Opportunities Slipping Away in Afghanistan

By James L. Creighton

http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/opportunities-slipping-away-in-afghanistan/

Both the Afghan government and the international coalition bear responsibility for the country’s lack of progress. 

After 15 years of international cooperation following the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan has progressed dramatically, although admittedly from a low starting point. The country has increased literacy rates and school attendance for both boys and girls. Electricity is now expected in major cities where it was nonexistent 15 years ago. Major projects such as the Salma Dam have been opened and others such as the Kajaki Dam are progressing toward utilization. Roads between all major cities are functional where they were a series of loosely connected potholes in 2001. 

But, considering the massive expenditure and effort to achieve this progress, the results are not satisfactory. The opportunities presented to the Afghan people via the overwhelming support provided by the international community will slip away without persistent and patient ongoing support.

The Afghan Government Working to Earn Respect

International commitment is waning as a result of the Afghan government’s stalled progress. The National Unity Government remains intact, but despite a positive vision from President Ashraf Ghani it has not lived up to expectations. Corruption from the ministerial down to the district level is rampant as many officials are concerned more with their own needs than the needs of their constituents. Cooperation between the president and CEO Abdullah Abdullah exists in public, but in private there is growing separation and mistrust. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for October 15, 2016 after a delay of over a year, but planning and preparation are lagging. Government institutions suffer from a lack of funding and human capacity at all levels. 

There are, however, signs of hope. Ghani’s personal energy and concept for a positive future include specific actions to address the major concerns. His outreach to improve relations with Pakistan in March 2015, however, failed to deliver a perceived reciprocal response, which cost him significant political capital and goodwill with many within Afghanistan’s political environment. 

Ghani’s dialogues with Pakistani military and ministerial leaders in March 2015 acknowledged the special relationship between the two countries and the economic and security gains that could potentially be gained by effective cooperation. The history of Afghan-Pakistani relations is fraught with mistrust, subterfuge, and competition; however, the relationship is also central to the eventual defeat of the Taliban and promotion of regional economic cooperation and growth. After Ghani’s visit to Pakistan in March 2015, the Pakistan government committed to demonstrating tangible results and progress toward improved relations. After 15 months, this commitment has fallen flat, and the relationship has continued to sour.

Ghani has subsequently shifted his focus. He is looking to Iran in the west, China in the east, and north to the Central Asian republics to assist in developing Afghanistan’s economic potential. These efforts will help but will not allow Afghanistan to maximize its economic potential and will not create the environment for cooperation against the Taliban and other insurgents. The governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan must continue to work toward a more cooperative relationship militarily and economically. They do not need to be friends but they need to work together to combat insurgent forces that pose an existential threat to both countries. There is no silver bullet that will resolve their tensions; therefore, both sides must look to small actions that can begin to build a more trusting relationship. Cooperation on visa requirements for local Pashtuns affected by the Durand Line is one area that could represent a small step forward.

A Stagnant Economy

The significant decrease in foreign investment and aid has hindered economic growth projections and infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. This decrease was not unexpected, and steps have been taken to make projects more cost-effective. The government of Afghanistan, in close cooperation with Resolute Support’s Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTCA) and donor nations, has instituted a detailed contract review system. Touted by the president and confirmed by CSTCA, the contract review initiative has significantly reduced the cost of the hundreds of existing contracts while maintaining the contracts’ goals and objectives. It has reduced the number of subcontractors allowed from more than three or four to a maximum of one level below the primary contractor. Also, an annual review has been introduced, eliminating the backlog and now reviewing contracts in minute detail for the coming years. Contracts that had little or no quality assurance and quality control are now more closely scrutinized. There is confidence on both sides that even with drastically reduced costs the thousands of projects already agreed upon will be finished to standard. The scrutiny of contractual agreements has also focused successfully on reducing corruption and improving transparency. Combined, these initiatives will go a long way to helping develop a sustainable infrastructure.

However, the economy has struggled with the loss of coalition demand for goods and services. There are several demonstrative aspects hindering economic growth and regional cooperation: 

The friction with Pakistan over the long term status of the Durand Line has marginalized the gains achieved in long term multi-entry visas, border crossing point procedures, and trade and transit cooperation. 

Afghanistan has not been able to raise the capital and international investment needed to exploit the $1 trillion worth of mineral potential in Afghanistan. 

Afghanistan’s financial system and rule of law have not earned the trust of international investors, which inhibits the vast potential for regional and international direct investment in Afghanistan. 

The tax code and rules associated with best business practices are at best written but not promulgated, or at worst yet to be codified at all. 

The outward migration of educated and capable Afghans and their capital is having a negative impact on the ability of the government and private sector to build economic capacity. 

The narcotics-driven illicit economy continues to grow and fund insurgent activity. 

Despite these many challenges, the economy grew by 1.3 percent in 2014 and 1.5 percent in 2015; the trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan reached 20,000 licit and illicit vehicles a day; and major regional and global agreements are moving forward.

Afghanistan’s acceptance into global and regional trade associations as well as the slow but continuous movement on regional infrastructure agreements bodes well for the long term. Afghanistan was formally accepted into the World Trade Organization on December 17, 2015. The country has been an active member of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) since April 2007. The Central Asia–South Asia power project, CASA 1000, has been approved for engineering and continues to move slowly through funding agreements; once completed, it will be a centerpiece for regional cooperation. 

In addition, the $44 billion leg of China’s One Belt, One Road initiative in Pakistan is seen as an opportunity for Pakistan and Afghanistan to cooperate. As part of the plan, the Chinese will build a road and connect it to both Karachi and the new Gwadar Port. China’s concept, combined with India’s agreement with Iran to build Chabahar Port, will yield an opportunity to connect east and west routes to north and south routes. The approximately 100 miles between the two ports offers the opportunity to link Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran to major trade routes. Although in the near term progress is slow and tangible results are often hard to see, mid-term and long-term integration efforts continue to move forward.

Securing the People

Hindering progress, however, the security environment continues to deteriorate, with a resilient Taliban and the infiltration of other insurgent organizations. On the positive side, Hezb-i-Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, appears ready to formally reconcile with the Afghan government. This is big win for the Ghani government and will enable the government to focus on a more narrow insurgent threat base. 

The killing of Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour created a vacuum in the insurgent leadership which has contributed to a delayed summer fighting season. The Taliban have expanded their influence in many provinces in the south and east as well as the region surrounding Kunduz in the north. In provinces such as Helmand and Uruzgan the insurgents have tested the Afghan National Security Forces, limiting government influence and communications, especially in the rural and remote regions. 

For its part, the Afghan Army took the offensive in Kunduz, where it was able to prevent a repeat of last year’s capture of the provincial capital. The army has been able to recruit over 50,000 new soldiers over the last year, replacing large losses due to enemy contact, desertion, and normal attrition, which is a positive view on a difficult first year without substantial coalition military support.

The Resolute Support mission to "enhance the Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan" lends credibility to the long-term security prospects. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) continue to improve, though they have many obstacles to overcome. They must develop strong junior leaders who can act independently in the rural areas of the country. Their logistics systems and accountability suffer from an overreliance on coalition support (enabled by the coalition in many cases.) The inertia of a fire base mentality is beginning to give way to a more proactive posture; however, the insurgents still exploit gaps in security created by ANDSF units that stay in their secure redoubts. 

Local leaders and citizens are not blind to the resilient Taliban, unabated corruption, and economic slowdown. In general they want a better life for their families and path to a secure lifestyle. They are willing to support whichever route will get them to a stable situation and a more positive future. Consequently, there is a general feeling that in the threatened areas people are hedging their bets. They do not support the Taliban inherently but if the Taliban represents a more direct line to a secure and predictable environment then they will tolerate the incumbent abuses of authority. There is a general deterioration in the people’s confidence that the government will prevail in providing a reasonable environment. The Afghan government has a chance to prove that it can provide a more secure and stable life; they just have to make it happen.

The impact of security concerns, governmental mistrust, and economic prognosis on citizens is a gradual loss of hope. The indecisive nature of coalition support has served to hasten this loss of hope. The United States has fallen into a pattern of announcing its withdrawal and then reversing the decision. The United States agrees to long term support but then changes course until the situation on the ground becomes so critical that the decision is reversed. Unlike Germany, Italy, Japan, and Korea where the United States fully committed to long term relationships after conflict, Afghan support has been continuously questioned. The inconsistent nature of the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan makes it difficult for citizens to trust the long-term viability of their own government. The citizens see the deteriorating security environment in rural areas, the lack of progress of the National Unity Government, and slow economic growth and question their loyalty to the Government of Afghanistan. They subsequently hedge their bets by allowing the Taliban to gain and sustain a foothold in their villages and districts. The government needs consistent guarantees of international commitment in order to improve and earn the support of its people.

Avoiding a Backslide

Progress in Afghanistan is glacial. Everything is inherently difficult. The Afghan government has failed to capitalize on the tremendous international goodwill and support provided over the last 15 years. The levels of corruption, ineffective institutions, and inability to provide a secure environment have created a lack of trust from the people, which jeopardizes the long-term prognosis. The coalition, meanwhile, has squandered opportunities by not clearly understanding the problem, not properly administering development funding, killing civilians through accidental (and tragically sometimes purposeful) misuse of force and accidents, and failing to adequately assist the government of Afghanistan in creating a more stable environment. 

But the international community committed thousands of lives and billions of dollars to the challenge that is Afghan security, stability, and eventual growth. The initial premise after September 11, 2001 was accurate: prevent a terrorist safe haven from returning and help build a stable Afghanistan. Considering where Afghanistan was in 2001 with regard to social well-being, infrastructure, education, security, and just about every other indicator, the country has made remarkable progress. The way forward is difficult and has many challenging obstacles; however, substantial progress has been made in every sector. The coalition’s continued unambiguous support is vital for ultimate Afghan stability. Meanwhile, the Afghan government must redouble its efforts to fix the problems it knows too well. Letting the progress that has been made slip away would only serve to squander the sacrifices made.

The Author 

Colonel (Retired) James L. Creighton commanded a coalition brigade in Uruzgan from 2010 – 2011 and was the lead author in writing the operations plan for the surge in 2009. He is a distinguished fellow at the EastWest Institute and has interviewed dozens of officials at the highest levels in Afghanistan over the last six months.