China’s Nuclear Deterrence in the Asian and Global Contexts

JIANQUN TENG

June 30, 2016

Summary: China’s nuclear deterrence thinking comes from its classic military thought, which will be still the driving force for the theory and practice of its nuclear deterrence in the future.

INTRODUCTION

Jianqun Teng is the director of the Department for American Studies and a senior research fellow at the Chinese Institute of International Studies (CIIS). He has worked at CIIS since he was discharged from 25 years of active military service in 2004.The end of the Cold War sharply reduced the importance of nuclear weapons in national security. In April 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama announced an ambitious initiative: a world free of nuclear weapons. In the years that followed, the world witnessed solid cooperation among major countries on nuclear disarmament and nuclear security. Chinese President Hu Jintao voiced his support at the United Nations: “When conditions are ripe, other nuclear weapon states should also join the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament.”1

However, the momentum for disarmament dissipated when the relationships among the major powers deteriorated. Today, instead of cooperation, there is a standoff between China and the United States over the South China Sea, there is a standoff between Russia and the United States over Ukraine, and a U.S. missile defense system has been deployed in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, regional nuclear dynamics still pose challenges for maintaining peace and stability. Just recently, North Korea conducted its fourth round of nuclear tests and pledged to become a nuclear-armed state.

China has been watching this situation closely, and it continues to attach great importance to the credible nuclear capabilities of other states. This study assesses the current nuclear posture around the world, explores the evolution of China’s nuclear policy and strategy, and offers suggestions for China’s future choices.

A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT GLOBAL NUCLEAR POSTURE

Nuclear issues have always been a balance of two imperatives. Nuclear weapons states seek to consolidate their nuclear capabilities in order to maintain their own security, while at the same time, the international community insists on disarmament and the end of weapons of mass destruction. Recent efforts at arms reduction have demonstrated the tension between these two imperatives. Even as the United States and Russia continue to disarm, as outlined in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), both countries are undertaking modernization efforts for their nuclear arsenals. Meanwhile, regional nuclear issues in Asia have become the most challenging arena for efforts at arms control and nonproliferation. North Korea has completed a fourth round of nuclear tests, and will continue its effort to become a nuclear-armed state. Nuclear security in the Asia-Pacific region has become another concern within the region. Given these complicated circumstances, China’s nuclear doctrine may need to evolve; but in the foreseeable future, China will not change its current nuclear policy and strategy.

Without a strong consensus among the major powers to carry out large-scale arms control and disarmament, the momentum for disarmament in international organizations—still the most important forums for nuclear issues—has slowed down in recent years.

International Organizations

In recent decades, relentless efforts have been made by the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), among others, to help promote the arms control and disarmament process. Yet despite their efforts, only limited progress has been made. In 2015, the UN Security Council adopted 64 resolutions, only four of which were related to international arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. And most of these four resolutions were related to North Korea’s nuclear program. On March 2, 2016, after North Korea’s fourth round of tests, the UN Security Council adopted its toughest sanction yet (Resolution 2270) against North Korea.

The UN Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is another forum for the international community on nuclear issues. At a meeting of this conference from April 27 to May 22, 2015, 190 state parties reviewed the NPT’s implementation and discussed the direction and priorities for the next phase of work. The conference also discussed the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones. Yet despite several rounds of negotiations, the states failed to approve a final document, as different opinions remained on ensuring a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

The IAEA, an important institution for monitoring the global nuclear order, has made constructive efforts in recent years to solve regional nuclear issues and ensure nuclear security. It has been one of the most important partners in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed by Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5 + 1). On July 14, 2015, the IAEA signed a road map with Iran to clarify issues, including the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. On December 2, the IAEA proposed an evaluation report on Iran, saying the country had secretly conducted a series of activities related to nuclear weapon research and development in about 2003. It noted that those activities were still below the level that would allow the country to acquire nuclear capabilities. The agency also stated that it had not detected similar nuclear activities in the country since 2009. On December 17, 2015, the IAEA decided to end its twelve-year-long investigation of Iran’s possible nuclear weapon research. This indicates that the issue of Iran’s possible military dimensions was solved.

The United States and Russia

The United States and Russia are continuing to cut the sizes of their nuclear arsenals in compliance with New START, but at the same time they are both modernizing their nuclear forces. As a result, the capability of their nuclear arsenals has actually increased since New START was signed in 2010. Russian President Vladimir Putin has mentioned the importance of nuclear weapons on many occasions. These mentions have been seen as a powerful signal to deter NATO, which is led by the United States. Developing a complete system of nuclear weapons has been the basis of Russia’s security policies since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Since 1991, Russia’s and NATO’s dependence on nuclear weapons has undergone fundamental changes. During the Cold War, NATO relied on nuclear weapons to counter the Warsaw Pact’s advantage in conventional forces. But since the end of the Cold War, Russia has become more and more dependent on nuclear weapons to deter NATO’s superior conventional forces. Putin has made nuclear strategy the basis of Russia’s security policy. This change has had an impact on both the United States’ and Russia’s policies and actions on nuclear disarmament and nuclear arsenal modernization.

The Iranian Nuclear Deal

After more than ten years of effort, in 2015 the international community finally reached a comprehensive deal to address Iran’s nuclear program. This agreement sets an example for how to resolve nuclear issues through dialogue and negotiations. On July 14, 2015, Iran, the European Union, and the P5 + 1 agreed on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA prevents Iran from developing nuclear weapons, but respects its rights to peacefully use nuclear power. The deal also outlines steps to lift economic sanctions from Iran and to monitor Iran’s development of nuclear power. The JCPOA is not only a positive development for nuclear issues, but is also conducive to strengthening the NPT and promoting regional peace and stability. The JCPOA nuclear deal took effect on October 18, 2015, and the United States and Iran pledged to abide by its related regulations.

The Iran nuclear deal has been an effective example for the international community of how to solve regional nuclear problems through negotiation. The JCPOA ensures that Iran still has the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The deal is intended to be a dividing line to distinguish whether a country’s nuclear program is peaceful or is aimed at developing nuclear weapons. And the deal’s comprehensiveness ensures that Iran will reintegrate itself into the international community. As the implementation of the deal continues, Western countries will gradually lift their sanctions, which will promote the development of Iran’s overseas trade and foreign investment, as well as its technology.

North Korean Nuclear Issues

In recent years, nuclear developments in North Korea have undergone a variety of twists and turns, and North Korea has become a major problem for the international community. Although North Korea stated its intention to pursue a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, it is still on track to advance its nuclear weapons program. On January 6, 2016, it conducted its fourth round of nuclear tests. After the tests, the international community strongly condemned North Korea, but North Korea did not waver. In addition, North Korea restarted the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, which had been suspended under the Six-Party Talks agreement. And North Korea also expanded the construction of a uranium enrichment plant, indicating its determination to build nuclear weapons. According to a report on North Korea’s nuclear program issued by the United State Congressional Research Service, North Korea may have 30 to 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, which can produce six to eight nuclear warheads.2

CHINA’S NUCLEAR POLICY AND DETERRENCE

As argued by scholars both in China and abroad, there are several approaches to explain why China developed nuclear weapons immediately after the Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Among them, two are mentioned more often than others.

First, the new PRC needed to respond to the threat of nuclear blackmail by the United States and the Soviet Union. As a newly formed republic, China felt that its survival and security were paramount. During the 1950s, the largest nuclear threat came from the United States, due to the Korean War, the Indochina War, and the treaty signed between the United States and Chinese Taiwan. All these events deeply influenced the decisionmaking of the first generation of the PRC’s leaders concerning the security and survival of the new government.

After Sino-Soviet relations began deteriorating in the late 1950s, China had to face another nuclear power—the Soviet Union. According to an Indian scholar, China faced nuclear threats several times, both from the United States and the Soviet Union, from the 1950s to the 1970s.3 China’s drive to go nuclear during the 1950s and 1960s, therefore, can be understood as an effort to counter the threat of nuclear blackmail from these two superpowers. As Devin Hagerty points out, “China’s 1964 nuclear test and subsequent weaponization were rooted in Beijing’s concern over the United States and later the Soviet Union as threatening adversaries.”4

Second, the PRC’s leaders sought to break the nuclear weapons monopoly of the United States and Soviet Union. In the minds of the first generation of Chinese leaders, the atomic bomb was a form of political leverage rather than a military weapon, even though they surely were quite familiar with the destructive power of nuclear weapons. Breaking up the Western imperialist monopoly on nuclear technology was considered one of the most important tasks for China. Traditional Chinese military thought—which sought to avoid war through thorough preparation—as well as the military theories of Marxism and Leninism, which argued for the use of force against imperialism—also deeply influenced the attitudes of the first generation of leaders toward nuclear weapons.

Beijing’s logic was that if Washington and its allies monopolized the use of nuclear weapons, the danger of nuclear war would be much greater. Thus, because the United States had nuclear weapons, China should have them as well. Only in this way, the Chinese leaders believed, could the elimination of nuclear weapons be possible.

From October 1964 to June 1987, China carried out 33 nuclear tests. Among the five official nuclear weapons states, China had tested the smallest number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with China’s philosophy of avoiding war through nuclear capability, only a small number of nuclear warheads are necessary; the quality of the weapons is more important than the quantity. Statements of the previous three generations of China’s leaders show the same perspective regarding the development of nuclear weapons: China should have its own nuclear weapons as leverage against the monopoly held by the United States and the Soviet Union, and against the threat of blackmail that this monopoly facilitates. As a consequence of this perspective, China has always followed the most economical path in developing nuclear weapons.

The central objective of China’s nuclear capability is to maintain minimum and effective deterrence capability. This capability entails building a nuclear force that can survive a nuclear first strike from any country and then return a second strike. Since the 1970s, China’s nuclear force has been undergoing modernization, and its silo-based, liquid-fueled nuclear missiles have been replaced by mobile, solid-fueled systems.

China’s nuclear policy has three important characteristics. First, China’s nuclear policy is defined by a no-first-use (NFU) declaration. This will not change in the long run. The success of China’s NFU policy depends on its leaders being knowledgeable about nuclear weapons, and on their confidence that China has a strong-enough conventional force.

In recent years, the NFU policy has been challenged by some scholars and officers in China, who say that economic development along the country’s east coast and the development of high-technology military equipment have fundamentally changed the nature of modern warfare, and that the country’s NFU commitment should be adjusted accordingly. They say that some conditions should be put on the policy—for example, exempting certain strategic targets in China from the NFU commitment. Such a modification would give officials and policy advisers more latitude to adjust nuclear policy and strategy to fit current needs.

China has solid reasons to insist on an NFU policy. First, NFU is a state policy, which reflects the Chinese philosophy and culture of warfare. Second, in the predictable future, there will be no large-scale conventional war against China. Third, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has recently undergone modernization and reform, has the capability to protect the mainland from invasion. Fourth, tactically speaking, discarding NFU from China’s nuclear strategy would completely change the structure and deployment of the country’s nuclear force. Although, in recent years, many resources have been allocated to the PLA’s Rocket Forces, the Chinese government would not pay the bill for the forces’ further enlargement that discarding NFU would necessitate.

For decades, some officials and scholars have considered NFU as the extent of China’s nuclear strategy. In a white paper, China’s National Defense 2006, the Chinese government announced its nuclear strategy—a self-defensive nuclear strategy—for the first time.5 According to the white paper, China’s nuclear strategy is subject to the state’s nuclear policy and military strategy. Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. In keeping with its self-defensive strategy, China will continue both to maintain a minimum nuclear force and to support the process of nuclear disarmament.

U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE AND CHINA’S RESPONSE

Since the late 1980s, Chinese experts and officials have paid close attention to the missile defense program of the United States. If one looks at the U.S. missile defense deployment in the Asia-Pacific region, one can find a chain of installations already in position along the eastern part of China. Chinese experts consider the United States’ antimissile system in China’s neighborhood to be a replica of its missile defense strategy in Eastern Europe against Russia.

For at least the past two decades, scholars and experts have voiced concern about the U.S. missile defense program, and Chinese officials have spoken against deploying it in Northeast Asia, as seen in white papers and speeches. On August 12, 2009, the then–foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, told the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that the U.S. missile defense program in the Asia-Pacific region would do no good for regional peace and stability, adding that China opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. China has joined all related international treaties and mechanisms; has put in place a comprehensive system of laws and regulations compatible with the relevant international legal regime; and has strictly enforced UN Security Council Resolution 1540, as well as other nonproliferation resolutions. According to Yang, the practice of seeking an absolute strategic advantage through missile defense should be abandoned, and countries should neither develop missile defense systems that undermine global strategic stability nor deploy weapons in outer space. His speech gave the world a clear-cut signal that China is not in favor of any kind of missile defense system—which, he explained, would harm the region’s stability.6

China’s concerns about the U.S. missile defense program have been emphasized repeatedly in official publications. For instance, the white paper China’s National Defense 2010 said,

International military competition remains fierce. Major powers are stepping up the realignment of their security and military strategies, accelerating military reform, and vigorously developing new and more sophisticated military technologies. Some powers have worked out strategies for outer space, cyber space and the polar regions, developed means for prompt global strikes, accelerated development of missile defense systems, enhanced cyber operations capabilities to occupy new strategic commanding heights. Some developing countries maintain the push toward strengthening armed forces, and press on with military modernization. Progress has been made in international arms control, but prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains complex, there is still much to do to maintain and strengthen the international non-proliferation mechanism.7

China has taken a very clear position on the possible deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system (THAAD) in Northeast Asia. During a briefing in October 2014, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said the move damaged peace and stability in the region. She made the comment after media reports said that the U.S. military had delivered an X-band radar system to the Kyogamisaki military base in Kyoto. This radar system, which scans for missile launches from North Korea, was expected to start operation in 2014. Hua continued, “Some countries have pushed forward antimissile system deployment in the Asia-Pacific region to seek unilateral security, which runs against regional stability and mutual trust as well as peace and stability in Northeast Asia. . . . This move causes even more concerns, under the backdrop of [a] complex and sensitive regional situation.” She called on relevant countries to focus on the broader picture of regional peace and stability and be committed to maintaining regional security through political and diplomatic means: “Relevant countries should not take their own security concerns as excuses for damaging others’ security interests.”8

In November 2014, the Chinese ambassador to South Korea, Qiu Guohong, warned that if South Korea allows the United States to deploy the THAAD battery on its soil, it would hurt Seoul-Beijing relations. North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, early in 2016, gave the South Korean leaders and the United States more excuses to have such a deployment.

Missile defense has strategic significance for the countries of Northeast Asia. At the end of the Cold War, when the United States largely abandoned its Star Wars missile defense plan that had been initiated by the Reagan administration, South Korea became very cautious in responding to invitations from the United States to participate in missile defense programs.

There are many reasons for South Korea’s cautious response, but three stand out. First, the program itself is sensitive—participation would damage South Korea’s security environment because it would induce North Korea, China, and Russia to make South Korea a target. Second, technology related to missile defense has been so uncertain that even the United States has doubts about its capacity to deal with the threat of missiles launched from North Korea. Third and finally, South Korea has its own ambitious kinetic missile defense plan, which mainly targets short- or medium-range ballistic missiles from North Korea, whereas THAAD mainly targets ballistic missiles with a range of more than 3,500 kilometers.

The deployment of U.S. THAAD systems has become, to some extent, a hot potato in South Korea. On one hand, it would provide South Korea with new protection even if it does not provide a 100 percent guarantee. On the other hand, South Korea must weigh the likely negative responses from relevant neighboring countries.

China has repeatedly reiterated its position on the U.S. missile defense project in Northeast Asia, expressing great concern not only about THAAD but also about the entire missile defense program. Russia now encounters the U.S. missile defense program on two fronts, both in the Asia-Pacific region and in Eastern Europe. North Korea, as the major target of the U.S. program, will continue to criticize the deployment of any advanced weapons system in this region.

The opposition to the U.S. deployment of a missile defense system in this region should not only be a technical or security matter. Behind the curtain of competition is the relationship between the United States, China, and South Korea. The Obama administration’s pro-Asian pivot, or rebalancing strategy, is a double-edged sword for the countries of Asia. China has recognized the pressure from the United States on its security. South Korea has also recognized the pressure from the United States. The enhancement of the traditional alliance between the United States and South Korea has already become one of the most important pillars of the rebalancing.

The possible deployment of the U.S. THAAD system in South Korea will test the United States’ relationships with South Korea, China, and even Russia. THAAD is not simply a military project to strengthen South Korean and U.S. security. Other factors are already involved—and China has raised its voice against THAAD and will take measures to counter it, including updating its conventional and nuclear warheads and increasing the size of its arsenal. South Korea has become the most important area for U.S. missile defense programs like THAAD.

China has a long list of reasons why THAAD should not be deployed in South Korea. First, THAAD hurts stability between China, the United States, and Russia. Balance and stability are still very important to these countries, as well as to the international community. The U.S. rebalancing strategy to the Asia-Pacific region has already entailed the United States deploying more and more advanced weaponry in the region. Deploying the THAAD system in South Korea would damage the credibility of China’s deterrent.

Second, if the United States establishes a missile defense system in South Korea, it restructures its alliances in Northeast Asia. South Korea used to be very wary about trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan. The possible deployment of a missile defense system would draw the three countries together through interoperation and information sharing. Missile defense might force the creation of a metaphorical bridge between Japan and South Korea.

Third, THAAD will hurt relations between China and South Korea, which have been on a good and stable track—at least since 2012. Even though the missile defense deployment is really a dispute between China and the United States, it has already caused great tension between China and South Korea.

In order to maintain effective deterrence, China will maintain a careful force posture for its nuclear warheads and delivery systems. With respect to its nuclear policy and strategy, China will continue to adhere to a self-defense posture, whereby its warheads and missiles are separated during peacetime. In terms of nuclear modernization, China will address the quality but not the number of its nuclear warheads, including the modernization of its sea-based missile systems. Though China tested its first sea-based system in October 1982, strategic submarines have only started their real mission in recent years. The PLA’s sea-based deterrent force will be further modernized and will play a key role in the nuclear self-defense strategy.

CHINA’S NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN 2025

The military’s wide use of new technologies in recent years has greatly changed the original significance of nuclear weapons. For example, the possible deployment of a prompt global strike system, hypersonic glide weapons, cyber systems, and counterspace systems makes deterrence and defense very different propositions. Years ago, researchers at the National Defense University and the Academy of Military Sciences, the two most important military think tanks in China, proposed that China should adjust its self-defense strategy in light of new conditions. They argued that if some strategic targets like the national capital or Three Gorges Dam were attacked by these new weapon systems, China could use its nuclear weapons for retaliation and still be acting in self defense. Today, this is still just a debate within academic circles.

In the near future, China will not change its basic nuclear policy since the fundamental reasons for the existing policy have not changed. The history of competition between Soviet Union and the United States has already tested the war-fighting doctrine of nuclear policy. The two countries benefited little from such a policy but wasted many precious resources. Today, the main task for the Chinese is to build up a fairly well-off society and not to spend many resources in the buildup of their armed forces. The Chinese are smart enough to learn the lessons from the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. The security environment surrounding China today is much better than any time in the past, and the relations between the nuclear states have greatly improved in recent years. All these elements in combination suggest that China will not change its nuclear policy and strategy in the near future, or even over a longer time frame.

There should be no fundamental change in the evolution of China’s nuclear deterrence in theory or in practice over the coming decade. China will not abandon its nuclear policy of NFU and nuclear strategy of self-defense by 2025. It will, however, continue to develop its nuclear capabilities and force structures so that it has a credible, lean, and efficient Rocket Force.

CONCLUSION

China’s existing nuclear philosophy will be maintained. China’s nuclear deterrence thinking comes from its classic military thought, which will be still the driving force for the theory and practice of its nuclear deterrence in the future. China’s nuclear outlook over the next ten years has six key aspects.

First, lagging behind leaves one vulnerable to attacks. One of the most important driving forces for China to acquire nuclear weapons is the 150 years of history since the 1894 Sino-Japanese War. After nearly 40 years of opening and reform, China has become the development engine of the world economy, and its political influence has also been increased. At the same time, the dispute between China and its neighboring countries over territory and islands has put China on alert to safeguard its sovereignty and integrity.

Second, China’s NFU policy is not only about maintaining moral high ground; it is also the most economical way for the country to maintain an efficient strategic force. For decades, the debate in China on this policy has been about whether the country should amend its NFU stance for nuclear weapons when new weapons come into service. These, however, are only debates over nuclear policy and strategy. China will continue its long-standing deterrence approach in the future.

Third, China’s nuclear control and disarmament policy should include new factors. China believes that the nuclear landscape in 2025 will be largely unchanged from the present, and that the world will still lack the impetus for disarmament and effective arms control. But if China’s growth maintains its current trajectory, the country’s relative power will grow vastly in the next decade. Nuclear arms control and disarmament will not be a game played by the United States and Russia alone. China might play a leading role. China might participate in the bilateral and multilateral dialogues with the United States and Russia on nuclear arms control and disarmament for the security and safety of the all countries.

Fourth, the Rocket Force of 2025 will be in a good shape, and its capability will be increased. On September 3, 2015, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced a size reduction of the PLA and also started a new round of military reform. According to this plan, the PLA’s strategic force changed its name from the Second Artillery Force to the Rocket Force. And in the coming ten years, the Rocket Force will be restructured in several ways: The land-based missile and nuclear warheads will be modernized to include a new type of strategic missile that is now being put into service; and the land missile forces will also include various types of missiles with conventional warheads. In terms of the sea-based strategic forces, the PLA Navy will further improve both its system for command, control, communications, and intelligence and also its bases, both in northern and southern parts of China.

Fifth, several other areas will be addressed. By 2025, China will have a streamlined and effective strategic force with both nuclear and conventional capabilities. The main steps toward this force include raising the level of information technology in weaponry and equipment systems; building an agile and efficient operational command-and-control system; increasing capabilities for land-based strategic nuclear counterstrikes and precision strikes with conventional missiles; improving battlefield systems and associated logistics; increasing the cost-effectiveness of integrated support; reforming training to harness scientific and technological achievements; strengthening safety management and control mechanisms for nuclear missiles; and improving the relevant rules, regulations, and technical prevention measures as well as emergency steps for handling nuclear accidents.9

Sixth and finally, China’s self-defense strategy will become much clearer to the world. China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and the limited development of nuclear weapons, and it aims to build a lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. The PLA’s Rocket Force will ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons, and will also maintain a credible nuclear deterrence force for the country.

Jianqun Teng is the director of the Department for American Studies and a senior research fellow at the Chinese Institute of International Studies (CIIS). He has worked at CIIS since he was discharged from 25 years of active military service in 2004.

NOTES

1 Hu Jintao, “Work Together to Build a Safer World for All” (speech given at the United Nations Security Council’s Summit on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, New York, September 24, 2009).

2 Mary Beth Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues,” CRS Report RL34256, Congressional Research Service, April 3, 2013, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34256.pdf.

3 Jasjit Singh, Nuclear India (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), 12–13.

4 Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 72.

5 State Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense 2006(Beijing: State Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2006).

6 “Address by H.E. Yang Jiechi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China at the Conference on Disarmament,” Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, August 12, 2009, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebe/eng/zgwj/t578020.htm.

7 State Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense 2010(Beijing: State Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2010).

8 Xinhua, “China Criticizes U.S. for X-Band Radar Deployment in Kyoto,” China Daily, October 23, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014-10/23/content_18793312.htm.

9 State Information Office, China’s National Defense 2006.