Restructuring the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

By Col NP Singh

Issue: Vol. 31.1 Jan-Mar 2016 | Date : 22 Aug , 2016

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If we seize this moment, reform may be accomplished in one fell swoop: if we let it pass by, we will lose a great opportunity. — PLA Daily, March 12, 2014

The one thing that caught the world’s attention besides all the impressive hardware at the 70th anniversary parade at Beijing was the announcement by President Xi Jinping on the reduction in the strength of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by 300,000 personnel. This has been followed up by Chinese media reports on the impending reforms in the PLA and has attracted worldwide attention.

A lot has been going on in China and in the PLA since Xi Jinping assumed office as President of China and as Chairman of CMC in November 2012. Three years since then, it is quite clear that he has easily become the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping or maybe Mao himself. The reduction of personnel is a part of wider reforms that have been undertaken within the PLA and will have far reaching impact on the organisation and its conduct of operations. This is only the fourth time such extensive reforms are being attempted; the first one being under Marshal Peng Dehuai in 1954, second under Deng in the early 1980s and then under Jiang Zemin in 1993. Each of the previous ones was either after a conflict or domestic political upheaval. It is also worth noting that each Chinese leader since Deng has reduced PLA numbers and attempted reforms.

Background of Reform

The PLA has undergone three stages of modernisation since its founding. The first stage which lasted till the 1980s was focused on a large conventional force which was prepared to fight the ‘People’s War’ leveraging China’s advantages of space, time and manpower. This was a predominantly Army-centric force as is evident from the name PLA itself.

The second stage started in mid-1980s and resulted from the realisation that large scale conventional wars were a thing of the past and future conflicts were likely to be localised. This resulted in a reduction in troop strength by almost a million plus by 1990. Operationally the PLA moved towards creating Combined Arms-Group Armies.

The Gulf War in 1991 was the trigger for the third stage of modernisation. This was facilitated by the end of the Cold War and the dawn of the Information Age. The CMC put forth the ‘Two Transformations’ i.e. to transform into an army prepared to fight local wars under modern high-tech conditions and from an army based on quantity to one based on quality. There were further cuts in manpower in PLA reducing its strength to 2.3 million as on date.

While the reforms process in the PLA has been an ongoing one over the past many decades, this particular announcement of reform has caught attention world over, primarily because of the prominence given to it by PLA itself and also due to the relative increase in transparency on matters related to PLA.

Why Reforms?

The Party must control the gun and the gun must never control the Party — Mao Zedong1

The changing nature of geo-politics has resulted in China focusing on its potential adversaries and as a result theatres of conflicts. These include USA, Japan, Taiwan, South China Sea, India and Russia. Except in the case of India and Russia, in all other cases, the conflicts are likely to be fought primarily in maritime, air and cyber domains. This is emphatically stated in the latest Chinese Defence White Paper issued in May 2015.2

China also feels that chances of a war on the land border (with India or Russia) are less likely. Its reform process over the past decade in terms of restructuring of the four components of the Armed Forces, policy statements through White Papers and equipment modernisation is indicative of this. The PLA Ground Forces have reduced by ten per cent in the period from 1985 to 2015 while the other three services have benefited in numbers as well as resource allocation.

Military Regions (MRs)

In December 1954, the existing five MRs were reorganised into 12, a thirteenth (Fuzhou) was added in 1956. These were reduced to 11 in the late 1960s and further reduced to the present seven in 1985-1988 and field armies were reduced too.3

These MRs were formed based on threats from three primary directions i.e. North, South and East. While the number of MRs has undergone a change and the formations contained therein have reduced in numbers and strength of troops, the location of GAs has continued to remain the same. These, therefore, do not reflect the changes in threat assessment.

Modernisation

As the PLA reduced its numbers, it also embarked on the twin paths of mechanisation and informatisation. This was facilitated by two factors i.e. the rapid growth in Chinese economy which allowed greater allocation of funds and secondly, the advances in Defence R&D and the indigenous defence manufacturing industry. The PLA, therefore, had the resources to modernise all the services. A major effort has gone towards services other than ground forces in the past decade.

Xi Jinping

The handing over of the reigns by Hu Jintao was noticeable in one major aspect. He did not continue as Chairman of the CMC even after he quit the other two posts of Chinese President and General Secretary of the CPC. Xi quickly asserted himself in matters concerning the PLA, getting more involved than any of his predecessors. As is the norm elsewhere, Xi also plans to carry out major reforms in the second half of his first tenure with a second tenure generally spent on building a legacy. This is because he has consolidated his power base and feels confident of asserting himself and has sufficient time to see his reforms through.

There is also a substantial shift from the ‘CMC Vice-Chairmanship responsibility system’ to that of ‘CMC Chairman’ thus re-asserting the political control over the CMC. He has called for tighter discipline of secretarial staff and an end to factions and cliques while paradoxically, he himself is a mishu and a princeling.4 A number of present generals in the PLA share the same credentials.5

Corruption

Since he has taken over, Xi has carried out an intense campaign against corruption targeting both ‘Tigers’ (higher leadership) and ‘Flies’ (lower functionaries). This campaign has extended to the military where 47 Generals and equivalent officers have been taken to task in just the past year with most from Logistics and Armaments branches.6 This included the two highest military officers (Vice Chairmen of CMC) during Jiang Zemin’s presidency i.e. Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. The PLA is involved in a number of non-military activities which have resulted in systemic corruption and which has assumed epidemic proportion as evidenced from the purge in higher ranks.

Loyalty

The PLA has had its major share of tribulations with Marshals Peng Dehuai and Zhu De purged by Marshal Lin Biao in 1959 (and who himself was purged and killed in 1971) when they opposed Mao. Still, it was surprising when 52 generals of PLA re-affirmed their loyalty to Xi in an open letter published online. (http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1487661/seventeen-more-generals-add-pledges-allegiance-xi-jinping?page=all)

The words “loyalty” and “following rules” figure more in Xi’s various addresses to the PLA than any other. The only probable cause for such repeated pronouncements is that Xi is not confident of the loyalty of the PLA.

Combat Effectiveness

The most prominent reason for reform, as stated by the official Chinese media, is enhancing Combat Effectiveness. The PLA (like several other armies world over) suffers from stove piping thus resulting in poor synergy between different services and vertically within the service. The highly centralised form of the PLA inhibits quick decision-making that is so essential in modern warfare. This is further accentuated by the predominance of the Army in higher leadership over the other two services. Out of 36 Generals in the PLA today, 30 are from PLA Army (PLAA). An officer other than from the PLAA became part of CMC only in 2004 and even in the present CMC out of 11 members only four are from services other than PLAA. No PLA Air Force (PLAAF) or PLA Navy (PLAN) officer has held the appointment of Director of any of the four General Staff Departments or as Commander of any MR. The PLA’s emphasis on Active Defence and Integrated Joint Operations necessitates that the four services that comprise the PLA be reformed for better cohesion.

Political Control

The PLA is unique as compared to any other major army in the world. It is an army of the party and not of the state and absolutely opposes nationalising the military, which it calls a western construct.7Xi and his two predecessors are also acutely aware of the fact that they do not have a military background and thus their actions are designed to overcome this vital shortfall in their CV.

The PLA’s representation in the politburo has stabilised to just two since 1993 and none in the Politburo Standing Committee. The PLA’s role in the selection of civilian leadership is reduced while the reverse is also true with political representation in the CMC which is now zero. There has also been a shift from Marxist ideology to a more nationalist one as also a bifurcation of civil and military elites, with generational change from the revolutionary generals who were also prominent party functionaries.

Ongoing Reforms

The PLA like all other armies is undergoing reforms all the time. Post 3rd Plenum in 2013, the PLA has embarked on a broad set of institutional reforms, tackling training, political work, command and control and corruption among others.

Broadly, the PLA’s modernisation program can be divided into three major heads

The development and fielding of new weapons systems and technologies.

The development of new operational concepts and war fighting doctrines for their employment.

Institutional reforms necessary to support the first two.

Over past four years these have included:

Higher Defence Organisation

A number of changes have been done in the recent past. These include:

Information Security Base (Cyber Command) created in July 2010.8

Regulations against corrupt behaviour titled “Regulations on the Performance of Official Duties with Integrity by Leading Cadres with Party Membership in the Armed Forces” taken out in June 2011.

Creation of Strategic Planning Department under GSD (Nov 2011).9

National Security Council created in Nov 2013.10

Joint Operations Control Centre created in 2014.11

Five Leading Groups created in March 2014 to deepen reforms of National Defence, Survey of Military Infrastructure Projects and Real Estate Resources, Mass Line Education, Inspection Work and Military Training Supervision.12

There has been a move towards having officers from services other than the PLAA in higher leadership. Since 2004 it has become an established norm to have an officer from each of the services other than the PLAA in the CMC. This was further enhanced by the first ever appointment of General Xu Qiliang of PLAAF as Vice Chairman of the CMC in 2012.

Trans MR Training

The CMC issued new training guidelines in 1999, which were codified by the GSD into an ‘Outline of Military Training and Evaluation’ (OMTE) in 2002 and revised in 2009 and have emphasized on operating in complex weather, terrain and electro-magnetic conditions and conducting military operations other than war.13 Accordingly over past few decades PLA has been conducting more and more Trans MR training and made a sustained effort to improve the quality and realism of the training.

Personnel Policies

Greater emphasis is being placed on inducting officers and men with higher educational qualifications. The service conditions are being improved with last significant pay upgrade in 2014. Chinese President Xi Jinping also said that in the future, military officers can only rely on their salaries for income, any unapproved income or illegal gains will be investigated and punished.14Senior officers were also asked to serve as soldiers for at least two weeks under a measure by President Xi Jinping to shake up the military and boost morale.15

China’s armed forces are raising the qualification and training levels of NCOs to build a professional corps with the ability to operate increasingly sophisticated weapon systems with number of NCOs planned to be raised to 900,000 replacing many of the present officer held billets.16

Equipment and Technology upgrade

The most significant modernisation has taken place in these fields and has transcended all services. The PLA today fields a larger inventory of modern equipment. This includes stealth and transport aircraft, submarines, destroyers, tanks, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, satellites, world’s first long-distance quantum encryption network and many others. This is supported by a robust and capable defence manufacturing industry.

Divestment of Non-Military Activities

The PLA controls a large number of firms which span diverse sectors from agriculture and mining to high-tech areas such as transportation, telecommunication, launching satellites and to real estate, shares and securities. Since President Jiang Zemin announced significant reforms in this field in 1998, many of such organisations have been wound up. These were also one of the primary sources of corruption and thus with the divestment it is felt that a new professional force could be formed.17

Doctrinal Reforms

While other reforms like induction of equipment is often the most visible face, changes in doctrines do not receive adequate attention. PLAs doctrinal reforms got a major boost in the mid-1980s. In January 1999, after at least four years of intensive work by the “PLA Operations Regulations Compilation Committee”, a new and comprehensive set of documented guidelines for the conduct of military operations was issued. Collectively, the new guidelines are referred to by the PLA as the “New Generation Operations Regulations”.18 These have been issued in a series of publications that are referred to by the PLA as gangyao (essentials). In addition to these “manuals” are a host of “operations regulations” that flesh out more details. These include Joint Campaigns and those of Army, Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Corps.

China’s ‘Military Strategic guidelines for the New Period’, completed in 1993 and revised in 2004, contain the overarching strategic and operational guidance that directs the training, development, and employment of China’s Armed Forces.19

It also evolved its major significant doctrinal concept of Active Defence in the mid-1980s which along with fighting Local Wars under Conditions of Informatisation remains at the top of China’s military doctrine. At the campaign level, Integrated Joint Operations, Information Warfare, Integrated Firepower Operations and Mobility are the principles and doctrines on which China plans to fight and win wars in the 21st century even against a technologically superior enemy.

Organisational Reforms

The PLA has also been carrying out changes in the organisation of its field formations. These have included changing from Division to Brigades, creation of Rapid Reaction Forces, conversion of Infantry to Mechanised Infantry and development of significant IW capabilities and formations.

UN Troops and HADR Missions

In 2007, a Major General from the PLA became the first head of a UN Peacekeeping Force from China in Western Sahara and then again in Cyprus in 2011. China has also decided to extend its role in UN missions from logistics, medical and engineering support to combat troops in April 2015.

President Xi also committed that China will contribute 8,000 troops for a United Nations peacekeeping standby force. China has also been actively involved in anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and evacuated 36,000 of its nationals from Libya in 2011 besides providing humanitarian relief after the natural calamities in Nepal and South-East Asia.

Reforms post Fifth Plenum

“The goal of military reforms is to build an army that “obeys the party command, is capable of winning battles and has a sound working style.” — 2013 communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of 18th CPC

The Key Tenets as listed above are the best indicators to the reform process, with party loyalty supreme over everything else. The current reforms owe their origin to decisions taken during the 3rd Plenum of the present congress issued in January 2014. They were discussed further after the 5th Plenum from November 24 to 26, by 200 delegates at the CMC. This is an indication of an attempt to build consensus and soothe any frayed nerves within the military towards these measures. The mouthpieces of the government and the PLA were quick to re-iterate the support of the forces, though some dissent was heard. “It is forbidden to speak nonsense, make irresponsible comments, have your own points of view, act as you see fit or feign compliance.”20 The timeline given for the completion of reforms is 2020. They are also likely to face resistance from the well-established current order.

The timing of the reforms aims to exploit the window of opportunity China possesses. This includes a phase of rapid economic growth and relative peace on international and domestic fronts. On a more personal level, President Xi aims to utilise the high goodwill he enjoys among the Chinese people and portray the reforms as part of a strong military dream within the larger China dream. While the reforms indicate a move towards a more Westernised army by way of organisational structures, development of concepts and restructuring of field army, the Chinese are keen to portray these as those with Chinese characteristics.

Reduction in Personnel

There is a planned reduction of 300,000 personnel which is likely to occur in administrative posts, at the headquarters and for non-combat personnel. The PLAA is the one which might face the biggest cuts with some Chinese experts suggesting a ratio of 2:1:1 between the PLAA, PLAAF and PLAN as compared to almost 70 per cent strength of the total strength of the PLAA at present.21 The reduction, as was in earlier phases, is likely to occur in the forces in the North.

Reorganisation of MRs

The MRs within PLA are almost like independent Armies of their own. These have their own recruitment of personnel and training academies. A soldier or even an officer could spend his entire service within the MR. Significant movement of an officer out of the MR happens only after the rank of Major General. Also, the formations within the MR have traditionally exercised only within. Trans MR training of troops is only a two-decade old phenomenon. This movement is significant because the PLA aims to create local superiority in the area of operations and would thus require troops from outside the MR to create such a situation.

Two theories of the most visible form of reforms are being suggested. One in which the existing seven MRs are re-organised into four and in the second five. These could be North, South, East and West with Central (in case of five). There will be one MR each looking after the major threats i.e. from Russia, Central and South Asia, Taiwan-Japan and South-East Asia. Geographically, the Chengdu MR is also likely to become the largest.22

Command and Control

The reforms aim to reiterate the role of CMC in military decision-making and reduce that of MR Commanders. It is planned to establish a ‘CMC-Battle Zone Commands-Troops’ command system. It is likely that PLAA, which does not have a separate office of its own, unlike the other three services, and functions from within the General Staff Department, will have a separate office. The National Security Council and Joint Operations Control Centre (announced earlier) are likely to function as National Defence planning body and Joint Chiefs of Staff respectively.

As per reports, the MRs (or their successor organisation) will not command any troops during peacetime. The troops will be under respective services. It is to be seen how this paradoxical arrangement is implemented.

Focus on Core Military Functions

President Xi said that PLA should close all paid services. This is likely to imply that the PLA will divest itself from non-military activities because it is felt that these activities are the major reason for corruption in the PLA.

Military Judicial System

The CMC will have an audit office and a political and legal affairs commission.

Defence Technology and Production

More to be done in this field with focus on developing new concepts and technologies.

Tackling Corruption

A new discipline inspection commission will be established within the CMC to eradicate the ‘soil’ of corruption.

Improved Service Conditions through better medical care, insurance, housing and pay for servicemen.

Further Implications

Chengdu and Lanzhou MRs combined will result in a single military leader in charge of all forces along India’s frontiers as opposed to four such commanders on Indian side. The Chinese though will have problems in command and control over such a large geographical area during operations.

Integrated Joint Operations is the key to future reforms and ‘jointness’ between services will be a cause of worry for its opponents. The other worrying aspect is preparations for Out of Area Contingency Operations which will impact conduct of operations in the IOR. All such previous reforms have been followed by doctrinal changes. ‘War Zone Concept’ followed by the PLA at the operational level will undergo a major change.

Conclusion

It is thus quite evident that the reforms have been ongoing for some time and have multiple aims. At the one end, it is meant to create a more professional, well-trained and equipped force and on the other, these will lead to substantial power shifts both between the PLA and civilian organs of the government and within the PLA. This will also consolidate power with President Xi. How these plan out in the future will be important as the PLA develops doctrines built along these lines which will have a greater impact.

Notes

1. Mao Zedong’s concluding speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan”, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_12.htm

2.China’s Military Strategy, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015, Beijing,http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/

3. James C Mulvenon, ‘The PLA’s Struggle for Identity,’ 2003, pg111.

4. CPC strikes cliques, factions, Xinhua, 15 Jan 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-01/15/content_19330728.htm

5. Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle (Part 5: The Mishu Cluster II) Cheng Li,China Leadership Monitor,HooverInstitution, Summer 2015:

Issue 47

6. 47 PLA generals investigated this year, China Military Online, 11 Dec 2015, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-12/11/content_6812284.htm

7. No nationalization of military in China: senior PLA officer, 20 June 2011 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-06/20/c_13940229.htm

8. Chinese army to target cyber war threat,TaniaBranigan, The Guardian, 22 July 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/22/chinese-army-cyber-war-department

9. PLA establishes strategic planning department, China.org.cn, November 23, 2011, http://china.org.cn/china/2011-11/23/content_23983204.htm

10. Xi Jinping expounds security commission role, Xinhua, Nov 15, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c_132892155.htm

11. Chinese military set up joint operations command center, Auug 7, 2014, The Japan Times,http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/08/07/asia-pacific/chinese-military-set-joint-operations-command-center-sources/#.vm5dmnj9671

12. China Creates New Military Reform Leading Group, Zachary Keck, The Diplomat, March 21, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-creates-new-military-reform-leading-group/

13. The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, Dennis J Blasko, 2012, Routledge, pg 176

14. Salaries of China’s officers, soldiers low in world levels, China Military Online, 2015-01-19, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-01/19/content_6314553.htm

15. Xi Jinping orders generals and senior PLA officers to serve as privates, South China Morning Post, Chow Chungyan, 23 April, 2013

16. PLA non-commissioned ranks under reform, Xinhua, 15 Jul 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/60th/2009-07/15/content_8623693.htm

17. Rise and Fall of the PLA’s Business Empire: Implications for China’s Civil-Military Relations, SwaranSingh, IDSA, http://www.idsa-india.org/an-may9-4.html

18. Thinking About The PLA’s “Revolution In Doctrinal Affairs”, Dr David M Finkelstein, China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Edited by James Mulvenon and David M Finkelstein, December 2005

19. DOD Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf

20. China military tells officers to hold their tongues onreform concerns, Reuters, Dec 7, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/uschinadefenceidUSKBN0TQ08X20151207#EYwgv73ez9cKerpk.97

21. China to optimize forces, Liu Xin and GuoYuandan, Global Times, 06 Sep 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/940755.shtml

22. China hits the launch button for massive PLA shake-up to create a modern, nimble force, Minnie Chan, South China Morning Post, 24 November 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1883071/china-hits-launch-button-massive-pla-shake

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