By Bharat Lather
19 Oct , 2016
As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) emerged from the 2nd Sino-Japanese war (1937-45) and revolution in 1949, China soon went to war against the United States in November 1950, the opening Chinese offensive, launched from deep within North Korea, and took U.S. forces by complete operational surprise. The U.S.-led United Nations offensive into North Korea was thrown back, with the U.S. Army handed its worst defeat since the American Civil War. Still, it became apparent that the Chinese economy lacked the capacity to compete with the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. in the production of advanced military technology. Transfers from the Soviet Union helped remedy the gap in the 1950s, as did transfers from the United States and Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Still, the stifled technology and scientific research left the Chinese even farther behind.
According to US Defense Department report, PLAAF continues to fly over 400 J-7s, an effective aircraft, but not competitive in any sense with the U.S. fleet; but by developing an integrated multi-layered air defense network, even J-7s (Mig-21) would pose a grave threat to U.S. fighter jets.
J-7/ MiG-21
In 1961, as tensions between the USSR and the PRC reached a fever pitch following Khrushchev’s policy of De-Stalinization; the Soviets transferred blueprints and materials associated with its new MiG-21 interceptor to China. The offering represented an effort to bridge part of the gap, and suggests to China that cooperation between the Communist giants remained possible. However, the offering didn’t work.
Things began to deteriorate between the two Communist giants with Nikita Khrushchev’s policy of De-Stalinization which resulted in withdrawing nuclear assistance to China by 1959. Relations got further deteriorated when the former Soviet Union (Presently Russia) decided to sell its MiG-21 jets to India; a country which China saw its major Asian rival. Sino-Soviet tensions continued to increase, nearly to the point of war in 1969 along the Ussuri River line which was claimed by both of them.
The Chinese worked from the blueprints and other materials, and eventually produced the J-7, a virtual copy of the MiG-21. The Chinese eventually sold the J-7 (F-7 export variant) in direct competition with the MiGs sold by the Soviets. Indeed, after the US-PRC rapprochement of the early 1970s, the Chinese sold J-7s directly to the Americans, who used them as part of an aggressor squadron to train US pilots to fight the Soviets.
Most of life is about just showing up, and since 1960 no fighter has shown up as consistently, and in as many places, as has the MiG-21. For countries needing a cheap option for claiming control of their national airspace, the MiG-21 has long solved problems, and will likely continue to serve in this role. It’s relatively easy to learn to fly, although not necessarily easy to learn how to fly well. Air forces continued to buy the MiG-21 for a long time. Counting the Chengdu J-7 variant, perhaps 13,000 MiG-21s have entered service around the world. In some sense, the Fishbed is the AK-47 (or the T-34, if you prefer) of the fighter world. Fifty countries have flown the MiG-21, and it has flown for fifty-five years. It continues to fly as a key part of twenty-six different air forces, including the Indian Air Force, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, the Vietnamese People’s Air Force, and the Romanian Air Force. One Indian weapon that made the Pakistani military sweat in the Indo-Pak War of 1971 was a Russian weapon – MiG-21. The decisive blows/strikes by IAF MiGs in East Pakistan (Presently Bangladesh) made Pakistanis run for their lives. As a result of which Pakistani army was forced to surrender after taking major beatings from IAF.
1990s saw several huge arms deals between Moscow and Beijing… The deal gave the Chinese one of the world’s most dangerous air superiority fighters, and gave the Russian aviation industry a lifeline.
The MiG-21 is known largely as fodder for the other great fighters of the Cold War, and for having an abysmal kill ratio. The Fishbed (in NATO terminology) has served as a convenient victim in Vietnam and in a variety of Middle Eastern wars, some of which it fought on both sides. Therefore, when flown well, it remains a dangerous foe for its enemy. In 2016, according to US Defense Department report, PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) continues to fly over 400 J-7s, an effective aircraft, but not competitive in any sense with the U.S. fleet; but by developing an integrated multi-layered air defense network, even J-7s (Mig-21) would pose a grave threat to U.S. fighter jets. It can threaten not only to deny Chinese airspace to its adversaries, but also to punch back.
Shenyang J-11/ Sukhoi Su-27:
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s heralded a thaw in Russia-China relations. Russia no longer had strong reasons to withhold its most advanced military technology from the Chinese. More importantly, the huge Soviet military industrial complex needed customers badly, and the Russian military could no longer afford new equipment. For its part, the PRC (People’s Republic of China) needed new sources of high technology military equipment after Europe and the United States imposed arms embargoes in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre, 1989.
Accordingly, the 1990s saw several huge arms deals between Moscow and Beijing. One of the most important involved the sale, licensing, and technology transfer of the Su-27 “Flanker” multirole fighter. The deal gave the Chinese one of the world’s most dangerous air superiority fighters, and gave the Russian aviation industry a lifeline.
But the era of good feelings couldn’t hold. Details remain murky and disputed, but the Russians claim that the Chinese began violating licensing terms almost immediately, by installing their own avionics on Flankers (J-11, under Chinese designation). The Chinese also began developing a carrier variant, in direct violation of agreed-to terms. The appropriation of Russian technology undercut the relationship between Russia and China, making the Russians far more wary of transferring their crown jewels to the Chinese military.
The original J-11 was purely a Su-27 manufactured in China, while the J-11B actually introduced Chinese hardware.
In 1995 the Chinese said they weren’t interested in buying more finished aircraft from Russia—but would pay for the license to assemble Su-27 kits in China. Russia agreed on the condition that the engines and avionics would still be made in Russia. The deal was struck: two hundred Chinese-made aircraft—now designated J-11s—for $2.5 billion. So far, everything was legal.
How Shenyang J-11B is different from Sukhoi Su-27?
Many aspects of the J-11B are modernized and uniquely Chinese: the pilot displays and the “glass cockpit,” the on-board oxygenator (which helps keep the pilot conscious at high altitudes or while performing tight maneuvers), and the optical Missile Approach Warning System are all new. The older Russian N001E radar was replaced with a Chinese Type 1493 pulse-Doppler, which can reportedly detect fighters at a range of over ninety miles and surface warships at over two hundred. The airframe itself is made with lighter composite materials.
The J-11B is also adapted to fire Chinese missiles and munitions—namely, the short-range PL-8 infrared guided missile (a knock-off of the Israeli Python 3) and the long-range PL-12 radar-guided missile (the so-called Chinese AMARAM, with a range of up to one hundred kilometers). A wide range of Chinese-made air-to-ground munitions, including antiradar missiles, laser-guided bombs and glide bombs, are supported. The Russian GSh-30 thirty-millimeter cannon are retained, however. Moreover, it has a range of over 3500km giving Chinese the ability to operate away from its shores/border.
The original J-11 was purely a Su-27 manufactured in China, while the J-11B actually introduced Chinese hardware. Around 120 J-11Bs of all types were estimated to be in service in 2015.
Both J-15 and J-16 are equipped with AESA radars which improve not only their air-to-air abilities but also allow them to target multiple precision guided munitions at the same time.
China continues to fail in developing a reliable jet engine
The J-11B has been encumbered by a major weakness: its domestically produced WS-10A Taihang turbofan engines. At one point the WS-10As were reportedly requiring overhauls every thirty hours of flight time, compared to four hundred hours for the original Russian AL-31F engines in the Su-27. The J-11B fleet had to be grounded and refitted with AL-31Fs. The most egregious problems have reportedly been addressed, but the WS-10A still has a poor reputation. Production has lagged far behind demand, and quality control remains a big issue with more engines returned to plant than actually produced! Reports also suggest that WS-10A can’t generate quite as much thrust as the AL-31F, nor raise it as quickly. Either way, the WS-10A’s reliability and thrust remain major problems not just for J-11s, but for China’s stealth fighter program as well.
Procuring Sukhoi Su-30MKK/MKK2 from Russia
China had earlier received seventy-three Su-30MKKs between 2000 and 2003, as well as twenty-four further improved Su-30MKK2 in 2004 specialized for anti-shipping attacks, now operated by the Naval Air Force.
The J-16 “Red Eagle” is a copy of the two-seat Su-30MKK Flanker—modernized and reconfigured to handle Chinese weapons, making it a specialist strike plane comparable to the F-15E Strike Eagle. Reportedly, a single regiment of J-16s (around twenty-four aircraft) was in service by 2014, and up to one hundred will be produced by 2020. In December 2015, an electronic-warfare variant, the J-16D was spotted with jamming pods on its wing tips—apparently intended to perform a similar role as the EA-18 Growler in disrupting enemy air defense ahead of strike packages.
There are also two additional Chinese Flankers. The J-15 “Flying Shark” is derived from the Su-33, a navalized variant of the Su-27 for carrier operations with folding wings, strengthened landing gear and an arresting hook. After an attempt to buy two Su-33s from Russia for $100 million was refused in 2006, China instead relied on a prototype purchased from Ukraine in 2001. By 2009, the first J-15 had been produced, and in 2012 two J-15s performed their first landing on the carrier Liaoning. Twenty-four Flying Sharks now serve on board the Chinese carrier.
Both the J-15 and J-16 are equipped with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars which improve not only their air-to-air abilities but also allow them to target multiple precision guided munitions at the same time. AESAs are considered the state of the art in aerial radar technology. They also incorporate radar-absorbent materials to reduce radar signature.
Why is China interested in buying Su-35 jets from Russia?
The Su-35 (NATO reporting name: Flanker-E) is a Fourth++ generation, twin-engine, highly maneuverable multirole fighter jet powered by two AL-117S turbofan engines. In January 2016 China and Russia finally agreed to a larger order of twenty-four Su-35s (including additional jet engines) for $2 billion.
Both of the PLAAF’s new fifth-generation fighter jet prototypes–the Chengdu J-20 and Shenyang J-31–are equipped with older Russian-made jet engines, the former with the Saturn AL-31 the latter with the Klimov RD-93.
Many observers believe China’s principal motivation for the buy is to reverse-engineer the technology behind the Su-35’s new advanced AL-41FS vector-thrust turbofan engines. One way or another, China will eventually develop high-performance jet engines. In the short term, the Russian aviation industry will do what it can to at least receive payment for its designs. Russia has repeatedly refused to sell the engine as a stand-alone product, which left the PLAAF with little choice but to acquire the entire aircraft. Both of the PLAAF’s new fifth-generation fighter jet prototypes–the Chengdu J-20 and Shenyang J-31–are equipped with older Russian-made jet engines, the former with the Saturn AL-31 the latter with the Klimov RD-93.
China’s aviation industry has been pushing hard to domestically develop and build high-performance turbofan engines. In August 2016, Beijing announced that it set up a new state-owned aircraft engine maker to accelerate the development of new jet engines. China, for example, is currently working on the WS-13 Taishan turbofan, a derivative of the Russian Klimov RD-33 turbofan. Obtaining the Su-35 combat aircraft and its AL-117S turbofan engine would be a major boon for China’s aviation industry given that the engine could be reverse engineered. Next to the powerful engine, the Su-35, with its air refueling capability and its ability to carry external fuel tanks and the massive payload will provide the PLAAF also with greater control of the skies over China and adjacent waters including the East and South China Seas.
Arming Chinese made Sukhois with PL-15 BVR missiles
A new generation of Chinese-built long-range air-to-air missiles – PL-15 (200km) could threaten the critical nodes that enable U.S. air operations. Those nodes include the AWACS, various intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, aerial refueling tankers and electronic attack aircrafts.
Especially over the vast reaches of the Pacific where airfields are few and far between, lumbering aerial refueling tankers could be an Achilles ’ heel that Beijing could chose to exploit. As pointed out in the 2008 RAND study—Chinese derivatives of the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker all but annihilated U.S. tanker, ISR, maritime patrol and command and control aircraft during a simulation using long-range air-to-air missiles.
The most logical way for the Chinese to tackle American and allied airpower is not to confront those forces head-on but rather by removing their ability to fight.
A 2008 RAND briefing suggested that in order to sustain F-22 operations over Taiwan from Guam, the U.S. Air Force would need to launch three to four tanker sorties per hour to deliver 2.6 million gallons of fuel. That’s a fact that has not likely escaped Beijing’s notice. The only answer the United States has to the problem is that those aircraft will have to be pulled back to safety outside the effective range of the Chinese threat. However, that would also shorten the effective range of the Pentagon’s short-range tactical fighters—reducing their ability to strike deep inside Chinese territory.
Further, there is a strong argument to be made that short-range tactical fighters like the F-22 and F-35 are ill-suited for operations in the Western Pacific where distances are vast and bases are scarce. The same geographic constraints also apply to the Chinese. That means that jets like the F-22 and F-35 need tankers to operate over those vast distances. The most logical way for the Chinese to tackle American and allied airpower is not to confront those forces head-on but rather by removing their ability to fight. That means going after U.S. bases, tankers and communications nodes. Thus in that sense, the J-20 or Chinese made Sukhois armed with PL-15 BVR missiles could be China’s means to establish air superiority if viewed through that lens. In that sense it might have the upper hand against the F-22.
Conclusion
China has developed a large, innovative technology economy in its own right. Indeed, the Chinese technology continues to catch up with American (and in some cases exceeds Russian). China has long supplemented legitimate transfers. In short, the PRC has a well-established habit of pilfering weapons technology from Russia. As the years have gone by, Beijing’s robust industrial-military complex have become ever more skillful and flexible in their approach.
The sale of Russian weapons to China has always been a win-win for the two countries.
The sale of Russian weapons to China has always been a win-win for the two countries. China receives some of the newest and most advanced weapons systems in the world, without the cost and hassle of research and development. Russia in turn gets much-needed hard currency. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the help of China’s financial assistance; Russia has somehow managed to retain a more or less credible defense industrial base—even if it’s just a shadow of its former self. Moscow is reassured by China’s continuing dependence on Russia for defense technology.
Since December 1992, when the two countries signed an agreement on military technology cooperation, China has purchased more defense items from the Russian Federation than from any other country. These include Kilo-class submarines, Su-27 aircrafts, S-300, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and many varieties of munitions and missiles. Despite a relative reduction in military sales in the past few years, Russia has continued the supply China with its most formidable military weapons (Su-35 and S-400). Therefore, the 2 major defense deals is a manifestation of an essentially robust defense relationship.
© Copyright 2016 Indian Defence Review
No comments:
Post a Comment