By Gp Capt AK Sachdev
18 Nov , 2016
Both India and China began their march towards progress almost at the same time and have had an unwholesome antagonism towards each other since the 1962 War. The boundary dispute between the two nations continues to simmer and tense episodes along the border show a steady growth pattern. Against this backdrop, Chinese ascent as a global aerospace power is no longer just a cause for India to envy but also reason for concern and indeed a clarion call for us to harness ‘Make in India’ into an impelling force to capitalise on the excellent work done by ISRO in the space domain while enticing private enterprise to reverse the immense injury caused to our aerospace industry in the years gone past by public sector ineptitude.
China’s impressive emergence as an aerospace power deserves attention…
In May last year, China unveiled the ‘Made in China 2025’ plan focusing on promoting manufacturing. One of the ten key sectors identified in the plan is aerospace equipment. More recently, addressing a press conference in Beijing recently, Xu Dazhe, Director of the China National Space Administration (CNSA), acknowledging that US and Russia were ahead of China. He said that China aims to become a true aerospace power in 15 years and alluded to the 13th Five Year Plan as the guiding light for aerospace growth. China’s impressive gains in the aerospace sector have added to its national power in recent years. Be it in its modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), PLA Navy aviation, PLA Rocket Force, PLA Strategic Support Force, its space capabilities (civilian and military) or its maturing commercial aircraft manufacturing capability, its growing prowess in aerospace, is a matter of grudging envy in the economic arena, as also a cause for concern in the military-strategic domain. On both counts, China’s impressive emergence as an aerospace power deserves attention.
Military Strategy Dimensions
In the military strategic domain, there are two evaluations Chinese aerospace prowess needs to be subjected to. The first one is qualitative and defines the doctrinal aspects of deployment of air power, while the second is the quantitative facet of numbers. Chinese military strategy and related doctrinal strands flow from its Defence White Papers (DWP) which are in the public domain and Military Strategic Guidelines (MSG) which are classified documents circulated internally on a need-to-know basis until it is deemed prudent by the establishment to de-classify them.
The last DWP, published in May 2015, was called ‘China’s Military Strategy’ and has been described by some China watchers as more of an MSG than a DWP due to its content. The document brings to maturity some thought processes discernible in Chinese strategic thinking over the last few years. The Chinese have a propensity for using some ‘catch phrases’ like mantras to be repeated ad nauseum in official iterations. Since the turn of this century, Chinese leadership has stressed on the first two decades of the 21st century to be a ‘period of strategic opportunity’ for the development of ‘comprehensive national power’. One of the stated objectives sub-serving this concept is to secure China’s status as a Great Power.
Chinese leadership has stressed on the first two decades of the 21st century to be a ‘period of strategic opportunity’…
Shortly after Xi Jinping came to power, he defined his concept of a ‘Chinese Dream’ an inspirational idea quoted in the preface of the 2015 ‘China’s Military Strategy’ document which also talks of ‘active defence’ as its military strategy, a concept styled as strategically defensive, but operationally proactive. The strategic concept of ‘active defence’ is the essence of the Communist Party of China’s military strategic thought. Implicit to ‘active defence’ is a commitment not to attack, but to respond aggressively once an adversary decides to attack, a defence that counter-attacks in order to disrupt an adversary’s preparations or offensive rather than a defence that reacts passively.
In the 2015 document, there is also an exhortation to the PLA by the leadership to be capable of fighting and winning ‘informationalised local wars’ and make major progress in that direction by 2020. Thus, the current expansion and modernisation of air power ingredients of the PLA draw inspiration from ‘active defence’ and ‘informationalised local wars’. The 2015 Military Strategy also speaks of ‘Preparation for Military Struggle’ (PMS) as an important guarantee for safeguarding peace, containing crises and winning wars. To expand and intensify PMS, China’s armed forces have been directed to meet the requirement of being capable of fighting and winning as also to enhance their overall capabilities for deterrence and war fighting. All the strands briefly mentioned above are indicators of the impetus for developing air power assets that can exploit cyberspace, defend Chinese territories and interests and, if required, carry the war to the enemy’s territory through the medium of air and space.
The PLAAF, China’s main instrument of air power, is a fairly modern force whose modernisation process started albeit at a slow pace, in 1978 with Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernisations which included defence modernisation. During Jiang Zemin’s tenure, modernisation process got a fillip in consonance with China’s strategic ambitions of modelling PLAAF into a modern air force with a strategic role and reach, capable of projecting air power by executing classic offensive missions. The impetus for modernisation is evident from the pace at which PLAAF is closing the technology gap with US and European counterparts in terms of aircraft, electronic warfare and communications. In terms of force structure, the PLAAF is developing advanced weaponry and equipment such as new generation fighters and new types of surface-to-air missiles and radar systems, improving its early warning, command and communications networks and raising its strategic early warning, strategic deterrence and long distance air strike capabilities. The focus is on the strategic requirement of conducting both offensive and defensive operations.
The PLAAF, China’s main instrument of air power, is a fairly modern force whose modernisation process started albeit at a slow pace, in 1978…
As far as size is concerned, the PLAAF is the third largest air force in the world and largest in Asia with 3,98,000 personnel and over 28001 aircraft, around three-fourths of which are combat aircraft including around 600 of fourth generation aircraft. Having been push-started with Soviet help, it further benefitted from the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 due to immigration of scientists and experienced workers. At the beginning of this century, it had 3,500 combat aircraft but most of these were J-6/J-7 types (equivalent of MiG-19/21 respectively) and not very potent as fighting machines. Induction of Russian Su-27SK/UBK in two batches in 1992 and 1996 and Su-30 MKK/ Su-30 MKK2 in 2002-2003 represented a quantum jump over the J-6/J-7.
From 2002 onwards, China produced the J-10 and the J-11 (variant of Su27). J-10 production started in 2003 and China is now working on a J-10B version with a J11B already operational since 2004. All four could be classified as fourth generation aircraft. China is also working on two fifth generation aircraft, the J-20 and the J-31, expected to enter service in the next two to four years. China is the only country besides US which is pursuing two fifth generation designs simultaneously. The J-20 that resembles the F-22 Raptor, first flew in January 2011. In October 2012, China flight tested the J-31 which is the size of an F-35 fighter and appears to incorporate design characteristics similar to the J-20. Thus, over the next few years, PLAAF can be expected to pursue ‘active defence’ with a substantially fourth generation air force with the J-10/ J-11 in air superiority roles complementing the fleet of Su-27/ Su-30, JF-17 in interceptor role and the fifth generation J-20/ J-31 as stealth multi-role fighters.
In addition, it is in the process of procuring 24 Su-35 fighters from Russia along with an unspecified number of spare 117S engines which could be used to power the J-20 which is currently being tested with the much inferior AL31 engine. Both these engines are Russian and China’s progress in the power plant regime has been rather slack. As far as bombers are concerned, China is producing three versions of H-6 developed from the Soviet Tu-16. The H6K version can carry CJ-10 Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) and thus has a long range stand-off offensive capability with Precision Guided Missiles (PGMs). The PLAAF has air-to-air refuelling capability with 30 IL-78s ordered from Ukraine, but none of the H-6 variants can be refuelled in the air. Reportedly, China is developing a new large delta-wing bomber.
The impetus for modernisation is evident from the pace at which PLAAF is closing the technology gap with US and European counterparts…
In the strategic transport arena, China has IL-76 since 2005 and has ordered 70 more. In addition, it is developing the Y-20, a heavy-lift military transport aircraft in keeping with the changed strategic perceptions over the last few years. It can carry a payload of 65 tonne as compared to 40 tonne for IL-76 and 77 tonne for the Globemaster C17. The Y-30 is another Chinese design that is expected to follow Y-20 into service, possibly by 2020. These heavy lift transport aircraft are needed to support airborne command and control, logistics (troop movement and resupply), para drop, aerial refuelling, strategic reconnaissance operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. China is also developing an AWACS capability on the IL76 airframe while the Y-8 is being modified for Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) roles.
Other Chinese military transport aircraft of importance are the Y-5 (a Chinese version of Soviet An-2), the Y-7 (designed and built in China but based on the Soviet An-24, later developed into the civil MA-60), the Y-8 (based on the Soviet An-12) and the Y-9 (developed as a stretched version of the Y-8). Helicopters have been omitted as inessential to this discussion.
As far as the ‘defence’ component of ‘active defence’ is concerned, the PLAAF possibly has the largest number of advanced long-range SAM systems in the world, consisting of a combination of Russian-sourced SA-20 (S-300 PMU1/2) battalions (PMU2 range is up to 195 km) and domestically produced CSA9 (HQ9) battalions (200-km range). In an effort to improve its strategic air defence systems even further, China plans to import Russia’s S400/Triumf SAM system (400-km range) as a follow on to the SA20, and may simultaneously develop its indigenous CSA-X-19 (HQ19), a dual purpose exosphere kinetic-kill vehicle warhead designed against ballistic missile warheads or satellites with range over 200 km, akin to US Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD).
Ongoing development of long-range Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), including the BZK-005, and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) will provide capability to conduct long-range reconnaissance and strike operations. In the area of air defence capabilities, the PLAAF is focussing on long range UAV systems designed against aircraft and cruise missiles. For intelligence and reconnaissance purposes it has the Wing Long and the Yaoying UAVs capable of flying at 19,685 and 24,600 ft altitude respectively. There is also a Vertical Take Off and Landing (VTOL) version of UAV named the Harrier III.
The PLAAF possibly has the largest number of advanced long-range SAM systems in the world…
Although it still operates a large number of older second and third generation fighters, it will probably become a majority fourth generation force within the next several years. Thus, the PLAAF would be a large force containing technological advanced aircraft and equipment and with a formidable offensive and defensive capability.
On January 01 this year, the Second Artillery Force responsible for China’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missile arsenals, so far an independent branch of the PLA was reorganised into the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) elevating it to a service fully on par with the PLA’s Navy, Army and Air Force. The Rocket Force is being modernised to act as a deterrent force in potential conflicts in the South China Sea and East China Sea, et al and is equipped with Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM), Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM), Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) and Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) some of them with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV).
China is the only country besides the US and Russia to have Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) capability in the form of the DFZF, designed to glide after re-entry. With speeds between Mach 5 and Mach 10, it travels longer distances than ballistic missiles and can be fitted on existing missiles like the DF-21 or the DF-31. Existence of DF-41, a 12,000-km range missile with ten warheads, is yet to be officially acknowledged by China. To summarise, the newly organised PLARF is on the way to further enhance its formidable status as an instrument of Chinese aerospace power.
The PLAN’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, which is in service since 2012, represents an element, howsoever insignificant, of air power. It is just about making its presence felt but, despite its impressive weapon systems, it is best viewed as a stepping stone towards bigger and brawnier carriers capable of global reach.
Civil Aerospace Industry
India and China both forayed into civil aerospace around the same time following the public route with the central government taking the lead. The similarity ends there. While China followed a ‘beg, borrow or steal’ policy to obtain access to technology which was put to result-oriented use with a formidable state machinery keeping tabs on the progress, Indian public sector was content to bask in self-aggrandizement based on license production of foreign designs. Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) was formed in 2008 with the aim of implementing large passenger aircraft programmes. Based at Shanghai, it is engaged in the research and development, manufacture and flight tests of civil aircraft. The COMAC website claims that it adheres to the principle of “development with Chinese characteristics”, an attempt at projecting China’s claims of self-reliance in aerospace technology. If sceptical views about the ‘indigenous’ content of China’s civil commercial aircraft development programme are disregarded for a moment, the fact remains that COMAC appears set to produce civil airliners that will compete with the leaders in the single aisle market (Airbus and Boeing) as well in the regional jet range dominated by Bombardier and Embraer.
China is the only country besides the US and Russia to have Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) capability…
The most impressive of COMAC’s products is the C919, which is in the same class as the Airbus A320 and the Boeing 737. Its all-economy class layout is expected to have 168 seats and the hybrid class 156 seats. The basic version will have a range of 4,075 km while the enhanced version can stretch to 5,555 km. The C919 is reported to have the CFM Leap 1C engine which, like the engines on the Airbus A320neo and the Boeing 737MAX, claims 15 per cent savings in fuel over their previous versions in the same class. The C919 is expected to carry out its first flight by the end of this year.
ARJ21, short for Advanced Regional Jet for the 21st century, is a short/medium range regional jet with a range of 3,700 km maximum take-off weight of 40.5 tonne. It has 90 seats in a full economy class configuration and 78 in a dual-class configuration. The ARJ-21 is also produced by COMAC and is designed to compete against the Bombardier CS100, Embraer 190 and Sukhoi SSJ100. Its first revenue flight took place on June 28 this year.
The Xian MA-60 preceded the ARJ-21 to enter production as an airliner. It is a turboprop commercial aircraft made by China Aviation Industry Corporation (CAVIC). The aircraft first flew in 1993 and was inducted into operations in 2004. The MA-60 is a stretched version of the Y7200A which was based on the Russian design Antonov An-24. It can operate in rugged conditions with limited ground support and has Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) capability. However, it ran into trouble when an MA-60 flown by Myanmar Airlines veered off the runway due to a hydraulic failure.
Between 2012 and 2015, China conducted 68 successful space launches, compared to the 72 by the US…
CAVIC is also working on a new design, the MA-700, with modern turboprop engine technology and performance better than the ATR72 and Bombardier Q400. It is expected to seat 78 passengers with a possible stretched version with 90 seats as also a shorter version with just 50 seats. The first prototype is expected to fly in June 2017, and entry into service is expected by 2019. None of the Chinese aircraft have been able to obtain certifications from the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) or the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) which is a dampener as far as international sales are concerned.
COMAC has ambitions of building larger aircraft and sporadically one reads about a C-929, C-939 and C-959 although the COMAC website lists only the C-919 and the ARJ-21 as products. As a follow through to a 2014 aviation cooperation deal signed during President Putin’s visit to China, COMAC is close to signing a joint venture with Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation for the development of a 250-280 seat plane, possibly an improvement of the IL96.
Space for Development
It is not the intent here to outline the progression of China’s space and missile programmes except to mention that having learnt from the Korean War that a nuclear threat can be debilitating, China decided on the “two bombs and a satellite” dictum and never faltered on the funding for nuclear bombs and its space programme, even during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution. The results are self-evident and even the US and Russia are watching helplessly as China resolutely moves on to overtake them in space. Its launch vehicles are largely derived from its missiles. For example, the Long March 2 is developed from the Dong Feng 4 (DF4) ICBM; the Long March 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are followed by Kuai Zhou (Fast Vessel) in the launcher series.
Even the US and Russia are watching helplessly as China resolutely moves on to overtake them in space…
There is some confusion about the Kuai Zhou launcher which could be the same as Long March 11 added on last year. The initial years were dismal with high failure rates but benefitting from illegal Transfer of Technology from US companies, China got its act together and since 1997, there have been only three launch failures. During 2015, it launched 19 Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs) carrying 45 spacecraft mostly for navigation, surveillance and test purposes. In September last year, a Long March 6 rocket put 20 satellites into orbit like the Indian PSLV-C34 launch on 22 June this year which also placed 20 satellites into orbit.
Between 2012 and 2015, China conducted 68 successful space launches, compared to the 72 by the US. During the current year, China continues to vigorously pursue its space programme with eight launches so far, the latest launch being a Long March 7 on June 25 with a lift-off weight of 597 tonne and a payload of 13.5 tonne, this was the most powerful Chinese rocket ever. In May this year, China launched a Ziyuan III satellite capable of collecting 3-D images of objects 2.5 metres or longer and a deviation of vertical positioning to one metre using an onboard laser range finder. A total of 20 launches are planned for this year.
China has taken a veritable lead in manned space missions. It has its own spacecraft, the Shenzhou and since 2003, has launched five manned orbital missions, the last in 2013, placed three astronauts in orbit and included a spacewalk. Its last two Shenzhou missions entailed docking with the Tiangong orbiting space lab and there are plans to place in orbit a small manned space station in the early 2020s. In 2013, it landed a rover on the moon and plans a mission to bring back lunar samples in 2017, land on the far side of the moon by 2018, and execute a moon walk by 2024.
This interest in the moon is driven by energy security as it has abundant supplies of Helium-3, a light and non-radioactive fusion fuel that is virtually non-existent here on Earth. Estimates suggest there are at least 1.1 million tonnes of Helium-3 on the lunar surface, enough to power human energy needs for up to 10,000 years. With one of the most cavernous appetites for energy on the planet, China realises that access to this fuel source could be a huge strategic advantage. There is also a plan to land a rover on Mars in 2020 which is also the target year by which China wants to have a reusable manned spacecraft ready.
This interest in the moon is driven by energy security as it has abundant supplies of Helium-3, a light and non-radioactive fusion fuel…
There have also been reports about a programme for the construction of space-based solar power satellites that would beam energy back to Earth. China’s homegrown navigation system, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), is being put into place. According to Yuan Minhui, Director, Beijing Institute of Space Science and Technology Information, China is likely to be building and supplying at least ten per cent of the world’s satellites by 2020. Meanwhile, private companies such as One Space Technology are planning to launch commercial rockets using low- cost models by 2018. Thus China’s space programme appears to be doing admirably well in the civil domain.
Space as a Frontier
China’s space programme is directed by the CNSA which is considered by the US and some other countries as a military organisation although it is a subordinate agency of the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND) which functions under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). The launcher rockets are produced by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology. Satellites are produced by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation; both are state-owned enterprises. The ‘China’s Military Strategy’ document identifies space as the “commanding height in international strategic competition”.
According to a report entitled ‘China Dream, Space Dream’ prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in 2015, “China is pursuing a broad and robust array of counter-space capabilities, which includes direct ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems, computer network operations, ground-based satellite jammers and directed energy weapons.” The document avers that Chinese leadership thinks that, “space warfare is inevitable” and that China must dominate it. China has made spectacular progress in peaceful and military uses of space and, while publicly advocating peaceful use of outer space and condemning weaponisation of space, has kept her options open.
The Long March 11 ‘next generation’ launcher, first launched in September 2015, is a militarily-relevant ‘quick response’ system to place into orbit a small payload like a directed energy weapons, satellite jammers and kinetic kill vehicles. A 2013 ballistic missile test to over 30,000 km altitude “could have been a test of technologies with a counter-space mission in geo-synchronous orbit.” An anti-satellite missile system was tested against a non-operational weather satellite in 2007 and reportedly, there have been other tests since then, the last one being in October 2015. An anti-satellite system called Dong Neng is expected to enter active service in the next five to ten years. As part of increasingly complex orbital operations, China is “probably testing dual use technologies in space that could be applied to counter-space missions.”
China has made spectacular progress in peaceful and military uses of space and while publicly condemning weaponisation of space, has kept her options open…
Some PLA write ups mention tasks in space of “destroying, damaging and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to blind and deafen the enemy in an “informationalised local war”. In 2007, a picture appeared on Chinese internet of an air-launched space plane called Shenlong which can also be rocket launched. Not much is known of this plane; but there are speculations that it might be inducted into the newly formed PLA Strategic Support Force one of whose arms is an Aerospace Army.
According to some experts, Shenlong is being developed as space weapons launch platform, as well as for surveillance, intelligence and early-warning missions. The Hypersonic Glide Vehicle mentioned earlier has already completed six tests and can be considered an operational and inherent part of China’s space power. The Yaogan satellite system has several satellites in place for identifying, locating and tracking an Aircraft Carrier Group on high seas and is an important part of China’s ASBM System. The foregoing is not a complete catalogue of Chinese space capability; but gives an insight into why the US is getting increasingly worried about China’s prowess in space and why India should be doing likewise.
Implications
The rivalry between India and China borders on antagonism and thus the emergence of China as a veritable aerospace power deserves attention. Its military aircraft programmes are of concern because China has definitely stolen the march over us with two fourth-generation and two fifth-generation programmes, their only drawbacks being reliance on foreign power plants for the time being. Estimates project a 50 per cent fourth generation composition of China’s combat aircraft fleet by next year with the proportion increasing steadily thereafter. In contrast, the Indian Tejas Light Combat Aircraft is a case of too late and too little; it does not look likely that we will catch up with China soon, all sloganeering about ‘Make in India’ notwithstanding.
China is also developing its own heavy-lift military transport aircraft and helicopters. The JF-17 co-produced by China and Pakistan for the latter, has put Pakistan on the global aerospace map with a world class, fourth generation combat aircraft to its credit. Potentially, all Chinese military aircraft are candidates for bolstering Pakistan’s air power at minimal cost. Moreover, there is the oft debated possibility of a two-front war that may confront India some day, given the long standing inimical disposition of both China and Pakistan towards India.
The US is getting increasingly worried about China’s prowess in space and India should be doing likewise…
In terms of numbers also, the situation is worrisome. China has about 2,100 combat aircraft while India has less than 600. A qualitative analysis is not attempted here nor necessary except to mention that the leading edge of both, the PLAAF and the IAF, have similar aircraft of Russian origin. The consolation is that all of the PLAAF aircraft are not deployable against India and those that are deployed in the large number of airfields in Tibet (reportedly 14) would be handicapped in terms of payload they can carry. This could be redressed in the coming years through in-flight refueling. Currently, the IAF may actually have an edge over the PLAAF in a war scenario.
China’s commercial airliner programmes are unassailably ahead of India’s and will remain so for years to come. China’s space ventures in the civil domain are a cause of envy, but not necessarily concern, except that China offers competition in the area of launching third party satellites. Indian space programme for civil uses is going well and the accomplishments of Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) are a matter of pride for India.
However, in the military uses of space, China is probably ahead of India and details of some of its military and dual use programmes may still be under wraps. Its anti-satellite capability, direct energy weapons and HGWs are cause for concern, not to mention the formidable ballistic missile capability it possesses which represents conventional as well as nuclear potency predicated to the missile capability. India’s newly commissioned GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) system is vulnerable to anti-satellite strikes as indeed are all space-based assets.
Possibly, the most significant aspect of Chinese aerospace clout is the fact that its power structure is designed to bring all assets to bear against an adversary in a coordinated manner under the direction of a centralised command structure. India’s quest for a higher defence organisation acceptable to the military and the bureaucracy is as yet a futile one.
China’s commercial airliner programmes are unassailably ahead of India’s and will remain so for years to come…
Conclusion
China’s opposition, as the lone dissenter to India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) at the Group’s 26th plenary meeting in Seoul in June was not a surprise. This act falls into the pattern that China has followed in its approach towards India which is one of unyielding antagonism irrespective of levels of political engagement between the two nations. Since Prime Minister Modi’s government came to power, the Chinese Foreign Minister has visited India; India’s Vice President has been to China; President Xi Jinping has come on a state visit to India and PM Modi has been on a three-day tour to China. All the bonhomie displayed during these visits showed that political engagement was prospering, but China kept India on tenterhooks by insidious acts of border transgressions, protests at the presence of the head of Tibetan Government in Exile at Modi’s swearing in ceremony, sporadic raising of the ‘One China’ policy with implications for Arunachal Pradesh and more recently, its opposition to India’s NSG candidature.
Both India and China began their march towards progress almost at the same time and have had an unwholesome antagonism towards each other since the 1962 War. The boundary dispute between the two nations continues to simmer and tense episodes along the border show a steady growth pattern. Against this backdrop, Chinese ascent as a global aerospace power is no longer just a cause for India to envy but also reason for concern and indeed a clarion call for us to harness ‘Make in India’ into an impelling force to capitalise on the excellent work done by ISRO in the space domain while enticing private enterprise to reverse the immense injury caused to our aerospace industry in the years gone past by public sector ineptitude.
Notes
Chinese resources on force strengths are unreliable and so some of the figures given above are from a report entitled ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016’ prepared by the US Secretary of Defence and presented to the US Congress.
© Copyright 2016 Indian Defence Review
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