How to Respond to Terror and LoC Attacks: Where Tactical is Strategic?

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Rahul Bhonsle 

How to Respond to Terror and LoC Attacks: Where Tactical is Strategic?

In military parlance, there are three distinct levels of conflicts – the tactical, operational and the strategic. The tactical obviously implies actions at the lowest level – from the company to the division, while the operational level is seen as the theatre – a corps while strategic entails impact at the campaign or national. A terrorist attack concerning resources employed is sub-tactical – wherein a small group strikes at a target causing disproportionate casualties. Similarly, any action at the Line of Control (LOC) carried out by a small team such as the BAT (border action team) is at best tactical having a direct impact at the post which is struck or ambush of a patrol. The overall effect of these measures is at the national or strategic level. Take the case of the Uri terrorist attack in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed by a small group of four terrorists. The anger in India extended across the nation leading the government to consider a variety of options from reneging on the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan or the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 to the surgical strike that was launched on the night of 28/29 September. Thus the tactical becomes strategic.

In the same manner, attacks on the LoC particularly those by Pakistan that have entailed inhuman mutilation of bodies of soldiers have resulted in a hue and cry across the country calling for revenge. A muted response to the mutilation of bodies by a Pakistan BAT team in 2013 had led to the government of the day being blamed for the lack of sufficient resolve to face the challenge and was one of the factors that had led to the downfall of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in 2014. While there was a retaliatory response even in 2013, it was not as demonstrative as the action taken by the Indian Army in 2016 under the present government led by Mr Narendra Modi. Thus the political implications of an action at the tactical and sub-tactical level would be more than evident.

Pakistan has bene deft in using the strategic effect of tactical steps to undermine the Indian security in Jammu and Kashmir and increasingly further south in Punjab as the attacks in Gurdaspur and Pathankot have shown. These are also used to scuttle peace parleys planned by the Indian and Pakistan government or a rapprochement which is in the offing. Thus the Pathankot terrorist attack came just days after Prime Minister Modi met Mr Nawaz Sharif his Pakistani counterpart in an unscheduled visit on 25 December 2015 in Lahore. Similarly, some believe that the Nagrota terror strike has come even as there was some speculation that talks would be held between Adviser on Foreign Affairs to the Pakistan Prime Minister Mr Sartaj Aziz with his Indian counterpart on the sidelines of the Heart of Asia Conference in Amritsar. Post Nagrota on 29th November the talks are off and what the government or the Indian Army now contemplates as a response remains to be seen? Thus terrorist groups have become a strategic asset for Pakistan.

What then is an appropriate response to the strategic effect of such tactical actions? First and foremost, reducing vulnerabilities at the tactical level, which in simple words implies foolproof base security, active patrols and perimeter defence. The age old saying of eternal vigilance being the price of liberty is most apt and applicable here.

Secondly, penetration over the vast span of the land borders is difficult but not impossible. Thus a terrorist attack can be avoided but not completely ruled out. When this happens, the aim should be to localise the impact by an effective counter-response that is rapid using shock and awe to effect, the longer the encounter, the more will be the strategic influence of the same given the 24/7 hovering presence of media including social and messaging applications.

Thirdly the response has to be proportionate – tactical action needs a reaction at the tactical level, making much hullaballoo over the same nationally is self-defeating. The Indian Army on the ground is capable of dealing with violations of the ceasefire, BAT actions and the like in most cases, Uri incident not withstanding. Allowing the military commanders to deal with such incidents rather than jumping levels is far more prudent and needs to be the norm. For this, a free hand has to be given to the military commanders on the ground rather than restraining them, in turn, the government of the day needs to have the confidence in the army leadership.

Fourthly once expectations are limited to the tactical level, time sensitivity of response is reduced, and there are greater flexibility and space for the military to act in a manner most appropriate to inflict maximum losses on the opponent. Finally allowing politics into actions which are purely in the tactical domain should be scrupulously avoided. The Armed Forces can best serve the security of the nation in case they are kept away from politics especially when the tactical is likely to lead to a strategic impact as regarding terrorist actions and LoC responses.