August 19, 2016
The United States Air Force is fighting insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria—but in recent years, the Air Force has had to contend with two uprisings much closer to home in Washington, DC. One was the storm of criticism it received over the controversial and expensive F-35 Lightning stealth fighter—but the trillion-dollar project falls under the definition of “too big to fail,” at least contractually speaking.
The other revolt concerned the fate of the A-10 Thunderbolt II ground attack plane, nicknamed the Warthog for its svelte good looks. In this case, Congressional activism succeeded in thwarting the A-10’s retirement, at least for now. Despite some gnashing of teeth by the top brass—accusations of “treason” were leveled at Warthog proponents at one point—a fleet of fewer than three hundred A-10s will remain in service at least until 2022—some possibly up until 2028. It is currently being deployed operationally in the campaign against ISIS.
The debate around the Thunderbolt is instructive because it reveals divergent philosophies and priorities within the U.S. military. While some of the political tactics in the A-10 debate may be controversial, both sides have rationales for their positions, which are worth judging on their own merits.
The Warthog can be described in four words, but I’ll add in a few hundred more because I’m generous that way.
Slow, because it flies well below the speed of sound—typically 350 miles per hour, and not much over 400—in order to give the pilot time to spot targets on the ground and line up attack runs.
Tough, because the A-10 has 1,200 pounds of titanium armor—unlike the Air Force’s fighter planes—and is designed to withstand hits from light antiaircraft cannons. An A-10 once returned to base in this condition after being hit by a missile.
Heavily armed, because in addition to carrying sixteen thousand pounds of bombs, rockets and missiles on eleven hardpoints, the A-10 is the only aircraft armed with the massive GAU-8 Avenger thirty-millimeter Gatling-style autocannon, with over a thousand shells each “the size of a milk bottle.” (That is, if your milk bottles are as slender as soda bottles.)
When it was first deployed in 1977, the A-10 was basically intended to be used as a flying sledgehammer against Soviet tank divisions. It wasn’t expected to survive very long performing this mission: even flying low to avoid long-range radar-guided SAMs, Air Force planners anticipated that, in the event of a Soviet invasion, they would lose their entire fleet of A-10s in just a few weeks of intense combat. Fortunately, such a scenario never materialized. Instead, the A-10 first won its fame destroying thousands of vehicles in the Gulf War.
Rarely has an aircraft so ugly been so passionately beloved, both by troops on the ground and in popular culture. So why does the Air Force leadership want to retire its Hogs? And why do its supporters so strenuously object?
I’ll try to roll out some of the arguments made by both sides. Please keep in mind that the counterarguments are not intended to be intrinsically more correct than the arguments.
Argument: The A-10 isn’t survivable in a high-threat environment.
This is basically issue number one: the slow, unstealthy A-10 is vulnerable to a full range of air defense systems developed by Russia and China that have only become more sophisticated with each passing year. Even against a lesser but heavily armed foe—think Iran or North Korea—the Warthog could suffer heavy losses unless air defenses were first suppressed. An A-10’s armor may provide protection against low-caliber flak and give it a fighting chance at surviving a hit from a smaller missile, but it will not offer much protection from the full array of tactical and theater Surface to Air Missile (SAM) systems.
Exhibit A in this argument is the A-10 in the Gulf War: four Warthogs were lost to SAMs (an SA-9, two SA-13s and a shoulder-fired SA-16), and three returned to base too damaged to fly again. These losses were inflicted by Cold War–era SAM systems operated by poorly trained crews.
A fast, high-flying fighter can fly above the effective range of antiaircraft guns, Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), or short range systems such as the SA-9. Stealth aircraft, like the F-22 and F-35, may also be able to operate in the vicinity of longer-range air defense systems without being targetable.
So, the argument goes, in the most vital scenario of national defense—a high-intensity conflict against an opponent with modern air-defense systems—the A-10 has little chance of surviving.
Counterargument: Almost all of the wars the United States has fought recently were in low-threat environments.
Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq again, Libya, Syria. The list of wars the A-10 has been employed in is basically all of the wars that the United States has fought since 1991. And continued engagement against lower-tier foes seems more likely than a devastating clash against peer military powers.
The conflicts over Iraq and the former Yugoslavia were also hardly zero-threat environments. For example, three F-16s and two F-15s were also shot down by SAMs in the Gulf War. Meanwhile, despite suffering losses, the A-10 accounted for nine hundred tanks, out of the 1,700 claimed by aircraft of all types in the campaign.
Only a single A-10 was lost in combat over a decade later, in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and none since. For over a dozen years, Hogs have so far survived their occasional encounters with missiles and antiaircraft guns. Army attack helicopters, also providing close support to ground forces in the same threat environment, have suffered heavier losses.
From this perspective, the fixation on preparing to fight high-tech opponents is a case of the Air Force preferring to plan for hypothetical wars in the future rather than for the ones in which it is engaged in the present.
Argument: The A-10 is a more effective close air-support platform than its proposed replacements.
The U.S. military found in Vietnam that jet fighters had difficulty identifying ground targets and lining up attacks runs because they were simply too fast, and performed poorly at low speeds. One of the more efficient close air support platforms in that war was the tubby A-1 Skyraider, a propeller plane that looked like it came out of World War II. It is no coincidence that today the air forces of Iraq and Nigeria, amongst others, are interested in the A-29 Tucano, a slow-flying propeller planes capable of carrying modern weapons for use in a counterinsurgency role.
The A-10, like the Skyraider, can fly slower and closer to the ground so as to effectively observe the situation and more precisely target its attacks. This added situational awareness can make a big difference for troops on the ground: an A-10 pilot may be able spot enemies that friendlies below don’t see, and better verify that he isn’t hitting friendly troops by accident. Furthermore, the A-10 can loiter overhead for hours while supporting friendly troops, longer than most fighters can under typical conditions.
The Thunderbolt’s thirty-millimeter cannon has no equivalent on other U.S. airplanes. It is ideal for chewing up armored vehicles (including tanks hit on the top or rear armor, but especially infantry fighting vehicles and other light armor) and allows the A-10 to attack targets much closer to enemy troops than is possible with a guided bomb. Not only is it far more lethal than the twenty-millimeter cannons on American fighters, but it carries six times more rounds than the F-35, and over twice as many as the F-16 and F-22. The F-35 stealth fighters are also limited to only four ammunition hardpoints if they are deployed using their stealth capabilities—that is, without externally stowed weapons.
Additionally, Warthogs are “short takeoff and landing” aircraft that can operate from rough landing strips closer to the front line, with engines designed to withstand loose debris from unprepared runways.
Of course, flying low and slow exposes the A-10 to fire from weapons such as heavy machine guns and ZSU-23 antiaircraft guns. But the A-10’s armor and design gives it a better chance of surviving hits by antiaircraft weapons compared to other U.S. warplanes.
Counterargument: Missiles and guided bombs make flying low and slow mostly unnecessary—and it’s unnecessarily risky.
Precision-guided missile and bomb strikes are used in the majority of air support missions today. Targets can be identified and painted by a Forward Air Controller on the ground, so that the pilot can safely fly high and fast to avoid enemy antiaircraft fire.
Even in the Gulf War, A-10s probably destroyed far more tanks using Maverick missiles than with cannons. But all kind of planes can be equipped to fire Mavericks and other precision-guided munitions: not just fast F-35s and F-16s, but also AC-130W gunships and B-52 bombers. The Air Force (controversially) records 80 percent of Close Air Support missions since 2006 as having been performed by aircraft other than the A-10.
The A-10’s cannon, while impressive, does not justify maintaining the plane by itself. The AC-130 gunship can operate with long loiter times in low-threat environments if necessary.
While fast jets aren’t ideal for spotting enemies on the ground from the air, that role should be left over to drones or long-range sensors—which have improved significantly on new aircraft such as the F-35. Ultimately, in the current air-defense environment it is wiser to avoid exposing aircraft to antiaircraft guns and MANPADS
Argument: The A-10 is too old, outdated and overspecialized
The A-10 dates back to the 1970s. Operating the A-10 and keeping it in flyable condition will cost money—at least $4.2 billion over the next five years—that could be spent on modern aircraft such as the F-35 that could perform a wide variety of missions. The A-10 is a dedicated close-support plane that can’t contribute to other kinds of operations—including close support in a high-threat environment. The Air Force can’t afford to pay for such specialized designs.
Counterargument: It isn’t really that old and expensive. Operating the Air Force’s A-10s consumes just 2 percent of its budget. The “too old” argument is a bit disingenuous. A service-life extension to reinforce the wings of 240 aircraft is being completed, and should keep the aircraft flyable for decades.
The A-10 is capable of performing other missions besides close air support: forward air observation (observing the battlefield from above and directing airstrikes), interdiction, armed reconnaissance and support for combat search-and-rescue missions. They also could have application in maritime missions, and have recently been deployed to the Philippines.
Finally, the A-10 could be a surprisingly effective fighter—for hunting slow, low-flying helicopters, that is.
Argument: The A-10 is the most cost-effective air support platform.
The cost of operating an A-10 is extremely low, around $17,000 per flight-hour. By comparison, an F-15 costs around $40,000 per flight-hour, and the new F-35 costs $67,000 per hour. (The latter’s cost is expected to decrease with time.)
Yet despite repeated attempts to shut down the Thunderbolt, the aircraft keeps on getting deployed to conflict hotspots because it gets the job done.
While faster and more sophisticated fighter can deliver precision guided munitions against insurgents, just like the A-10, they aren’t better than the A-10 at that job. And the A-10 does it way more cheaply.
Counterargument: Um…
I could try to make up an argument here, but the Air Force leaders have themselves tentatively expressed a change of heart in regard to operating low-cost aircraft for the close air support mission in permissive (low-threat) environments. According to General James Holmes, “[the F-35] would certainly be an expensive way to go after a permissive environment mission and we hope to not have to do that, so we will look at other options.” The options mentioned are between developing a new ground-attack plane or acquiring AT-6 or A-29 counterinsurgency aircraft.
Although my take on the A-10 debate will not satisfy everyone, I think you can judge where you stand on the Warthog debate by your answers to the following questions:
1. Should the Air Force focus mostly on preparing for possible future war against peer opponents, or set aside resources for the kinds of conflicts the U.S. military has fought in the previous two decades?
2. Is it better to maintain a cost-efficient war plane that is very effective at a specific role, or use that money to acquire a more expensive and versatile airplane, even if it cannot perform that specific role as well?
Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.
No comments:
Post a Comment