June 14, 2016
Afghanistan: A War of Politics, Not Policy
While U.S. efforts in Iraq and Syria to combat the Islamic State wear on, Washington’s other major war in the region is showing signs of deepening. U.S. President Barack Obama granted expanded military authority to the 9,800 U.S. troops stationed in Afghanistan on June 9. Under the new authorization, U.S. troops serving in a training and counterterrorism capacity can now join conventional Afghan security forces on the battlefield if their presence is deemed to have “strategic effect.” (Previously, U.S. troops assisted only in high-value target missions, carried out more often by Afghan elite fighting forces.) In addition, U.S. forces now have an expanded capacity to conduct limited airstrikes in support of U.S. operations.
In requesting expanded U.S. troop capabilities, Gen. John Nicholson, the new NATO commander in Afghanistan who assumed the post in March, was channeling longstanding frustrations of the U.S. military, which has felt unable to act effectively in an increasingly precarious theater of war. Still, the Pentagon made a second request that Obama did not satisfy: maintaining the current U.S. troop level at 9,800. Obama has pledged to reduce U.S. troop levels to 5,500 by the end of the year, even while the Taliban now control or contest a greater part of the country’s territory than at anytime since the war began.
Calculating the Costs
Obama’s decision is a matter of politics, not policy. It is an election year in the United States, and Obama does not want news of a troop redeployment to become a liability for his preferred successor and presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, Hillary Clinton. It is more likely that he will avoid making any such announcements until after the election is over.
Washington’s worries in Afghanistan also extend to the costs it has sunk into the war. According to a report released by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, much of the $113 billion the United States has spent in Afghanistan on development since 2001 has been squandered by corruption, waste and mismanagement. Specifically, the report cautions that a troop drawdown would have real consequences on the battlefield, threatening the few development gains that have been made.
Even after replacing its recently killed leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, with Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, the organization has sustained its insurgency. It has launched damaging attacks not only in its southern bastion of Helmand province but also in the north and other parts of the country. And though Afghan security forces are making incremental gains, it is not enough to win the conflict militarily or force the Taliban to halt fighting and come to the negotiating table.
Problems With Pakistan
The complexities surrounding the United States’ relationship with Pakistan are also intensifying, with direct repercussions on the Afghan war. Washington needs Pakistan — which shares a porous mountainous border with Afghanistan that has often been used as a haven for the Taliban and other militant groups — to cooperate in ending the conflict. Understandably, ties between the countries are paramount, but relations have often been far from steady.
Tensions were on full display when a U.S. delegation visited Islamabad on June 10, indicating the continued importance of U.S. ties with Pakistan for Washington and recognition that ties are strained. Obama adviser Richard Olson and National Security Council member Peter Lavoy led the delegation, meeting with Pakistani foreign affairs adviser Sartaj Aziz. During the meeting, Aziz reiterated the message that the drone strike that killed Mullah Mansoor, in Pakistan’s sensitive Balochistan provinceno less, violated the country’s sovereignty. Moreover, he said the act had been and will continue to be detrimental to relations.
The timing of the visit is important as well. The delegation visited the same week that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress. During his speech, Modi made a veiled reference to Pakistan, discussing the continued threat of militancy facing Washington and New Delhi. In response, Aziz repeated Pakistan’s concerns with strengthening U.S.-India ties to Olson and Lavoy.
Of course, Pakistan has limited means to make clear its displeasure with U.S. leaders and policies other than formally condemning them. But Pakistan is home to 1.5 million documented Afghan refugees, one of the largest such populations in the world. Islamabad has threatened to expel refugees in the past and could do so again, using a potential wave of destabilizing refugees to pressure Afghanistan, and thus U.S. officials, to concede on topics in discussions on ending Afghanistan’s conflict.
The politics of the war in Afghanistan will remain divided, hampering efforts at a negotiated peace settlement anytime soon. Despite disagreements, Washington is forced to deal with Islamabad since any negotiated settlement to the war will involve Pakistan, which shares in the fate of Afghan stability. The intransigence of the insurgency and the futility of peace talks are compelling Washington to consider its military options once again, though not seriously until after the 2016 elections. Meanwhile, the United States cannot ignore Pakistan or its potential threats and will continue engaging with the country diplomatically. The battle against the Islamic State has taught Washington of the dangers of withdrawing too early from combat. The Pentagon will reconsider its options, all while the war continues.
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