Pravin Sawhney
Gen Bajwa, the new Pakistan Army Chief, has China's support and, perhaps, now of Russia’s as well. It cannot be expected that he will defuse tensions across the Line of Control until India agrees to unconditional talks
With the new Pakistan Army Chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa having taken charge, the question Indians are asking is whether he would be a hardliner like his predecessor or ease tensions with India across the Line of Control?
The answer, perhaps, lies in two recent observations made by Pakistan’s High Commissioner in India, Abdul Basit. Speaking with the Indian media, he said that democracy has matured in Pakistan, the balance (in civil-military relations) is set, and the era of coup was over. What he did not say is that the balance has tilted so much in favour of the military (Army) that coups have been rendered unnecessary. And, ironically, India, by its 1998 nuclear tests, has contributed towards it.
With nuclear weapons in the open, the Pakistan Army Chief has become the unquestioned strategic player responsible for Pakistan’s foreign and security policies. In choosing Bajwa, by deep selection from the list of contenders sent to him by Rawalpindi, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, like earlier times, was not picking up the candidate for the powerful post of Army Chief who may not overthrow him, but one who would give breather from alleged corruption charges levelled against him by Panama leaks.
It all started with Pakistan Army Chief, General Jehangir Karamat, who in May 1998, took the decision for Pakistan to conduct its nuclear tests to ‘maintain strategic parity’, as he put it, with India. Having demonstrated nuclear weapons capability, converting it into nuclear weapons under Rawalpindi’s watch, was the natural next step. Within weeks of the nuclear tests, the Pakistan Army was briefing the Pakistan Foreign Ministry on various aspects of its nuclear policy. With the ownership of nukes, the stature of the Pakistan Army Chief, both within and outside the country, was taller than that of the Prime Minister.
Given the altered situation, the Pakistan military sought a more direct role in the country’s governance and to use its nuclear weaponisation to give it a larger role on the world stage. With this in mind, Karamat, on October 5, 1998, publicly floated the idea of a National Security Council (NSC), where, in an institutionalised fashion, the Army would have a role in the Government. Prime Minister Sharif saw this as an affront to the people’s mandate, and asked Karamat to resign, which he did on October 7, 1998.
His successor, General Pervez Musharraf took two steps immediately on assuming command. He created the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), comprising Army officers to oversee nuclear weapons management. And he submitted the National Command Authority (NCA) organisation plan for nuclear weapons decision-making to be headed by political and military leaders to Prime Minister Sharif. Sharif was sceptical of the NCA plan as it resembled the NSC (first proposed by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1985) and had more military officers rather than civilians in it. It remained on paper until Sharif was deposed by Musharraf after the 1999 Kargil conflict.
Once in power, Musharraf, on February 2, 2000, announced the creation of the NCA, consisting of military and political leaders under the direction of the SPD. Musharraf as the Chief Executive (and later as the President) was the chairman of the NCA and the SPD reported to him. Having assumed total control over all aspects of nuclear weapons policy and management, Musharraf formed the NSC (for institutionalised role of the military in governance) for which Karamat had been forced to resign. The NSC did not go far as (a) its role was unclear; whether it was an executive or advisory body, and (b) after Musharraf was deposed, President Asif Ali Zardari let it languish.
Meanwhile, following the 18th Amendment to the Constitution in April 2010, whereby substantive presidential powers were handed over to the Prime Minister, Pakistan Army Chief, General Ashfaq Kayani revamped the NCA to consist of the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and Development Control Committee (DCC). The DCC, responsible for nuclear weapons management, has the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), always from the Army, as its Deputy Chairman and all members from the military (read Army) with the Prime Minister as its chairman (on paper). With the SPD as the nerve centre of the DCC firmly under the control of the Army Chief, the Prime Minister, just like the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) which notionally reports to him, had as little to do with nukes as he had with sub-conventional (terrorism) warfare. Since both the director generals of SPD and the ISI report to the Army Chief, he, and not the Prime Minister, is the key strategic player with whom the world (except India) interacts with.
Being Pakistan’s foremost strategic player — which is being much more than operational commander like Indian services chiefs — Bajwa’s top priority, much like his predecessor, would be the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Pakistan’s turbulent eastern front (India) and western front (Afghanistan) gain importance because of their immediate relevance to the CPEC.
Meanwhile, the northern end of the CPEC which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), is unstable. Instead of discussing the Kashmir resolution with Pakistan, the Narendra Modi Government has declared getting back PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan from Pakistan as its mission.
The dichotomy in the end-game desired by India and Pakistan is responsible for tensions between India and Pakistan. Bajwa, who has China’s support and, perhaps, now of Russia as well, cannot be expected to defuse tensions on the LoC until India agrees to unconditional talks.
(The writer is co-author, with Ghazala Wahab, of the coming book, ‘Dragon on our Doorstep’ to be published by Aleph Book Company)
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