By Pranab Dhal Samanta
India is not a US ally yet. But it’s every bit on the edge of the American circle of trust. The creation of a special category, ‘MajorDefence Partner’ (MDP), signifies this best.
This is not just about perception tags, but about real deals, projects and high-technology access. The defence relationship has been tricky business between India and the US. Even former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh desisted from pushing the envelope on the defence piece for political reasons, despite an exponential rise in military purchases from the US under his watch.
Only for Friends of Friends The nature of military cooperation with a country is at the core of Washington’s definition of an alliance. It’s settled and framed into law and regulatory practices, rules and orders that govern military sales — especially, high-end equipment and technology transfers. This is a tightly-held controls framework, closely guarded and watched over by the US’ vigilant arms control community.
Yes, let’s talk business
It is only the US’ closest military allies who have a passport through this complex framework. Exceptions are often made depending on political exigencies of the day. But those also mostly relate to the sale of whole weapon systems.
India, however, wanted access to technology, also sensitive and dual-use items that have broader application. India’s established scientific credentials only strengthened that case. But there was still lot of history to cover.
Between India’s old American fears and the US’ suspicious arms control and industry protectionist lobbies, both countries found this ‘bridging solution’ in the form of this unknown status of an MDP.
There are two US arms control lists. One, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (Itar) list, which comes under the Department of State. The other is the Export Administration Regulation (EAR) list controlled by the Department of Commerce.
In 2013, the US administration moved a whole bunch of sensitive items from the Itar to the EAR list. The EAR was then revisited, reworked and redone to make military commerce easier. So, when the rejig happened, India fell in the list category of Strategic Trade Authorisation (STA)-2. America’s closest allies are in STA-1. The licensing requirements are qualitatively different in these two categories, which is where the challenge lay in steering the India case forward.
India was not an ally and wasn’t going to define itself as one either. The US bureaucracy felt that as a confidence measure, India should at least become member of the four technology control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group.
India has acceded to the MTCR and is prepared to sign into the rest. Except that China has held up its NSG membership bid. So, New Delhi has been telling Washington not to hand Beijing a veto on their plans on defence production by making membership of these regimes a precondition of sorts. There was bureaucratic resistance to this.
But US secretary of defence Ashton Carter, who spearheaded this effort in Washington, seems to have mustered the requisite political backing to see this through in the dying days of the Obama administration.
Licence for Licence to Kill To implement this, the US has agreed to officially amend the EAR to insert the special MDP category, with India as the first entrant. What would that mean in terms of getting a licence? Presumption of approval: Any licence sought through a country in this category will move through the process as politically deemed approved. Essentially, any authority would now have to actively intervene to stop the approval process. Earlier, the process would not move without authorised approvals at every point.
Validated end-user authorisation: To validate the end-use of every item has proved to be a cumbersome process. So, this allows one certificate for the entire project after which all items related to that specific venture won’t need fresh validation. If, say, India and US agreed to build a fighter jet under ‘Make in India’, then a generic authorisation to the entire project would be enough to transfer the sensitive and dual-use items the venture would need.
In-principle approval for G-to-G projects: While the category helps private and government entities alike, there is a special presumed in-principle approval for any project underwritten by governments of both sides.
Roadmap for STA-1: This is the last element of the agreement, which outlines an agreed road map on how India will eventually enter the STA-1 list, which means the same privilege as US allies.
The US Congress simultaneously passed a legislation ascribing this description in law. This was not really needed as all this is within US administration’s remit. Officials would like to call this a parallel process that just converged in the end. But it’s difficult to miss the political guile for mere coincidence. The legislation, backed by Republican heavyweights like John McCain, may not be mandatory. But what it does is convey an intent that gives this category strong bipartisan sanctity.
But the proof of any of this would lie on how this translates into real projects. That will depend on how soon Washington notifies these changes through official orders. Then, how it incentivises defence co-production by giving the go-ahead to some big projects at the earliest.
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