SR Research
Jun 15, 2016
Reforming Ammunition Management in the Indian Army: The Pulgaon Trigger
Ammunition Management – Incident Based or Holistic Approach
The massive blaze in Central Ammunition Depot, (CAD) Pulgaon in Wardha District in Maharashtra a State in Western India on 31 May this year has once again brought to limelight necessity for accident free management of ammunition in the Indian Armed Forces. The focus has been mainly on flaws in storage of ammunition; however detailed review of the accident now that adequate information is available denotes necessity for a systems approach with a view to holistic ammunition management in the armed forces and more particularly the Indian Army.
The importance of ammunition management is evident as armed forces annual procurement of munitions varies between Rs 15,000 to Rs 20,000 Crore or US $ 3 Billion each year. Losses impinge on the costs of acquisition thus ammunition well managed is money saved as well.
Ideally the Comptroller and Auditor General of India Report on Ammunition Management in Army for year ended 2013 No. PA 19 of 2015 (Referred to hereafter as CAG Report 2015) should have acted as a trigger for reforms in ammunition management. However, possibly as the report was released just prior to the Pulgaon incident as also since crisis appears to be the best forcing function for reform in India, the blaze in CAD can lead to larger reforms.
Suffice to say the subject head of the CAG Report 2015 is misleading. While the Performance Audit has been carried out of ammunition management in the Army, the remedial measures required involve many agencies ranging from the Ministry of Defence Department of Defence Production, Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and Director General Quality Assurance (DGQA) amongst others. CAG Report 2015 would reveal that the Ministry of Finance is also a key agency for provision of budget for requirements for ammunition with a persistent shortfall over the years. Future CAG reports on defence hopefully overcome this anachronism which will result in fixing responsibility.
The Pulgaon Incident and SOPs
Preliminary reports of the CAD Pulgaon blaze reveals, disposal has been the main issue and not flawed storage. Lack of timely instructions for clearance of defective mines in the Depot led to the blaze which killed 16 brave hearts including two senior army officers and several firemen who valiantly fought the fire to prevent spreading to other sheds which had high value serviceable ammunition.
While in terms of precious human lives the losses are irreplaceable, this in turn prevented the loss to serviceable munitions in other sheds. Even though in cases of ammunition accidents the first finger is raised on non observation of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), it should be noted that the system of ammunition storing, movement etc in Indian ammunition depots is very evolved over many decades and perfected to the extent feasible, Murphy’s Law notwithstanding.
Non adherence of SOP may occur in smaller depots or munitions dumps. In large depots SOPs are well taped up or the Commandants job is on the block. SOPs could also be violated during transit due to inadequate safety standards in transportation.
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) Centre for Environment and Explosive Safety (CFEES) is the body which prescribes norms for storage of explosives, based on Storage, Transport and Explosive Committee (STEC) Regulations and UN classification.
Ammunition storage as per this classification is undertaken not only in Ammunition Depots managed by the Director General of Ordnance Services (DGOS) but also units in the Army. Each unit has experienced and qualified Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) who are under the supervision of commissioned officers for storage and management of ammunitions.
The main problem however comes in terms of storage space. While CFEES rules state that ammunition cannot be stored in temporary accommodation frequently permanent accommodation is deficient thus the CAG Report 2015 has observed that Indian Army was holding 18 per cent ammunition in Temporary Accommodation as of 31 March 2013. In many cases temporary storage is also an outcome of the lack of effective turnover and disposal.
There could also be deficiencies in fire fighting systems, personnel and so on which could impact the readiness levels for management of fire. CAG Report 2015 has indicated that depots were functioning with inadequate fire fighting equipment. In the CAD Pulgaon case the brave fire fighting teams show that whatever may have been the deficits, there was a high degree of dedication and motivation to risk lives in conduct of their duty which needs to be highly commended.
Problem of Unserviceable Ammunition and Disposal
The storage at CAD Pulgaon was in permanent shelters; however as it appears lack of disposal of unserviceable ammunition has been a major cause of fire as highlighted by Indian Express report of 04 June which covers details of the incident.
The Express report states, “On the day of the fire in Pulgaon, the defective ammunition that triggered the blast was earmarked as “segregated” and kept separately in Shed 192 that stored a total of 22,000 ND Mark-1 anti-tank mines weighing 330 metric tonnes (MT)”. The Report further states, ““These ND Mark-1 mines had been reported for TNT ‘exudation’, which means TNT was leaking out from these mines”.
The CAG Report 2015 has observed that 17.5 per cent of total quantity of ammunition held was lying in segregated, repairable and unserviceable condition in March 2013.
The responsibility of the disposal is that of the DGOS and Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) which carries out repairs. There was a need for immediate disposal of the mines which were reported for TNT exudation in CAD Pulgaon making these extremely sensitive to high temperatures. Was there a laxity in disposal and if so who is to be blamed for the same needs investigation? Did the Commandant CAD Pulgaon raise the issue and to what level needs to be determined as responsibility for the same has to be fixed, which may be the logical outcome of the investigations apart from investigating the fire at the spot.
As CADs commanded by very senior Ordnance Corps officers of the rank of Brigadier, these need to be vested with powers to destroy ammunition which is not disposed off up to a certain time if the same is highly sensitive such as with TNT content and is not accepted by the OFB for repairs and destruction.
Sabotage and Other Causes
Another major cause for fire in large ammunition depots such as CAD Pulgaon could be sabotage – this needs detailed investigation and the inquiry is expected to go into the same. On the face of it sabotage should never be ruled out, as all organisations have their bad eggs that could be subverted by the enemy.
In North India fire in ammunition depots also spreads due to, “Sarkanda,” or elephant grass that pocks depots and which in the summer is highly inflammable. Clearance of Sarkanda is a major task for depot managers and hopefully automation and chemical spraying is being carried out to restrict growth and reduce chances of fire in such cases.
CAG Report 2015 and Reforming Ammunition Management System
While the CAD Pulgaon incident may lead to better management of repairable ammunition in the future and other deficiencies that are revealed in the Inquiry, the CAG Report 2015 has also outlined some of the major grey areas in ammunition management which need to be considered for holistic management of ammunition in the armed forces. These are as follows:-
Shortage of ammunition - CAG Report 2015 reveals that of the War Wastage Reserve scales of 40 (I) days, based on which Annual Provisioning of ammunition was carried out by DGOS, indent for procurement of ammunition by AHQ was placed on the basis of ‘Bottom Line’ or ‘Minimum Acceptable Risk Level’ (MARL) requirements which averaged to 20 (I) days due to budgetary constraints, and inadequate production capacity with OFB. Stocking at MARL was also not ensured with availability of ammunition in March 2013 below the MARL in respect of 125 out of a total of 170 types of ammunition (74 per cent). In com cases critical ammunition was available for less than 10 days (I). Clearly this situation cannot be accepted.
Non fructification of procurement orders placed on OFB – While a five year Roll on Indent on OFB was placed by the Indian Army after discussion with various agencies including the OFB, projections of funds for the Ordnance Factories was below the targets fixed thus the required ammunition could not be supplied to the Army.
Delay in finalization of imports – Procurement of imports through the capital and revenue routes continued to be slow as, “no procurement of ammunition took place against the nine items initiated for procurement through capital route during the period 2008-2013 due to single vendor situation, complexities in TOT, delay in finalization of GSQR, etc”. In the case of revenue procurements these were as low as 20 percent.
Deficiencies in Quality Control and Quality Assurance Systems- The main challenge here is the inadequate checks in quality by the Ordnance Factories, which include, “check of input material, inter-stage and final product”. Poor quality control at the initial stage only adds to the cycle of unserviceable ammunition, segregation and accidents where speedy disposal is not obtained as in the CAD Pulgaon case.
Inadequacies in supply chain management and depot activities - CAG Report 2015 highlights the inadequacies in movement of ammunition to include delays, non accounting, and transportation of explosives in non specified vans and so on.
Recommendations for Transforming Ammunition Management
CAG Report 2015 has outlined key recommendations in reforming ammunition management for the Army; many of these are seen as basic issues which need attention at the appropriate levels to overcome the shortcomings outlined hitherto fore. The recommendations given in the CAG Report 2015 are pragmatic and if undertaken would lead to not only making up the deficiencies in numbers but also quality and upkeep of munitions. These essentially involve putting into place realistic mechanisms for assessing the ammunition requirements and projections for fulfilling the same, modernisation of factories as well as processes, ensuring accountability and fixing responsibility, improvement in quality assurance and computerised inventory management. These are summarised as follows:-
ü Ministry of Defence should evolve a realistic mechanism to ensure ammunition deficiencies are overcome and operational requirement are fully met considering the, “capacity of Ordnance Factories, availability of budget and inescapable requirement of the Army”.
ü Modernisation of Ordnance Factories to augment capacity to produce items required by Army should be undertaken on priority. There would be a requirement of allocation of additional budget to the Ordnance Factories for this purpose.
ü Accountability and responsibility has to be determined, “once production targets for factories are fixed after mutual consultation between Ministry, AHQ and OFB---for subsequent slippages”. Given the turnover of officials in the government as well as the Army there is a need for fixing responsibility each year so that those in chair at the time of occurrence of deficits are held accountable in person. Similar action has been recommended for agencies in the procurement process to ensure, “strict adherence to timelines for procurement as per DPP/DPM.”
ü GSQR should be, “framed after issue of Request for Intent/responses from potential vendors. Detailed matrix of responses vis-à-vis QRs should be prepared and must be highlighted while seeking the AON”.
ü Evolving robust framework of Quality Control and Quality Assurance
ü Urgent action should be taken on Segregated and Repairable Major (RMJ) ammunition. CAG Report 2015 states that, “DGQA should ensure that defect cases are investigated and cleared within the prescribed time frame of three months”.
ü Effective steps should be taken, “to establish environment friendly demilitarisation method for disposal of ammunition and explosives”.
ü Expediting the Computerised Inventory Control Project with a view to, “enhance visibility of assets, speedy issue and receipt,” is another recommendation as the project is overly delayed.
Ammunition Management a General Staff Function
Ammunition management is a General Staff function and cannot be left to the DGOS or the Master General of Ordnance. The General Staff today is coming into the picture when the items have reached a degree of criticality whereas the overall responsibility is to ensure effective monitoring of the procurement-production-supply chain and disposal cycle. Given significant deficiencies in the present system of management, there is a need for periodic review of the processes by the General Staff.
Conclusion
Ammunition is a critical war fighting asset. Provisioning right quantities of ammunition with a view to ensure availability at prescribed scales assumes importance. This would imply that stocking is carried out in ammunition depots as CAD Pulgaon in the given conditions of safety and environment to avoid losses. The CAG Report 2015 has underlined the flaws in the entire ammunition chain thus underlining the necessity for undertaking systemic reforms to make up very heavy deficiencies which will impact war fighting readiness of the Indian Army. Hopefully recommendations of the CAG Report 2015 are being reviewed at the appropriate level by the Ministry of Defence, the Army Headquarters, Ordnance Factory Board, the Ordnance Factories and depots to bring about accretions to ammunition management processes.
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