By Dr Sudhanshu Tripathi
11 Nov , 2016
Though foreign policy of any country happens to be a well-planned, consistent, predetermined and calculated statement of its goals and objectives and their priorities and also about the methodology that the country shall use with a view to realise them, the constant application of the so prescribed principles of foreign policy always presents several challenges as well as prospects before the decision-maker or the leader of the country.
While challenges create problems before the decision-maker that prompt him to explore solutions to resolve these crises, the prospects open the way for favourable conditions to accomplish the so-defined goals regarding the foreign policy of the country.
It is in this context that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi began his term two years ago while expressing his full faith and firm commitment to the proclaimed objectives of India’s foreign policy viz. peace, non-violence, non-alignment and the like, which were enunciated by the founder architect and first Prime Minister of independent India Jawaharlal Nehru even prior to independence of the country and were announced to the world over All India Radio in his speech to the nation on September 7, 1946.
But the compulsions of the global scenario that emerged after the end of Cold War in 1990 — wherein the US had moved ahead from its erstwhile Super Power status to occupy the global centre-stage as the first Hyper Power controlling even the ideas of people in the world and thereby paving way for the emergence of a unipolar world order as against the bi-polar world order with the then USSR as a counter-pole as well as an independent bloc of communist countries that came into existence immediately after the Second World War — categorically demanded India’s inclination towards Washington so that India’s national interests may be secured and preserved.
It was not that the erstwhile USSR had disintegrated to become obsolete and redundant for India after having supported New Delhi in its critical moments — whether it was in the United Nations or in the Indo-Pak wars, particularly of 1971. The fact of the matter was that the USSR was not that much powerful and influential enough where it would be able to challenge US hegemony as a counter-pole in the world politics, as it had been doing in the aftermath of the Second World War during the fierce Cold War years of international politics and relations.