A worrisome development is taking place in the South China Sea region amidst the rising tension in the area, particularly between China on the one side and Vietnam and the Philippines on the other side. Since the declaration of the verdict by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, China has been expressing her anger over the decision and has made clear that she has no intention of recognising this judgement. On predictable lines, China has criticised the verdict on several grounds-the Permanent Court of Arbitration has no jurisdiction over the issues considered by it, the composition of judges was flawed and no objective decision could be accepted by them, that the Philippines’ approaching the Permanent Court for the ruling was wrong, etc.
The behaviour of China is understandable as her several decades of efforts to establish hegemony in this region has been nullified by this verdict. Not only the Chinese claim in the region under the nine dash lines was declared as having no legal basis but it was also clarified that the features occupied by China cannot be considered islands under the UNCLOS Article 121 and therefore are not eligible for claiming extra limit of territorial waters and placed the blame on China for spoiling the maritime environment by her activities.
The recent Chinese cyber-attacks against the Philippines and Vietnam presage a grim picture. These attacks needs to be seen in a wider perspective of the Chinese game plan to bolster her claims in the area in the nine-dash line, reject the demand for the implementation of the verdict, conveying a strong message to those are pressing for its implementation and indicating that China would go to war if need be to protect her claims. The cyber-attacks by China against the Philippines and Vietnam are not a new thing. In the past these countries were subjected to the Chinese cyber-attacks and were linked to episodes like Scarborough Shoal crisis, Oil rig deployment in the Vietnamese EEZ region.
However the intensity and the selection of targets suggest that this was the biggest attack on these two countries. This time the Chinese hackers attacked the website of the national airline at two biggest airports of Vietnam (Noi Bai International Airport in Hanoi and Tan Son Nhat International Airport in Ho Chi Minh City) and placed statement as well as spoke against the stance of Vietnam and the Philippines on the South China Sea after taking over control over the speaker system at the Hanoi airport. An insulting message against the two countries was posted crossing all limits of decency. Earlier, 68 websites national and local government websites of the Philippines were attacked soon after the verdict was announced. These suggest a centralised plan for cyber-attacks.
Notwithstanding denial by 1937CN group that it was not involved, the pictures on the screen at the time of attack clearly revealed its involvement. This group was earlier involved in attacks in 2012, 2014 and 2015. It is clear that the hackers had not only support of the Chinese government but was directed by them if contents are taken into account. The moot question is whether this is an isolated action or a part of a wider strategy. It would be naïve to see these attacks as the reaction to the passport row. The message was clearly to the two countries’ stance on the South China Sea. It was not an episodic reaction. Significantly the Chinese defence minister Chang Wanquan has urged preparations for people’s war at sea and prepare to counter offshore security threat and safeguard sovereignty. Chang also linked ‘this threat from the sea’ to national security reflecting the importance given by China to South China Sea and its determination to protect her claims even at the cost of war. Crucially he asked the military, police and people to prepare to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This suggests that the attacks were a part of larger Chinese grand strategy.
China’s cyber strategic doctrine is the basis of the current operations against Vietnam and the Philippines. In Chinese ‘integrated strategic deterrence’, the cyber operations have the central role. Crucially in Chinese concept, deterrence of cyber operations could serve the same purpose as the nuclear deterrence in international environment. For China, the cyber warfare is the decisive element in its strategy to ascend the international system and is central in military conflicts. Therefore, China deliberately maintains an aggressive cyber warfare posture to deter its adversaries. Deterrence is achieved by projecting its capabilities for infiltration of critical infrastructure of adversaries; for military technological espionage to gain military knowledge; and for industrial espionage to gain economic advantage. By attacking national airline website and controlling speaker system, China has conveyed her capabilities to infiltrate into adversaries one of the most critical and secured infrastructure. In addition, China may have also acquired sensitive data from the airport, which may be used subsequently.
The Chinese concept of “No Contact War” is also significant in understanding the Chinese cyber operations. The underlying principle is fighting wars without its forces coming into contact with the forces of adversaries and winning war without causalities. It involves application of all national capabilities in an integrated manner to conduct distant operations to achieve a quick decisive victory by disrupting, denying and destroying the enemy’s war waging potential and its command and control systems through remote delivery of destructive kinetic energy and effective cyber operations. Thus the cyber-attacks are not merely to achieve deterrence but are also aimed at ensuring quick victory in conflicts. The Chinese defence minister’s statement assumes serious dimension in this context.
In South China Sea, China had been fighting three wars-
(i) psychological warfare to convey other disputants that it is futile to challenge China as she has not only better claims but also has resources to defend her national interests;
(ii) media warfare to build international support for China and ‘expose’ the weaknesses of the claims of adversaries; and
(iii) legal warfare to strengthen her legal claims based on historical evidence. In all the three wars, cyber operations play a critical role.
In the above context the Chinese objectives and likely moves can be anticipated. First notwithstanding the fact that the verdict has nullified Chinese ‘legal’ claims, she would continue to project that the verdict is flawed and that she has historical claims over the nine-dash line area. The cartographic aggression would be intensified. Second, various media platforms of China and her allies would be used for to build international support and would project that the claims of adversaries have no basis. Third, the most important aspect would be to put pressure on the disputants to accept that they cannot oppose China which has vast resources and could harm their interests. Cyber offensive operations would be intensified to achieve this objective. All these would also be accompanied with subtle diplomacy to keep the disputant divided. The very fact that ASEAN statement in July 2016 did not contain any reference to the verdict may have boosted Chinese confidence in achieving her objectives by keeping ASEAN divided.
The cyber-attacks thus are aimed at achieving the larger objectives in the South China Sea. It is worth noticing that China has strengthen her cyber offensive capabilities by establishing the new Strategic Support Force- a military service-level force equal in standing to China’s army, navy, air force and missile services. The Strategic Support Force includes the 3rd Department of PLA, which has highly-trained personnel who specialize in network attacks, information technology, code-breaking, and foreign languages; the 4th Department, which has the responsibility for military electronic intelligence and electronic warfare; and the 2nd Department the traditional military spy service devoted to human spying. In addition the civilian intelligence organisations like Ministry of State Security (Foreign Intelligence) and Ministry of Public Security (Internal Intelligence) are also linked to it. Thus China is now better prepared for cyber offensive operations than ever before. Other disputants need to be prepared for this and strengthen the safety of their critical infrastructures which are likely to witness increase in the coming period.
The Chinese cyber-attacks against Vietnam and the Philippines provide important lessons for India. China has been claiming areas in our border and terming Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet. She already has occupied a large chunk of J&K by an illegal agreement with her all weather friend Pakistan. Chinese forces are also present in PoK where they are facing opposition from the local people. Keeping in view the present situation when she sees India as a rival as India’s influence is growing in the ASEAN and India has stood for freedom of navigation as also of over-flight in the South China Sea, which in a way opposes Chinese claims in the nine dash line, extensive attacks on our critical information infrastructure cannot be ruled out.
China may try to project her claims on Arunachal Pradesh through these attacks as first step. Later it may indulge in DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks on our important sites. They have indulged in the past in such attacks but with their ‘integrated strategic deterrence’ in which cyber-attacks play a central role, intensified attacks are a distinct possibility. Chinese cartographic aggression is continuing and there appears no indication that she is going to behave like a responsible nation. India needs to prepare itself against such large scale attacks. Needless to say that our deterrence would work only if the Chinese know about India’s offensive capabilities.
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