http:/www.asianage.com/columnists/how-gilgit-was-lost-forever-574
With
Prime Minister Narendra Modi launching a massive counter offensive
against Pakistan’s intensified propaganda war on Kashmir, by throwing
into stark relief the human rights violations in the Shia-majority
Gilgit and Baltistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, the Great Game has
taken a spanking new hue. By highlighting how Pakistan is an occupier of
Indian territories, Mr Modi has given the whole Kashmir calculus a new
spin. India is no longer the desperate prey, cornered and submissive in
this equation. As the uncoiling of history takes place, it is pertinent
to understand that the state of Jammu and Kashmir originally had five
parts to it: Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, Aksai Chin and Northern Areas
(Gilgit-Baltistan).
Over time, India has lost Aksai Chin to China and, of course, the
part captured by the tribal raiders in October 1947, which Pakistan
chooses to refer to as “Azad” Kashmir, which incidentally includes the
Gilgit-Baltistan area garnered courtesy a quietly executed British coup.
In The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s
Partition, Narendra Singh Sarila highlights how in 1935, the
administrative and defence responsibilities of this northern frontier
had been transferred by the Maharaja of Kashmir to the British
government of India under a 60-year lease. As the result of the civil
war in China became uncertain, the Viceroy prevailed upon Maharaja Hari
Singh to do so in the interests of the security of the empire. Gilgit
was administered by the political department from Delhi in the same way
as Malakand or Khyber in the NWFP, with political officers reporting to
the Viceroy through Peshawar. A carefully chosen force capable of rapid
movement in mountainous territory controlled by British officers, the
Gilgit Scouts, provided the muscle to the administration.
On August 1, 1947 the Gilgit lease was receded by Delhi to the
maharaja of J&K and Lt. Col. Roger Bacon, the British political
agent, handed over the area to Brig. Ghansara Singh, the state’s new
governor. According to V.P. Menon, secretary of state and Sardar Patel’s
pointsman in the integration of states, Kashmir did not have the
resources, including financial, to hold Gilgit which was cut off from
Srinagar during winters. In view of the lapse of paramountcy, the
retrocession was probably inevitable, but the fact remains that no
sooner was Gilgit handed over to the maharaja than it came under the
mercy of Pakistan.
The British officers of Gilgit Scouts: Major William Alexander Brown
and Capt. A.S. Mathieson, still served Hari Singh as contract officers,
though they continued to receive instructions from the political agent
for Khyber based in Peshawar which was now Pakistan.
Brown and Mathieson had to swear an oath of allegiance to the
maharaja on the “holy book”. According to Alistair Lamb: “In fact, they
knew as the story has it that the book which they held in their hand,
while swearing was actually the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,
suitably wrapped in an opaque cloth.”
As the new governor occupied his official residence in the grandeur
of impotence, it was Brown and Mathieson who held the keys to power in
Gilgit.
Lt. Col. Bacon, on transfer from Gilgit, was given the Khyber post.
This ensured perfect coordination between the Gilgit Scouts and
Peshawar. According to the bulletin of Military Historical Society of
Great Britain, the broad post-Partition plan had been discussed by Brown
and Bacon in June 1947. And after Mathieson arrived in Gilgit, as
second in command, the two British officers refined contingency
measures, should the maharaja take his state over to India.
In such a situation, writes Sarila, whatever the fate of the rest of
J&K, delivering Gilgit to Pakistan was fairly straightforward. This
was accomplished on the night of October 31, 1947. As soon as Maharaja
Hari Singh acceded to India, Brown got the Gilgit Scouts to surround the
residency and, after a short gun battle, he imprisoned governor
Ghansara Singh. Brown then informed Peshawar about the accession of
Gilgit to Pakistan. On November 2, the major raised the Pakistani flag
at his headquarters and informed the force that they now served the
government in Karachi. Brown and Mathieson had surreptitiously opted for
service in Pakistan when the maharaja signed the Instrument of
Accession in favour of India. Since Gilgit by this act had become a part
of India, properly, they should have made an immediate request for
release from their appointments. But they didn’t.
The actions of Brown and Mathieson were suspect politically and,
while Brown describes it as a coup d’etat, Lamb writes that Brown was
certainly not acting as a party to a British conspiracy. However, there
existed a small number of British soldiers and officials who, in a
private capacity as friends of Pakistan, encouraged Brown and Mathieson
to be in Gilgit on the eve of the transfer of power. Moreover,
subsequent events came as no surprise to Col. Bacon, who certainly acted
as a liaison between Major Brown and the government of Pakistan. In
this respect, he may have contributed significantly to the success of
Gilgit coup d’etat. Col. Bacon, however, in no way represented the
policy of the British government in London.
The geopolitically sensitive Gilgit had been swallowed whole by two
Brits acting in concert with Pakistan. India was aghast. Sir George
Cunningham, the new governor of NWFP (whose role has been disputed in
the sending of the tribal raiders), on hearing of Brown’s coup in Gilgit
instructed him and his colleague Mathieson to restore order, ignoring
the fact that Gilgit was part of J&K, which had acceded to India.
Even the King of England didn’t frown upon the coup. An entry in the
1948 London Gazette reads: The King has been graciously pleased on the
occasion of his birthday to give orders for the following appointments
to the Most Exalted Order of the British Empire to Brown, Major (acting)
William Alexander, Special List (ex-Indian Army).”
It was unparalleled. Maj. Brown had been officially rewarded by the
King for the Gilgit coup, once again proving how the British continued
to play their sinister games of chicanery and subterfuge in the
subcontinent.
Soon Major Aslam Khan, once deputy to Major Khurshid Anwar (one of
the key Pakistan Army strategists who organised the tribal lashkar raid
on Kashmir from the Muzzafarabad road), arrived to take control over
Gilgit. Throughout the Kashmir War (October 22, 1947 to January 1,
1949), Britain successfully ensured that Pakistan’s occupation of this
region was not disturbed. After Mountbatten’s mediatory role and the
collapse of the direct talks between Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali
Khan, the Indian Cabinet planned a full-scale war. But Mountbatten made a
monumental blunder of suggesting to Nehru that “the UN would promptly
direct Pakistan to withdraw the raiders, which would make war
unnecessary.” And Nehru believed him, internationalising Kashmir in the
process. Thus, Gilgit was lost forever.
The writer is a former editor, author and visiting fellow at Observer Research Foundation. He loves the space where politics and economics converge.
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