By Pranab Dhal Samanta
Why cannot a government dig deep to select an Army Chief of its choice? After all, at this level when it’s down to the top five or six general officers of the Indian Army, there’s little separating them on merit. To become an Army Commander in the cut-throat fauji system is a big deal. So, conventional wisdom is to then just go by seniority but it’s never that simple.
Before arriving at any judgment, it’s important to decode this rather secretive and exhausting process, which involves the Intelligence Bureau visiting every location a candidate has been posted. The ritual begins at least six to eight months before the retirement of the incumbent. And interestingly, all eligible candidates — essentially, the Vice-Chief, every Army Commander including the Chief of Integrated Staff Committee if he is from the Army — are considered.
The Joint Secretary (G), one of the more pivotal jobs in the Defence Ministry’s bureaucratic labyrinth, prepares a profile of each candidate based on their dossiers, course record and perception. The profiles are meant to cover every detail, starting from the officer’s date of commission till the present.
The process then moves to the Defence Secretary, who reviews this and on being satisfied, makes a formal detailed compilation for reference to the Director of the Intelligence Bureau.
The IB then carries out ‘discreet inquires’ in each place of posting. They are supposed to delve into every aspect of the officer’s reputation, facts that may have been suppressed in official files or embarrassments that may have been covered up through times.
Outcomes from this process have been a mixed bag. On many occasions, just as ridiculous as an officer was delayed in paying mess bills or some cantonment gossip from younger days but at times, they have also been relevant. Apparently, in one case regarding the Navy, it emerged one candidate had some deep corporate contacts and that did tilt the scales.
This exercise takes up to four months, before it finally returns to the Defence Ministry. Here on, the Defence Secretary’s judgment becomes important. However, not all secretaries choose to make a recommendation.
Many just highlight key findings and leave it for their political authorities to make a call. In the appointment of Gen AK Vaidya, where Lt Gen SK Sinha was overlooked, then Defence Secretary PK Kaul is believed to have relied on old annual confidential reports where there was a hint of an observation of the officer having been given a second chance on a command assignment.
While the real reason was, perhaps, his outspokenness and firm views as articulated in some books he had written by then, the recorded reasons were around Sinha’s command profile versus Vaidya’s field record — like he had won two Mahavir Chakras in 1965 and 1971 conflicts.
NN Vohra, who is currently J&K Governor, as Defence Secretary had a difficult recommendation at hand for the Navy Chief in 1990. His noting was the basis on which the then Prime Minister VP Singh selected Admiral L Ramdas.
While it’s not known if the Defence Secretary recorded a recommendation in this case, there’s no doubt a political call was made. Which is fine in principle because a government is entitled to select an Army Chief of its own choice. This happens routinely in bureaucracies.
The UPA government did so twice in the case of appointing foreign secretaries. So, to pick political holes in an Army Chief appointment on grounds of seniority may not wash beyond a point.
But there’s a larger issue. The situation has turned odd for Eastern Army Commander Lt Gen Praveen Bakshi and Southern Army Commander Lt Gen PM Hariz. To think their Army Chief is junior to them does complicate perceptions in a regimented, hierarchical institution like the Army. Such issues, if unaddressed, can give birth to new schisms, hence conflict.
No comments:
Post a Comment