http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/pathankot-attack-aimed-at-probing-modi-govt-s-red-lines-christine-fair-116010900252_1.html
Q&A with C Christine Fair, associate professor, Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Bhaswar Kumar | New Delhi January 9, 2016
C Christine Fair
The Pathankot attack is not a spontaneous response to recent developments; it is a manifestation of the Pakistani national security strategy to pursue its revisionist agenda against India, says C CHRISTINE FAIR, author of Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War, and an associate professor in the Peace and Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign Service. Fair, who earlier served as a political officer to the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, tells Bhaswar Kumar in a telephonic interview that there is a consensus within the Indian security establishment that India lacks the offensive capability to defeat Pakistan in a short war.
The January 2 attack on an Indian Air Force base in Pathankot was allegedly carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) operatives. What are the dynamics between organisations like JeM and Pakistan’s military and civilian establishments?
Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) set up JeM as a competitor to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), which the ISI had formed earlier. Prior to the formation of JeM, three Pakistani terrorists – Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar, Ahmed Okmar Saeed Sheikh and Maulana Masood Azhar – were released by Indian authorities in return for hostages taken during the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight 814 in December 1999. Azhar and the two other terrorists, upon their release in Kandahar, were ferried to Pakistan under ISI escort. Within a few weeks, Azhar announced the formation of JeM in Karachi.
LeT and JeM are ideologically distinct organisations. JeM, like the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, is Deobandi; LeT is Ahle Hadees. Besides, JeM generally conducts suicide attacks, while LeT conducts high-risk missions where the goal is not to die but its operatives would still rather die than be taken captives.
These terrorist groups have an army major assigned to them. It is the majors’ responsibility to ensure the groups’ operatives are trained and they get the required resources. A major can, for example, authorise a small-level attack in Kashmir against an Indian army unit – an offensive that does not have major strategic implications. On the other hand, every attack outside of Kashmir has to have the army chief’s imprimatur, given the likely strategic implications – after all, if the Americans get upset and hold up coalition support funding, it is the army chief who will have to answer.
The Pathankot attack came within a week of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Lahore and the resumption of talks with Pakistan. Have the terrorists and their handlers achieved their goal by creating a hurdle for the peace process?
Q&A with C Christine Fair, associate professor, Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Bhaswar Kumar | New Delhi January 9, 2016
C Christine Fair
The Pathankot attack is not a spontaneous response to recent developments; it is a manifestation of the Pakistani national security strategy to pursue its revisionist agenda against India, says C CHRISTINE FAIR, author of Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War, and an associate professor in the Peace and Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign Service. Fair, who earlier served as a political officer to the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, tells Bhaswar Kumar in a telephonic interview that there is a consensus within the Indian security establishment that India lacks the offensive capability to defeat Pakistan in a short war.
The January 2 attack on an Indian Air Force base in Pathankot was allegedly carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) operatives. What are the dynamics between organisations like JeM and Pakistan’s military and civilian establishments?
Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) set up JeM as a competitor to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), which the ISI had formed earlier. Prior to the formation of JeM, three Pakistani terrorists – Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar, Ahmed Okmar Saeed Sheikh and Maulana Masood Azhar – were released by Indian authorities in return for hostages taken during the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight 814 in December 1999. Azhar and the two other terrorists, upon their release in Kandahar, were ferried to Pakistan under ISI escort. Within a few weeks, Azhar announced the formation of JeM in Karachi.
LeT and JeM are ideologically distinct organisations. JeM, like the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, is Deobandi; LeT is Ahle Hadees. Besides, JeM generally conducts suicide attacks, while LeT conducts high-risk missions where the goal is not to die but its operatives would still rather die than be taken captives.
These terrorist groups have an army major assigned to them. It is the majors’ responsibility to ensure the groups’ operatives are trained and they get the required resources. A major can, for example, authorise a small-level attack in Kashmir against an Indian army unit – an offensive that does not have major strategic implications. On the other hand, every attack outside of Kashmir has to have the army chief’s imprimatur, given the likely strategic implications – after all, if the Americans get upset and hold up coalition support funding, it is the army chief who will have to answer.
The Pathankot attack came within a week of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Lahore and the resumption of talks with Pakistan. Have the terrorists and their handlers achieved their goal by creating a hurdle for the peace process?