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31 December 2016

Why 2017 is the most dangerous year for Britain since the Cold War


The ashen-faced prime minister blinked in the candlelight and looked again at the paper the Russian ambassador had slapped onto her desk. ‘I am not here to negotiate,’ the envoy said. ‘Sign this now or face the consequences.’

The terms were stark. Britain was to pay £100 billion in ‘reparations’ for damage caused by sanctions and the brief and disastrous war in the Baltic states.

This payment was to be guaranteed by the immediate transfer to Moscow of the Bank of England’s gold reserves. Britain was also to nationalise its energy industry and hand controlling shares to Russian companies.

On the military front, the surrender was even more humiliating. The Royal Navy’s ships and submarines, including the Trident nuclear deterrent, were to be transferred to Russian command with immediate effect. An admiral operating from a new Russian naval base at Portsmouth would implement other terms of the ‘Friendship Pact’, including the disbanding of the Army and closure of the RAF.

Britain’s intelligence establishment was to be gutted, too. MI6, MI5 and GCHQ would be dissolved forthwith, with their files transferred to Russian control. Russian ‘advisers’ would be placed in all government departments.

Most sinister of all, a ‘joint counter-extremism’ commission, under the control of Russia’s FSB security service, would be allowed to order the immediate extradition to Russia of ‘provocateurs’ and ‘wreckers’.

Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine could have been far tougher. But they certainly constrained the leadership in Moscow from escalating the conflict

An initial list was attached. It included not only emigre Russians, but also leading British academics, civil servants, journalists, judges and politicians.

The sole candle on the Cabinet Office table flickered in the draught, as if epitomising Britain’s humiliation.

Not only had the Russian cyber attack shut down the power grid. It had disabled the giant diesel generators designed to power the bunkers under Whitehall.

Without lighting, ventilation or communications, Britain’s leaders emerged to the surface, isolated and humiliated.

The prime minister sipped a precious cup of coffee, made with rainwater and brewed from a camping stove in the Downing Street garden.

Top of the list to be ‘extradited’ — in effect, deported — were her Foreign Secretary and two senior advisers. The ambassador offered a pen. ‘Sign here.’

Smolensk and Voronezh nuclear-powered submarines moored at a base in the Murmansk region of Russia earlier this year

It is all too easy to see how events could unfold if the West, led by a skittish and unpredictable Donald Trump, did not present a resolute and united front against Russian aggression

The Kremlin had succeeded where foreign invaders had failed since the Norman Conquest of 1066. Britain had been not just defeated, but crushed . . .

Such a scene might seem like a nightmarish fantasy. But 2017 is shaping up to be the most dangerous year in our history since the heights of the Cold War. And, unlike then, we are pitifully unprepared.

It is all too easy to see how events could unfold if the West, led by a skittish and unpredictable Donald Trump, did not present a resolute and united front against Russian aggression.

2017 is shaping up to be the most dangerous year in our history since the heights of the Cold War

The greatest problem is that Nato — the bastion of our security for decades — has been fundamentally undermined by Trump’s victory in the American presidential election.

As the President-elect has made abundantly clear, he reveres strongmen — including the Russian dictator, Vladimir Putin. And early next year he will seek a wide-ranging deal with the Russian leader. In return for co-operation on security and terrorism, he will give the Kremlin what it wants in Europe.

Primarily, that will mean the abandonment of support by the EU and America for the government in Ukraine — a country which Russia has invaded and occupied in flagrant breach of international law.

Trump wants to end sanctions on Moscow over Ukraine - not least because they deprive American oil and gas companies of lucrative deals in energy-rich Russia


Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov in the English Channel in October

Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine could have been far tougher. But they certainly constrained the leadership in Moscow from escalating the conflict. But Mr Trump wants to end those sanctions — not least because they deprive American oil and gas companies of lucrative deals in energy-rich Russia.

He will also, I fear, do a deal over the heads of the front-line states of eastern Europe — our brave Nato allies in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. That is terrible news for this country, too, because we are fully committed to their defence, but without American support that job becomes harder, perhaps impossible.

In truth, alliances are the true source of American greatness. No country in the history of the world has had so many friends and allies.

We and the front-line states are among those who have sacrificed our servicemen and women in American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But Mr Trump’s narrow vision — shaped by his decades as a ruthless property developer — sees foreign policy only in terms of trade-offs and deals.

He wants to concentrate on terrorism and China. For him, Europe’s local security worries are no longer America’s concern. Such an approach creates a huge opportunity for the leadership in Moscow.

The two leading candidates in France, Marine Le Pen (left) and Francois Fillon (right) are unlikely to show any enthusiasm for standing up to Russia

Without America, European security relies hugely on the two remaining nuclear powers in Nato — Britain and France.

But France is no longer reliable. The presidential election there in April is likely to deal a body blow to European defence.

The two leading candidates are Marine Le Pen, whose National Front party is openly financed by Russia, and Francois Fillon, an arch-conservative who boasts close personal ties with Mr Putin. Neither of them is likely to show any enthusiasm for standing up to Russia.

That leaves Britain in the firing line — literally. If Russia attacks the Baltic states or Poland, we are bound by treaties to defend them as best we can.

The historical echoes are ominous. In 1914, we went to war to defend Belgium against Kaiser Wilhelm. In 1939, we went to war with Nazi Germany to defend Poland.

While we and other European countries have been cutting back, Russia has been re-arming fast. It has doubled its defence budget between 2004 and 2014

In both cases we were unprepared for war, but in both cases we won out in the end. We may not be so lucky this time round.

Our Armed Forces are at their lowest ebb since the Napoleonic wars. Short-sighted defence cuts have reduced the Royal Navy’s strength to a mere 19 frigates and destroyers — termed a ‘national disgrace’ by the House of Commons Defence Committee.

The Army, cut by a fifth since 2010, is struggling to reach even its puny official strength of 82,500. The RAF depends on aircraft which are in some cases 40 years old.

But while we and other European countries have been cutting back, Russia has been re-arming fast. It has doubled its defence budget between 2004 and 2014.

Russia’s message to Nato will be simple — are you really willing to risk World War III in order to keep us from holding sway in the former Soviet empire?

We have ignored that threat, preferring to make two fatally flawed assumptions. One is that Russia does not pose a military threat to this country and its allies. Second is that America will always be there to defend us.

In the event of a conflict in the Baltic states or Poland, Russia has what is called in military parlance ‘escalation dominance’. Like a seasoned poker player, Mr Putin can raise the stakes quickly in the knowledge that his opponents will crumble.

Russia’s military doctrine explicitly endorses the use of small-scale nuclear weapons in order to deter a conventional adversary.

In a conflict in the Baltic states or Poland, Russia can deliver a terrifying message to this country by detonating, for example, a nuclear depth charge that might obliterate an enemy submarine.

In a conflict in the Baltic states or Poland, Russia can deliver a terrifying message to this country by detonating, for example, a nuclear depth charge that might obliterate an enemy submarine

Russia’s message to Nato will be simple — are you really willing to risk World War III in order to keep us from holding sway in the former Soviet empire?

Faced with that, I fear that many British decision-makers would cave in at once.

But Russia does not need to risk a full-scale war to achieve its goals. It has a mighty arsenal of other measures. As the American election showed — when embarrassing Democratic party emails emerged — Russian hacking and leaking of sensitive information can skew other countries’ democratic political systems.

In theory we could do that, too, but in practice Russia’s phoney democracy and tightly controlled media give our intelligence services little scope.

Defeat is not inevitable. If America is no longer interested in defending Europe from Russia, I am convinced that, with willpower and resolve, we can do it on our own.

Russia can also use cyber attacks to more destructive effect — as the not entirely fanciful introduction to this article imagined. How long would this country survive if our ATMs stopped working? How would our financial system survive if our banks lost control of the computers and networks which manage our money? A Russian cyber attack could destroy the British banking system, changing balances and closing accounts at random.

A cyber attack, believed to be from Russia, nearly destroyed a French broadcaster last year. If the Kremlin wishes, it could knock the BBC, Sky and other broadcasters off air. All over Britain, phones would be silent and screens dead.

A full-on cyber attack could also see public services coming to a halt: sewerage, water, rubbish collection. Like my fictional prime minister, we would be living by candlelight: cold, hungry and isolated.

Civilised life would break down within a couple of days. Hungry mobs would storm supermarkets. Epidemics would break out.

Mr Putin is willing to take risks, break rules and accept economic pain in a way we in the West are not

In such circumstances, the overwhelming priority would be to recover a semblance of normality — even at the price of ending our existence as a sovereign nation.

In theory our nuclear deterrent should protect us in such conditions. But I fear that the Trump presidency will expose a fatal flaw in this assumption. France can use its nuclear weapons independently of any other country. But our nuclear planning is deeply entwined with the United States.

I fear that if we did attempt to use our ‘independent’ nuclear deterrent against the wishes of Donald Trump, we would receive a terse and unambiguous message from the White House: ‘Don’t bother trying.’

Yet defeat is not inevitable. If America is no longer interested in defending Europe from Russia, I am convinced that, with willpower and resolve, we can do it on our own.

The greatest problem is that Nato — the bastion of our security for decades — has been fundamentally undermined by Trump’s victory in the American presidential election

Russia has a population of 140 million, and a GDP of just over £1 trillion. Yet its real strength is willpower. Mr Putin is willing to take risks, break rules and accept economic pain in a way we in the West are not.

And yet — as I noted in a report last year for a Washington think-tank — the combined GDP of the five Nordic states, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, plus the three Baltic states and Poland, is bigger than Russia’s. These nine countries alone have combined defence spending that amounts to half of Russia’s.

With British help on cyber warfare, intelligence and nuclear weapons, they could create a Nordic-Baltic-Polish mini-Nato that would be more than a military match for Russia.

Similarly, we can defend ourselves against Russian cyber attacks. Our new National Cyber Security Centre deserves praise for its efforts to secure the critical national infrastructure. But we are painfully, and dangerously, late in tackling the very real threat.

If Russia wins a trial of strength with this country, it will be merciless in victory

Stuart Peach discusses the possible future of NATO and Trump

For more than a decade we have put convenience, innovation and low cost ahead of security. Our banks and big companies still take a shamefully careless and cheapskate approach to cyber threats.

We can also improve the resilience of our society in other ways.

Russia’s approach to international relations combines cyber attacks, propaganda, assassination, organised crime, psychological pressure, bribery, espionage, diplomacy, military pressure and other dirty tricks. But when it comes to defence, we still see these spheres as separate categories.

Our spy-catchers, military top brass, internet geeks, businessmen, bankers, financial supervisors, police and politicians see only the aspect of Russian mischief-making that lies right in front of their noses. By missing the big picture, they allow Mr Putin’s spooks, crooks and meddlers to make hay.

During the Cold War — and when dealing with Irish terrorism — this country developed effective habits of co-operation against a common threat.

We need to rediscover that now — for we should be certain of one thing. If Russia wins a trial of strength with this country, it will be merciless in victory.

Edward Lucas writes for The Economist.

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