HAPPYMON JACOB
October 10, 2016
Summary: India’s states traditionally haven’t played any significant role in the formulation of foreign policy, but this may be changing.
Happymon Jacob
Happymon Jacob is an associate professor of disarmament studies at the School of International Studies of Jawaharlal Nehru University.
India’s states traditionally haven’t played any significant role in the formulation of foreign policy, but this may be changing to some degree. Economic liberalization and the emergence of coalition governments in New Delhi have created an environment conducive for states to proactively engage the central government on foreign policy issues that affect their interests. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has realized the necessity of getting the country’s regional governments on board with his foreign policy endeavors, but efforts to make good on this vision have had limited success. New Delhi needs to institutionalize the legitimate foreign policy role that Indian states are starting to play so that they can put forward their views in a constructive manner.
Key Themes
In recent years, Indian states have begun playing a larger role in foreign policy than they previously did, due to the country’s economic liberalization and the rising influence of regional political parties.
The current government led by Prime Minister Modi has been more accepting of states playing a role in foreign policy than past administrations. It seems to view such engagement not as a negative form of interference but as a useful asset for pursuing the country’s national interests abroad. The creation of the States Division within the Ministry of External Affairs is indicative of this new willingness to mainstream regional voices on foreign policy matters.
Modi has implemented some measures to integrate states into the foreign policy making process, but these efforts have been largely ad hoc and functionalist rather than holistic and structurally transformative.
The Modi government’s efforts are informed by the logic of using the tools of diplomacy for promoting economic development and foreign direct investment, with very little focus on strategic security issues.
Modi’s government will need to take a more consensus-based approach and make institutional adjustments in order to make good on promises of broadening states’ role on foreign policy making.
Institutionalizing Indian States’ Foreign Policy Role
The Modi government should strengthen existing coordination mechanisms such as the Inter-State Council and National Development Council.
The Modi administration should allow state governments to place personnel in new and existing institutions, empowering state-level officials to coordinate with Indian central government officials and foreign diplomats in state capitals, foreign capitals, and New Delhi.
The Modi government should institutionalize ways for top officials in the Ministry of External Affairs to regularly meet and consult with their leading counterparts in state governments.
State governments should consider creating their own institutional frameworks to engage the central government on foreign policy issues.
INTRODUCTION
Indian states historically have not been closely involved in the country’s foreign policy, but this may be changing at least partially. In October 2014, India’s national government announced the creation of a new States Division within the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), to be headed by a senior officer with the rank of joint secretary.1 Designed “to coordinate facilitation of efforts . . . between . . . Mission/Post(s) and State/Union Territories Governments as well as foreign diplomatic and trade missions in India,”2 this new division is unprecedented and indicative of the newfound recognition in New Delhi of the significant role that states have come to play in the country’s foreign policy engagements.3
Indeed, even before he became the country’s prime minister, Narendra Modi and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) consistently argued for the need to involve states in the process of foreign policy making. In its 2014 election manifesto, Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) referred to the importance of creating a new spirit of cooperation and collaboration between New Delhi and the states, arguing: “Team India shall not be limited to the Prime Minister led team sitting in Delhi, but will also include Chief Ministers and other functionaries as equal partners.”4
There is a newfound recognition in New Delhi of the significant role that states have come to play in the country’s foreign policy.
In October 2013, in what was viewed as his first major speech on foreign policy, Modi criticized the incumbent Congress Party’s approach as Delhi-centric. He reminded the audience that “India is not just Delhi. The foreign policy should be decided by the people and not by some politicians sitting in Delhi.”5 In subsequent months, Modi continued to be vocal about the need to involve states in the country’s foreign policy making even after his election as prime minister. He often invokes the importance of instilling a spirit of “cooperative federalism” in the relationship between the central government and various state governments.6 In November 2015, one and a half years after he assumed office, Modi stated: “In a break with over sixty-five years of tradition we have involved states even in foreign policy. The Ministry of External Affairs has been asked to work with the States. When I visited China, a state-to-state summit was also held. And states have been asked to create export promotion councils. Making the States think globally is yet another reform with potential to transform.”7
Has the Indian government finally recognized the importance of granting Indian states a legitimate role in the country’s foreign policy making process? Have the BJP and Prime Minister Modi put their preelection promises and postelection declarations into practice? And, looking forward, in what ways could New Delhi consider working more closely with the states to ensure their concerns about its foreign policies are heard?
This analysis evaluates the current role of the Indian states in the foreign policy making process. It examines relevant constitutional provisions, the extraconstitutional manner in which states have managed to play a role, the rationale and causes behind such engagement, the approach of the new government in New Delhi, and what can be done to institutionalize the role of states.
While the role of states in India has traditionally been seen by New Delhi as hampering its constitutionally mandated, autonomous, unconstrained foreign policy making process, today there is an increasing acceptance of states’ legitimate concerns and role. While the Congress-led regime under former prime minister Manmohan Singh (2004–2014) viewed the so-called foreign policy activism of states as a constraint, the new BJP-led regime does not seem to view state influence as something necessarily negative. Having been chief minister of a state himself for more than a decade,8 Modi seems to be aware of, and sensitive to, states’ demands and concerns. More importantly, the central government increasingly views states’ role as useful—an asset that can be utilized to better articulate and pursue the country’s national interest. In short, in India today there is a certain appetite for mainstreaming and purposively directing what was previously seen as interference by the Indian states in the realm of foreign policy.
While Modi’s declared attempts at consulting state governments on foreign policy matters are laudable, they need to be institutionalized.
Despite the stated enthusiasm of the central government to increasingly consult states on foreign policy matters, fundamental policy changes do not appear to be underway. Surely, the Modi government has undertaken important measures to mainstream the role of states in the country’s foreign policy, but the approach seems more functionalist in nature than holistic or aimed at structural transformation. Moreover, the central government’s inability to engage in consensus building with other political parties and state governments on foreign policy matters has further constrained progress. The BJP-led central government in general and Prime Minister Modi in particular do not come across as consensus builders. Modi’s majority in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament) does not seem to encourage him to be a consensus builder, and the lack of it in the Rajya Sabha (the upper house) has not yet persuaded him to be one either.
In short, while Modi’s declared attempts at consulting state governments on foreign policy matters are laudable, they need to be institutionalized and more broadly based. Moreover, the catchy slogans that the Modi government has propagated—such as “Make in India” and “cooperative federalism”—can only achieve success if the government builds consensus among state governments and opposition political parties that happen to be in power in many of these states. There are several steps that Modi can take to bring about such changes, such as strengthening existing coordination mechanisms between central and state government personnel and establishing new organizations to deepen such collaboration.
FACTORS SHAPING INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
The Constitution of India is unambiguous in bestowing the central government, also known as the Union government, with nearly absolute powers when it comes to the dual areas of foreign policy and defense. One important exception concerns the redrawing of borders, in which case the matter needs to be referred to the respective state legislature(s). Indeed, when the Modi government pushed to conclude a land boundary agreement (LBA) with its eastern neighbor Bangladesh in June 2015, it had to ensure that key border states, such as Assam and West Bengal, were on board. This exception aside, the constitutional predominance of the central government has been fully adhered to, in letter and spirit, for most of the republic’s journey since independence.
Article 246 of the Indian Constitution divides legislative powers of the country into three categories, or lists: the Union list (items on which the central government alone can make laws), the State list (items on which only state governments can make laws), and the Concurrent list (items on which both the Union and state governments can enact legislation, though the writ of the central government prevails in case of a conflict). Almost all legislative matters related to foreign policy, security, and defense come under the Union list. Moreover, international trade and even interstate trade come within the mandate of the Union government. As the author and Amitabh Mattoo argue in a previous publication, “the Constitution, then, gives the central government in New Delhi virtually exclusive jurisdiction over foreign and defense policy. The states have, with some notable exceptions, played little role in formulating or implementing the country’s foreign relations.”9
Jawaharlal Nehru, the country’s first prime minister, is widely considered to be the architect of independent India’s foreign policy. During Nehru’s years in power (1947–1964), not only did the states have no role in the country’s foreign policy making, even his own cabinet colleagues did not play a prominent role in it. While an underlying reason for the limited role of states was Nehru’s personality, a significant driver was the presence of what is commonly referred to as the Congress system, which refers to the huge majority that the Congress Party enjoyed in the country’s politics and governance before 1967. Until then, most states were ruled by the Congress Party and, given the constitutional provisions regarding foreign policy, it was unthinkable for a state to dispute the Nehruvian foreign policy consensus. Nehru himself often wrote to his various chief ministers on foreign policy issues to take them into confidence, though it was mostly by way of informing them of foreign policy matters rather than consulting them.
Beyond the Congress System
While the constitutional provisions regarding foreign policy decision making have remained unchanged since 1947, evolutionary changes in India’s politics have had a positive impact on states’ ability to assert themselves. Between 1947 and the late 1960s, the country experienced extreme political centralization. From the 1970s onward, the Congress system came under severe stress and the rise of regional parties led to increasing demands by the states. However, nothing substantial transpired until the general election of 1989, which saw the rise of the National Front coalition government led by former defense minister V.P. Singh. The Singh government (1989–1990) was formed by a coalition of twenty-seven political parties, and the 1991 elections saw a coalition of forty-three parties come to power. Since then, all central governments (barring the current one led by Modi) have been formed by coalitions of political parties.10
The author and Mattoo attribute the weakening of central control over foreign policy to the following four factors:11
Some states, such as Jammu and Kashmir, enjoy a special constitutional status that may enhance their political leaders’ influence on foreign policy.12
Certain state leaders have the political clout to informally shape foreign policy making.
Central coalition governments have empowered state governments and leaders to have a greater say on foreign policy because such coalitions are composed of regional parties, many of them located in a single state.
Finally, although the constitution has not undergone change, the forces of globalization have created new practices and possibilities that have already given the states a greater role and will continue to do so in the future.
In addition to the dawn of coalition governments in New Delhi, the other major factor that managed to dilute the central authority was the onset of economic liberalization in the early 1990s. Economic liberalization drastically weakened New Delhi’s grip over the economic activities of Indian states. It also led to the end of the License Raj, which involved excessive governmental control over economic matters. States’ ability to engage in international economic activities has empowered them in an unprecedented manner.
In short, despite lacking a constitutional mandate, states today have come to play a significant role in India’s foreign policy by virtue of their ability to put pressure on, negotiate with, or obstruct the central government’s policy making capacity. Moreover, various circumstantial, geographic, and political factors have empowered the states to do so.
The Rationale for a Greater State Role
One of the major factors underlying the foreign policy demands of Indian states is the country’s geopolitical context (in terms of contested borders, shared cultures, and economic ecosystems), which creates ripe conditions for state participation in foreign policy. Traditional trade routes and modes of economic exchange involving border states, in many cases, have been disrupted due to the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. And yet ethnic, familial, and economic affinities continue to exist between many Indian border states and neighboring territories. In some cases, however, resources such as water—which have been artificially partitioned—have created problems for many border states. Moreover, there is often a conflictual relationship that many border states share with neighboring countries due to migration and the attendant employment pressures as well as conflicts over water scarcity, among other issues. In short, India’s border states face both challenges and opportunities in the context of the country’s relations with their neighbors. This is what prompts them to play a role in India’s foreign policy toward their neighbors, and most of the time, legitimately so.
A Lack of Institutional Mechanisms
What recent trends also show is that states’ ability to have a say in the country’s foreign policy making is, at best, ad hoc and contingent on factors such as where a given state is located and which political party is in power there. As of today, there is neither a developed institutional role for states nor fully formed institutional procedures for serious consultation—even on issues that matter to the states. The MEA’s recently created States Division is a central-government body that does not include state representatives, and the Inter-State Council (ISC) is increasingly becoming dysfunctional. The latter is a council chaired by the prime minister and composed of all chief ministers as well as selected Union ministers.
States’ ability to have a say in the country’s foreign policy making is, at best, ad hoc.
Efforts in this direction have been largely futile. In 2000, the previous BJP-led coalition established the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution. In its final report, the commission thoughtfully recommended “that for reducing tension or friction between States and the Union and for expeditious decision-making on important issues involving States, the desirability of prior consultation by the Union Government with the inter-State Council may be considered before signing any treaty vitally affecting the interests of the States regarding matters in the State List.”13 To date, however, this proposal has remained on paper.
Another measure that has been suggested, in this case by the present government, is a potential accord called the Center-State Investment Agreement (CSIA), which would help the central government better implement any bilateral investment treaty it signs with foreign countries. An annex to the finance minister’s 2016 budget speech argued that such an agreement “will ensure fulfilment of the obligations of state governments under these treaties. States which opt to sign these will be seen as more attractive destinations by foreign investors.”14 CSIA, in other words, would help the central government coordinate with states on matters relating to the management of foreign direct investment, although it is unlikely to improve states’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the center.
Other institutional fora where the center and the states can coordinate their policy preferences are the ISC and the National Development Council (NDC). Though the constitution (Article 263) provides for the ISC, it was only established in 1990 after the Sarkaria Commission (which was set up in 1983 to give recommendations for smooth center-state relations) strongly recommended its creation. However, the ISC has neither met regularly nor served as a key institution of center-state consensus building.15
The other mechanism, the NDC, set up in 1952 to discuss and deliberate the country’s five-year plans, is an extraconstitutional and non-statutory body. It used to advise the Planning Commission, which functioned as a national-level body for planning economic policy, allocating funds, and coordinating policy. Given the NDA government’s disbanding of the Planning Commission, the NDC’s future is also bleak.
Although the BJP mentioned in its 2014 manifesto that “moribund forums like the National Development Council and Inter-State Council will be revived and made into active bodies,” it has not shown any interest in doing so; if anything, it has gone in the opposite direction. With existing institutions either being disbanded or not given adequate importance, and given that the Modi government has not shown a great willingness to establish new institutions (barring the States Division in the MEA), it will be exceedingly difficult to convert promises such as cooperative federalism into actual practice.
Indeed, some voices have harshly criticized the role that states have come to play. For instance, senior political scientist C.P. Bhambhri argues that “India is likely to pay a very heavy price if it makes foreign policy a football game where ‘regionalists’ begin to dictate and decide the directions of policy.”16 Although Bhambhri was referring to the extreme context of India’s contentious vote against Sri Lanka in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in March 2012, the fact remains that there is a certain unease among a lot of Indian analysts about the increasing influence of states on the country’s foreign policy. The concern is that states tend to pursue their parochial interests rather than promoting what is good for the country as a whole.
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