature who questioned the efficacy of World War II concepts in the context of short, intense wars and advocated tailoring plans and concepts to meet political requirements.
He stood for increasing military capability by streamlining infantry, heavy and defence-oriented organisations to achieve hard hitting power. He challenged the existing systems of promotions and appointments and advocated meeting halfway the aspirations of the rank and file in the way of accommodation and other amenities of life. He changed the entire old koi hai concept of man management and gave it a humane approach. Our systems and political expediency wasted him out, and this was a national loss.
Another officer who made a significant contribution to military literature was Maj Gen D.K. Pallt. He started writing as a major and kept up his output of military literature throughout. Even today, he adds every year to some compilation or other, and as military correspondent of the Hindustan Times, New Delhi, keeps public opinion well informed. Gen Chaudhuri wrote a book or two, and still writes as a military correspondent, but his contributions are still wedded to Western thought and have no bearing on the realities of the times.
How is it that for the last 27 years we have not been able to find solutions to our military problems? The reasons are simple: first, we have not encouraged new thought; secondly, whenever new thought raised its head we have stifled it with a heavy hand; and thirdly, our generals have been busy promoting their own interests rather than those of the nation. Intoxicated with the power to bestow favours in the way of postings and promotions, the military.
M48 Patton vs Centurion: Indo-Pakistani War 1965 (Duel) Paperback – January 19, 2016
by David Higgins (Author)
M48 Patton vs Centurion: Indo-Pakistani War 1965 (Duel) Paperback – January 19, 2016
by David Higgins (Author)
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· The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall.[55] Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns.[56] The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.[57]
· At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions – the latter being in the process of formation.
· The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, which consisted of the 17th Horse (The Poona Horse), also called 'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), the 4th Horse (Hodson's Horse), the 16th Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.
· Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour,[58] Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on Amritsar;[59][60] they were sometimes employed in a faulty manner, such as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division at Assal Uttar.
· After Indians breached the Madhupur canal on 11 September, the Khem Karan counter-offensive was halted, affecting Pakistan's strategy substantially.[29] Although India's tank formations experienced some results, India's attack at the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armoured Division and supporting units, was brought to a grinding halt by the newly raised 6th Armoured Division (ex-100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector. Pakistan claimed that Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda.[61] Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such as India's 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and Pakistan's 25th Cavalry at Chawinda.
The Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, proved superior to the overly complex Pattons and their exaggerated reputations.[60] However, in the Sialkot sector outnumbered Pattons performed exceedingly well in the hands of the 25th Cavalry and other regiments of the 6th Armoured Division, which exacted a disproportionately heavy toll of Centurions from the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 witnessed the largest tank battles seen since World War II, notably between India's British-made Centurion Mk 7s and the American-made M48 Pattons fielded by Pakistan. Following nearly two decades of tensions and sporadic conflict between India and Pakistan, in August 1965 several thousand Pakistani soldiers entered the disputed territory of Kashmir disguised as local civilians, to which India responded with a successful ground assault. After a week of fighting, India's 1st "Black Elephant" Armoured Division launched an offensive toward Sialkot, where it rebuffed Pakistan's 6th Armoured Division, which suffered considerable tank losses. The ensuing battle at Chawinda on 14-16 September 1965 would demonstrate that the Centurion, with its 105mm gun and heavier armour, generally proved superior to the faster, lighter but overly complex Patton, mounting a 90mm main gun; however, the latter performed exceedingly well in the Sialkot sector, exacting a disproportionately heavy toll on its Indian opponents.
Featuring full-colour artwork, expert analysis and absorbing combat accounts, this is the story of the clash between the Centurion and the M48 Patton in the massed armour battles of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.
Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3, July-September 2015
Commemorating 50 years of the 1965 India-Pakistan War, the July-September 2015 special issue provides a broad overview of the war by covering a range of actions and events spanning the diplomatic, tactical and strategic space, with the additional scope of relating them to the present conditions prevalent with Pakistan.
Editorial
Focus
Recounting 1965: War, Diplomacy and Great Games in the Subcontinent
-- Shruti Pandalai
Operation Gibraltar: An Uprising that Never Was
-- P.K. Chakravorty and Gurmeet Kanwal
Battle of Haji Pir: The Army’s Glory in 1965
-- P.C. Katoch
Indian Army’s Continuity and Transformation: Through the Prism of the Battle of Dograi
-- Rahul K. Bhonsle
Critical Analysis of Pakistani Air Operations in 1965: Weaknesses and Strengths
-- Arjun Subramaniam
Air Power in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War: An Assessment
-- Ramesh V. Phadke
The 1965 Indo-Pak War: Through Today’s Lens
-- Ali Ahmed
An Infantry Combat Leader’s Memoir of the 1965 War
-- M.A. Zaki
Review Essay
India and Pakistan: An Eternal Conflict!
-- S. Kalyanaraman
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