By Dheeraj P.C.
07 Oct , 2016
The new Modi-fied operational art is an unprecedented change in India’s response to Pakistan’s hybrid threat because India never had an operational art. The absence of it gave Pakistan a tacit approval of its adventurism in India leaving strategic decision making in India nearly impossible.
The Indian Army conducted surgical strikes on the terrorist launch pads across the Line of Control (LOC) in retaliation to terrorist strikes on an Army base in the Uri Sector, Jammu and Kashmir. Although popular media houses and others have regarded the strikes to be a knee-jerk reaction there seems to be much more than what meets the eye.
…the strikes preceded by the political and diplomatic ground work in tilting international and domestic opinion in India’s favour marks a revolutionised operational art.
The strikes signify a change in the commander’s (Prime Minister) operational art, resulting in the legitimate appreciation of the hybrid threat emanating from Pakistan. To this point, cross border terrorism, jihadi terrorism in mainland India, meddling with Kashmir issue and several other contentions in Indo-Pak bilateral relations were received by Indian political leaders in isolation from one another. What resulted was a lethargic understanding of the hybrid threat that Pakistan was, and an inability to design an effective operational art to address the same. However, the strikes preceded by the political and diplomatic ground work in tilting international and domestic opinion in India’s favour marks a revolutionised operational art.
Hybrid nature of warfare emerged as states and non-state actors realised that defeating a superior conventional force is impossible through conventional military means. Nadia Schadlow describes hybrid warfare as a “blend of military, economic, diplomatic, criminal, and informational means to achieve desired political goals”. This is evident in the case of Arab confrontation with Israel, US’ threats in Iraq and Afghanistan and more so in the case of Pakistan’s confrontation with India after 1971. This gave birth to hybrid actors who were willing to employ all instruments available at their disposal to fight the superior combatant, who is constrained by norms and rules. These include rules of engagement, global media coverage, military doctrines and traditions.
In such a complex engagement, the superior combatant can either exhibit resilience and keep absorbing multiple attacks by the hybrid actor awaiting a conventional war, or adapt to the situation by modifying its operational art effectively to eliminate the threat. Therefore, development of a flexible operational art dominated by propaganda mechanism and offensive action is the key.
Operational art works to build up synergy through integration of campaigns in different theatres towards achieving a strategic objective. Without operational art, any number of campaigns or operations would be futile disconnected engagements. Successive Indian leaders had failed to develop an operational art that could connect their national security mechanism in line with Pakistan’s hybrid threat. This resulted largely from a lack of political will to act. With the political leadership unclear about the course of action, commanders of the diplomatic corps, armed forces and the intelligence agencies were left with little freedom of action.
The attacks of 26/11 were one of the worst attacks the world witnessed. Yet, lack of political will to act not only saved Pakistan but also made India a victim to accusations of weak counterterrorism machinery.
An example of such consternation was Operation Parakram, following the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament. While the estimated cost of our troop mobilisation and consequent standoff was a little over USD 3.2 billion, the benefit of the operation are still imperceptible. A series of terrorist attacks with ties to Pakistan continued to threaten India. The attacks of 26/11 were one of the worst attacks the world witnessed. Yet, lack of political will to act not only saved Pakistan but also made India a victim to accusations of weak counterterrorism machinery.
Nevertheless, the incumbent regime seems to have a comprehensive grasp on the hybrid nature of the threat posed by Pakistan. Consequently, an operational art has been built that can be understood by decoding some of the post Uri developments. As noted earlier, the hybrid actor is privy to a wide range of exploitable weaknesses of the superior combatant enforced by an adherence to established norms. In such case, an unorthodox operational art is the key to confuse the hybrid enemy and gain a competitive advantage. Modi’s operational art did just this. India’s operational art addressed three principal components of Pakistan’s hybrid threat design:
• Military component: India’s operational art, in the current context, was emboldened with the political will that gave all the sub commanders power and direction to act. In doing so, India managed to crack the pivotal component of Pakistan’s threat design by calling its nuclear bluff. This marked a crucial transformation in India’s operational at which was hitherto choked by Pakistan’s nuclear threat. The nuclear component was the only facet that gave Pakistan a sense of parity with India and a sense of insurance against retaliation despite its nefarious adventurism against India.
Despite being known for its dare devil attitude and bravery in targeting and eliminating terrorists and enemies in any given environment Israel has failed to gain a strategic victory over them. This is purely, due to a lack of operational art.
• Terrorism and Criminal component: Pakistan’s connivance in terrorist plots inside India has been a repetitive phenomenon. Compare and contrast the current episode with the previous attack on Pathankot. Analysing through the lens of a hybrid actor, Pakistan was adept in using terrorist proxies that would provide it plausible deniability. In addition, the Indian response was also predictable owing to its modus operandi of blaming Pakistan, gathering evidences, conducting investigations: all resulting in nothing more than wastage of time. The change in India’s operational art facilitated the military commander to adopt the necessary course of action against terrorist groups across the LOC. This unanticipated response clearly put the hybrid actor into confusion.
• Informational and Psychological component: This is the central aspect to the survival of a hybrid actor as it completes the comprehensive picture. Given the relative weakness of the hybrid actor, heavy reliance on psychological warfare is compulsory. This is evident in the case of the PLO and Hezbollah fighting the Israelis. International backing becomes a compelling factor in demonising the acts of the superior combatant. Pakistan is no exception to this. It has banked on two points to garner international support. One is advertising itself as a victim of terror, on which it tries to portray India as a sponsor, and the other is accusing India of human rights violation in Kashmir.
India took this factor into cognizance and devised an operational art that tasked its diplomatic corps of exposing Pakistan’s knavery. Subsequently, the SAARC summit to be held in Islamabad was boycotted by India with other members like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan endorsing the boycott, while Nepal expressed concerns over cross border terrorism in the region. The surgical strikes were later backed by several other powerful nations of the world like Russia, Germany and the United States.
The new Modi-fied operational art is an unprecedented change in India’s response to Pakistan’s hybrid threat because India never had an operational art. The absence of it gave Pakistan a tacit approval of its adventurism in India leaving strategic decision making in India nearly impossible.
Hybrid actors like Hezbollah and Pakistan are aware of the nature of their enemy. Hence, they do not seek an outright victory, but thrive to wear out the enemy through a long war of attrition using all practical means.
The current episode that has exhibited the rise of a Modi-fied operational art through integrating several instruments of state-policy seems to be set in a direction of devising a strategic response that can tackle Pakistan for long. Should the operational art break, strategic victory becomes cloudy and the surgical strikes will remain only an episode of tactical advantage gained over Pakistan.
This is a mistake that Israel has repeated over the years and India can borrow a lesson from their experience. Despite being known for its dare devil attitude and bravery in targeting and eliminating terrorists and enemies in any given environment Israel has failed to gain a strategic victory over them. This is purely, due to a lack of operational art. While offensive action has eliminated some ruthless terrorist figures, the issue still remains at large because Israel has lost the psychological warfare that has resulted in hostile international opinion despite being a victim of terror.
Hybrid actors like Hezbollah and Pakistan are aware of the nature of their enemy. Hence, they do not seek an outright victory, but thrive to wear out the enemy through a long war of attrition using all practical means. In this case, a comprehensive operational art is the key and India looks headed in that direction.
© Copyright 2016 Indian Defence Review
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