Why air power was not used in 1962

PRAVEEN DAVAR

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The war was more a victory of India’s policy of non-alignment than a humiliating defeat at the hands of China.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) recently celebrated its 84th anniversary with the usual fanfare. In a film made for the occasion, the IAF’s achievements in all the wars and rescue missions since World War II were highlighted. Its remarkable performance in the wars against Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965 and, above all, the decisive victory of 1971, was well emphasised. Regarding 1962, the narrator regretted that the IAF was not used in the Sino-Indian conflict — an intervention many military historians and retired officers claim could have altered the final outcome to a great extent. It was only the helicopter and transport crew of the IAF that were deployed to service forward pickets in the then North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Ladakh.

What was the reluctance of India’s political and military leadership to use its offensive air power assets to stop the advance of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in NEFA and Ladakh? Let us first examine the strength of the air force of both the countries in 1962.

With nearly 22 combat squadrons and over 500 aircraft, the IAF’s mainstays in mid-1962 comprised the Hunter Mk-56 fighter-bomber aircraft, Gnat interceptor aircraft, French-built ground-attack aircraft such as Mystere and Toofani, Canberra bomber-reconnaissance jets, and the Vampire ground-attack jet. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) was equipped with the MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19 and medium-range IL-28 bombers.

Better safe than sorry

With no sound operational assessment of the PLAAF by the IAF, the government relied on inputs from the Intelligence Bureau (IB). The IB cautioned the government that the use of offensive air power could result in the PLAAF attacking Indian cities like Calcutta and also deny India the ‘moral high ground’ in case of a protracted conflict. No cognisance was taken of the fact that PLAAF aircraft could reach targets in India only if they operated from airfields in Tibet with the high altitudes imposing severe restrictions on their weapon-carrying capacity. On the other hand, IAF fighters would have had the advantage of operating with full weapon loads from airfields in the plains of Assam and Punjab.

General B.M. Kaul, the commander of IV Corps in NEFA, alleged in his memoirs that the IAF was not used in close support of the Army. This was disputed by IB chief B.N. Mullik, who said that Kaul had not asked for air support. The question of air support had anyway been considered at the headquarters and the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) arrived at the conclusion that the positions were so interlocked that air strikes would have endangered the safety of India’s own troops.

CAS Air Marshal Aspy Engineer accepted the IB assessment at face value. Apart from IB chief, there were others who played a role in ensuring that the IAF was kept out of the conflict. H.C. Dewan, the officer in charge of air operations in 1962, would later say: “It was I who advised not to use fighters and bombers against the Chinese. As the Army got more and more bogged down in NEFA, it became quite difficult to hold [Jawaharlal] Nehru back; he wanted to launch the fighters. Had he done so, it would have had disastrous consequences.”

Neville Maxwell, correspondent of The Times (London) in 1962, in his book India’s China War says: “The government had decided that tactical air support with bombers on ground attack must be ruled out for fear of Chinese retaliation against Indian cities, especially Calcutta. Considering the terrain in NEFA and the limitation of IAF, it is doubtful whether its intervention in a tactical role could have had much effect.” Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam in his recent book India’s Wars has written: “With joint Army-Air Force structures in place at the corps level, and forward air controllers with the brigades, it is clear that the IAF brass was timid and diffident about forcefully articulating to both the Army and the political leadership that in an asymmetric situation on the ground, offensive air power could play a stabilising role, if not a decisive one.”

However, India did seriously contemplate using American-supplemented air power in the later stages, when it appeared as if the Chinese could not be stopped from overrunning Tezpur and possibly reaching Guwahati and even Calcutta. But before it could materialise, the PLA declared a unilateral ceasefire on November 21 and withdrew completely from NEFA and partially from Ladakh. JFK’s Forgotten Crisesby Bruce Riedel notes: “JFK [U.S. President John F. Kennedy] gave Nehru the support he needed to signal [Chinese leader] Mao [Zedong] not to go too far… Later the Indian Prime Minister was to publicly acknowledge that one of the factors that halted the war ‘was the speed of the American response’.”

India’s defence experts and historians should revise their view of 1962 seen as a ‘humiliating defeat’. Instead it should be seen as a victory of Nehru’s policy of non-alignment which, with massive military and economic aid from both the American and (then) Soviet blocs, had India’s defence forces fully prepared by 1965. It was a blessing in disguise.