MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS
June 20, 2016
June 20, 2016
U.S. is no longer at war with Taliban, so Special Forces remaining in Afghanistan have to weigh every situation to decide whether striking them is justified
A U.S. Army helicopter crewman gave a 'hang ten' sign as he dangled his legs off the rear ramp of a Chinook helicopter high over northern Afghanistan in late May. The U.S. still has some 9,800 troops in Afghanistan, many of them special operations forces, but limits the circumstances in which they can fire on the Taliban. PHOTO:MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan—U.S. spy drones had no trouble spotting the Taliban fighters. There were more than 20 figures snaking through sparsely wooded hills, trying to outflank the Afghan government commandos in the village below.
In the starry darkness overhead, American helicopters loitered armed with precision-guided missiles, along with a flying gunship capable of drenching the area with cannon-fire. It would have been a hard shot to miss.
But before they could fire, the Americans knew they would have to get past the lawyers.
In the amorphous twilight of the Afghan war, it isn’t enough to draw a bead on the enemy. Before they shoot, U.S. troops have to navigate a tricky legal and political question: When is it OK for them to kill Taliban?
The operation late last month in Elbak, a flyspeck village in Kandahar province, exposed the complexity of implementing President Barack Obama’s Afghan strategy in the mud-brick villages, steep mountains and vast poppy fields where the combat takes place. With their Afghan allies walking into a possible ambush that night, U.S. commanders, monitoring video feeds and radio traffic miles from the front, had to judge whether enemy fighters who weren’t actually fighting constituted an imminent threat.
A U.S. Green Beret, center, reviewed plans with Afghan commandos before an operation in Kunduz province, in northern Afghanistan, in May. American Special Forces troops advise and assist their Afghan counterparts in the fight against Taliban insurgents. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Mr. Obama, who campaigned on a promise to extract the U.S. from its long wars, has declared an end to the American combat mission in Afghanistan and set guidelines for when the remaining 9,800 U.S. troops, many of them in elite special-operations units, may use lethal force.
U.S. troops and warplanes are free to attack militants belonging to groups that threaten the American homeland, such as al Qaeda and the local branch of Islamic State.
The rules are sketchier when it comes to the Taliban, descendants of the regime the U.S. and its allies ousted in 2001 for sheltering Osama bin Laden as he planned the Sept. 11 attacks. The U.S.-led coalition has handed the anti-Taliban campaign over to the Afghan military and police forces trained and equipped by U.S. and allied money and personnel.
“We’re not at war with the Taliban,” said one of the senior U.S. Green Berets. The U.S. military prohibits them from releasing their names.
Since 2014, American special-operations troops and aircraft have been allowed to strike the Taliban only when the insurgents present a direct threat to U.S. or allied forces, or if the Afghan government faces a catastrophic failure such as loss of a major city.
Troops up and down the chain of command, though, say that in practice the rules are mushy, open to interpretation about what constitutes justifiable violence, particularly when only Afghan soldiers are directly in harm’s way. U.S. commanders and military lawyers make seat-of-the-pants calls every day about using force against the Taliban, trying simultaneously to respect the rules, avoid killing civilians and spare their allies casualties that a quick airstrike might prevent.
The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John Nicholson, has signaled that he would like greater freedom to use American air power to bolster Afghan troops. In response, Mr. Obama ruled this month that U.S. troops and aircraft, until now limited to assisting Afghan commandos and other special units, will be allowed to provide the same aid to Afghan conventional forces, who in several places have been reeling from Taliban warm-weather attacks.
Mr. Obama also decided to allow the military a freer hand to use airstrikes to help Afghan forces conducting major offensives.
Those expanded powers mean U.S. commanders and their lawyers will have to decide even more frequently whether they can justify the use of force against Taliban fighters.
The limits have come into particular focus since a U.S. warplane, in a terrible blunder, attacked a Doctors Without Borders hospital during intense fighting in the northern city of Kunduz last year, killing 42 civilians.
A military investigation in April found that the U.S. Special Forces commander on the scene, hearing gunfire and assuming it was from the Taliban, had requested an airstrike to “soften the target” when the nearest Afghan troops were still more than 5 miles away. The investigators concluded the commander’s rationale—that the airstrike was an act of self-defense—was unjustified and violated U.S. rules of engagement. The Pentagon punished 16 service members for the incident.
Especially in volatile provinces such as Kunduz and Kandahar, the Taliban’s spiritual heartland, it is common for U.S. Special Forces either to accompany the Afghans on missions or, more often, to provide assistance. The U.S. often supplies intelligence to plan operations, helicopter airlift to carry troops to targets, aerial surveillance to warn of enemy movements and, at times, airstrikes if insurgents get the upper hand.
Afghan commandos prepared for an overnight mission at Kandahar Air Field on May 29, waiting for U.S. helicopters to carry them to an operation. The remaining American troops in Afghanistan provide assistance, but U.S. rules limit the circumstances in which they may fire on the Taliban. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Such was the plan the night of May 26, when the Green Beret team in Kandahar gave critical support as the Afghan 3rd Special Operations Battalion sought to clear insurgent fighters from Elbak.
A year ago, the government controlled the road that ran from the city of Kandahar through Elbak and north to Tarin Kowt, capital of Uruzgan province. This spring, the resurgent Taliban focused on Uruzgan and blocked passage of an 800-man Afghan army convoy trying to deliver troops and supplies to beleaguered Tarin Kowt.
The Taliban picked off troops in the convoy with roadside bombs and rifle fire, killing both the brigade commander and his deputy last month. Sometimes, the convoy crept forward a few hundred yards during the day, only to fall back at night when insurgents emerged to plant bombs in the road ahead.
The convoy stalled about 2 miles south of Elbak. Seemingly paralyzed by the loss of their commanders, Afghan soldiers neglected to seize key positions to protect the column—the high ground along the road, and the village itself, with its warren of walled compounds.
The Afghan army has 10 transport helicopters in Kandahar for special operations but only four crews to fly them. So the plan was to use U.S. helicopters to land some 80 Afghan commandos in Elbak, where they would sweep through the village, dislodge the insurgents and let the convoy resume its movement.
“We need to clear that road,” said the commander of the Afghan assault force. “For a month we haven’t been able to get supplies through to that brigade in Uruzgan.”
After sunset, the Green Berets gave the Afghan commandos a final once-over on the darkened Kandahar Air Field. “We ask you to confound the enemy and confuse him,” a U.S. military chaplain prayed with the American soldiers.
While the commandos waited, U.S. aircraft spotted Taliban close to where the helicopter pilots planned to land. The Green Berets won permission for three airstrikes to protect the inbound U.S. aircraft, their crews and the commandos. U.S. drones fired missiles that killed seven suspects and wounded others, securing the village for the Afghan commandos’ arrival.
Approaching Elbak, the helicopters raised clouds of dust as they maneuvered between hills in search of a flat place to set down. They finally landed on a narrow trail and dropped the rear ramps, spilling commandos into the unlit village.
An Afghan commando found space on the floor aboard a U.S. helicopter carrying his assault unit on a mission to clear Taliban from Elbak village in Kandahar province on the night of May 26. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Overhead, U.S. aircraft sent live video feeds to the Special Forces command post in Kandahar, a plywood-lined room where a big screen showed several views of the operation.
At 11:15 p.m., one feed revealed 15 men, small black figures that stood out against the white hillsides in an infrared image.
The Green Beret team captain radioed higher-ups—battalion staff officers and the military attorney at headquarters in Bagram Air Field—“requesting permission to engage,” a euphemism for calling in a strafing run or missile strike. “It’s easier for us to strike from here than to send the commandos to that location and get them into a potentially dangerous engagement,” he said.
Before he got a definitive response, however, the black figures disappeared into a grove of trees, some 500 yards from the advancing Afghan commandos.
At headquarters, the lawyer and officers focused on several concerns: Was there a risk that an airstrike would kill civilians? Were the men actually militants? Even if they were, did they pose a threat that made them legitimate targets on this particular night?
Soon the tiny figures emerged from the trees. As they walked, their left arms swung back and forth but their right arms were still, a sign they carried weapons.
By now the spy planes had picked out 21 people walking single file along a dry river bed. On the computer screen, the U.S. captain measured the distance from there to the commandos. Three hundred yards.
He and his team were getting edgy. Headquarters still hadn’t given a go-ahead for airstrikes. The Taliban appeared to be maneuvering around the commandos to surprise them from the rear. The U.S. captain’s Afghan allies, men he had trained for months, looked to be moments away from a firefight.
He radioed headquarters again, saying the team had confirmed the insurgents carried at least one machine gun and two assault rifles.
“They’re getting closer and closer to [the commandos’] position,” he said.
His superiors at Bagram pressed him to show that the Taliban were an imminent threat. In Kandahar, consternation grew. Headquarters had approved the earlier airstrikes without much resistance. Why was it against the rules to launch another one when the commandos faced attack?
At headquarters, the officer in charge didn’t doubt the men in the hills were insurgents. But they hadn’t demonstrated any overt hostility.
As the officers and lawyer there debated, the Taliban headed to higher ground. Just before midnight they moved into a mud-brick compound, kneeling behind walls.
The captain said since he arrived in Afghanistan in January only one of his airstrike requests had been declined, a case where he wanted to level a building used to launch rockets. By 12:15 a.m. this night, he could see another opportunity slipping away. “We’ve lost them in the trees because we waited so long,” he said.
Five minutes later, an officer at headquarters radioed for an update. The captain in Kandahar thought of a way to prove the men in the hills were hostile: If the Afghan commandos sent a small element forward—close but not too close—the insurgents might take a shot at them.
It would be a balancing act. “You never want to put the commandos at risk to loss of life, limb or eyesight,” the captain said. But pushing the men forward might allow the U.S. to hit the enemy from the air and end the encounter.
“These are all soldiers I know,” he said. “I don’t want them to walk into an enemy ambush.”
At 12:45 a.m., the U.S. Special Forces team sergeant reached the Afghan commander in Elbak by phone. “They’re trying to maneuver and set up an ambush,” the sergeant warned.
At 1 a.m., an American AC-130 arrived over Elbak to take its turn in the rotating group of aircraft providing cover in case needed. A fearsome gunship that can spray fire over an area the size of a football field, the plane also had sensors that could see the insurgents in the tree line. Now the cameras didn’t pick up any weapons, further complicating the request for an airstrike.
The Green Berets figured the Taliban, well aware U.S. aircraft weren’t allowed to attack unarmed guerrillas, had stashed their weapons in the trees when they heard the big plane overhead.
At the same time, it became apparent the Afghan commandos had no intention of advancing on the Taliban position.
“The goal was not to let the Taliban block the road,” their commander said later. “It wasn’t our goal to hunt down the Taliban.”
Still, at 1:40 a.m., he ordered his men to lob mortars at the insurgents. Twenty-five high-explosive shells arced into the copse of trees. At least 10 men scattered from the woods.
At the U.S. headquarters, an American analyst, examining the surveillance feed, spotted one insurgent carrying a machine gun and radioed the information to the Green Berets.
The Green Beret captain felt a surge of confidence an airstrike would come soon. Still, no permission was forthcoming. At headquarters, the officer in charge felt uneasy ordering an attack on men who, though armed, hadn’t fired a single shot at the commandos.
While the Green Berets waited for a ruling, the Taliban again disappeared into an overgrown spot in the hills.
“We had our chance,” the team sergeant said with dismay.
Ten minutes later, the insurgents emerged and jogged single-file up the steep hills. Now they were headed away from the commandos, not toward them. The Green Berets knew the moment had slipped away.
A U.S. Apache attack helicopter banked over Baghlan province in Afghanistan on May 26. The U.S. still has nearly 10,000 troops in Afghanistan for training and assistance but they may fire on the Taliban only in certain situations, such as when facing an imminent threat. PHOTO: MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Indeed, at headquarters the officer in charge, noting the growing distance between friendly and enemy forces, ruled out an airstrike.
At 4 a.m., U.S. helicopters collected the Afghan commandos and brought them back to Kandahar.
An hour later, the Green Beret captain, still glued to the aerial video feeds, watched the insurgents pick their way among the rocks and head down toward the village. They left a white Taliban flag flapping in the hills behind them.
The next morning, the Afghan army convoy barely budged.
The Special Forces company commander tried to see the bright side. The commando operation had interrupted the Taliban’s nightly routine of bomb-planting.
“Ever since Kunduz happened”—the airstrike on a hospital—“there are a lot more controls on everything, and justifiably so,” he said.
A week later,, U.S. helicopters again dropped Afghan commandos in the village of Elbak. This time, they stayed for more than a day, while police cleared some 18 booby-trap bombs from the road. Slowly, the relief convoy began to make its way north.
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